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Summary
The system of the carrier's liability, in respect of 
carriage of goods, is a very controversial issue which 
raises many difficulties in solving the problems thereto 
related, whether in national laws or in international 
Conventions.
The present thesis, dealing with the carrier's 
liability, consists of five chapters and final 
conclusions.
The first four chapters concentrate, theoretically, 
practically and in detail on analysing and comparing the 
liability regimes in relation to the carrier's liability 
under the Hague/Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, in 
order to ascertain which is more conducive to 
international certainty and uniformity. The Hague/Visby 
Rules and the Hamburg Rules have played a vital role in 
the international transport industry. They are
correspondingly discussed in the thesis. Chapter five is 
devoted to discussion of the liability of the multimodal 
transport operator as one of the most important parts of 
the International Multimodal Transport Convention (1980). 
The chapter also evaluates the situation when, in the 
future, the Convention comes into force.
In its structure the thesis is divided as follows; 
chapter one deals with a brief history and the scope of 
application of the Rules. The liability of the carrier
and the limitation of the carrier's liability are 
considered in chapters two and three. Chapter four deals 
with the procedures of action for lost or damaged cargo. 
The liability of the multimodal transport operator for 
loss or damage to the goods under the 1980 United Nations 
Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention is dealt with in 
chapter five.
Table of Contents
Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Summary iv
Table of abbreviations x
Table of cases xiii
Introduction 1
Chapter One 
A brief history and the scope of
application of the rules 5
1.1 A brief history of the Hague Rules, Visby 5
Rules and the Hamburg Rules
1.2 Scope of Application of the Rules 18
1.2.1 The documents governed by the Rules 20
1.2.1.1 Under the Hague Rules 20
1.2.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 28
1.2.2 The Functions of the Bill of Lading 35
A. As evidence of a contract 36
B. As a receipt for goods shipped 39
C. As a document of title to the goods. 45
1.2.3 The Voyages governed by the Rules 50
1.2.3.1 Under the Hague Rules and the
Visby Rules 50
1.2.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 57
Concluding Remarks 60
Chapter Two
The Liability of the Carrier 61
2.1 The basis of the carrier's liability and
the period of responsibility 61
2.1.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules 62
A.Exercising due diligence to make
the vessel seaworthy 62
B.Loading the cargo properly and carefully 69
C.Stowing the cargo properly and carefully 76
D.Discharging the cargo properly and carefully 83
vii
2.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 89
2.2 The burden of proof 112
2.2.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules 113
2.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 117
2.3 The immunities of the carrier 122
2.3.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules 122
A.Error in navigation or in the management
of the ship 124
B.Fire 128
C.Peril of the sea 132
2.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 136
Concluding Remarks 142
Chapter Three
The limitation of the Carrier's liability 144
3.1 The units of limitation 145
3.1.1 Under the Hague Rules 145
A.The concept of per package 146
B.The concept of per unit 150
1."The intention of the parties" test 156
2."Functional Economic" test 159
3.1.2 Under the Visby Rules 160
3.1.3 Under the Hamburg Rules 171
3.2 The unit of account 176
3.2.1 The Gold Clause basis 177
3.2.2 The Gold Franc basis 182
3.2.3 The S.D.R. basis 185
3.3 Loss of the right to limit liability 188
3.3.1 Declaration of the nature and
value of the goods 188
A.The declaration must be express 190
B.The declaration must be before shipment 192
C.The declaration must be inserted in
the bill of lading 192
3.3.2 Serious Faults 194
Concluding Remarks 2 02
Chapter Four
Procedures of action for lost or damaged cargo 2 05
4.1 Notice of loss, damage and delay in delivery 2 06
4.1.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules 2 06
4.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 209
4.2 Time limitation for suit 213
4.2.1 Under the Hague Rules and Visby Rules 214
4.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 228
4.3 Jurisdiction clauses 231
4.3.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules 2 32
4.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules 2 39
Concluding Remarks 2 44
Chapter Five
The liability of the multimodal transport operator for 
loss of or damage to the Goods under the 1980 United
Nations Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention 2 46
5.1 The background of the Convention 246
5.2 The aim and importance of the multimodal
transport of goods 256
5.3 Scope of application of the Convention and
its mandatory effect 259
5.4 The liability of the MTO for loss of or
damage to goods under the MT Convention 2 68
5.4.1 The system of liability under the MT 
Convention 2 69
5.4.2 The basis of the MTO and the period of 
responsibility under the MT Convention 2 73
5.4.3 The limitation of the MTO's liability 
under the MT Convention 2 84
5.4.3.1 The MTO's liability limit in case of 
non-localized or of localized loss or 
damage to goods 2 84
1. The MTO's liability limit in case of non­
localized loss or damage if a sea leg of 
transport is included in the multimodal 
transport 2 85
2. The MTO's liability limit in case of non­
localized loss or damage if no sea leg of 
transport is included in the multimodal 
transport 2 89
5.4.3.2 Loss of the right to limit liability 2 94
5.5 Procedures of action for lost or damaged cargo 
under the MT convention 2 98
5.5.1 Notice of loss, damage or delay in
delivery 2 98
5.5.2 Limitation of actions 304
5.5.3 Jurisdiction clauses 310
5.6 The problems of conflict between the multimodal 
transport convention and the existing unimodal 
conventions; the solution to avoid the conflict 312
Concluding Remarks 322
Final conclusions 
Bibliography
Table of conventions, reports and documents
325
336
350
XAbbreviations
A. C.
A.M.C.
Adm.
All E.R.
Am.J.Comp.Law,
Asp.M.L.C.
C.A.
C. J.
C • L • R •
Can.Sup.Ct.
Ch.
Ch.D.
C.M.I.
COGSA.
Com.Cas.
Ct.
Ct. J.
Ct. of App.
D. J.
Dist.Ct.
Div. Ct.
E.C.E
E.C.O.S.O.C.
E ■ L . D •
E.T.L.
Ex.C.R.
F. 2d.
F.C.
F.Supp.
Fed.Rep.
H.L.
H.L.R.
Law Reports, Appeal Cases. 
American Maritime Cases. 
Admiralty Court.
The All England Law Reports. 
American Journal of 
Comparative Law.
Aspinall's Maritime Cases.
Court of Appeal.
Chief Justice.
Commonwealth Law Reports. 
Canadian Supreme Court.
Law Reports, Chancery.
Chancery Division.
Comity Maritime International. 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 
Reports of Commercial Cases. 
Court.
Circuit Judge.
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
District Judge.
U.S. District Court.
Divisional Court.
Economic Commission for Europe. 
Economic and Social Council. 
European Law Digest.
European Transport Law.
Exchequer Court Reports.
Federal Reporter, Second Series. 
Federal Court Reports (Canada). 
Federal Supplement (USA) 1932. 
Federal Reporter (USA) 1880.
The House of Lords.
Harvard Law Review.
I.C.A.O.......... .........  International Civil Aviation
Organization.
I.C.C............ .........  International Chamber of
Commerce.
I.C.L.Q.......... .........  International and Comparative
Law Quarterly.
I.L.A............ .........  International Law Association.
I.M.C.O.......... .........  Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization.
I.P.G............ .........  Intergovernmental Preparatory Group
J. .........  Mr. Justice.
J.B.L. .........  The Journal of Business Law.
J.M.L.C. .........  Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce.
Jur.R. .........  The Juridical Review.
J.World Trade. .........  Journal of World Trade [Law]
from 1988.
K.B. .........  Law Reports, King's Bench.
L.C. .........  Lord Chancellor.
L.J. .........  Lord Justice.
L.Q.R. .........  The Law Quarterly Review.
L.R.Ex. .........  Law Reports Exchequer.
L.T. .........  Law Times.
L.T.(O.S.) .........  Law Times. Old Series 1843-59.
LL.L.Rep. .........  Lloyd's List Law Reports
(prior to 1950).
Lloyd's Rep. .........  Lloyd's Law Reports
(after 1950).
LMCLQ .........  Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial
Law Quarterly.
M.L.R. .........  Modern Law Review.
McGill L.J. .........  McGill Law Journal.
N.Y.Sup.2d. .........  New York Supplement (Second
Series) (U.S.).
P.C. .........  Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council.
Para. (s). .........  Paragraph(s) .
Q.B. .........  Law Reports, Queen's Bench.
Q.B.D. .........  Queen's Bench Division.
S.C.............. .........  Session Cases.
S.C.R............ .........  Supreme Court Reports (Canada).
S.D.N.Y.......... .........  Southern District of New York.
S.E.2d........... .........  South Eastern Reporter
(Second Series)(U.S.).
S.J.............. .........  Scottish Jurist; Solicitors
Journal.
S.L.T. .........  Scots Law Times.
Sch.(s) .........  Schedule(s).
Sh.App........... .........  Shaw's Scotch Appeal Cases, H.L.
Sup.Ct. .........  Supreme Court.
T.D.B. .........  Trade and Development Board.
T.L.R. .........  Times Law Reports.
Tul.L.R. .........  Tulane Law Review.
UNCTAD. .........  United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.
UNCITRAL. .........  United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law.
UNIDROIT. .........  International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law.
U.S. .........  United States Supreme Court
Reports
W.L.R. .........  Weekly Law Reports.
W.L.R. .........  World Law Review (USA).
Table of Cases
Accomac (The),(1890)63 L.T.737.
Adolf Warski (The), [1976]1 Lloyd's Rep. 107,[1976]2 
Lloyd's Rep.241.
Aegis Spirit (The), [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep. 93.
Agios Lazaros (The), [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep.47.
Aktieselskabet Olivebank V. Dansk Fabrik, [1919]2 K.B.162.
Albacora S.R.L. V. Westcott & Laurence Line Ltd, [ 19 6 6]2 
Lloyd's Rep.53.
Allan V. Patterson, 1980 S.L.T. 77.
Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. V. S.S. Navigator, (19 68) 
A.M.C.2532.
American Export Isbrandtsen V. Joe Lopez, (1976)11
E.T.L.665.
American Hoesch Inc. V. "Aubade", [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep. 423.
American Legion (The), [19 75]1 Lloyd's Rep.295.
Andros (The), [1987]1 W.L.R.1213.
Angliss & Co V. P & 0 Steam Navigation Co. (1927) 28 LI. L. 
Rep.202.
Anglo-Continental Holidays V. Typaldos Lines, (1967)2 
Lloyd's Rep. 61.
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd V. Adamastos Shipping Co. 
Ltd, [1957] 2 Q.B.233; (1957)1 Lloyd's Rep.271.
Antares (The) (Nos.1&2 )( 1987) 1 Lloyd's Rep.424, No . 2 
[1986]2 Lloyd's Rep.633.
Anticosti Shipping Co. V. Viateur St. Amand, [1959]1 
Lloyd's Rep. 352.
Arawa (The), [1980]2 Lloyd's Rep.135.
Ardennes (The), [1951]1 K.B.55.
Argonaut Navigation Company Ltd v. Ministry of Foods SS 
"Argobec", [1949]1 K.B.572.
Aron & Co. V. Sterling Navigation Co, (1976) A.M.C. 311.
Arrond Rotterdam, (1978) 13 E.T.L.483.
A/S Samelling V. Grain Importers [EJRE], Ltd, [1952]1 
Lloyd's Rep.313.
xiv
Asiatic Petroleum Co, Ltd V. Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd,
[1914]1 K.B.419.
Astri (The), (1945) A.M.C.1064.
Ballantyne & Co. V. Paton & Hendry, 1912 S.C.246.
Bamfield V. Goole, etc. Transport co, [1910]2 K.B.94.
Bank of India, Australia & China V. British India Steam 
Navigation Co. Ltd, [1909] A.C.369.
Barber V. Meyerstein, (1870) L.R.4HL 317.
"Beltana" (The), [1967] 1 LLoyd's Rep. 531.
Benarty (The), [1984]2 Lloyd's Rep. 244.
'Bischofstein'(The), [1974]1 Lloyd's Rep. 122.
Biskra (The), [1983]2 Lloyd's Rep. 59.
Blackwood Hodge (India) Private, Ltd V. Ellerman Lines Ltd, 
(1963)1 Lloyd's rep.454.
Blower V. G.W.R.Co (1872) L.R.7 C.P. 655.
Blue Wave (The), [1982]1 Lloyd's Rep.151.
Bosma V. Larsen, [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep.22.
Bradely & Sons V. Federal Steam Navigation Co, (1927) 27L1.
L.R.395.
Bramley Moore (The), [1964] P.200.
Brazil Oitica Ltd. V. M/S. Bill, (1944) A.M.C.883.
British Columbia Co. V. Nettleship, (1868)L.R.3 C.P.499.
British Columbia Telephone Co. V. Marpole Towing Ltd.
(1971)17 D.L.R.545.
Bryans V. Nix, (1839) 4 M&W.775, (150 E.R. 1634).
"Bulknes" (The), [1979]2 Lloyd's Rep.39.
Burton V. English, (1883)12 Q.B.D.218.
Buxton V. Rederi, (1939) A.M.C. 815.
Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producer V. Paterson S.S. Ltd, 
(1939)49 LI. L.Rep.421.
Canada Shipping Co. V. British Shipping Association, (1889) 
23 Q.B.D.342.
Canadian Transport Co. V. Court Line Ltd. [1940] A.C.934.
Captain Gregos (The), [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 63; [1990]1
Lloyd's Rep.310.
XV
Captain V. Far Eastern, [1979]1 Lloyd's Rep.595.
Carbon Black Export Inc V. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d, 297 
( 1958) .
Carmichael & Co. V. Liverpool S.S. Association, (1887) 19
Q.B.D.242.
Caterpillar Overseas,S.A V.S.S.Expeditor,(1963) A.M.C.1662.
Centerchem Products V. A/S Rederiet Adjell et Al, (1972) 
A.M.C. 373.
Chanda (The), [1989]2 Lloyd's Rep.494.
Charles Brown & Co. and others V. Nitrate Producers' 
Steamship Co. (1937) 58 Lloyd's Rep.188.
Charles Goodfellow Lumber Sales V. Verreault, Hovington 
and Verreault Navigation Inc, (1971) 1 Lloyd's Rep.185.
Chasca (The), (1875) L.R 4 A & E,446.
Chung Hwa Steel Products & Trading V. Glen Lines, (1935)51 
LI.L.R.248.
Citta di Messina (The), 169 F. 472 (1909 S.D.N.Y.).
Clifford Maersk, [1982]2 Lloyd's Rep.251.
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft V. Large, 1977 S.L.T.219.
Commodity Service Corp, V. Furness Withy & Co, (1964) 
A.M.C. 760.
Compania Colombiana De Seguros V. Pacific Steam Navigation, 
Co, [1965]1 Q.B.101.
Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A. V. The Oceanus Mutual 
Underwriting Association, Ltd, (The "Eurysthenes", 
[1976]2 Lloyd's Rep. 171.
Compania Naviera Vasconzada V. Churchill & Sim, [1906]
1 K.B.237.
Cosmos U.S.A. V. U.S. Lines(1983)A.M.C.1172 (N.D.Cal.1980).
Coventry Sheppard & Co. V. Larrinaga Steamship Co. Ltd, 
(1942) 73 LI. L.R. 256.
Crooks V. Allan, (1879)5 Q.B.D. 38.
C.Tennant,Son&Co. V. Norddeutscher Lloyds,(1964) A.M.C.754.
David Crystal V. Cunard S.S.Co, (1965) A.M.C.39.
De Clermont V. General Steam Nav. Co, (1891)7 T.L.R.187.
Denny Mott & Dickson, Ltd, V. Lynn Shipping Co. Ltd, 
(1963)1 Lloyd's Rep.339.
xvi
Deere & Co V. Mississippi Shipping Co (1959) A.M.C.480.
Delfin (The), (1990)1 Lloyd's Rep.252.
Derry V. Peek, (1889)14 App.Cas. 337.
"Despina R", [1977]2 Lloyd's Rep 319.
Die Deutsche Bank V. Humphrey, 272 U.S.517 (1926).
Diethelm & Co.Ltd V. Flying Trade, (1956) A.M.C.1550.
Di Ferdinando V. Simon Smits & Co. [1920] 3 K.B.409.
Domestic Insurance Co. V. Barber Line, [1970]1 Lloyd's 
Rep.49.
Dunbee Ltd V. Gilman & Co. (Australia) Pty, Ltd, [ 1968] 2 
Lloyd's Rep.394.
Dunelmia (The) President of India V. Metcalfe Shipping Co. 
Ltd, (1969)2 Lloyd's Rep.476.
East & West S.S.Co. V. Hossain Bros,[1968]2 Lloyd's 
Rep.145.
El Amria (The), [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.119.
Elder Dempster Co. V. Paterson Zochonis [1924] A.C.522;
[1923]1 K.B.420.
Eleftheria (The), [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237.
Elser, Inc V. International Harvester, (1955) A.M.C. 1929.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc V. "Hong Kong Producer" & 
Universal Marine Corp, [1969]2 Lloyd's Rep.536.
Ermua (The) V. Coutinho Caro & Co. (Canada) Ltd,(1982)1
F.C.252.
Esmerelda (The), (1988)1 Lloyd's Rep. 206.
E.T. Barwick Mills (The) V. Hellenic, (1972) A.M.C.1802. 
Eurymedon (The), [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep. 399.
Evans (J. ) & Sons (Portsmouth) Ltd V. Andrea Merzario Ltd, 
[1976]2 Lloyd's Rep.165.
Evans V. Nichol, (1841) 4 Scott's N.R. 43.
Falconbridge Nickel Mines V. Chimo Shipping Ltd,[1973]2 
Lloyd's Rep. 469.
"Farrandoc" (The), (1967) 1 Lloyd's Rep.232.
Federazione Italiana V. Mandask Compania, (1968) A.M.C.315.
Fehmarn(The),[1957]1 Lloyd's Rep.511,[1957]2Lloyd's Rep.551.
Ferro (The), [1893]P.38.
Fiskasola V. Mauritzen, 1977 S.L.T. 76.
"Folias" (The), [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep. 39.
Foreman & Ellams, Ltd V. Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd,
[192 8]2 K.B.424.
Foy & Gibson Pty Ltd V. Holyman & Son Pty. Ltd, (1946) 79
LI.L.Rep.339.
Frances Salman (The), [1975]2 Lloyd's Rep. 355.
Frank Pais (The), [1986]1 Lloyd's Rep.529.
Freedom, (The)(1869) L.R.3 P.C.594.
Freedman and Slater V. M.V. Tofevo(1963) A.M.C. 1525.
"Friso" (The) (1980)1 Lloyd's Rep.469.
Froman V. Pan American Airways Inc, (1954) 284 App.Div.935.
General Glass V. Livorno, (1977) A.M.C. 2050 (S.D.N.Y.1977)
George E.Pickett, (1948) A.M.C.453.
George Veflings Rederi A/S V. President of India (The 
Bellami), [1978J1 Lloyd's Rep. 467; [1979]1 Lloyd's
Rep.123.
J.Gerber & Co V. S.S. Sabine Howaldt & Co., (1971) A.M.C. 
539 .
Glenochil (The), [1896]P.10.
Good Friend, (1984)2 Lloyds Rep.586.
Goodwin, Ferreia & Co V. Lamport & Holt, Ltd, ( 192 9 ) 34 
Lloyd's Rep.192.
Gosse Millerd Ltd V. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
Ltd, (1927) 28 LI. L. Rep.88;(1928)32L1.L.Rep.91; [1929]
A.C.223; (1927)2 K.B.432.
Government of Ceylon V. Chandris, (1965)3 All E.R.48.
Gulf Italia V. American Export Lines, Inc (1959) A.M.C.930.
"Gundulic" (The) [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.418.
G.W. Grace & Co. Ltd V. General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, 
[1950]1 All E.R.201.
Hai Tong Bank Ltd. V. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd, [1959] A.C.576
Hall Brothers Steamship Co, Ltd V. R&W.Paul Ltd, (1914)30 
T.L.R.598.
Hamilton V. Pandorf ( 1887) 12 App. Cas 518.
xviii
Hang Fung Shipping Co. V. Mullion & Co, [1966]1 Lloyd's 
Rep.511.
Harland & Wolff V. Burns & Laird Lines, 1931 S.C. 722.
Harris v Best, Ryley & Co [1891] All E.R.567.
Harris V. Polland [1941]1 K.B. 462.
Harrower V. Hutchinson, (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B.523.
Hartford Fire Inc Co. V. Pacific Far East Line Ltd, [ 1974] 1 
Lloyd's Rep.359; (1974)A.M.C.1478 .
Heinze Horn-Marie Horn, [1970]1 Lloyd's Rep.191.
Henderson V. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris, (1873) 
L.R.5.P.C.253.
Herald & Weekly Times, Ltd V. New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd, 
(1947)80 LI. L.Rep. 596.
Herd & Co V. Krawill Machinery Corp, (1959) A.M.C.879.
Heskell V. Continental Express, (1950)83 LI.L.R.438.
Heyn V. Ocean S.S.Co., (1927) 27 T.L.R.358.
Hird V. Rea Ltd, [1939] 63 LI .L.Rep.261.
Horabin V. BOAC, [1952] 2 All E.R.1016.
Hornlinie A.C. V. Soci£t£ Nationale P^trole Aquitaine,
(1972)7 E.T.L.933.
Horst Co. V. Biddell, [1912] A.C.18.
Hugh Mack & Co. Ltd V. Burns & Laird Lines, Ltd, (1944)77
LI. L.Rep. 377.
Hunt & Winterbotham V. B.R.S.(Parcels) Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B.
617.
Hyslops V. Gordon, (1824)2 Sh.App.451.
Indussa Corp V. Ramborg, [1967]2 Lloyd's Rep. 101.
Insurance Company of North America V. S/S. Brooklyn Maru, 
[1975]2 Lloyd's Rep.512.
International Factory Sales V. S.S.Alexander Serafinnovich, 
[1975]2 Lloyd's Rep. 346.
International Packers Ltd V. Ocean Steamship Company Ltd, 
(1955)2 Lloyd's Rep.218.
Ion, [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep.541.
Isle De Panay (The)267 U.S.260 (1925).
xix
Italian (The), [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.11.
J.A.Johnston Co. Ltd V. The 'Tindefjell', [1973]2 Lloyd's
Rep.253.
John T. Ellis Ltd V. Walter T. Hinds, [1947]1 K.B.475. 
Joseph Constantine V. Imperial Smelting Co,(1942)A.C.154. 
Juno(The),[1986]1 Lloyd's Rep.190.
Kislovodsk (The), [1980]1 Lloyd's Rep. 183.
Kodros Shipping Corpn V. Empresa Cubana de Fletes, [ 1982] 2
Lloyd's Rep.307.
Kopitoff V. Wilson,(1876)1Q.B.377.
Koufos V. C. Czarnikow, Ltd,[1969]1 A.C.350.
Kranger V. Pennsylvania Rail Co, 174 F.2d.2556 (1949).
Kum V. Wah Tat Bank Ltd, (1971)1 Lloyd's Rep. 439.
Kwei Tek Chao V. British Traders & Shipper, [1954]2 Q.B. 
459; (1954)1 Lloyd's Rep. 16.
Lauro V. Dreyfus & Co, (1937)59 LI. L.R. pp.110.
Laveroni V. Drury, (1852)8 Ex.166.
Leather's Best Inc V. The "Mormaclynx" [1971] 2 Lloyd's
Rep.476, (1971)A.M.C.2383.
Leeds Shipping Co. Ltd, V. Soci6t6 Francise Bunge, [1958] 2 
Lloyd's Rep.12 7.
Leesh River Tea Co. Ltd V. British India Steam Navigation 
Co. Ltd, [1967] 2 Q.B.250.
Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. V. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.
[1915]A.C.705; [1914]1 K.B.419.
Leonis S S. Co V. Rank Ltd, [ 1908 ] 1K.B. 499.
Lickbarrow V. Mason, (1794)5 T.R. 683.
Limerick SS. Co. V. Stott & Co, [ 1921]1 K.B.568.
Lipton V. Jescott Steamers (1895)1 Com. Cas, 32.
Loeb V. S.S. Washington Mail, (1957) A.M.C.267.
London & N.W.Ry V. Ashton, [1920] AC.84.
Lord V. Newsum & Co. Ltd, [1920]1 K.B. 846.
Louis Dreyfus & Co V. Tempus Shipping Co. [1931] A.C.726.
Macfie's Judicial Factor V. Macfie, 1932 S.L.T.460.
XX
Maharani Woollen Mills Co. V. Anchor Line, (1927)29 
LI.L.Rep.169.
Makedonia (The), (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep.316.
Makefjell (The), [1976]2 Lloyd's Rep.29.
Marine Sulphur Queen,[1970]2Lloyd's Rep.285;[1973]1 Lloyd's 
Rep.88.
Marpesia (The), (1872) L.R. 4.P.C. 212.
Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. V. Canadian Government Merchant 
Marine Ltd, [1959]2 Lloyd's Rep.105.
Mcffaden V. Blue Star Line [1905]1 K.B.697.
Media (The),(1931)41 LI L.Rep. 80.
Merak (The), [1964]2 Lloyd's Rep. 527, [1965]1 All E.R. 230.
Miami Structural Iron Corp V. Cie Beige de T.M, 224 F.2d 
566 (1955).
Miliangos V. Frank (Textiles), Ltd, [1976]1 Lloyd's Rep.2 01.
Minister of Food V. Reardon Smith Line, (1951) 2 Lloyd's
Rep.265.
Mitsubishi International Corp. V. S. S. Palmetto State, 
(1963) A.M.C.958.
Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd V. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B), 
[1949] A.C.197.
Monsieur Henri Wines Ltd, V. S.S .Covadonga, (1965) 
A.M.C.740.
Mormacvega (The), [1973]1 Lloyd's Rep.267.
Morviken (The), [ 1983]1 Lloyd's Rep.l.
Moss S.S.Co. V. Whinney, (1912)A.C.254 .
Muller V. Swedish American Lines Ltd, (1955) A.M.C. 1687.
Nashiwa et al V. Matson Navigation, (1954) A.M.C. 610.
National Steam Co, Ltd v. Sociedad Anonima Comercial De 
Exportacion Y Importacion & c (1932) Com Cas.283.
Nea Agrex SA V. Baltic shipping Co. Ltd, [ 1976] 2 All E.R, 
842.
New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd V. Ocean S.S. Co, [1917] 2 
K.B.664.
New Port (The), 7 F. 2d 452 (1925).
New York Star (The),[1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep.445.
xxi
New Zealand Shipping Co.Ltd V. Lewis's Ltd,(1920) 
N.Z.L.R.243(N.Z.S.Ct.1919) .
Nichimen Co. V. N/V Farland & A/S Virgo, ( 1972 ) A.M.C. 
1573.
Nichols V. Marsland, (1876) 2 Ex.D.l.
Nieto V. Tinnum, (1959) A.M.C.2555.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha V. Ramjiban Serowgee, [1938] A.C. 429.
Norce (Dodds Shipping Ltd V.Karoli Lumber Co),
(1968JA.M.C.1524.
Norman V. Binnington, [ 1890]2 Q.B.D. 475.
Northern Assurance Co. Ltd V. M.V. Caspian Career, (1977) 
A.M.C., 421.
North Scottish Helicopters Ltd, V. United Technologies 
Corp. Inc. (no.2.) 1988 S.L.T. 778.
Nugent V. Smith, (1876) 1 C.P.D.423.
Ocean Liberty (The), [1953]1 Lloyd's Rep.38.
Ohrloff V. Briscall, (1866) L.R.1.P.C.231.
Olsen V. U.S. Shipping Co., 213 Fed.Rep.18,(1914).
Oricon Waren-Handles G.m.b.h. V. Intergraan N.V,(1967)
2 Lloyd's Rep.82.
Owners of Cargo of City of Baroda V. Hall Line, Ltd, (1926) 
42. T.L.R. 717.
Pandle & Rivett Ltd V. Ellerman Lines Ltd, (1927) 29
LI.1.Rep.133; (1927)33 Com.Cas 70.
Pandorf & Co. V. Hamilton, Fraser, & Co, (1887)16 Q.B.D. 
629.
Paterson Steamships Ltd. V. Robin Hood Mills Ltd. (1937)58 
LI. L.Rep.33.
Peel V. Price, (1815)4 Camp. 243.
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. V. Leatham 
Sons Ltd, (1915) 32 T.L.R.153.
Pennell V. U.S. Lines, (1959) A.M.C.935.
Peter Der Grosse (The), (1875)1 P.D. 414.
Peter Helms, (1938) A.M.C.1220.
Philip Holzman A.G. V. S.S. Hellenic Sunbean,( 1977)A.M.C. 
1731.
Phillips V. Edwards, (1858)3 H & N. 813.
Pia Vesta (The), [1984]1 Lloyd's Rep, 169.
Pink V. Fleming (1890) 25 Q.B.D.396.
Ponce, (1946) A.M.C. 1124.
Pyrene Co V. Scindia Steam Navigation Co, [1954]1 Lloyd's 
Rep 321, (1954)2 Q.B.D. 402.
Queen Dynamic (The),[1982]2 Lloyd's Rep.88.
R. V. Campbell, Ex parte Nomikos, [1956]2 All E.R.280.
Reardon Smith V. Ministry of Agriculture, [1962]1 Q.B.42.
Regina V. Montreal Shipping Co., (1956) Ex.C.R.280.
Renton (G.H.)& Co. Ltd V. Palmyra Trading Corporation, 
(1957)2 Lloyd’s Rep.379;[1957] A.C.149.
Riverston Meat Company Ptd. Ltd V. Lancashire Shipping 
Company, Ltd. The "Muncaster Castle", (1961)1 Lloyd's 
Rep.57.
"Roberta" (The),(1938)60 LI.L.R. 84.
Robert Dollar Co.(The) V. Blood, Holman & Co., (1920)4 LI. 
L. Rep.343.
Rodney(The)[1900]P.112.
Rose V. Plenty, [1976]1 W.L.R.141.
Rosenbruch V. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines Inc, 
[1974]1 Lloyd's Rep.119.
Rowson V. Atlantic Transport Co. Ltd. [1903]2 K.B.666.
Royal Commission on the Sugar Supply V. Hartlepools 
Seatonia S. Co, [1927]2 K.B. 419.
Royal Exchange Shipping Co.(The) V. Dixon,(1886)12 App. 
Cas.11.
Royal Typewriter V. M.V. Kulmerland, [ 1973] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep.428.
Runquist V. Ditchell, (1800)3 Esp. 64.
Russell V. Niemann, (1864)17 C.B.(N.S).163.
Rustenberg V. Pan American World Airways, Inc, [19 77]1 
Lloyd's Rep.564.
Sanders Bros V. Maclean & Co, (1883)11 Q.B.D. 327.
"Santa Malta" (The), [1967]2 Lloyd's Rep.791.
xxiii
Satya Kailash,(The) (Seven Seas Transportation Ltd V.
Pacific Union Marina), (1982)2 Lloyd's Rep. 465.
Schooner St. Johns N.F. (1923)A.M.C. 1131.
Schroeder Bros Inc V. The Saturina, (1955) A.M.C. 1935.
Schwerbach Coffee Co. V. S.S. Suriname, ( 1967) A.M.C. 604.
Scow Steelweld (The) , (1968) A.M.C.2064.
Sennar (The),[1984]2 Lloyd's Rep. 119(No. 2)[1984]2 Lloyd's 
Rep.143.
Sewell V. Burdick, (1884)10 App. Cas.74.
Shawinigan Ltd V. Vokins & Co. Ltd, [1961]2 Lloyd's Rep. 
153.
Shaw, Savil V. Electric Reductions Sales Co "The Mahia",
[1955]1 Lloyds Rep.264.
Silversandal, (1940) A.M.C.731.
Silver V. Ocean S.S. Co, Ltd, [1930]1 K.B.416.
Smith, Ltd V. Great Western Railway, Co. [1922]1 A.C.178.
Smith, Hogg & Co. Ltd V. Black Sea & Baltic General In. Co. 
Ltd, [1940] A.C.997.
Smith V. Stages, [ 1989]1 All E.R.833.
Son Shipping Co. V. De Foss & Tanghe, (1952) A.M.C. 1931.
Spanish American Skin Co. V. M.S. Ferngulf, (1957) A.M.C. 
611.
Spartus Corp V. S.S. Yafo, 590 F. 2d, 1301 (1979).
Spiliada (The), [1987]1 Lloyd's Rep.l.
Spurling Ltd, V. Bradshow, [1956]1 W.L.R. 461.
"Standale" (The), (1938) 61 LI.L.R.223.
Standard Electrica S.A. V. Hamburg Sudamerikanische, 
[1967]2 Lloyd's Rep. 193.
SS. Knutsford, Ltd V. Tillmanns & Co,[ 1908]A.C.406.
"Straat Cumberland" (The), (1973)2 Lloyd's Rep. 492.
Strohmeyer & Arpe V. American Lines S.S. Corp. (1938)A.M.C. 
875.
Studebaker Distributors Ltd V. Charlton S.S.Co. Ltd,
[1938]1 K.B.459.
Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget V. Maritime Agencies 
(Southampton), Ltd, [1953]2 All E.R.570.
xxiv
Tamini V. Salen Dry Cargo A.B, 866 F.2d 741(5th Cir. 1989).
Tempus Shipping Co. Ltd, V. Louis Dreyfus & Co, Ltd,
[1930]1 K.B.699.
"Thorsa" (The),(1916)P.257.
"Toledo" (The),(1939) A.M.C.130.
"Tolmidis" (The),(1983)1 Lloyd's Rep.530.
"Torenia" (The),[1983]2 Lloyd's Rep.210.
Torni (The), (1931) 41 LI.L.Rep.174.
Touraine (The), [1927]P.58.
Traugutt (The), [1985]1 Lloyd's Rep.76.
Trucks & Spares Ltd V. Maritime Agencies,(Southampton), 
Ltd, (1951)2 Lloyd's Rep. 345.
Tuller V. KLM, (1961) 292,F.2d.775.
Ungar V. S.S.Urola, (1946) A.M.C. 1663.
Union Castle SS Co. V. Borderdal Shipping Co., [1919]1 
K.B.612.
United Africa Co. Ltd V. Saka Owoade, [1955] A.C.130.
United Fruit, Co. V. Folger, (1959) A.M.C. 2224.
United Railways of Havana & Regia Warehouses Ltd, [1961] 
A.C.1007.
Unitramp v. Garnac Grain Co. Inc, The Hermine, [ 1978] 2 
Lloyd's Rep.37.
Varing,(The) [1931]P.79.
Vechscroon (The), [1982]1 Lloyd's Rep.301.
Vestris (The),(1932)43 Ll.L. Rep. 86.
Vishva Prabha (The), [1979]2 Lloyd's Rep. 287.
Vita Food Products V. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A.C.277;
[1939] 1 All E.R.513.
Waddle, V. Wallsend Shipping Co. Ltd,(1952)2Lloyd's Rep.105.
Walter Raleigh (The), (1952) A.M.C. 618.
Waterman S.S.Corp V. U.S.Smelting Refining & Mining, (1949) 
86 F.Supp.487.
Western Gear Corp. V. States Marine Lines Inc, (1966) 
A.M.C. 1969.
XXV
White V. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. (1874)L.R.9 Ex.67;
(1927)P.79.
Williams V. African S.S. Co. (1856)1 H. & N. 300.
Willowpool (The), (1936) A.M.C. 1852.
Wood & Salick Inc V. Companie Generale Transatique, 43F. 
ed, 941 (1930).
Wright V. Marwood,(1881)7 Q.B.D.62.
Xantho (The), (1887)12 App.Cas. 503.
Xingcheng (The), [1987]2 Lloyd's Rep.210.
Yoro (The), (1952) A.M.C.1094.
Zapata Off-shore Company V. The "Bremen" & Unterweser 
Reederei G.M.B.H. (The Chapparral), [1971J2 Lloyd's 
Rep.348, [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 315.
1Introduction
In today's world, different nations and countries 
have, through international trade, close economic and 
commercial relations with each other. Every day huge 
volumes of cargoes are sent from one part of the world to 
another. Transport appears to be one of the key factors 
in overall economic development; it will be even more 
important in the future.
Damage to cargo is a foreseeable occurrence in 
international transport. It results in unwanted loss or 
damage and expense to all participants in the transport 
industry. Carriers and cargo-owners both try to avoid 
the burden of absorbing these costs, either directly or 
through insurance. The laws of most countries originally 
made, with few exceptions, the carriers of cargo strictly 
responsible for any loss or damage to cargo entrusted to 
their care. However, when the bill of lading came into 
general use, as a receipt for goods and as a document of 
title, carriers began to insert various exception clauses 
to diminish their liability. This was the result of the 
19th century freedom to contract for the shipment of 
goods, but this situation was considered unsatisfactory. 
It removed any incentive to take care of the cargo. 
Owing to the international nature of maritime commerce, 
the problem was international in character.
2In 1924 the Brussels Convention for the unification of 
certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (commonly known 
as the Hague Rules) was adopted in an attempt to 
establish a balance between commercial risks and legal 
responsibilities between carriers and cargo-owners. 
These international rules were designed to provide a 
definite measure of protection to cargo-owners. In return 
they gave carriers some valuable exemptions from 
liability in certain circumstances.
The Hague Rules served their purpose reasonably well, 
but in the course of time, with changes in vessel design 
and communication technology, together with the increase 
in trade, certain weaknesses became apparent. These were 
dealt with by the introduction of an amended set of rules 
under a Protocol signed in 1968.1 These rules are known as 
the Visby Rules and have been in force since June 1977.
The amendments contained in the Visby Rules were few 
and not very significant, and have not gained universal 
approval. They have been regarded by many cargo owning 
countries as constituting merely a temporary expedient 
and there was a growing demand for a thorough reappraisal 
of carrier liability designed to produce a comprehensive 
code covering all aspects of the contract of carriage. 
This culminated in the drafting of a new convention, 
which was adopted at an international conference
1- There was another Protocol which followed the 1968 Visby 
amendments usually called the "Special Drawing Right 
'S.D.R.’Protocol", 1979, which came into force in 1984.See p.14 
n.2
3sponsored by the United Nations in Hamburg, in March 
1978. The Convention, known as the "Hamburg Rules", came 
into force on November 1, 1992. In respect of the 
carrier's liability the Hamburg Rules make some radical 
changes in international maritime law.
The past two decades have witnessed an explosion in 
demand for multimodal transportation. This has coincided 
with a technical revolution in the transport industry. A 
great volume of goods are moved by different modes of 
transport and by increasingly sophisticated cargo handling 
techniques. Transportation has become more complex and 
legal regimes within which it operates have become less 
predictable when the existing unimodal conventions are 
applied in cases where the goods are carried by more than 
one mode of transport and involve more than one carrier. 
Parallel to these developments in multimodal transport 
operations, a need was felt for a convention governing the 
multimodal transport of goods. This was why for many years 
there have been efforts by different bodies to provide such 
a Convention. Therefore, following the successful 
development in 1978 of the Hamburg Rules, it was possible 
in 1980, under the supervision of the United Nations, to 
conclude an International Convention on Multimodal 
Transport of Goods (not yet in force). This Convention has 
been substantially based on the Hamburg Rules. It is the 
only Convention which tackles liability and other problems 
arising in multimodal transport.
4It is to be noted that the crux of any international 
convention on the contract of carriage is the liability 
system. It will therefore be necessary to consider the main 
features of the carrier's liability under the Hague/Visby 
Rules and the Hamburg Rules with reference to relevant 
experience of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts (COGSA) of 
the United Kingdom and the United States; and the 
liability of the multimodal transport operator (MTO) under 
the International Multimodal Transport Convention (IMTC), 
considered to be one of the most important parts of this 
Convention.
The study is divided into five chapters:
Chapter One: A brief history and the scope of application
of the Rules.
Chapter Two: The liability of the carrier.
Chapter Three: The limitation of the carrier's liability.
Chapter Four: Procedures of action for lost or damaged
cargo.
Chapter Five: The liability of the multimodal transport
operator for loss of or damage to the goods 
under the 1980 United Nations Multimodal 
Transport of Goods Convention.
5Chapter One 
A Brief History and The Scope of Application of the Rules
Before discussing the scope and application of the 
Rules, it is useful to refer briefly to the historical 
background of the Hague Rules and Visby Rules in order to 
follow the evolution of what are known as the "Hamburg 
Rules".
1.1 A brief history of the Hague Rules, Visby Rules and
the Hamburg Rules
Historically, maritime law held the carrier absolutely 
liable for loss or damage to cargo during the voyage, 
whether or not such loss or damage resulted from the 
negligence of the carrier. He could only escape from this 
liability if the loss or damage was caused by an act of 
God,l the Queen's enemies,2 the inherent vice of the goods 
t h e m s e l v e s , 3 the fault of the shipper, or losses suffered 
by a general average sacrifice. Even where the loss was 
caused by one of these "common law exceptions" the carrier 
remained liable if he had been negligent or otherwise at 
fault.^ Therefore, in order to recover the value of the
Nugent V. Smith, (1876) 1 C.P.D.423 at p.444 (per James L.J); see 
also (per Cockburn C.J) at pp. 437, 438; Nichols V. Marsland. 
(1876) 2 Ex. D. 1.
2- Russell V. Niemann. (1864) 17 C.B.(N.S). 163.
3- Blower V. G.W.R.Co (1872) L.R.7 C.P. 655; Bradley V. Federal 
Steam Navigation Co. (1927) 27 Ll. L.R. 395; Albacora S.R .L. V. 
Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd, [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53.
4- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/Geneva, Report 
by the Secretariat of UNCTAD,New York,Doc.TD/B/C.4/ISL/6 
/Rev.1,(1971)par.49,p .11,hereinafter cited as "UNCTAD,
6cargo loss or damage, the cargo owner would only need to 
prove that the carrier received the goods on board the
vessel in good order and condition and prove either non­
delivery or delivery in bad order at the place o f 
discharge.1
The carrier’s liability under the common law and civil 
law codes is in theory strict liability, and the carrier 
and cargo interests generally seem to have been in
agreement that it was the responsibility of the carrier to 
carry and deliver the goods to the port of discharge in the 
same apparent order in which they were shipped or otherwise 
make good any loss suffered by the cargo owner by reason of 
any loss or damage that the goods had s u s t a i n e d .  ^ And so, 
it can be seen that a code of rules governing the carriage 
of goods by sea was being formed.
It is necessary here to refer briefly to the events 
leading to the development of the bill of lading. For so 
long as the merchants travelled with the goods, their 
particulars would be entered in a book or register which
was part of the ship's papers. But as trade developed, the
TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev. 1”; John D. Kimball, Shipowner's liability 
and the proposed revision of the Hague Rules (1975-76)7 J.M.L.C, 
217 at p.220, hereinafter cited as "Kimball"; Malcolm A. Clarke, 
Aspects of the Hague Rules, 1976, pp.118-19, hereinafter cited as 
"Clarke"; Benjamin W. Yancey, The carriage of Goods: Hague,
COGSA, Visby and Hamburg, (1983) 57 Tul.L.R.pp.1238-1239,
hereinafter cited as "Yancey"; Scrutton on Charter Parties and 
Bills of Lading, 19th ed, 1984, p.201, hereinafter cited as 
"Scrutton", 19th ed; G. Gilmore & C.L. Black, The Law of 
Admiralty, 2nd ed, 1975, p.139, hereinafter cited as "Gilmore & 
Black".
1- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev.1, par. 50, p.12; Gilmore & Black, 
p. 140.
Paul Todd, Modern Bills of Lading, 1986, p.102, hereinafter cited 
as "Todd"; Clarke, p.119; Yancey, 1238.
7merchant ceased to accompany his goods, and the necessity 
then arose for a separate document which was at first in 
the nature of a receipt for the goods and later became a 
document which embodied the terms on which the carrier 
would carry and deliver the goods at the port of
destination.^ At first these were customary terms, which 
came in time to be incorporated into the common law of 
England and the commercial codes of continental Europe. 
Thus was born the bill of lading which, in future years,
was to develop into the document of the present time with 
its special legal features. The bill of lading became, in 
the course of time, the basic shipping document, embodying 
or evidencing the contractual relationship between the 
carrier and the shipper.2 But with the growth of seaborne 
commerce and the increasing complexity of business and in 
consequence of the concern for speed, the need was felt for 
a means of transferring the title in the goods before they 
arrived at their destination. From this in turn arose the 
practice of transferring the ownership of the goods by 
endorsing the bill of lading to the buyer, and so by the 
eighteenth century, this practice was established and the 
transferable bill of lading as a document of title was in 
common u s e . 3 These early bills of lading did not contain
any clauses exempting the shipowner or carrier from
liability for loss or damage to cargo occurring during the 
voyage. However, as a result of eighteenth century
!- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev.1, note.61, p.12.
2- Ibid, para. 58, p.13.
3- Ibid; Gilmore & Black, p.140.
8judicial decisions, when the cargo interests began to take 
action against the shipowners for recovery of loss or 
damage to cargo occurring during the voyage, and to obtain 
legal rulings establishing shipowners' liability for such 
loss or damage to their goods, shipowners generally began 
seeking to counter this by including in their bills of 
lading clauses exonerating them from liability for cargo 
loss or damage and so limiting contractually the strict 
liability imposed upon them by maritime law.* Carriers 
were entitled to do this by reason of the freedom of 
contract principles expressed in both the common law and 
civil law, whereby the carrier was enjoined on the one hand 
to strict liability by maritime law, but could, on the 
other, contract out of almost all liability by 
appropriately framing the clauses in the bill of lading.2 
These rights were generally exercised, so that from a 
position where the carrier of goods by sea under contracts 
of carriage evidenced by bills of lading was virtually the 
insurer of the goods and responsible for any loss or damage 
sustained by the cargo, the situation under general 
maritime law was reversed . Instead of being absolutely 
liable irrespective of negligence, the carrier enjoyed a 
contractual exemption from liability regardless of 
negligence, and this contractual exemption became as wide 
as the carrier's bargaining position would allow.3
Ibid; Kimball, p.221.
2- Todd,p.103; Kimball, p.222; UNCTAD, TD/B/4.4/ISL/6/Rev.1, par.58,
p. 13.
2- Gilmore & Black, p.142.
9The manner in which this right of freedom of contract 
was being exercised caused serious concern among trading 
nations, because overseas commerce was developing upon 
credit and bills of lading were the medium through which 
credits financing overseas commerce were arranged. Also, 
banking interests, quite apart from cargo interests, were 
being seriously affected by this right of the shipowner to 
relieve himself of responsibility for delivering the cargo 
to its destination in sound condition or paying for any 
loss or damage that the cargo had suffered. Thus, as a 
result of the growing dissatisfaction of cargo and banking 
interests about the manner in which shipowners were (in 
their opinion) abusing the right of freedom of contract, 
legislation was demanded to remove the perceived abuse thus 
produced.^ After considerable negotiation, the demands of 
shippers for legislation was acceded to in the form of a 
compromise between the shippers and carriers. The Harter 
Act was enacted in the United States in 1893.2 Differing 
standards then existed in other countries. In the 
nineteenth century, with the growth of international trade, 
accelerated by the development of steamships, the need for 
further reform was generally felt, but shipowning countries
!- A simultaneous development took place in the United States and 
the British Dominions, whose ocean trade depended heavily on 
United Kingdom shipowners.
On the details of the Harter Act, see A. Knauth, American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th ed, 1953, p.121, hereinafter cited as 
"Knauth"; Several Commonwealth countries followed the model of 
the Harter Act. Australia passed an Act, the Sea Carriage of 
Goods Act, 1904; the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910, 
and series of acts in New Zealand in 1908, 1911 and 1912 leading 
to the New Zealand Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1922, which gave 
way eventually to the countries giving effect to legislation 
incorporating the Hague Rules.
10
feared that the re-imposition of liabilities upon their 
carriers would increase their freight charges and place
them at a disadvantage by comparison with others. They did 
not like the idea of abridging the principle of freedom of 
contract which formed a fundamental feature of their legal 
systems. It also came to be realized that any solution 
would have to be based on international agreement in order 
to be of any practical value in international trade.1 
Accordingly, in 1921, the Comity Maritime International 
(CMI) of the International Law Association (ILA) held a 
meeting at the Hague, when the views of the shipowning and 
cargo interests, in relation to proposals being put forward 
for introduction of uniform legislation world-wide, were 
discussed.^ As a result, the ILA, at the Hague, adopted a 
set of rules which had been formulated by the CMI, and 
which came to be known as the Hague Rules, 1921. But the 
Rules were not immediately adopted. ^ The Rules were
amended at the London Conference of CMI in 1922, and
followed by a diplomatic conference on maritime law which
was held in Brussels in 1922 . As a result of that 
conference, a draft convention was drawn up at Brussels in
■*■- John C. Moore, The Hamburg Rules, (1978)10 JMLC, p.2, hereinafter 
cited as "Moore", Yancey, p.1241; Gilmore & Black, p.141.
2- w.E. Astle, Shipowners' Cargo Liabilities and Immunities, 3rd ed, 
1967, pp.3-4, hereinafter cited as "Astle"; D.C. Toedt, Defining 
"package" in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, (1982) 60, Texas 
Law Review, p.964, hereinafter cited as "Toedt"; Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 18th ed, 1974, p.403, 
hereinafter cited as "Scrutton, 18th ed"; UNCTAD, TD/B/C.5/ISL/6/ 
Rev.l, par. 62, p.15.
3- "The Hague Rules were drafted in the form of a uniform Bill of 
lading in the hope that the great shipping companies would adopt 
them voluntarily and that similar enterprises would soon follow 
suit". UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev. 1, p.15; Gilmore & Black, 
p.143; Scrutton, 18th ed,p.410.
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1923, and in due course an international convention was
ultimately signed there by the most important trading
nations on 25 August 1924,1 but it did not come into force 
until 1931.2
The Hague Rules have proved remarkably successful in 
practice. Their success has been due in large measure to
the Rules being based on commercial practicality.
Subsequently, the Hague Rules have been especially 
successful in dealing with the following points:
1. The Hague Rules redressed the traditional imbalance 
which had formerly existed between the carrier and cargo 
owner as regards the risks of loss or damage occurring 
to goods. In place of exclusion clauses which exempt 
the carrier from loss or damage sustained by the cargo, 
the Rules imposed upon him a duty to use due care to put
The Rules adopted by this convention are popularly known as the 
"Hague Rules", because they were originally drafted at The Hague 
in 1921. The terms "Brussels Convention" and "Hague Rules" are 
sometimes used interchangably , to indicate those rules which 
were approved at the 1924 Conference, of the "International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills 
of Lading"; it is noteworthy that the Hague Rules embodied the 
Harter Act compromise in its main outline. See Astle, p. 3; 
Toedt, p.964; Gilmore & Black, p.143;UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev. 
1, p.14.
2- it is to be noted that the United Kingdom enacted the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) 1924 on the basis of the 1923 draft 
convention which came into force on January 1st, 1925; The 
United States acceptance came in 1936 through enactment of COGSA, 
which closely follows the Hague Rules, but modifies them 
significantly in a few areas. See, Gilmore & Black, p. 144; 
Astle, p.6, Scrutton, 18th ed, p.404, Michael J. Mustill, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, Arkiv-for-sjorett, (1972) 
Vol, II, p.685, hereinafter cited as "Mustill"; George F. 
Chandler III, A comparison of "COGSA", the Hague/Visby Rules and 
the Hamburg Rules, (1984)15 JMLC p.235, hereinafter cited as 
"Chandler"; Kimball, p.222; Joseph C. Sweeney, the UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (part 1), (1975) 7 
JMLC, p.72, hereinafter cited as "Sweeney, part 1".
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his vessel in good condition for the voyage and to care 
properly for the goods entrusted into his custody.1
2. The Hague Rules were designed to strike a compromise 
between the strict liability of the carrier under the 
common law on the one hand, and the freedom of contract 
which permitted the carrier to insert broad exceptions 
into the contract of carriage exonerating him from 
liability for loss or damage on the other. 2 in 
achieving this compromise, the Hague Rules intended "to 
standardize within certain limits the rights of every 
holder of a bill of lading against the shipowner, 
prescribing an irreducible minimum for t h e  
responsibilities and liabilities to be undertaken by the 
latter."3
3. The Hague Rules have proved successful in their 
principal objective of regulating and standardising the 
contractual relationship between the carrier and cargo 
interests by controlling the terms of bills of lading, 
and this of course is very important to the speedy 
conduct of commerce and settlement of claims.4
Clarke, p.6; Anthony Diamond, The Hague/Visby Rules, (1978)2 
LMCLQ, p.226, hereinafter cited as "Diamond".
2- David M. Sassoon & John C. Cunningham, Unjustifiable Deviation 
and the Hamburg Rules, published in the Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, p. 
167, hereinafter cited as "Sassoon & Cunningham".
3- The "Muncaster Castle", (1961) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 67 (per 
Viscount Simonds).
James J. Donovan, Existing problems under the Hague Rules and 
need for Changes in U.S. Legislation, published in the 
Speakers' papers for the Bill of Lading Conventions Conference, 
New York, November, 29/30, 1978, p.l, hereinafter cited as
"Donovan".
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4. The Hague Rules encourage quick settlement of disputes 
by providing that the carrier shall be discharged from 
all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit 
is brought within one year after delivery of the goods 
or the date when the goods should have been delivered. 1 
While the Hague Rules served ocean transport reasonably 
well for over forty years, eventually it became obvious 
that technological progress had made it necessary to amend 
the Rules to suit modern developments in transportation. 
Their ambiguities and inadequacies such as the carrier's 
"per package or unit limitation" of liability, i.e. 100 
sterling gold v a l u e ^  on the one hand, and the development 
of shipping technology such as the introduction of 
containers on the other, caused the container package 
problem to which the Hague Rules did not provide a 
solution. This led to proposed changes by the CMI, which 
became known as the "Visby a m e n d m e n t s ".3 Finally, after 
lengthy discussions^ a diplomatic conference was held in 
Brussels in May 1967 to consider the amendments, but the 
work was not completed until February 23, 19 68,5 ancj the
Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules.
5- Chandler, p.235; Joseph C. Sweeney, UNCITRAL and The Hamburg 
Rules - The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of 
Goods, (1991) 22 J.M.L.C. p.519, hereinafter cited as "Sweeney".
4- The CMI held different meetings: In 1959 (held at Rijeka); and in 
1963 (held at Stockholm); see, Diamond, p.228; Moore, p. 3; 
UNCTAD, TD/B/C.41/ISL/6/Rev.l, p.15.
5- The Brussels Protocol of amendments to the Hague Rules signed in 
February 1968. In 1979 a new diplomatic conference was held in 
Brussels. This added a protocol to the Visby Protocol, 1968,
that is, to express the amount of unit limitation of carrier
liability in terms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
"Special Drawing Right" (SDR). This protocol came into force in 
1984.
14
new Rules known as the "Visby Rules" were adopted. This 
protocol came into force on June 23, 1977.1
The 1968 Protocol amendments to the Hague Rules and the 
new provisions such as the "container clause", were few and 
not very significant, particularly in respect of the 
carrier's liability so that it appeared that the Protocol 
had failed to bring the Hague Rules up to d a t e . 2  in other 
words, despite the various amendments made to the Hague 
Rules in one form or another, it became clear that they 
could no longer hide the fact that technological 
developments had rendered those Rules outdated. It was felt 
by many countries (particularly the developing countries) 
that their interests were not sufficiently covered by the 
existing rules.3 Therefore, in order to update the Hague
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the amendments agreed 
at the convention are incorporated in the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act, 1971. This replaced the 1924 Act, and re-enacted the 
Hague Rules in their modified form. The Act came into effect in 
1977.
2- Anthony Diamond, A Legal Analysis of the Hamburg Rules, published 
in The Hamburg Rules, A one-day seminar organised by Lloyd's of 
London Press Ltd, London, 1978, p.2, hereinafter cited as 
"Diamond, The Hamburg Rules".
3- it has to be said that, there were two dissimilar sources of the 
the dissatisfaction with the Hague Rules: the traditional
maritime states and the newly independent states of the 
developing world in Asia and Africa. The dissatisfaction of the 
traditional maritime states is said to have led to the Visby 
Rules. The dissatisfaction of the developing world stemmed from 
the belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along 
with other aspects of international trade law) continued to 
impair the balance of payments position and ensured its continued 
poverty and perpetual under-development in an industrial age; 
Yancey, p.1250; Sweeney, p.520; for more details, see also, 
Sweeney, The UNCITRAL Draft Convention of Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, (part I), (1975) J.M.L.C.,69 at p.72. This Article, which
included five parts and appeared in two volumes (7 & 8) sets 
forth the development of the drafts which eventually emerged as 
the Hamburg Rules, and is the work of one of the principal 
proponents of the movement; Samir Mankabady, Comments on the 
Hamburg Rules, published in the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.30, hereinafter 
cited as "Mankabady"; Erling Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, the Hague
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Rules and their amendments, and to achieve a fairer balance 
in the allocation of risks, rights and obligations in the 
rules on liability between the carriers and shippers, 
UNCTAD decided to review the Hague Rules and to produce a 
new convention on carriage of goods by sea to replace the 
Hague/Visby Rules.1 The evidence of the need to revise the 
Hague Rules, beyond what was achieved by the Brussels 
Protocol of 1968, came from several sources. Firstly, 
there were the complaints made in response to the inquiries 
of the UNCTAD secretariat; secondly, from a study of 
standard texts and periodicals; and thirdly, there was the 
result of the analysis of the commercial and economic 
aspects and consequences, and of the analysis of the Hague 
Rules themselves.2 in the UNCTAD study, the main grounds 
for concern were identified as follows:
a. Uncertainties arising from vague and ambiguous wording
in certain areas of the Rules, which led to conflicting 
interpretations and which complicated such matters as 
the allocation of responsibility for loss or damage to 
cargo; and the burden of proof, (this being the subject 
of complaints by both carrier and cargo interests);
Rules and Marine Insurance Practice, (1981)12 J.M.L.C.299 at 
p.303, hereinafter cited as "Selvig".
UNCTAD, Report, The Economic & Commercial Implications of the
Entry into force of the Hamburg Rules & the Multimodal Transport
convention, (1987, part 1, p.7 (TD/B/C.4/315), hereinafter cited 
as "UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315"; M.J. Shah, The Revision of the Hague 
Rules on Bills of lading within the UN system - key issues, 
published in the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.9 hereinafter cited as "Shah". 
2- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/lSL/6/Rev.l, par.72, p.17.
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b. The continued retention in bills of lading of 
exoneration clauses of doubtful validity, and the 
existence of restrictive exemption and time limitation 
clauses in the terms under which cargo is deposited with 
warehouses and port authorities;
c. The unfairness of exemptions in the Hague Rules which 
are peculiar to ocean carriage, in cases where the 
liability should logically be borne by the ocean 
carrier, such as those which exempt him from liability 
in respect of the negligence of his servants and agents 
in the navigation and management of the vessel, and in 
respect of perils of the sea, etc;
d. The uncertainties caused by the interpretation of terms 
used in the Hague Rules, such as "reasonable deviation", 
"due diligence", "properly and carefully", "in any 
event", "loaded on", "discharge";
e. The ambiguities surrounding the seaworthiness of vessels 
for the carriage of goods;
f. The unit limitation of liability;
g. Manifestly unfair jurisdiction and arbitration clauses;
h. Insufficient legal protection for cargoes with special 
characteristics requiring special stowage, adequate 
ventilation, etc., and cargoes requiring deck shipment;
i. Clauses which permit carriers to divert vessels, and to 
tranship or land goods short of or beyond the port of 
destination specified in the bill of lading at the risk 
and expense of cargo owners;
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j. Clauses which entitle carriers to deliver goods into the 
custody of shore custodians on terms which make it 
almost impossible to obtain settlement of cargo claims 
from either the carrier or the warehouse.1
After considerable lengthy discussions, the UNCITRAL 
Working Group which had undertaken to review the Rules, 
produced a draft convention on carriage of goods by sea.^ 
The draft was adopted by UNCITRAL and was then submitted to 
a United Nations diplomatic conference held in Hamburg in 
March 1978. The draft convention was, with slight 
amendments, adopted by the conference and was known as the 
1978 Hamburg Rules, which came into force on November 1, 
1992 .
Lastly, it is important to mention that the form and 
structure of the Hamburg Rules are entirely different from 
those of the Hague Rules and its amendments (Visby Rules).
1- Ibid.
2- In pursuing that task, UNCITRAL had the following aims: "...the
removal of such uncertainties and ambiguities as exist and at 
establishing a balanced allocation of risks between the cargo 
owner and the carrier, with appropriate provisions concerning the 
burden of proof; in particular the following areas, among others 
should be considered for revision and amplification: a)
responsibility for cargo for the entire period it is in the 
charge or control of the carrier or his agents; b) the scheme of 
responsibilities and liabilities, and rights and immunities, 
incorporated in Articles III and IV of the convention as amended 
by the Protocol and their interaction and including the 
elimination or modification of certain exceptions to carrier's 
liability; c) burden of proof; d) jurisdiction; e) 
responsibility for deck cargoes, live animals and transhipments; 
f) extension of the period of limitation; g) definition under 
Article 1 of the convention; h) elimination of invalid clauses 
in bills of lading; i) deviations in seaworthiness and unit 
limitation of liability".
TD/B/C.4/86; TD/B/C.5/ISL/8 Annex 1; Mankabady, p.31; Shah,
p. 10.
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They introduced several substantive changes in maritime 
law. These changes will therefore be shown through our 
discussion and analysis in so far as the Rules are
concerned, especially in respect of the basis of liability, 
the limitations of liability and the "common understanding" 
attached to the convention which are deemed to be the heart 
of the Hamburg Rules.1
1.2 Scope of Application of the Rules
The scope of the Hague Rules is limited as follows:
1. The kind of contract: the Rules apply only to contracts 
of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar 
document of title. They do not apply to charter
parties as such, but if a bill of lading is issued in 
the case of a ship under a charter-party, it will be 
governed by them.
2. The class of the goods: the Rules do not apply to the
carriage of live animals^, nor to cargo which by the
contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck 
and is so carried.3
Moore, p.6.
2- There have been many explanations for the exclusion of live 
animals from the scope of the Hague Rules. It is outside the 
scope of this thesis to deal with all these explanations; See 
Mankabady, p.3 8.
3- Concerning the position of deck cargo and live animals under the 
Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules, see chapter two of this thesis 
(2.1.1 at p.62, 2.1.2 at p.89, 2.2.2 at p.117).
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3. The period of carriage: the Rules only apply from the
time of loading until the time when the goods are
discharged from the ship.l
4. The place of issue of the bill of lading: the Rules
apply to all bills of lading issued in any of the
contracting states.
In the Comity Maritime International at the Stockholm 
Conference in 1963, many delegations criticised these
limitations and proposed to expand the scope of the Rules. 
The 1968 Protocol brought certain changes to their scope. 
Moreover, the Hamburg Rules brought radical changes in that
respect. Accordingly, I will discuss the following points:
1.2.1 The documents governed by the Rules.
1.2.2 The functions of the Bill of Lading.
1.2.3 The voyages governed by the Rules.
Concerning the period of responsibility under the Hague Rules and 
the Hamburg Rules, see chapter two of this thesis (2.1.1 at p.61,
2.1.2 at p.89).
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1.2.1 The documents governed by the Rules
1.2.1.1 Under the Hague Rules
The general principle of the Hague Rules is that they 
only apply to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of 
lading, "or similar document of title".1 This means that 
there must be a contract of carriage for the Rules to 
apply.
It is necessary to mention that the Hague/Visby Rules 
make no distinction between common or public carriage and 
private carriage,2 and apply to both because the criterion 
is simply that there be a contract of carriage covered by a 
bill of lading or similar document of title.3 Furthermore, 
by virtue of Article 1(b) of the Hague Rules the contract 
of carriage is defined as meaning in the Rules "contract of 
carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar 
document of title". That definition cannot be interpreted 
to include only contracts in which a bill of lading is in
Article 1(b) of Hague Rules. The Rules will also apply if there 
is an express provision to this effect even if this agreement is 
evidenced by a non-negotiable receipt, S.l(6)(b) of COGSA 1971.
2- "'Common or public carriage' is a contract of carriage arranged 
after public offers and advertisements and is usually by liner 
bills of lading i.e. a bill of lading issued by a steamship 
company whose ships ply an advertised route on a regular 'liner' 
basis. 'Private carriage' is usually by charter-party and takes 
place when a special contract is entered into for the 
transportation of particular goods". Quoted from William Tetley, 
Marine Cargo Claims 3rd ed, 1988, pp.9-10, hereinafter cited as 
"Tetley, 3rd ed".
3- Hugh Mack & Co. Ltd V. Burns & Laird Lines. Ltd. (1944)77 Ll. 
L.Rep. 377 at p.383; Nichimen Co. V. N/V Farland & A/S Virgo.
(1972) A.M.C. 1573 (2 Cir. 1972); General Glass V. Livorno.
(1977) A.M.C. 2050 (S.D.N.Y.1977).
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fact issued, because under Article 3(3) of the Hague Rules, 
after receiving the goods, the shipper is entitled to 
demand from the carrier or master a bill of lading, and if 
the Rules are not to apply at all unless a bill of lading 
has already been issued, that provision is rendered 
meaningless.^ The term "covered by a bill of lading" is 
therefore generally interpreted as referring to all 
contracts of carriage of goods in which the shipper has the 
right to demand a bill of lading from the carrier.2 To 
such a contract the Hague Rules apply even if no bill of 
lading is in fact demanded or i s s u e d . 3 On the other hand, 
the Hague Rules do not apply even if the bill of lading has 
been issued, if the carrier has not received the goods. 
This is because the contract of carriage has not yet 
commenced.^
It should be noted that the Hague/Visby Rules apply to 
all contracts of carriage of goods by sea, except where by 
Article 6 of the Hague Rules,5 a non-negotiable receipt is
!- Anticosti Shipping Company V. Viateur St. Amand. (1959)1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 353 at p.354; Carver's Carriage by Sea, (1982)Vol.1, 13th 
ed, para.470, p.322, hereinafter cited as "Carver".
2- Harland & Wolff V. Burns & Laird Lines. 1931 S.C. 722 at p.728.
3- in Pvrene Co V. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. (1954)1 Lloyd's Rep
321 at p.329, [1954]2 Q.B.402 at pp.419-420, the criterion was 
whether a bill of loading was intended and not whether it was 
issued, Devlin J, said: "In my judgment, whenever a contract of 
carriage is concluded, and it is contemplated that a bill of 
lading will, in due course, be issued in respect of it, the
contract is from its creation "covered" by a bill of lading, and
is therefore from its inception a contract of carriage within the 
meaning of the Rules and to which the Rules apply".
4- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.114; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.13; Strohmever & Arpe 
V. American Lines S.S. Corp. (1938)A.M.C. 875.
5- Article 6 of the Hague Rules provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, a 
carrier, master or agent of the carrier and a shipper shall in 
regard to any particular goods be at liberty to enter into any
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issued in an extraordinary shipment in non-commercial 
trade.1 Thus Article 6 of the Hague/Visby Rules permits the 
issue of a non-negotiable receipt which is not subject to 
the Rules only if the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) a non-negotiable receipt (i.e. a waybill) must be 
issued and marked non-negotiable;
b) the carriage must be of particular goods, and shall not 
be contrary to public policy; and
c) ordinary commercial shipments must not be involved.2
It is important to note that the operation of the 
Hague/Visby Rules in the U.K., has been extended by Section 
1(6)(b) of COGSA 1971; the Rules are given the force of law 
in relation to "any receipt, which is a non-negotiable 
document marked as such, if the contract contained in or 
evidenced by it is a contract for the carriage of goods by
agreement in any terms as to the responsibility and liability of 
the carrier for such goods, and as to the rights and immunities 
of the carrier in respect of such goods, or his obligation as to 
seaworthiness, so far as this stipulation is not contrary to 
public policy, or the care or diligence of his servants or agents 
in regard to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, 
care and discharge of the goods carried by sea, provided that in 
this case no bill of lading has been or shall be issued and that 
the terms agreed shall be embodied in a receipt which shall be a 
non-negotiable document and shall be marked as such.Any agreement 
so entered into shall have full legal effect. Provided that this 
article shall not apply to ordinary commercial shipments made in 
the ordinary course of trade, but only to other shipments where 
the character or condition of the property to be carried or the 
circumstances, terms, and conditions under which the carriage is 
to be performed are such as reasonably to justify a special 
agreement".
1- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.11.
2- The Vechscroon. (1982)1 Lloyd's Rep. 301 at p.305; Astle, p.185; 
Anthony Diamond, The Hague/Visby Rules, published in the 
Hague/Visby Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, 
published by Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, London, 1977, p.25, 
hereinafter cited as "Diamond, The Hague/Visby Rules"; Tetley, 
3rd ed, p.945.
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sea which expressly provides that the Rules are to govern 
the contract as if the receipt were a bill of lading." 1 It 
seems that the object of this provision is to indicate the 
legal effect of a clause in a non-negotiable receipt 
expressly incorporating the Rules, rather than any attempt 
to delimit the circumstances in which the Rules will be 
applicable to such a document.2
Concerning the Rules relating to the bill of lading
issued under a charter-party, the Hague/Visby Rules do not 
apply to a charter-party, 3 "but if bills of lading are 
issued in the case of a ship under a charter-party, they
shall comply with the terms of these Rules . This
provision is supplemented by Article 1(b) of the Hague 
Rules where "contract of carriage" is defined as including 
any bill of lading "issued under or pursuant to a charter- 
party from the moment at which such bill of lading
...regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder 
of the same".5
Under the charter-party the operative document between 
the charterer and the shipowner is the charter-party, and 
the bill of lading issued to the charterer generally acts 
as a receipt when it is in the hands of the c h a r t e r e r . 6 in 
other words, when the bill of lading is still in the hands 
of the charterer, there is no "contract of carriage" within
1- Section 1(6)(b) of COGSA 1971.
2- The Vechscroon. (1982)1 Lloyd's Rep. 301.
3- Article 5 of the Hague Rules.
4- ibid (second sentence).
5- Article 1(b) of the Hague Rules.
Scrutton, 19th ed, p.417.
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the meaning of Article 1(b) of the Hague Rules, and 
therefore the shipowner is not a carrier within the meaning 
of Article 1(a) of the Hague Rules. 1 When the bill of
lading, then, is in the hands of the charterer, it is 
merely a receipt and the Rules do not apply, but when the 
bill is negotiated to a third party who is not a party to 
the charter-party, the Rules apply to the bill of lading, 
and this document ordinarily becomes the contract which 
regulates the relationship between the transferee and the 
carrier.2
This situation was summarized by Astle^ as follows:
"If the charterer be the shipper also, the charter- 
party governs his rights, but when the goods are 
transferred by endorsement4 of the bill of lading the 
rights of the endorsee or holder of the bill of lading 
will be governed by the bill of lading".
Carver points out that when a bill of lading issued 
under a charter-party is transferred to a buyer, a new 
contract appears to spring up between the carrier and the 
consignee or endorsee on the terms of the bill of lading. 
In general, the consignee then acquires the right to claim
1- Article 1(a) of the Hague Rules provides: "'Carrier' includes the 
owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage 
with a shipper".
2- TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev. l/p.53; Payne & Ivamy's, Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, 2nd ed, 1985, p.86 hereinafter cited as "Payne & Ivamy"; 
Mankabady, p.45; Norce (Dodds Shipping) Ltd V.Karoli Lumber Co.
(1968)A.M.C.1524.
3- Astle, p.41.
4- "Endorsement" means a written endorsement and transfer of the 
document, see The Delfin, (1990)1 Lloyd's Rep.252 at p.270 
(C.A.).
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for breaches of that contract before, as well as after, the 
transfer of the bill.l
Undoubtedly, where the charterer issues a bill of lading 
to a third party who endorses it back to the charterer, the 
bill of lading is a mere receipt and the Hague Rules do not 
apply.2
One can, therefore, conclude that the Rules do not apply 
as long as the bill of lading issued under the charter- 
party remains in the hand of the charterer; on the other 
hand, considering Articles 5 and 1(b) together, one can 
conclude that the Rules apply to any bill of lading issued 
under a charter-party when the bill of lading is in the 
hands of the third party holder of the bill of lading. In 
such a case, the bill of lading should expressly 
incorporate the Rules. Consequently, many countries have 
included in their Acts a provision which requires the 
parties to bills of lading governed by the Act to include 
therein an express statement that the bill of lading is to 
have effect subject to the provisions of the Hague Rules 
enacted by that Act.3 This express statement is called a 
"paramount clause" /  The paramount clause which appeared
Carver, par.496, p.349; Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd V. Karlshamns 
Olnefabriker (A/B). [1949]A.C. 197 at p.218, (Lord Porter).
2- 'The Dunelmia' President of India V. Metcalfe Shipping Co. Ltd.
(1969)2 Lloyd's Rep.476.
3- T.M.C. Asser, Choice of Law in Bills of Lading, (1974)5 JMLC, 
p.388, hereinafter cited as "Asser".
4- E.g. Section 3 British COGSA of 1924, which provides: "Every bill 
of lading or similar document of title in Great Britain or 
Northern Ireland which contains or is evidence of any contract to 
which the Rules apply shall contain an express statement that it 
is to have effect subject to the provisions of the said Rules as 
applied by this Act"; Section 13 United States COGSA of 1936.
26
in the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd. V. Adamastos
Shipping Co. Ltd..l is a clear example of the normal
paramount clause, which reads as follows:
"This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the 
provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the 
United States, approved April 16th, 1936, which shall
be deemed to be incorporated herein, and nothing 
herein contained shall be deemed a surrender by the 
carrier of any of its rights or immunities or an 
increase of any of its responsibilities and 
liabilities under said Act. If any term of this bill 
of lading be repugnant to said Act to any extent, such 
term shall be void to that extent, but not further".
It is to be mentioned that charter-parties,
occasionally, specifically invoke the Hague/Visby Rules by
means of a paramount clause; and this may have the effect
of invalidating all of the charter-party clauses which may
be contrary to the Hague/Visby Rules.2 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal in England decided in Anglo-Saxon Petroleum
Co.Ltd V. Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd.3 that the paramount
clause must be properly drafted to be upheld by the courts,
otherwise it may cause such confusion that it will not be
deemed incorporated into contracts.
1- [1957] 2 Q.B.233; (1957)1 Lloyd’s Rep. 271.
2- Tetley 3rd ed, p.38; TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/Rev.1.p.51; Article 3(8) of 
the Hague Rules provides:
"Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage 
relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or 
damage to, or in connection with goods arising from negligence, 
fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this 
Article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in 
this convention, shall be null and void and of no effect. A 
benefit of insurance clause in favour of the carrier or similar 
clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from 
liability.”
3- [1957]2 Q.B.233.; (1957)1 Lloyd’s Rep. 271.
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The incorporation of the Rules into the charter-party, 
therefore, must be explicit, i.e. by express terms. In the 
Marine Sulphur Queen.1 the United States Court of Appeals 
held that: "This mere similarity of rather common phrases
does not invoke the entirety of COGSA, including its burden 
of proof rules, [...] while par. 28, captioned 'limitation 
of liability', does provide that the owner shall have 
'privileges, rights and immunities as are contained in 
Sects. 3(6), 4 and 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act'; 
this too is not a general incorporation of COGSA, as the 
reference is limited to specific provisions of COGSA 
favourable to the owner. When a statute is incorporated by 
reference, its terms become the terms of that part of the 
charter-party, but limited incorporation does not trigger 
the entire Act". In consequence the general exception 
clauses and the terms of the charter-party applied.2
Furthermore, failure to insert in the bill of lading a 
paramount clause or the fact that it does not contain such 
a clause, does not, however, render the bill of lading void 
and the Rules will still apply.3
One can, therefore, conclude that the Hague/Visby Rules 
apply to waybills by force of law^, as well as the Rules
(1973)1 Lloyd's Rep. 88 at p.97.
2- 'The Satva Kailash' Seven Seas Transportation Ltd V. Pacifico 
Union Marina. (1982)2 Lloyd's Rep. 465 (Staughton J), affirmed at 
(1984)1 Lloyd's Rep. 588 (C.A.)
3- in Kwei Tek Chao V. British Traders & Shipper. [1954]2 Q.B. 459; 
(1954)1 Lloyd's Rep. 16, it was held that a forgery did not 
necessarily nullify a bill of lading. If the forgery corrupted 
the whole instrument, then the instrument was destroyed; but if 
it corrupted merely a part then the instrument remained alive. 
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.11.
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applying to a charter-party, when a bill of lading is
issued under the charter-party and the bill of lading
rather than the charter-party regulates the relations
between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading,
i.e., when the bill of lading is in the hands of a person 
not a party to charter-party. They also apply when the
charter-party specifically incorporates the Rules, usually 
by a paramount clause as discussed above.
1.2.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
As already noted above, the Hague Rules applied to the 
contract of carriage covered by a bill of lading or to
bills of lading issued under a charter-party but negotiated 
to a third party. This limit of applicability was because 
in the early part of this century the bill of lading was a 
unique shipping document. This view is confirmed by
Sweeney 1 where he said: "The Hague Rules had been prepared 
at a time when international trade involving ocean 
transport was financed solely through documentary credits, 
a method of procedure which began in the nineteenth century 
and reached its greatest development in the middle years of 
the twentieth". Consequently, the Hague Rules do not 
provide satisfactory solutions to the problems raised by
the use of new types of documents used in modern liner 
trade, e.g. waybills and computerised documents. In other 
words, it is not clear whether these Rules apply to liner
■*■- Joseph C. Sweeney, The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of
Goods by Sea, (1975-76) 7 JMLC, part III, p.495, hereinafter
cited as "Sweeney, part.III".
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waybills and other similar computerised documents if these 
are non-negotiable and do not expressly incorporate the 
Rules.1
The UNCTAD Working Group held its first session in 
Geneva in December 1969, and, at its ninth meeting, decided 
to discuss bills of lading in its programme.2 in 
accordance with this discussion the UNCTAD Secretariat 
prepared a report entitled "Bills of lading". This report 
was presented to the UNCTAD Working Group in its second 
session held in Geneva in February 1971. In this session 
the Working Group adopted the resolution to expand the 
coverage of new Rules to this various types of document 
used in maritime transport.3 This expansion, of course, 
would remove the problem which exists under the Hague Rules 
where it is not clear whether these Rules apply to liner 
waybills and other similar computerised documents if these
Anthony Diamond, The Division of Liability as between Ship and 
Cargo,(in so far as it affects cargo insurance) under the New 
Rules proposed by UNCITRAL (1977)1 LMCLQ, p.49, hereinafter cited 
as "Diamond, UNCITRAL"; Selvig, p.303.
Report of Working Group on International Shipping Legislation on 
its first session held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 1 
to 12 December, 1969, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/289, TD/B/C.4/64, TD/B/C.4 
ISL/4, par. 17, hereinafter cited as "UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/289, 
TD/B/C.4/64, TD/B/C.4/ISL/4"
3- Paragraph 1 of the Resolution states:
"Considers that the rules and practices concerning bills of 
lading, including those rules contained in the International 
convention for the unification of certain Rules of Law relating 
to Bills of Lading [the Brussels Convention 1924] and in the 
protocol to amend that Convention [the Brussels Protocol 1968] 
should be examined with a view to revising and amplifying the 
rules as appropriate, and that a new international convention may 
if appropriate be prepared for adoption under the auspices of the 
United Nations". UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.4/86, TD/B/C.4/ISL/8, pars
1-81; Gabriel M Wilner, Survey of the Activities of UNCTAD and 
UNCITRAL in the field of International Legislation on shipping, 
(1971)3 JMLC, p.139, hereinafter cited as "Wilner".
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are non-negotiable and do not expressly incorporate the 
Rules.1
During the discussions, therefore, on the scope of new 
Rules many proposals were presented by different 
c o u n t r i e s .  ^ Finally, they agreed that the new Rules should 
apply to "all contracts of carriage of goods by s e a "  3 ,  
including all types of maritime transport, and all types of 
documents in use in maritime transport.
As far as charter-parties are concerned, there was 
agreement that the new Rules should not be applicable. 
However, where a bill of lading is issued pursuant to a 
charter-party, the Rules will apply to the contractual 
relation between the carrier and the cargo owner under a 
bill of lading who is not himself the c h a r t e r e r .  4 These 
principles are now found in Articles 2 and 18 of the 
Hamburg Rules as follows:
Article 2 of the Rules provides:
"1. The provisions of this convention are applicable to 
all contracts of carriage by sea...
However this idea was criticised by some delegates, because they 
believed that the expansion would weaken the traditional bill of 
lading as the principal documentation in ocean transport, whereas 
some other countries supported the idea that the new convention 
should be given the broadest possible scope. Sweeney, part.Ill, 
p.497; Diamond, UNCITRAL,p.49.
2- The U.K. presented a draft as follows:
"1.These Rules shall apply to all contracts for the carriage of 
goods by sea where a bill of lading or similar document of title 
is issued.
2.These Rules shall apply to all other contracts for the carriage 
of goods by sea unless the parties have expressly agreed 
otherwise and a statement to that effect is endorsed on the 
document evidencing the contract of carriage and signed by the 
shipper.
3.These Rules shall not apply to charter-parties". Sweeney, part 
III, pp.497-498.
3- Article 2(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
Mankabady, p.45; Sweeney, part.IV, p.500.
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2 ........
3. The provisions of this convention are not applicable
to charter-parties. However, where a bill of lading 
is issued pursuant to a charter-party, the 
provisions of the Convention apply to such a bill of 
lading if it governs the relation between the 
carrier and the holder of the bill of lading, not 
being the charterer.1
4. If a contract provides for future carriage of goods
in a series of shipments during an agreed period, 
the provisions of this Convention apply to each 
shipment. However, where a shipment is made under a 
charter-party, the provisions of para.3 of this 
Article apply".
Article 18 of the Rules provides:
"Where a carrier issues a document other than a bill 
of lading to evidence the receipt of the goods to be 
carried, such a document is prima facie evidence of 
the conclusion of the contract of carriage by sea and 
the taking over by the carrier of the goods as therein 
described".
This Article is quite useful because of the increasing 
use in maritime transport of transport documents other than 
bills of lading, such as waybills. Since there are various 
types of documents within this category, the Article is 
rather general. By according to transport documents other 
than bills of lading certain important effects, not granted 
under the Hague Rules, the Hamburg Rules give increased 
legal security to shippers and carriers alike and promote 
the use of such documents. Article 2(1) of the Hamburg
1- The Hague Rules (Articles 5 and 1(b)) contain a similar 
provision, with the same effect; but the Hamburg Rules are 
perhaps clearer.
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Rules also makes it clear that even where there is no bill 
of lading, the Rules will apply, if another maritime 
document was issued, because the words "all contracts of 
carriage" cover all documents used in maritime transport 
such as a shipping receipt, a consignment note or contracts 
recorded and produced by computer or other electronic 
devices.^ Furthermore, the Hamburg Rules Convention is 
very broad, that is to say, where a non-negotiable receipt 
is issued^, none of the exceptions described in Article 6 
of the Hague Rules as extraordinary shipments not met in 
the ordinary course of trade is permitted, because Article 
29 of the Hamburg Rules disallowed all r e s e r v a t i o n s .3
One can, therefore, conclude that the Hamburg Rules by 
Articles 2(1) and 18 now have a much broader and clearer
scope of application than the Hague Rules.
It should be mentioned that the definition of the 
"contract of carriage" in Article 1(b) of the Hague Rules 
was most unsatisfactory. Therefore, the Working Group also 
attempted to define the contract of carriage by using some 
of the language which had been used as part of the
definition of carrier. The following definition was 
proposed:"5.'Contract of carriage' means a contract whereby 
the carrier agrees with the shipper to carry by sea against 
payment of freight, specified goods from one port to
! - Mankabady, p.4 4.
2- william Tetley, The Hamburg Rules - A Commentary, (1979)1 LMCLQ, 
p. 7, hereinafter cited as "Tetley, The Hamburg Rules - A
Commentary".
3- Article 29 of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"No reservations may be made to this convention".
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another where the goods are to be delivered".1 This
definition became paragraph 6 of Article 1 of the Hamburg
Rules providing that a
"'Contract of carriage by sea' means any contract 
whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of 
freight to carry goods by sea from one port to 
another; however, a contract which involves carriage 
by sea and also carriage by some other means is 
deemed to be a contract of carriage by sea for the 
purpose of this convention only in so far as it 
relates to the carriage by sea".
The phrase "from one port to another" in the Hamburg 
Rules ' definition should not be interpreted too 
restrictively. The purpose of those words is to support 
the reference to sea transport. Thus, it is believed that 
a "port" may mean also a river p o r t . 2
As to the definition of the bill of lading, it is to be 
noted that there is no definition of it under the Hague 
Rules^; Article 3 of the Hague Rules deals only with the 
contents of the bill of lading. Therefore, the fourth 
session of UNCITRAL considered the recommendations made by 
its Working Group. A great deal of discussion was given 
to the term "Bills of lading". Some representatives 
considered that the use of the term "bills of lading" might 
give rise to a misunderstanding, and various suggestions
Report of the Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/96 of 18 
November, 1974, pars.99-103 at 33, hereinafter cited as 
"U.N.Doc.A/CN.9/96"; Sweeney, part. IV, p.615.
2 - Mankabady, p.4 0.
3- The Hague Rules define only "contract of carriage". Under that 
definition a contract of carriage is one "covered by a bill of 
lading or similar documents of title". Article 1(b) of the Hague 
Rules.
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were made for modifying the designation of the subject to
be examined, such as "Bills of lading with respect to
transport by sea", "ocean bills of lading", "contracts of
international transport of goods by sea". Most of the
representatives, however, desired to retain the term "bills
of lading", because the substitution of a different term
could lead to confusion. It was therefore agreed to retain
the term "bills of lading".1 On the other hand, in order
to avoid the defect found under the Hague Rules, the
Secretary General, in his fourth report, proposed two
alternative definitions of the bill of lading.2
Consequently, after long discussions the following
definition of a bill of lading became paragraph 7 of
Article 1 of the Hamburg Rules, providing:
"'Bill of lading' means a document which evidences a 
contract of carriage by sea and the taking over or 
loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the 
carrier undertakes to deliver the goods against 
surrender of the document. A provision in the
document that the goods are to be delivered to the
Report of the United Nationas Commission on International Trade 
Law on the work of its fourth session [Geneva from 29 March to 20 
April, 1971], official Records of General Assembly, twenty-sixth 
session, supplement no.17 par. 18, U.N. Doc.A/8417; Wilner, 
p.141.
2- Draft provisions A-l."'Bill of lading' means a document which 
evidences [ the receipt of goods and] a contract for their 
carriage and by which a carrier undertakes to deliver the goods 
only to a person in possession of the document. A provision in 
the document that the goods are to be delivered to the order of a 
named person, or to bearer, constitutes such an undertaking". 
Draft provision A-2. "'bill of lading' means a document which 
evidences [ the receipt of goods and] a contract for [their] 
carriage and by which a carrier undertakes to deliver the goods 
to the order [ or assigns] of a named person or to bearer". 
Report of the Secretary General, Fourth Report on Responsibility 
of Ocean Carriers for Cargo; Bill of lading (U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.111/Wp.17 (Vols. I and II) of 13 August 1974), pars. 4- 
13 at 8-12.
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order of a named person, or to bearer constitutes
such an undertaking".
It is now clear enough that the aim of the Hamburg 
Rules, by Article 1(7) is to clarify the ambiguities 
contained in the Hague/Visby Rules^. As discussed below, 
these ambiguities may be clarified by explaining the 
functions of the bill of lading and whether the bill of 
lading is a contract or not.
Lastly, it is noteworthy that when the bill of lading 
stipulates that the goods will be carried through a series 
of shipments during an agreed period, the Hamburg Rules 
will apply to each shipment, unless the shipment is made 
under a charter-party, in which case the provisions of 
Article 2(3) of the Hamburg Rules apply.2
1.2.2 The Functions of the Bill of lading
A bill of lading is a document signed by the carrier, or 
by the master or other agent of the carrier, and issued to 
the shipper of goods after the goods have been placed on
board the vessel. In this document the goods are described 
and it is stated to which place the carrier shall bring 
them and to whom delivery shall be m a d e . 3 The bill of 
lading has however different functions depending upon the
Chandler, p.239.
Article 2(4) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Mankabady, p.41; David M. Walker, Principles of the Scottish
Private Law, (4th ed, Vol, II, 1988), p.338, hereinafter cited
as "Walker, Private Law, Vol, II"; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 
Shipping and Navigation, (4th ed, Vol 43, 1983), para. 490,
p.328, hereinafter cited as "Halsbury's Shipping & Navigation".
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principal purpose of the bill of lading which may be 
described:
A. As evidence of a contract.
Doubt has sometimes been raised whether the bill of
lading is a contract between the shipowner and the shipper,
or if it is only a piece of evidence which assists with
others to show what the contract is.l It is often said
that the bill of lading is not itself considered as a
contract of carriage, rather it is the best evidence of the
contract of carriage which can be produced. Lord Bramwell
in Sewell V. Burdick,2 states this quite clearly by saying; 
"To my mind there is no contract in it. It is a 
receipt for goods, stating the terms on which they 
were delivered to and received by the ship, and 
therefore excellent evidence of those terms, but it is 
not a contract".
The contract of carriage may be made without any writing
at all^, and therefore the issue of the bill of lading does
not necessarily mark any stage in the development of the 
contract.4
Article 1(b) of the Hague/Visby Rules states however 
that the contract of carriage applies only to a contract of
Carver, para.84, p.59.
2- (1884) 10 App. Cas, 74 at p.105; The Ardennes. [1951]1 K.B.,55,
at p.57, where Lord Goddard C.J, states: "A bill of lading is
only 'best evidence' of a contract: it is not the true
contract"; Per Lush, J, in Crooks V. Allan. (1879)5 Q.B.D. 38 at 
p.40; Moss S.S.Co. V. Whinnev. [1912]A.C.254 at p.264.
3- Harland & Wolff V. Burns & Laird Lines. 1931 S.C.722 at p.729
(Per Lord President Clyde).
4- Pvrene Co. Ltd V. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954]2 Q.B.402, at 
p.419 (Per Devlin J).
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carriage covered by a bill of lading. The use of the word 
"covered" therefore recognizes the fact that the contract 
of carriage is always concluded before the bill of lading 
is issued. The bill of lading evidences the terms of the 
contract.1
The terms of the bill of lading will then be in force 
from the inception of the contract of carriage; if it were 
otherwise the bill of lading would not be evidence of the 
contract but would be a variation of it. Moreover, it 
would be unreasonable to suppose that the parties intend 
that the terms of the contract should be changed when the 
bill of lading is issued.2 Thus it is accepted that one 
looks to the bill of lading for the terms of the contract 
of carriage which the bill of lading covers, despite the 
fact that the bill of lading may be issued several days 
after the conclusion of the c o n t r a c t . 3
Furthermore, if there is a discrepancy between the 
written terms of the contract of carriage and the terms 
included in the bill of lading, precedence will be given to 
the document creating the contract rather than to the bill 
of lading as a document evidencing it. 4
Ibid.
Ibid; Harland & Wolff Ltd V. Burns & Laird Lines Ltd. 1931 S.C. 
722, (Lord President Clyde).
3- Charles Debattista, The Bill of Lading as the contract of 
carriage, (1982)45 M.L.R. 652 at p.654; hereinafter cited as 
"Debattista".
For instance, where the contract of carriage did not contain any 
conditions which allowed the vessel to deviate from the agreed or 
customary route, then nothing could change the terms of that 
contract though such a condition was subsequently printed on a 
bill of lading. Debattista, at pp. 655,656.
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On the other hand, if there is a discrepancy between a 
bill of lading and a previous oral representation the 
latter could not alter the terms of the bill of lading! 
the oral representation would have precedence over the bill 
in determining the rights of parties. Thus, in The 
Ardennes. 2 -the plaintiff shipped a cargo of mandarin 
oranges on the defendant's ship on the basis of an oral 
promise by the defendant's agent that the cargo would be 
shipped direct from Cartagena, Spain, to London. Under a 
bill of lading issued subsequent to the loading of the 
goods the shipowners were "at liberty to carry the said 
goods to their port of destination [ . .. ] proceeding by any 
route and whether directly or indirectly to such port". 
The ship did in fact stop over at Antwerp on its way to 
London, and the delay caused by this call led to losses 
being incurred by the plaintiff, losses which he sought to 
recover in an action for breach of contract. Lord Goddard 
C.J. found for the plaintiff, holding that the bill of 
lading was not itself the contract of carriage, and oral 
evidence was admissible to prove the existence of a 
previous bargain or promise, the terms of which were at
variance with the terms contained in the bill of lading and 
could prevail over those terms.
Thus, the bill of lading is only evidence of the
contract of carriage, but it is liable to be rebutted by 
contrary evidence. Therefore it is open to the shipper to
!- Sewell V. Burdick. (1884)10 App. Cas, 74 at p.105, (Per Lord
Bramwell).
2- [1951]1 K.B.55.
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adduce even oral evidence to show that the true terms of 
the contract are not those contained in the bill of lading, 
but are to be gathered from a mate's receipt,1 shipping- 
cards^, placards, handbills® announcing the sailing of the 
ship, advice-notes, freight-notes^ or undertakings or 
warranties by the broker, or other agent of the carrier.5
B. As a Receipt for goods shipped.
The bill of lading is also a document which acknowledges 
receipt of the goods shipped by the carrier.6 The carrier 
or the master or agent of the carrier shall on demand by 
the shipper issue a bill of lading showing:
a. the leading marks necessary for the identification of 
the goods.^
b. either the number of packages or pieces, or the 
quantity, or weight, as the case may be, as furnished 
in writing by the shipper.®
c . the apparent order and condition of the goods.9
De Clermont V. General Steam Nav. Co. (1891)7 T.L.R.187.
Peel V. Price. (1815)4 Camp. 243.
Phillips V. Edwards, (1858)3 H & N. 813, Cf. Anglo-Continental 
Holidays V. Tvpaldos Lines. (1967)2 Lloyd's Rep. 61.
Lipton V. Jescott Steamers (1895)1 Com. Cas, 32.
5- Runouist V. Ditchell. (1800)3 Esp. 64.
Article 3(4) of the Hague/Visby Rules provides:
"Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the 
receipt by the carrier of the goods and therein described in 
accordance with paragraph 3 (a,b and c); Section (3) of the bill 
of lading Act, 1855; Ronald Bartle, Introduction to Shipping Law, 
1963, p.17, hereinafter cited as "Bartle"; Todd, p.14, where he 
states: "The function of the bill of lading have not altered
significantly since the 1855 Act".
7- Article 3(3) of the Hague/Visby Rules, and COGSA 1971 (schedule).
8- Ibid.
Ibid; Apparent order and condition was defined by Sir R. 
Phillimore in The Peter Per Grosse. (1875)1 P.D. 414 at p.420, as
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Such a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the 
receipt by the carrier of the quantity and the apparent 
order and condition of the goods shipped, and the ship must 
deliver the same goods as therein described. On the other 
hand, it is considered conclusive evidence when the bill of 
lading has been transferred to a third party in good 
faith. 1 The shipowner is bound by the bill of lading which 
is considered to be conclusive evidence by the contracting 
parties, unless the shipowner can prove error or fraud, or 
that the goods have not been shipped.^
The shipowner, or the master is nonetheless not bound to 
show both the number of packages and the weight. That 
means, if the number of packages is stated in the bill of 
lading, then the phrase "weight unknown" may properly be 
inserted in the bill of lading, and will have full legal 
effect. Thus, in Oricon Waren-Handels G.m.b.h V. 
Intergraan N.V..3 the bill of lading acknowledges the
meaning that "apparently, and so far as met the eye, and 
externally, they were placed in good order on board this ship"; 
this statement relates only to their apparent condition. The 
shipowner is saying in effect "I accept this case as it appears 
on the outside; I know nothing about the inside, and will be 
bound by no statement in reference to it". New Zealand Shipping 
Co.Ltd V. Lewis’s Ltd. (1920) N.Z.L.R.243(N.Z.S.Ct.l919).
Scrutton, 19th ed, p.Ill; John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, 1988, p.130, hereinafter cited as "Wilson"; Article 3(4) of 
the COGSA 1971.
Roval Commission on the Sugar Supply V. Hartlepools Seatonia S. 
Co, [1927]2 K.B. 419, where it was held, it was not enough for 
the shipowner "to give evidence from which it might be inferred 
that a mistake had been made in the bill of lading; there must be 
actual proof of a mistake to show how the discrepancy arose"; 
Goddard, J, in Lauro V. Dreyfus & Co. (1937)59 Ll. L.R. 
pp.110,117; Carver, para.106, p.77; Halsbury, Shipping & 
Navigation, para. 493, p.331.
3- (1967)2 Lloyd's Rep. 82; New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd V. Ocean
S.S. Co. [1917]2 K.B.664 at p.669 (Viscount Reading L.J); The 
Ermua V. Coutinho Caro & Co (Canada) Ltd. (1982)1 F.C 252 at 
p.257; The Esmerelda. (1988)1 Lloyd's Rep.206; However, if the
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receipt of 2000 packages of Copra Cake. A clause in it 
stated: "Contents and conditions of contents . . .
measurement . . . weight .. . unknown, any reference in this 
bill of lading to these particulars is for the purpose of 
calculating freight only". The bill of lading also stated
under the heading "Description of Goods said to weigh
Gross, 105,000 Kg..." It was held that the bill of lading 
was prima facie evidence of the number of packages shipped, 
but was no evidence whatever of their weight.
The bill of lading normally describes the condition of 
the goods by providing a general statement that the goods 
are "shipped in good order and condition". This is so 
especially when the shipper insists upon inserting such a 
statement in the bill of lading and the shipowner or his 
agent has had an opportunity to inspect the goods so 
shipped.1
It is then necessary to distinguish between the 
condition of the goods, which means their apparent or 
external condition, and the non-apparent condition when the 
skilled carrier cannot find out the condition of these 
goods. In Compania Naviera Vasconzada V. Churchill & Sim.^
carrier acknowledged both, he shold be liable for both. Spanish 
American Skin Co. V. M.S. Fernqulf. (1957) A.M.C.611.
Spartus Corp V. S.S. Yafo, 590 F. 2d, 1301 (1979), where it is
stated: "Although a bill of lading can establish prima facie that
the merchandise being shipped was in good condition, the 
'apparent good condition' clause applies only to those portions 
of the shipment which are visible and open to inspection"; The 
Isle De Panav 267 U.S, p.260 (1925); Carver, par. 110, p.82; 
Payne & Ivamy, p.79.
2- [1906]1 K.B. 237 at .245; Ponce. (1946) A.M.C. 1124, where it is
stated: "The specification in the 'shipped on board in apparent
good order and condition, contents unknown' constitutes prima
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Channell, J. states: "I think that 'condition' refers to
external and apparent condition, and 'quality' to something 
which is usually not apparent, at all event to an unskilled 
person. I think a captain is expected to notice the 
apparent condition of the goods, though not the quality".
Proof to the contrary, viz, against the value of the 
statement concerning the condition of the goods carried, 
contained on the face of the bill of lading, is not 
admissible when the bill has been transferred to a third 
party acting in good faith,! or the g00dS have not been 
inspected by the carrier at the time of loading, or the 
damage was caused by inherent vice in the goods.2
It is noteworthy that the shipper is deemed to have 
guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy of any information 
supplied by him for incorporation in the bill, and he is 
required to indemnify the carrier against all loss or 
damage arising in the event of any i n a c c u r a c i e s .3 On the 
other hand, the carrier is under no obligation to issue a 
bill containing such information unless requested to by the 
shipper*^ and, even then, he can refuse if either he has 
reasonable grounds for believing the information supplied
facie evidence that on the exterior there are no signs of 
damage".
!- The "Esmerelda 1". (1988)1 Lloyd's Rep.206 at p.208; Silver V. 
Ocean S.S. Co. Ltd. [1930]1 K.B.416 at p.425; Article 3(4) of 
COGSA 1971; Article 1(1) of the Visby Rules.
2- TD/B/C.4/ISL/6 Rev.1/p.1 at p.25.
2- Article 3(5) of the Hague/Visby Rules; however, under the Hamburg 
Rules, there is the additional provision that the shipper remains 
liable even if he has transferred the bill of lading to someone 
else (Article 17(1).
4- in practice, however, the carrier will almost always want to 
issue a bill for reasons of his own.
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to be inaccurate, or has no reasonable means of checking 
it.l Under the Hamburg Rules the situation is somewhat 
different. The carrier must insert a reservation in the 
bill of lading if:
a. he knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect certain 
inaccuracies in the bill of lading description of the 
goods taken over or loaded^, or
b. he had no reasonable means of checking such particulars. 
The reservation must specify the inaccuracies, grounds 
of suspicion or absence of reasonable means of 
checking.3
The last sentence of Article 3(3) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules deals with the same matter. However, one difference 
is that the Hamburg Rules, unlike the Hague/Visby Rules, 
require the carrier, master or carrier's agent to specify 
the grounds for suspicion as to the accuracy of the 
particulars and the absence of reasonable means of 
checking. For instance, if there are no facilities or 
possibilities of examining the weight of the cargo; this 
must be stated in the bill of lading. Another difference 
is that the Hamburg Rules regulate the insertion of 
reservations. In order for such inserted reservations to 
be effective, they must be inserted in the bill of lading 
in writing and with r e a s o n s . 4
Article 3(3) of the Hague/Visby Rules.
2- Article 16(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Ibid.
4- A.J.Waldron, The Hamburg Rules - A Boondoggle for Lawyers?, 
(1991) J.B.L. p.316, hereinafter cited as "Waldron"; it has been 
submitted that the use of the words "a reservation specifying" 
will clearly prevent the use of old terms such as "weight
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However, requiring such reservations is to the benefit 
of the carrier, who bears the burden of proof under the 
Hague/Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. In practice, 
reservations are also used nowadays.
With respect to the particulars of state and condition 
demanded, the Hamburg Rules add little to the Hague/Visby 
Rules. The carrier must include a statement of the 
"general nature of the goods"; he must include not only the 
number of packages or pieces but also the weight or their 
quantity. * All this information, it should be noted, is a 
mere reflection of information provided by the shipper. 
The carrier, therefore, is only obliged to include, from 
his own observation, a description of apparent condition of 
the goods. Otherwise, he will be "deemed to have noted on 
the bill of lading that the goods were in apparent good 
condition". 2 This provision answers the question which, 
under the Hague/Visby Rules, is sometimes uncertain.
unknown", "particulars furnished by shipper", "said to contain". 
It will also, possibly prevent a general standard form 
reservation such as "the carrier had no reasonable means of 
checking the particulars given", unless the carrier states in the 
bill of lading the reasons for no reasonable means of checking. 
See R.J.L. Thomas, A Legal Analysis of the Hamburg Rules, part 
III, p.2, published in the Hamburg Rules, A one-day seminar 
organised by Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd, London, 1978, 
hereinafter cited as "Thomas".
Article 15(1)(a) of the Hamburg Rules; whereas, the Hague/Visby 
Rules gives the carrier the option of specifying only one of 
these particulars [Art.3(3)(b)]; Waldron, p.316.
2- Article 16(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
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C. As a Document of Title to the Goods
The bill of lading is considered as a symbol of the 
right of the property in the goods shipped as specified in 
the bill.l The possession of the bill of lading is 
therefore treated as equivalent to possession of the 
g o o d s 2, and its transfer as being a symbolical delivery of 
the g o o d s . 3 The carrier is then entitled to deliver the 
goods to the consignee or any person holding the bill of 
lading, 4 that is to say, the latter is entitled, on the 
production of the bill, to delivery of the goods.5
A bill of lading is not in itself a negotiable
instrument^, but in some ways it resembles a negotiable
instrument. ^  Thus the contract which it contains is
transferred simply by delivery of the bill, without a 
separate contract for the assignment itself being 
required.®
Sanders Bros V. Maclean & Co, (1883)11 Q.B.D. 327 at p.341; 
Barber V . Meverstein. (1870) L.R.4HL 317; Halsbury's, Shipping & 
Navigation, par. 494, p.339; Walker, Private Law, Vol, II, p.341. 
Wilson, p.144; Krai V. Wah Tat Bank Ltd. (1971)1 Lloyd's Rep. 439 
at p.440.
3- Horst Co. V. Biddell. [1912] A.C.18 at p.21; Sanders V. Maclean & 
Co, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327 at p.341.
Trucks & Spares Ltd V. Maritime Agencies. (Southampton!. Ltd. 
(1951)2 Lloyd's Rep. 345; Mankabady, p.43.
5- Lord Denning in Hai Tong Bank Ltd. V. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd. 
[1959] A.C.576 at p.586, where he stated: "It is perfectly clear 
that a shipowner who delivers without production of the bill of 
lading does so at his peril"; Barber V. Meverstein. (1870) L.R. 
4HL,317.
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.220; Walker, private law, Vol, II, p.343, where 
he states "A bill of lading is not a negotiable instrument 
Stricto Sensu and the transferor's title to the bill and his 
competency to dispose of the goods therein are important factors 
in the validity of the transaction".
7- Mark S.W. Hoyle, The Law of International Trade, 2nd ed, 1985, 
p.190, hereinafter cited as "Hoyle".
®- Walker, Private Law, Vol, II, p.343; Bartle, p.34.
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When the word 'negotiable', however, is used in relation 
to a bill of lading, it merely means transferable.1 By 
mercantile usage, however, recognised by the courts, a bill 
of lading can be regarded as negotiable if it is stated 
that delivery of the goods is to be made to "order or 
assigns" of the shipper or consignee.2
The real function of the bill of lading, then, as a 
document of title to the goods, is to give the consignee a 
document which he can, to some extent, negotiate whether by 
delivery or endorsement and delivery of the bill of 
lading.3
The endorsee or transferee of the bill of lading has the 
same rights and duties which emerge from the bill. 
Therefore, he will be subject to the same liabilities as if 
the bill of lading has been made with himself, and also all 
rights of suit should be transferred to h i m . 4 
Consequently, the endorsee cannot enjoy a better title than 
the holder of the bill of lading himself, but if the 
endorser has no title, then he cannot pass o n e . 5
Kum. Supra, at p.446 (Per Lord Devlin); Lickbarrow V. Mason, 
(1794)5 T.R. 683.
2- Henderson V. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris. (1873) L.R.5.P.C.253 
at pp. 259-260 (Sir R.P. Collier); cf. Lickbarrow V. Mason. 
(1794)5 T.R. 683, where it is stated: "By the custom of 
merchants, bills of lading, expressing goods as merchandise to 
have been shipped by any person or persons to be delivered to 
order or assigns, have been, and are, at any time after such 
goods have been shipped, and before the voyage performed, for 
which they have been or are shipped, negotiable and 
transferable..."; Kum. Supra, at p.448; Scrutton, 19th ed,p.l85; 
Carver, par. 1598, p.1115.
3- Kum. Supra, at p.440.
Mankabady, p.43; Walker, Private Law, Vol.II, p.344.
Payne & Ivamy, p.81.
\
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It is to be noted that there is a document other than 
the bill of lading sometimes issued by the shipowner or his 
agent, to the shipper. This document is known as a "mate's 
receipt" which acknowledges receipt of the goods as it 
states their quantity and condition and the name of the 
owner of the goods. 1 Further, it may be given when the 
goods are in the custody of the ship but no bill of lading 
has yet been issued.2 These goods, which have been 
delivered alongside the ship at the port of loading, will 
be in the shipowner's possession and at his r i s k . 3
The mate's receipt is not however a document of title to 
the goods shipped, but is only deemed prima facie evidence 
of receiving such goods by the shipowner and giving the 
cargo-owner a right to receive a b i l l  of l a d i n g . 4  The main 
purpose, then, for issuing such a receipt is to accelerate 
the preliminary measures of issuing the bill of lading 
according to the cargo-owner's instructions.5
It may, however, be treated as a document of title, in 
some cases, by virtue of trade c u s t o m , 6 or if the
*■- Halsbury's, Shipping & Navigation, para. 500, p.337; Carver, 
par.119, p.89.
2- D.M.Day, The Law of International Trade, 1981, p.21, hereinafter 
cited as "Day".
British Columbia Co. V. Nettleship, (1868)L.R.3 C.P.499, where it 
is stated: "The defendant was liable for the loss of the
machinery, as delivery to the defendant's servants alongside the 
vessel was equivalent to a delivery on board"; Hoyle, p.201. 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha V. Ramiiban Serowqee, [1938] A.C. 429 at pp. 
445,446, (per Lord Wright); Scrutton, 19th ed, p.176; Jasper 
Ridley, The Law of the carriage of Goods by Land, Sea and Air, 
6th ed, 1982, p.115, hereinafter cited as "Ridley".
5- Walker, Private Law, Vol.II, p.351.
Kum. Supra, at p.440.
>
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contracting parties have intended to replace the bill of 
lading with a mate's receipt.^
Whatever characterization is made for the functions of 
the bill of lading, it is still considered to be an 
important and effective document in transporting sea-borne 
goods.
It is worthwhile to mention that the increased speed of 
ocean transport, fast container ships, and current payment 
and financing arrangements have led to shipment under a 
document, often called a "waybill".2 in consequence, in 
recent times, waybills have often replaced bills of lading.
What is, then, a waybill? The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) defines the term "Seawaybill" 
as:
"A non-negotiable document which evidences a contract 
for the carriage of goods by sea and the taking over 
or handing of the goods by the carrier, and by which 
the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods to the 
consignee named in the document".3
A waybill therefore performs two out of the three functions
of a bill of ladings
a) it acts as a receipt for the goods;4
Brvans V. Nix. (1839) 4 M&W.775, (150 E.R. 1634), where it is
stated: "Whether a document, similar in form to a bill of lading, 
but given by the master of a boat navigating an Inland canal, has 
the effect of such an instrument in transferring the property in 
the goods"; Evans V. Nichol, (1841) 4 Scott's N.R. 43, 3 Man & G 
614 (133 E.R. 12861).
2- John 0. Honnold, Ocean Carriers and Cargo: Clarity and Fairness - 
Hague or Hamburg? (1993)24 J.M.L.C. p.83, hereinafter cited as 
"Honnold”.
3- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.942.
4_ Todd, p.133.
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b) it provides evidence of the contract of carriage.1 
The basic difference between a waybill and a bill of lading 
is that the waybill does not constitute a negotiable 
document of title in any sensed In other words, it does 
not share the third function of a bill of lading, i.e., as 
the waybill is a wholly non-negotiable document, it cannot 
be a document of title.
One can therefore conclude that the contract of carriage 
of goods is not always evidenced by a bill of lading.3
The position under the waybill, unlike the bill of 
lading, is such that the carrier is bound to deliver the 
goods only to the consignee named in the waybill, unless he 
receives instructions to do otherwise from the named 
shipper.^
It should be mentioned that the terms and conditions of 
carriage of a waybill are usually the same as those of the 
carrier's bill of lading.5 The contents of the waybill, as 
no negotiation of the document is envisaged, can be telexed 
to the destination^, thus speeding up the receipt of the 
required information. However, despite the fact that the 
waybill is neither negotiable nor a document of title may
Wilson, p.159.
Hoyle, p.201.
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.941.
Richard Williams, Waybills and Short Form Documents: A lawyer's 
view, (1979) L.M.C.L.Q.p.308, hereinafter cited as "Williams".
5- Gordon Humphreys & Andrew Higgs, Waybills: A case of common law 
Laissez Faire in European Commerce, (1992) J.B.L.p.457,
hereinafter cited as "Humphreys & Higgs".
Wilson, p.159; Humphreys & Higgs, p.458.
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be deemed to be a major deficiency, 1 it is believed that 
the sea waybill will eventually replace the bill of lading 
as the universal contract for carriage of goods by s e a . 2
The obvious advantage of the waybill is that it avoids 
the difficulties in delivery that may result from delayed 
arrival or loss of a "document of title" .3 it would also 
help in reducing the risk of fraud presented by a bill of 
lading.^
1.2.3 The Voyages governed by the Rules
1.2.3.1 Under the Hague Rules and the Visby Rules
The concept of the voyage governed by the Hague Rules is
expressed by Article 10 of the Hague Rules providing that 
"The provision of this convention shall apply to all 
bills of lading issued in any of the contracting 
states".
This Article endeavours to widen the scope of 
application of the Rules to outward and inward voyages by 
making the Rules applicable to all bills of lading issued 
in any of the contracting states. In other words, it was 
the purpose of the Hague Rules that they should apply to 
all bills of lading anywhere in the world, thus intending 
to unify the law applicable to the carriage of goods by sea
For more details see Humphreys & Higgs, p.459; Tetley, 3rd 
ed,944.
Anthony Lloyd, The bill of lading: do we really need it?, (1989) 
L.M.C.L.Q. p.56, hereinafter cited as "Lloyd".
3- Wilson, p.159.
4- Lloyd, p.57; Humphreys & Higgs, p.461.
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under bills of lading and thereby eliminating the need for
choice of law.1 However, national legislation implementing
the Hague Rules has not always complied with this Rule.
Some contracting states only subject all outward voyages to
the Hague Rules while others apply the Rules to both inward
and outward voyages.2
Section 1 of the United Kingdom COGSA 1924 provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Rules 
shall have effect in relation to and in connection 
with carriage of goods by sea in ships carrying goods 
from any port in Great Britain or Northern Ireland to 
any other port whether in or outside Great Britain or 
Northern Ireland."
This section limited the concept of a voyage by 
providing that the Rules shall apply only to outward 
voyage. By applying only to bills of lading issued in 
Great Britain or Northern Ireland, this section has a 
narrower scope than that sought by Article 10 of the Hague 
Rules. The latter was intended to be applied to bills of 
lading issued in any of the contracting s t a t e s . 3 it is 
noteworthy that in contrast Article 13 of the United States 
COGSA 19364 has adopted the same attitude as the Hague 
Rules themselves by applying the Rules to inward and 
outward voyages.5
Asser, p.358.
2- D.C. Jackson, The Hamburg Rules and conflict of laws, published 
in The Hamburg Rules on the carriage of Goods by Sea, Edited by
Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.227, hereinafter cited as"Jackson".
2- Clarke, p.18.
4- Article 13 of the United States COGSA 1936 provides: "This act 
shall apply to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or 
from ports of the United States in foreign trade".
5- Gilmore & Black, p.130; Jackson, p.227, Schroeder Bros Inc V. The
Saturina, (1955) A.M.C. 1935.
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As already mentioned in the present Chapter, the failure 
to insert the paramount clause does not render the bill of 
lading void. A difficulty arises, however, when the 
carrier inserts in the bill of lading a clause for the 
selection of a proper law of contract other than that of 
the port of shipment. Reference here should be made to an 
important case, namely The Torni :^ an action was brought
against the shipowner for short delivery and damage in 
consignment of oranges shipped from Jaffa in Palestine to 
Hull in the U.K. The bills of lading were issued in 
Palestine with the provision that the terms and conditions 
of these documents were to be construed in accordance with 
English law. They did not expressly incorporate the Hague 
Rules, although by clause 4 of the Palestine Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Ordinance 192 6 (corresponding to Section 3 of 
the British Act) "every bill of lading .... issued in 
Palestine .... shall contain an express statement" that it 
is subject to them, and further that the bill of lading 
should "be deemed to have effect subject thereto, 
notwithstanding the omission of such express statement". 
The Court of Appeal held that the laws of Palestine could 
not be evaded by an illegal declaration that the bills of 
lading were to be construed according to English law; 
consequently, it interpreted the bill of lading as if 
Palestine law had been complied with. This ruling was 
given in 1932 and held good until 1939. In that year an
1- (1931) 41 LI. L. Rep. 174.
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appeal in Vita Food Products V. Unus Shipping Company  ^was 
heard before the Privy Council. In this case, the cargo- 
owner claimed against the shipowner for damage to a cargo 
of herrings shipped from Newfoundland to New York. The 
Newfoundland Act (1932) has in Section 3 a similar 
provision to Section 3 of the British Act. The bill of 
lading did not contain a reference to the Newfoundland Act, 
but included a wide exception clause not permissible by 
this Act, and also a statement that the contract should be 
governed by English law. The Privy Council held that the 
requirement of Section 3, that bills of lading "shall 
contain" an express statement, was directory and not 
mandatory. The bills of lading were, therefore, not 
illegal. The Privy Council then went on to decide that the 
applicable law was not the Newfoundland Act but the law of 
England for which the parties had expressly contracted.
The view that the stipulation of Section 3, that every 
bill of lading contain a paramount clause, is directory and 
not mandatory, is open to objection. Tetley points out^s 
"It would appear that the Privy Council, upon deciding that
S.3 was directory and not mandatory, came to the confused 
conclusion that the Rules themselves were therefore not 
mandatory. There is a strong argument that the Rules are 
mandatory, and that the Rules themselves make this 
abundantly clear". In this connection Asser also said^:
1- [1939] A.C. 277; (1939) 36 Ll. L. Rep. 21; [1939] 1 All E.R. 513.
2- William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 1st ed, 1965, p.274, 
hereinafter cited as "Tetley, 1st ed."
3- Asser, p.375.
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"In the Vita Food case the interests of international 
maritime commerce as expressed in the convention were 
sacrificed without justification on that score to a very 
liberal choice of law principle". However, the decision of 
the Privy Council in Vita Food case need no longer be 
followed*: the solution adopted by C.M.I. Conference in
1959, and reiterated in 1963, was that the Hague Rules 
should apply to both inward and outward shipments to or 
from any state which was a party to the convention.^ This 
solution effected the widening of the concept of the voyage 
subject to the Rules.3 in 1968, it was replaced by Article 
5 ^ of the Visby Protocol which attempted to remedy the 
unsatisfactory situation under Article 10 of the Hague 
Rules. By contrast, Article 5 of the Visby Rules has 
amended Article 10 of the Hague Rules so that the latter no 
longer applies unless the ports of loading and discharge 
are in two different states.5 Accordingly, the Visby Rules
The Morviken. (1983) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 at p.9 (Lord Diplock);
Scrutton, 19th ed, p.418, Tetley, 3rd ed, p.6.
2- CIM. Stockholm Conference, 1963, p.101.
3- Diamond, 1978, p.230.
4- Article 5 of the Visby Rules provides: "Article 10 of the
convention shall be deleted and replaced by the following:
The provisions of this convention shall apply to every bill of 
lading relating to the carriage of goods between ports in two 
different states if:
a. the bill of lading is issued in a contracting state, or
b. the carriage is from a port in a contracting state, or
c. the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading 
provides that the rules of this convention or legislation of any 
state giving effect to them are to govern the contract. Whatever 
may be the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the
consignee, or any other interested person. Each contracting
state shall apply the provisions of this convention to the bills 
of lading mentioned above. This Article shall not prevent a 
contracting state from applying the rules of this convention to 
bills of lading not included in the preceding paragraphs”.
Diamond, The Hague/Visby Rules, p.257.
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will apply to inward and outward voyages to or from the 
contracting states, as follows;
a. If the bill of lading is issued in a contracting 
state regardless of where the shipment it refers to 
is situated, so long as the port of destination is in 
a different state.1
b. If the carriage is from a port in a contracting 
state.
c. If the contract contained or evidenced by the bill of 
lading provides that these Rules or legislation of 
any state giving effect to them are to govern the 
contract.2
The United Kingdom COGSA 1971 has applied the same 
approach as the Hague/Visby Rules as set out in the 
schedule of this Act. In addition, COGSA 1971 has dealt 
with two other types of voyages not covered by the Visby 
Rules, as follows:
1. Section 1(3) of COGSA 1971 provides;
"Without prejudice to subsection (2) above, the said 
provisions shall have effect (and have the force of 
law) in relation to and in connection with the 
carriage of goods by sea in ships where the port of 
shipment is a port in the United Kingdom, whether or 
not the carriage is between ports in two different 
states within the context of Article X of the Rules".
2. Section 1(6) of COGSA provides:
"without prejudice to Article X(c) of the Rules, the 
Rules shall have the force of law in relation to
Hoyle, p. 219.
2- Article 5 of the Visby Rules.
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a. any bill of lading if the contract contained in or 
evidenced by it expressly provides that the Rules 
shall govern the contract..."
Consequently, the practical effect of S.1(3) of COGSA 
1971, is to apply the Rules to all voyages where the port 
of loading and the port of discharge are both within the 
area of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whereas S.l 
(6)(a) of COGSA 1971 purports to apply principles which are 
similar to Article 5(c) of the Visby Rules to coastal 
voyages. 1 This position is summed up in the words of 
Diamonds "Both Article X(c) and S.l (6) (a) set out the 
principle that even a voluntary paramount clause will 
attract the statutory application of the Rules. But S.l 
(6)(a) is slightly wider than Article X(c) since the former 
applies to all voyages while the latter applies only to 
international carriage".2
Lastly, it is important to note that the Hague/Visby 
Rules will apply independently of the presence or absence 
of a relevant clause in the bill of lading incorporating 
the Hague/Visby Rules. In other words, the paramount 
clause is no longer required under the Hague/Visby Rules 
because they specifically apply by force of law.3
Diamond, 1978,p.260.
Ibid; see also,Sweeney, p.537.
3- The Morviken. [1983]1 Lloyd's Rep.l at p.8; Scrutton, 19th ed, 
p.419; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.6; Wilson, p.177; Todd, p.110.
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1.2.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
Despite the improvement brought by Article 5 of the 
Visby Rules which amended Article 10 of the Hague Rules, 
the Hague/Visby Rules did not provide a sufficiently broad 
scope of application for the Rules.
In order to resolve this defect the Secretariat of 
UNCTAD prepared two draft proposals
Draft Proposal A^ was a similar formula to Article 5 of 
the Visby Rules and provided that the contracting states 
were free to apply the rules of the convention to bills of 
lading not included within the convention's scope. Draft 
Proposal would apply the convention to every bill of
lading (or contract of carriage) between two different 
states if:
a. the bill of lading or other document evidencing the 
contract of carriage is issued in a contracting 
state, or
b. the port of loading or the port of discharge or one 
of the optional ports of discharge provided for in
*■- Sweeney, part III, p.501.
2- This proposal was supported by Japan and the United Kingdom.
3- This proposal was supported by Egypt, Hungary, Singapore, India, 
Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Argentina, Chile and Australia; it is 
to be mentioned that Australia proposed permissive language to 
authorize contracting states to apply the convention to coastal 
voyages. The Norwegian proposal, which was supported by the 
Soviet Union, was to state directly that the convention shall 
apply to domestic transport, but the United States indicated that 
this proposal might raise problems. See Secretary-General Report 
(A/CN.9/WGIII/W.P.12) at par. 5 (1973); Sweeney, part III, p.502.
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the documents evidencing the contract of carriage is 
located in a contracting state, or
c. the document evidencing the contract of carriage 
provides that the provisions of this Convention or 
the legislation of any state giving effect to them 
are to govern the contract.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 are applicable without 
regard to the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the 
shipper, the consignee or any other interested person.
Finally, the Drafting Party proposed a new text which is 
now incorporated in Article 2 of the Hamburg Rules. 
Accordingly, the following provisions of this Article will 
be applicable to all voyages which emerge from the 
contracts of carriage between ports in two different states 
if:
a. the port of loading is located in a contracting state;
b. the port of discharge is located in a contracting state;
c. an optional port of discharge mentioned in the contract 
of carriage which becomes the actual port of discharge 
and such a port is located in a contracting state;
d. the bill of lading or other document is issued in a 
contracting state;
e. an agreement is inserted in the bill of lading or other 
document for application of the provisions of the 
Hamburg Rules.1
Article 2 of the Hamburg Rules.
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It is clear, now, that the Hamburg Rules brought a 
radical change concerning the application of the Rules by 
increasing the number of voyages covered by the Rules.1 It 
also makes no distinction between inward and outward 
voyages as the Rules are applicable to both.^
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the Hamburg Rules, 
like the Hague/Visby Rules, apply merely to contracts of 
carriage by sea where the port of loading and discharge are 
in two different states.3 These Rules, therefore, do not 
apply to the coastal trade^ because it is outside the scope 
of the Rules which purport to apply to the trade between 
two different states.
1 - Mankabady, p.4 4.
Wilson, p.203; Mankabady, p.44; Tetley, The Hamburg Rules, p.7.
3- Article 5 of the Visby Rules and Article 2 of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Wilson, p.203.
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Concluding Remarks
We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that the 
Hamburg Rules seem to have a much broader and clearer scope 
and application than the Hague Rules or the Visby Rules.
The Hamburg Rules apply to all documents which are used 
in maritime transport. That is to say, the Hamburg Rules 
have adopted a flexible approach by using the phrase 
"contract of carriage by sea" instead of the "bill of 
lading", whereas the Hague Rules limited their 
application, by applying only to the contract of carriage 
covered by a bill of lading or similar document of title. 
The number of voyages governed by the Hamburg Rules is 
sharply increased. Furthermore, the scope of application 
of the Hamburg Rules, generally, would resolve many 
existing problems in maritime transport. The Hamburg 
convention, in my opinion, has also achieved a very 
important political objective, by giving the developing 
countries, through the committee which drafted the Rules, a 
good opportunity of participation in the formulation of 
maritime law.
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Chapter Two 
The Liability of the Carrier
Both the Hague/Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules set out 
the rules concerning the liability of the carrier. These 
Rules differ from each other in respect of the rights and 
obligations of the carrier. In order to get a proper 
conception of these differences, it is necessary to 
highlight in detail, in the present chapter, the following 
points, followed by the limitation of the carrier's 
liability which is the subject of chapter three.
2.1 The basis of the carrier's liability and the period of 
responsibility.
2.2 The burden of proof.
2.3 The immunities of the carrier.
2.1 The basis of the carrier's liability and the period of
responsibility
It is important to discuss this point under the following 
headings:
2.1.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules.
2.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules•
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2.1.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules.
The Hague/Visby Rules and some domestic laws, such as those 
of United Kingdom and the United States of America, impose 
on the carrier the following duties:
A - Exercising due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
B - Loading the cargo properly and carefully.
C - Stowing the cargo properly and carefully.
D - Discharging the cargo properly and carefully
A - Exercising due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy
Article 3(1) of the Hague/Visby Rules provides that:
"The carrier shall be bound before and at the 
beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to:
a) Make the ship seaworthy.
b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship.
c) Make the holds, refrigerating and coolchambers, 
and all other parts of the ship in which goods are 
carried, fit and safe for their reception, 
carriage and preservation".
The first of the carrier's major obligations under the
Hague rules is "to exercise due diligence to make the
vessel seaworthy".
It is to be noted that, before the Hague Rules came into
force, the shipowner's duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel
was an implied warranty. After these Rules entered into
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force, the duty of the shipowner bound him to exercise due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.1
The phrase "exercise due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy" in the Hague Rules was adopted from the American
Harter Act, 1893, and similar British Commonwealth
statutes. The words in the phrase were understood to carry
the meaning attributed to them prior to the Hague Rules.2
"Due diligence" may be however defined as follows:
"The basic definition of due diligence is the use of 
all reasonable means to make the vessel s e a w o r t h y ".3
It may also mean that a carrier has exercised due
diligence when he pays:
"all attention to his duties to provide a seaworthy 
ship as is properly to be expected of a carrier of 
goods by sea"/
Consequently, the carrier guarantees the shipper that 
the carrying vessel of goods is seaworthy. The question 
is, then, what is the meaning of seaworthiness? In 
principle, seaworthiness is a relative term, because the 
meaning of the word is dependent upon the context in which 
it is u s e d . 5 As a result, the meaning of "seaworthiness"
R.Dewey, The Concept of due diligence in maritime law (1971)2 
JMLC, p.763, hereinafter cited as "Dewey"; Astle, p.52
2- Riverston Meat Company Ptd. Ltd V. Lancashire Shipping Company. 
Ltd. The "Muncaster Castle". (1961)1 Lloyd's Rep.57 at p.58; 
Diamond, UNCITRAL, p.46; F.J.J.Cadwallader, Seaworthiness - An 
Exercise of Due Diligence, published in the speaker's papers for 
the Bill of Lading Conventions Conference, organized by Lloyds of 
London Press in New York, November, 1978, p.2, hereinafter cited 
as "Cadwallader, Seaworthiness"; W.E. Astle, Bills of Lading, 
1982, p.26, hereinafter cited as "Astle, Bills of Lading".
3- Dewey, p.767.
4- Cadwallader, Seaworthiness, p.3.
5- Astle, p.52; Waddle. V Wallsend Shipping Co. Ltd. (1952)2 
Lloyd's Rep.105.
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may differ from case to case. Hence, "seaworthiness" may
be defined as the:
"state of a vessel in such a condition, with such 
equipment, and manned by such a master and crew,that 
normally the cargo will be loaded, carried, cared for 
and discharged properly and safely on t h e  
contemplated voyage"1
The ship, then, should be fit in design, structure,
condition, equipment and also have a competent and
sufficient master and crew.2
It is to be noted that the duty to supply a seaworthy
ship does not mean that the carrier should provide a
perfect ship, but it means that the ship must have a degree
of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner
would require his ship to have at the commencement of her
voyage, having regard to all the probable c i r c u m s t a n c e s .3
In The Good F r i e n d ^ . Staughton, J. stated that the
"obligation is to see that the ship is fit for cargo 
service. Where the particular service is specified 
in the contract, it is an obligation to see that the 
ship is fit to carry the specified cargo on the 
specified voyage".
It is noteworthy that the warranty of seaworthiness at 
common law which was absolute is replaced under the Hague 
Rules Article 3(1) by the duty of the carrier to exercise 
due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, that is, as a 
relative term dependent on the kind of adventure
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.371
2- Carver, p.114
3- Mcffaden V. Blue Star Line [1905]1 K.B.697 at p.706 (Channell.
J.); The "Gundulic" [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.418; Carver, p.115. 
(1984)2 Lloyd's Rep.586 at p.592,
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contemplated and the particular voyage undertaken, the 
goods to be carried and their stowage, and the state of 
knowledge and scientific progress at the time of the 
contract.1 In "Muncaster C a s t l e " ^  Lord Keith of Avonholm 
said:
"The Hague rules abolished the absolute warranty of 
seaworthiness. They substituted a lower measure of 
obligation...The carrier will have some relief which, 
weighed in the scales, is not inconsiderable when 
contrasted with his previous common-law position. He 
will be protected against latent defects^, in the 
strict sense, in work done on his ship, that is to 
say, defects not due to any negligent workmanship of 
repairers and, as I see it, against defects making 
for unseaworthiness in the ship, however caused, 
before it became his ship, if these could not be 
discovered by him or competent experts employed by 
him, by the exercise of due diligence".
We must now consider the question as to the time when 
due diligence is to be exercised to make the vessel 
seaworthy. Article 3(1) of the Hague Rules makes this 
point clear when it refers to "before and at the beginning 
of the voyage". This means that the obligation to exercise 
due diligence covers the period from at least the beginning 
of loading until the vessel starts on her voyage.
Bradelv & Sons V. Federal Steam Navigation Co. (1927) 27L1.
L.R.395 at p.396, where Lord Sumner said: "...neither
seaworthiness nor due diligence is absolute. Both are relative, 
among other things, to the state of knowledge and standards 
prevailing at the material time."; Chorly & Giles, Shipping Law, 
7th ed, 1980, p.132, hereinafter cited as "Chorley & Giles, 7th 
ed"; Clarke, p.125.
2- (1961)1 Lloyd's Rep.57 at p.58.
3- The Walter Raleigh (1952) A.M.C.618 at p.619 where it is stated 
that: "A latent defect is one that could not be discovered"; see 
also, Charles Brown & Co. and others V. Nitrate Producers'
Steamship Co. (1937) 58 Lloyd's Rep.188 at p.191.
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Furthermore, due diligence must also be exercised before 
the commencement of each voyage.1
Seaworthiness must concern many aspects of a vessel such 
as the hull, machinery, personnel and stowage of cargo. 
Failure to exercise due diligence in these respects will 
make the vessel unseaworthy, but the unseaworthiness is not 
sufficient in itself yet to make the carrier responsible. 
Responsibility will be invoked when it can be shown that 
loss of or damage to the cargo is the result of 
unseaworthiness. Accordingly, questions may arise as to 
how there can be unseaworthiness? The integrity of the 
hull is an important condition for seaworthiness. The 
bulkheads, the wasting of shell plates through the passage 
of time has often produced leakage and consequent cargo 
damage, and accordingly testing of each rivet, and dry 
docking is needed from time to t i m e . ^  in Federazione 
Italiana V. Mandask Compania .^ which concerned the 
shipowner's failure to investigate or determine the cause 
of small cracks in bulkhead plating, it was held that due 
diligence had not been exercised. Moreover, the ship
The case of Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. V. Canadian Government 
Merchant Marine Ltd. (1959)2 Lloyd's Rep.105, is good evidence of 
the effect of the words "before and at the beginning of the 
voyage". This case concerned the loss of goods before the vessel 
actually left the port and after the goods were loaded on the 
vessel, due to a fire which caused the scuttling of the vessel. 
It was held that the words "before and at the beginning of the 
voyage" mean the period from at least the beginning of loading 
until the vessel started on her voyage.
2- Dewey, p.770; The "Tolmidis" (1983)1 Lloyd's Rep.530.
3- (1968) A.M.C.315 U.S. Court of Appeal; The Torenia" (1983)2
Lloyd's Rep.210 at p.230, where Hobhouse. J, states: "The
unseaworthiness was not latent nor was it undiscoverable by due 
diligence. Due diligence was not exercised"; Astle, p.59.
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should have competent propulsion machinery and sufficient 
fuel, refrigeration and ventilation machinery. Failure to 
supply these things is a failure to use due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy. 1
Seaworthiness is also dependent upon a competent and 
adequate number of crew members who have to be experienced 
and trained in the operation of the ship. Thus, in the 
M a k e d o n i a ^ . it was held that the ship was unseaworthy 
because the ship's engineers were inefficient at the 
commencement of the voyage, and the shipowners had failed 
to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of 
the voyage to man their vessel properly.
It is to be noted that not only should the carrier 
exercise due diligence, but due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy should also be exercised by every person 
to whom any part of a necessary work is entrusted, (whether 
servants, agents or independent contractors). The question 
of unseaworthiness concerns whether the carrier will be 
liable for the negligence of such a person. This was made 
clear in the case of "Muncaster C a s t l e " ^ ,  which concerned 
damage to cargo resulting from the negligence of a ship- 
repairers' fitter in tightening up the nuts on the storm 
valve covers of the vessel after they had been removed for 
the inspection of the storm valves by the surveyors. 
Because an employee of the ship-repairers had tightened up
The "Toledo" (1939) A.M.C.130; Dewey, p.772
2- (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep.316 at p.317; the "Farrandoc". (1967) 1
Lloyd's Rep.232; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.385.
3- (1961) 1 Lloyd's Rep.57.
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the nuts unevenly, causing the covers eventually to become 
loose, and sea-water entered into the vessel hold, the 
House of Lords held that the carrier was liable to the 
cargo-owner, no matter whether he was carrier's servant, 
agent or independent contractor.*
It should be borne in mind that unseaworthiness may be 
caused not only by faulty construction of the vessel 
itself, as we have already discussed, but also by the 
manner in which the stowage of cargo takes place. Due 
diligence must, then, also be exercised to make the vessel 
seaworthy with respect to the stowage of cargo. That is, 
due diligence also requires attention to see that the 
vessel is balanced and not overloaded. The carrier in this 
way must take into account the nature and characteristics 
of the goods offered for shipment when planning the voyage, 
and the holds must be cleaned in preparation for receipt of 
cargo.2
Due diligence should be exercised not only to provide a 
vessel fit to undertake a voyage, but also fit to carry the 
cargo safely to its destination.3 An important case that 
can be mentioned in connection with the stowage of cargo 
and unseaworthiness is that of Kopitoff V. Wilson^. where
Ibid at p.58; It was also held in Charles Goodfellow Lumber 
Sales V. Verreault. Hovinqton and Verreault Navigation Inc. 
(1971) 1 Lloyd's Rep.185 at p.194, that the production of a
certificate of seaworthiness is not sufficient to discharge the 
statutory onus of proof that due diligence was exercised to make 
the ship seaworthy.
2- Dewey, p.774.
3- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.85; Astle, p.59.
4- (1876)1 Q.B. p.377; The "Standale". (1938) 61 LI.L.R.223. A cargo 
of grain in bulk was stowed in the hold without adequate 
protection having been taken against its shifting. It was held
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armour plates broke loose from their stowage and sank the
ship. The court found that the ship was unseaworthy as
regards the mode of stowage, because the ship was not fit
for the voyage. Another interesting case in this
connection is Paterson Zochonis. and Company Ltd V. Elder
Dempster and Co. Ltd .^ where Scrutton, L.J. said:
"The ship must be fit at loading to carry the cargo 
the subject of the particular contract. If she is so 
fit, and the cargo when loaded does not make her 
unseaworthy, as in the case of the iron plates which 
might go through the ship's side, the fact that other 
cargo is so stowed as to endanger the contract cargo, 
is bad stowage on a seaworthy ship, not stowage of 
the contract cargo on an unseaworthy ship."
B. Loading the Cargo Properly and Carefully
In addition to the carrier's duty to exercise due 
diligence in providing a seaworthy ship, there is another 
duty. Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules provides that: 
"Subject to the provisions of Article 4, the carrier shall 
properly and carefully load, ...the goods carried". That 
is the carrier's duty is to load the cargo properly, 
carefully and safely on the vessel and in a manner so that 
it can be found for quick and safe discharge without 
delay.2
that this mode of stowage made the ship unseaworthy; The "Friso" 
(1980)1 Lloyd's Rep.469; The "Torenia" (1983)2 Lloyd's Rep.210 
at p.234; The "Tolmidis" (1983) 2 Lloyd's Rep.530 at p.540; The 
"Thorsa" (1916)P. 257.
1- [1923]1 K.B.420 at p.438
2- international Packers Ltd V Ocean Steamship Company Ltd. (1955)2 
Lloyd's Rep.218, where it was held that there was a failure of 
the ship under Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules to care for the
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It is important in defining due diligence, as found in
Article 3 (1) of the Hague Rules, that it involves an
overriding obligation. Lord Somervell, in Maxin Footwear
Co. Ltd V. Canadian Merchant Marine Ltd .^ said that:
"Article III, Rule I, is an overriding obligation.
If it is not fulfilled and the non-fulfilment causes 
the damage, the immunities of Article IV cannot be 
relied on. This is the natural construction apart 
from the opening words of Article IV, Rule 2. The 
fact that that Rule is made subject to the provision 
of Article IV and Rule 1 is not so conditioned makes 
the point clear beyond argument".
Consequently, in order to allow the carrier to rely on 
the exceptions in Article IV(2), the carrier must first 
show that he has exercised due diligence and that he has 
been careful in accordance with Article III(2)such as 
showing reasonable care in loading etc. the goods; he must 
also show such care in preparing the ship that will carry 
the goods.2
The question, then, is: when does loading begin, and
when do the Rules begin to apply?
Under Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules, the carrier is 
responsible for the operation of loading; therefore, it 
seems that the loading will begin from the time the goods 
are received into tackle for lifting on board the vessel 
and does not cease until the goods are released from the
cargo and that the carrier was responsible for the damage 
sustained by canned meat; Gosse Millerd Ltd V. Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine Ltd, [1929] A.C.223.
(1959)2 Lloyd's Rep.105 at p.113.
2- Clarke, p.140,
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discharge tackle.1 This means that the carrier's liability 
related to the operation of loading is limited to a "tackle 
to tackle" period.2 This has meant that, if the ship's 
tackle is used or the carrier is doing the loading with 
shore personnel, loading will then begin and the Rule will 
apply when the tackle is hooked onto the cargo. However, 
if the shore tackle is used, then the loading will begin 
and the Rules shall apply when the cargo crosses the rail. 
An interesting case that can be cited is Pvrene Company Ltd 
v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co  ^where the tender was being 
lifted onto the vessel by the ship's tackle and before 
crossing the ship's rail it was dropped and damaged. It 
was held that since the accident occurred outside the 
period specified in Article 1(e), the Rules did not apply.4 
As far as the question of loading is concerned, Devlin, J. 
said that:
"The phrase 'Shall properly and carefully load' may 
mean that the carrier shall load and that he shall do 
it properly and carefully: or that he shall do
whatever loading he does properly and carefully. The
Goodwin. Ferreia & Co V. Lamport & Holt. Ltd. (1929)34 Lloyd's 
Rep.192 at p.194; Astle, p.80.
2_ so-called "maritime stage". This means that the Hague/Visby Rules 
do not apply when the loss or damage to the goods occur before 
the loading or after discharge, even though the goods are still 
in the control of the carrier or his servants or agents, unless 
there is an agreement between the contracting parties to extend 
the scope of the Hague/Visby Rules to apply in such cases. 
Leopold Peyrefitte, The period of maritime transport comments on 
Article 4 of the Hamburg Rules, published in the Hamburg Rules on 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, 
p.125, hereinafter cited as "Peyrefitte"? Tetley, 3rd ed, p.528; 
Wilson, p.185
3- (1954)1 Lloyd's Rep.321; (1954)2 Q.B.402 at p.403.
4- Article 1(e) of the Hague Rules provides that: ("carriage of 
goods" covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded 
on to the time they are discharged from the ship.).
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former interpretation phrase fits the language more 
closely, but the latter may be more consistent with 
the object of the Rules "1
It can be concluded from this case that the carrier was 
responsible for loading before the goods crossed the ship's 
rail
Devlin, J. said that the whole contract of carriage was 
thus subject to the Rules, but the extent to which the 
loading stage of the carriage is brought within the 
carrier's undertaking is left to the parties themselves to 
decide, depending upon different systems of law, the custom 
and practice of the port and nature of the cargo.3
If loading is from lighters, when does the carrier's 
responsibility begin? The answer to this question depends 
upon whether the carrier owns or controls the lighters, 
both in terms of the contract of carriage and the 
lighterage contract. 4 When the carrier does not own or 
control the lighters, his responsibility commences at the 
point when the vessel's tackle is hooked onto the cargo.5 
In the United States a court held that the carrier was 
responsible for the cargo lost when a lighter capsized 
alongside.6
Pvrene Company Ltd V. Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd.
(1954)1 Lloyd's Rep.321 at p.328.
2- Carver, para. 515.
3- Pvrene Co Op.Cit, p.328-9; C.H.Renton & Co V. Palmyra Trading 
Coro at Panama. [1957] A.C.149 at p.170.
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.529.
5- The E.T. Barwick Mills V. Hellenic. (1972) A.M.C.1802.
The Scow Steelweld. (1968) A.M.C.2064 at p.2073, where the court 
stated "The barge and its contents had come within the actual 
control of the carrier at its terminal. Furthermore, additional
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The carrier should be liable for any loss of or damage
to goods at least from the beginning of loading until the
completion of discharge unless the carrier agreed to extend
the period of liability during his control of the goods (at
the port of loading or discharge) or during his custody of
the goods, such as, where the carrier discharged the goods
in his warehouse.
Article 7 of the Hague Rules grant complete freedom of
contract prior to the loading on and subsequent to
discharge, when it states:
"Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or 
a shipper from entering into any agreement, 
stipulation, condition, reservation or exemption as 
to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or 
the ship for the loss or damage to, or in connection 
with, the custody and care and handling of goods 
prior to the loading on, and subsequent to, the 
discharge from the ship on which the goods are 
carried by sea".
Therefore, I am inclined to agree with Justice Devlin's 
view that the whole of the contract of carriage which is 
covered by a bill of lading is subject to the Rules, but at 
what point the goods are loaded on and brought within the 
carrier's obligation is a matter left to the parties to 
decide.1
Coming now to the consideration of the phrase used in 
Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules, that is, "properly and
evidence of delivery includes acceptance of the scow's papers and 
direction of a particular berth, and orders by the ship to tie a 
scow alongside, and control by the ship of the place and speed of 
loading operations from the scow"; The Yoro. (1952) A.M.C.1094 
at p.1096.
See Pvrene Co (1954)1 Lloyd's Rep. at p.329.
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carefully", we find that this phrase originated from the
Harter Act in which these words are used alternatively or
interchangeably 1. That means the two expressions are
intended to have the same meaning. They are employed
jointly in the Hague Rules.2 Viscount Kilmuir L.C.
expressed the opinion that:
"The natural and ordinary meaning of 'properly' in 
antithesis to 'carefully' in the phrase 'properly and 
carefully load, handle stow, carry keep, care for and 
discharge', is in accordance with a sound system. It 
has not a geographical s i g n i f i c a n c e " . 3
The House of Lords accepted such an interpretation of
"properly", but pointed to some differentiation between
"properly" and "carefully" when Lord Pearson said that: 
"'properly' meant in an appropriate manner; that if 
'carefully' meant merely taking care, 'properly' 
required, in addition, the element of skill or sound 
system".4
whereas Lord Pearce added that:
"The word 'properly' presumably adds something to the 
word 'carefully' and means upon a sound system. A
Section 1 of the Harter Act provides that: "All clauses
exonerating the carrier from liability for loss or damage arising 
out of "negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stowage, 
custody care, or proper delivery..." are null. Section 2 of the 
Harter Act provides that: "The clause that are designed to lessen 
the carrier's obligation to exercise due diligence in rendering 
the vessel seaworthy, and also to "carefully handle and stow her 
cargo and to care for and properly deliver same..." are equally 
void.
Guido Alpa & Francesco Berlingieri, The Liability of the Carrier 
by sea: Present Regulation and Prospects of Reform, published in
the Studies on the Revision of the Brussels Convention on Bills 
of Lading, 1974, p.79, hereinafter cited as "Alpa & Berlingieri".
3- G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd V. Palmyra Trading Corporation. (1957)2 
Lloyd's Rep.p.379 at p.388; Gosse Millerd Ltd V. Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine. (1927) 28 Ll.L.R.88 at p.103; (1927)2 
K.B.432 at p.434.
4- Albacora S.R.L. V. Westcott & Laurence Line Ltd. (1966) 2 Lloyd's 
Rep.53 at p.54.
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sound system does not mean a system suited to all the 
weaknesses and idiosyncrasies of a particular cargo, 
but a sound system under all the circumstances in 
relation to the general practice of carriage of goods 
by sea".*
Therefore, a "sound system" is "tantamount to 
efficiency".2
Thus, the carrier must adopt a system which is sound in 
the light of all the knowledge about the nature of the 
goods.3
It should be mentioned that in the absence of an express 
agreement, the duty of the shipper is to bring the goods 
alongside the ship at his own expense, and the duty of the 
carrier is to load the goods on to the ship by the ship's 
tackle at his expense unless there is a custom of the port 
of loading to the c o n t r a r y . " *  it is important to note that 
the shipper will be only liable for any loss or damage to 
his own cargo resulting from his failure when bringing the 
goods alongside the ship. What happens, however, if he, 
while succeeding in bringing the goods alongside the ship, 
does damage to a third party's cargo? The carrier rather 
than the shipper will be liable as being responsible to the
Ibid, p.62.
Ibid, p.62.
3- Ibid, p.58.
Argonaut Navigation Company Ltd v. Ministry of Food: SS.
"Argobec". [1949]l K.B.572, at p.580 (Per Bucknill L.J.); Harris 
v Best. Rvlev & Co r18911 All E.R.567 at 569 (per Lord Esher); 
National Steam Co. Ltd v. Sociedad Anonima comercial De 
Exportacion Y Importacion & c (1932) Com, Cas.283 at p.290 (per 
Greer L.J.).
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third party or parties whose cargo is damaged during the 
loading operations.1
C. Stowing the Cargo Properly and Carefully
The stowing of the cargo is closely connected with the
loading of the cargo. Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules
provides that:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 4, the carrier 
shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, 
carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods 
carried".
Having received the cargo over the ship's rail or 
otherwise as is customary or provided by the contract, it 
becomes the carrier's duty to stow it. Therefore, the 
carrier must stow the goods with due skill and care in the 
proper place and condition in accordance with the nature of 
the goods.2
The duty of stowing the cargo in the ship is arranged by 
the master of the ship or his representative. The master 
has to be a competent stevedore, and he must have a full 
knowledge to see that the stowage is done with skill and 
care. Otherwise the carrier will be responsible for any 
loss or damage to cargo.3
Ridley, p.123; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.532.
2- Blackwood Hodge (India) Private. Ltd V. EHerman Lines Ltd. 
(1963)1 Lloyd's Rep.454, where the pieces of cargo were lashed and 
there were gaps in the stowage and it was not sound block stowage; 
and that, therefore, shipowners were liable; Elder Dempster Co. 
V. Paterson Zochonis [1924] A.C.522; Walker, Private Law, p.354.
3- Canadian Transport Co. V. Court Line. Ltd. [1940] A.C.934 at 
p.943, where Lord Wright said:
"In modern times the work of stowage is generally deputed to 
stevedores, but that does not generally relieve the shipowners of 
their duty, even though the stevedores are under the charter party
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It must be mentioned that part of the shipowner's duty 
is to stow the goods properly and carefully not only with 
regard to the seaworthiness of the ship, but also to avoid 
damage to the goods.* If the carrier, however, inserts a 
clause in the bill of lading that he is not responsible for 
bad stowage, this clause would be invalid under Article 
3(8) of the Hague Rules.2 But, the carrier may be relieved 
from the liability by virtue of Article 4(2)(i)^ of the 
Hague Rules, if he proves that the method of the stowage 
has been directed by the shipper, and that the damage 
caused to the cargo by improper stowage was due to the 
shipper's directions.4 If the carrier chooses to carry a 
number of different types of goods together, he does so at 
his own risk, nevertheless while using all possible care in 
stowing the goods, he will be responsible for the damage 
they may cause to each other. ^ However, the carrier is 
relieved from the liability if he has adopted the customary
to be appointed by the charterers, unless there are special 
provisions which either expressly or inferentially have that 
effect"; Heinze Horn Marie Horn. [1970]l Lloyd's Rep.191 at 
p.198.
Ibid.934 at p.943.
2- Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules provides that:
"Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage 
relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or 
damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence, 
fault or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this 
article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in 
this convention, shall be null and void and of no effect."
3- Article 4(2)(i) of the Hague Rules provides that:
"Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or 
damage arising or resulting from: (i) act or omission of the
shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative".
Arrond Rotterdam. (1978) 13 E.T.L.483, where insistence on a
certain type of stowage by the shipper, which stowage proved to be 
faulty, permitted the carrier to relay on Article 4(2)(i).
5- The Freedom.(1869) L.R.3 P.C.594; Carver, p.832.
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method of stowage for the cargo. 1 Thus, in Silver sandal. 2 
bales of crude rubber were stowed so that pressure was 
generated on the tiers. This caused the crushing of some 
bales. The crushed bales could not fit into the slicing 
machines for treatment. It was held that they had been 
stowed in the customary way and that the shipowners were 
not therefore liable. But, it is no defence to stow the 
goods according to the custom if that custom is improper. 
Thus, in Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producer V. Paterson 
SS. Ltd.3 which concerned shipment of grain, the grain was 
loaded in bulk without shifting boards in accordance with 
practice in the region of the Great Lakes over the previous 
2 0 years. It was held that due diligence had not been 
exercised to provide a seaworthy ship. It must be 
mentioned that the shipper should provide the carrier with 
sufficient information for a cargo requiring special care 
or involving a dangerous character, because the carrier is 
expected to be experienced in respect of normal cargo not 
requiring special information and he should stow it 
properly and carefully.4 That means unless the carrier 
knows or is expected to know that the goods need special 
care or involve a dangerous character, there will be an 
implied warranty by the shipper that goods are fit for 
stowing in a proper way without having special
For a custom to be enforced by the courts it must be ( a ) 
reasonable; (b) certain; (c) consistent with the contract; (d) 
universally acquiesced in; (e) not contrary to the law. See 
Scrutton, 19th ed, p.15.
2- (1940) A.M.C.731.
3- (1939)49 LI. L.Rep.421.
4- Tetley, 3rd ed,p.546.
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instructions.^ However, the carrier or the master is 
entitled to refuse any package which, he suspects, to 
contain dangerous goods and he may request that it should 
be opened to ascertain that fact. Moreover, if the 
dangerous goods have been brought on board the ship without 
being marked, or without notice being given as prescribed, 
the carrier or the master may give orders to throw the 
cargo overboard without being in any way liable.2 it is to 
be noted that the master has absolute control over stowage 
of the goods. As such he alone is responsible for this 
matter not only because of the carrier's responsibility for 
the stability of the ship but also because of the carrier's 
duty to care for other cargo as well as part of the 
carrier's responsibility for any loss or damage to cargo.3 
Then, mere ignorance of the effect of stowing particular 
kinds of goods together will not make the carrier liable, 
unless as a competent person he may reasonably be expected 
to know it. In Ohrloff V. Briscall4-. which concerned 47 
casks of olive oil stowed in a hold together with some rags 
and wool, the latter became heated; the staves of the 
casks dried and the casks became leaky. A large part of
!- Bamfield V. Goole. etc. Transport co. [1910]2 K.B.94
2- Scrutton, 19th ed,p.l03; see also Article 4(6) of the Hague Rules.
3- Olsen V. U.S. Shipping Co.. 213 Fed.Rep.18 (1914) at p.21, where 
Hinckes Ct. J, relied on, it was stated that "It makes no 
difference whether this was due to the amount or the stowage of 
the deckload alone or also to the fact that the largest ballast 
tank could not be filled. All these matters were under the 
absolute control of the master and it was his duty to see they 
were right”. It was held that the carrier was therefore
responsible for the loss; Canadian Transport V. Court Line [1940]
A.C.934 at p.943.
4- (1866) L.R.l P.C.231.
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the oil escaped. It was held that the carrier was 
responsible for this loss, as caused by negligent stowage. 
This decision was reversed by the ,Privy Council. Turner, 
L.J. saidjl
"Notwithstanding the evidence of the notoriety at 
Liverpool of the deleterious consequences of the 
collection of oil in casks with rags and wool, or 
other matters tending to generate heat, we do not 
believe that either the shippers or the shipowners in 
this case were aware of them... Nor do we think the 
ignorance of the shipowners in itself amounted to 
negligence. It can hardly be imputed as misconduct 
that the shipowners should be ignorant of latent 
mischief of this nature, when Lloyd & Co., who are 
proved to have had very great experience as Oil 
merchants, were in the same state of ignorance".2
We must now consider the question of whether cargo may
be stowed on deck. This depends on the conditions of the
ship, and on the probable circumstances of the intended
voyage. In the ordinary way, the cargo must be stowed in
the holds and other usual carrying parts of the ship, not
on deck where it may be exposed to greater r i s k s . 3 Certain
kinds of cargo are frequently carried on deck for different
reasons, among which the most important is that the cargo
is too large to be stowed in the hold, such as railway
engines, containers, coaches and timber cargo.4
Ibid, p.238.
Ibid, p.239; Union Castle SS Co. V. Borderdal Shipping Co..
[1919]l K.B.612.
3- Chorley & Giles, Shipping Law, 8th ed, 1987, p.236, hereinafter 
cited as "Chorley & Giles, 8th ed"; Carver, p.858.
4- R_j_ v. Campbell.Ex parte Nomikos. [1956]2 All E.R.280;
Mankabady, p.7 5.
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An important point to be mentioned is that the shipowner 
is not entitled to carry the goods on deck unless the 
shipper has accepted, or permitted this in accordance with 
usage of trade.1 Therefore, in the absence of any contrary 
usage in the particular trade, it is required that the 
goods shall be stowed under deck, otherwise the carrier and 
the ship will be responsible for any damage to the cargo.2 
Insofar as the custom and usage of stowage on deck is 
concerned, whether a shipper knew of the existence of such 
a practice, or is justifiably ignorant of the practice, and 
does not object to it, he cannot be said to have consented 
to modification of the contract embodied in his bill of 
l a d i n g . 3 if the shipper then accepts the bill of lading at 
the carrier' s option to stow the goods either on deck or 
under deck, the shipper has no right to a claim for any 
damage resulting from such goods c a r r i e d . 4 if the goods, 
however, are carried on deck without the shipper's 
acceptance, or a clean, unclaused bill of lading calls for 
under deck stowage, and stowage is on deck, the shipowner 
becomes liable for damage from such stowage.5 Moreover, if 
the goods are shipped on deck at the shipper's risk, the 
carrier is not relieved of the duty of due care and
Burton V. English. (1883)12 Q.B.D.218; The Roval Exchange Shipping 
Co. V. Dixon. (1886) 12 App. Cas.ll.
2- Schooner St. Johns N.F., (1923) A.M.C.1131; Chorley & Giles, 8th 
ed, p.237.
3- The Roval Exchange Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Dixon. (1886)12 App. 
Cas.ll at p.18 (Lord Watson).
Peter Helms. (1938) A.M.C.1220 at p.1122, Walker, Private
Law,p.354.
5- Wright V. Marwood. (1881) 7 Q.B.D.62 at p.67.
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attention towards the cargo.1 The question may also arise 
if a ship adapted for container transport carries them on 
deck. The stowage of containers on deck, without any 
reference to that fact in the bill of lading, constitutes a 
breach of the carrier' s duty and he will be liable for the 
amount of damage. 2 However, the stowage of the containers 
on deck of a container ship may not be a breach of the 
carrier's duty, because the deck of the container ship is 
held to be exactly the place where containers are 
reasonably intended to be c a r r i e d . 3
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the goods carried on deck 
and stated to be so carried in the bill of lading are not 
"goods" within the meaning of Article l(c)^ of the Hague 
Rules. In other words, where the parties agree on cargo 
being carried on deck, the Hague Rules do not apply and the 
carrier remains liable for stowing the goods carried 
properly and carefully.5
Thus it seems clear that the carrier is bound to stow 
the cargo properly and carefully throughout the whole 
voyage. That means the duty of the carrier to stow the 
cargo set out under Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules is not
The Ponce, (1946) A.M.C.1124; Shaw, Savil V. Electric Reductions 
Sales Co "The Mahia", [1955]i Lloyds Rep.264.
2- Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc V. Hong Kong Producer & Universal 
Marine Corp. [1969]2 Lloyd's Rep.536, (1969)A.M.C.1741.
3- The Mormacvega, (1973)1 Lloyd's Rep.267.
4- Article 1(c) of the Hague Rules defined the goods as: "goods, 
wares, merchandise and articles of every kind whatsoever except 
... cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being 
carried on deck and is so carried".
5- Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget V. Maritime Agencies (Southampton). 
Ltd. [1953]2 All E.R.570; The Roval Exchange Shipping Co. V. 
Dixon. (1886)12 App. Cas.ll.
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a strict obligation which is not required for goods carried 
during the voyage, but the carrier must be shown to have 
exercised all due care and stow the goods properly and 
carefully.1
D. Discharging the Cargo Properly and Carefully
According to Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules, the
carrier's duty is to discharge the cargo properly and
carefully. And Article 1 (b) and (e), taken together,
state that the contract of carriage of goods "covers the
period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the
time they are discharged from the ship".
Discharge is a joint operation, the carrier being also
responsible for shifting the cargo from the hold to the
ship's side, while the consignee is responsible for taking
it from alongside.2 Lord Wright has defined however, a
proper discharge as follows:
"Deliver from the ship's tackle in the same apparent 
order and condition".3
The scope and the meaning of the word "discharge" can be 
found through consideration of what is meant by the port or 
place of discharge, the manner in which discharge is to 
take place, the party to whom discharge is to be made, and 
the question of substituted d e l i v e r y . 4
Silversandal, (1940) A.M.C.731 at p.734; Diethelm & Co.Ltd V.
Flying Trade. (1956) A.M.C.1550; Tetley,3rd ed,p.541.
2- Wilson, p.87.
3- Gosse Millerd. Ltd V. Canadian Government Merchant Marine. (1927) 
28 Ll. L. Rep.88 at p.103 (Lord Wright).
4- William Tetley & eleven, Prosecuting the voyage,(1970-71)45 
TUL.L.R.p.824, hereinafter cited as "Tetley & eleven".
/
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The word "discharge" is used, in place of "deliver", 
because the period of responsibility to which the Rules 
apply (Art. 1(e)), ends when they are discharged from the 
ship.* The carrier, then, is practically bound to play 
some part in discharging the goods from the ship.2
The bill of lading must contain the name of the port of 
discharge. The carrier, then, is obliged to discharge the 
goods at the named port. The port may be, however, defined 
as follows:
"Port, a place for the loading or unloading of ships, 
created by royal charter or lawful prescription. A 
port is a harbour where customs officers are 
established, and where goods are either imported or 
exported to foreign countries, as distinguished from 
a mere harbour which is simply a place, natural or 
artificial, for the safe riding of ships. It is said 
that every port comprehends a city or borough, with a 
market and accommodation for sailors. No person may 
land customable goods on his own land or elsewhere 
than at a port".3
It should be mentioned that the words "port or ports" 
must be taken to mean, functionally, not only those places 
which are technically called ports, but all the places to 
which ships may be accustomed to resort for the purpose of
Gosse Millerd, Ltd V Canadian Government Merchant Marine. 
op.cit,p.103.
2- Pvrene Co.Ltd V. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954]2 Q.B.402 at 
p.418.
3- John Burke, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, (1977)Vol.II 
pp.1384-1385, hereinafter cited as "Burke"; To be a port, "it 
seems that it should have somewhere for vessels to lie safely, and 
a shore where goods may be safely landed; also that there should 
be some conveniences for trade, such as wharves and warehouses; 
and that it should be a place to which vessels are allowed to come 
by the government of the country". Carver, p.1064,para.1504.
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taking cargo. 1 The port also must be s a f e , ^  and taken as 
meaning to be a port by businessmen, insurance companies 
etc. 3
The carrier's duty is to discharge the goods at the port 
named in the bill of lading or at the port about which the 
parties have agreed in the contract, but if the named port 
is found unsafe, for example, with respect to natural 
dangers of the seas, or for political reasons, such as war, 
blockade, the carrier is entitled to discharge the goods at 
the nearest safe place (as a port) which the ship can reach 
and return from s a f e l y . 4 On the other hand, a temporary 
danger, condition or obstruction, such as ice, will not 
make the port unsafe and the carrier is bound to wait for a 
reasonable time until the temporary obstacle ends, and then
Harrower V. Hutchinson. (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B.523 at p.540, (Lush.J.) 
Hall Brothers Co. Ltd V. Paul Ltd. (1914) 30 T.L.R.598, where 
Sankey J, said: "A 'safe port' means a port to which a vessel can 
get laden as she is and at which she can lay and discharge, always 
afloat".
3- Leonis S S. Co V. Rank Ltd. [1908] 1 K.B.499 at p.520 (Kennedy, 
L.J.); The Robert Dollar Co. V Blood. Holman & Co.. (1920)4 Ll. L. 
Rep.343 at p.345 (McCardie, J).
4- G.W. Grace & Co. Ltd V. General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1950]1 
All E.R.201; Limerick SS. Co. V. Stott & Co. [1921]1 K.B.568 at 
p.575? Leeds Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Soci£te Francise Bunge. [1958]2 
Lloyd's Rep.127 at P.131, Sellers, L.J. where he states: "A port 
will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the 
particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, 
in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to 
danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship"; 
Bartle, p.6, said :"A port where she can enter and remain, whether 
for the purpose of loading or unloading, without danger from 
either physical or political causes. If such a danger exists the 
shipowner may require another port to be named and, failing 
direction by the charterer, should proceed to the nearest 
convenient port"; Unitramp v. Garnac Grain Co. Inc. The Hermine. 
[1978]2 Lloyd's Rep.37 at p.46 (Donaldson, J); Kodros Shipping 
Corpn V. Empresa Cubana de Fletes. [1982]2 Lloyd's Rep.307 at 
p.320 (per Lord Roskill); Aktieselskabet Olivebank V. Dansk 
Fabrik. [1919]2 K.B.162.
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he is bound to proceed to the port.l However, if the 
reasonable time has elapsed or when there is no chance for 
the ship to get to a discharge place within a reasonable 
time, the ship is at liberty to go to a reasonable 
discharging place (port) as near as she can safely get to.2 
As has already been mentioned, the carrier's duty is 
defined in the Hague/Visby Rules; he is to discharge the 
goods carried properly. Therefore, the carrier will be 
subject to the liability contained in the Rules until the 
end of the "tackle to tackle" period. Accordingly, if the 
goods are put into a lighter while other goods are being 
discharged into the same lighter, liability prevails until 
the discharge operations of. these goods are completed. This 
point is covered by the Rules, because the Hague Rules are 
intended to apply only to the contract of carriage not to a 
period of time.3 The carrier may also remain responsible 
for loss of or damage to the cargo caused by negligence or 
improper discharge.4 This means that the ocean carrier
Steamship. Knutsford. Ltd V. Tillmanns & Co. [1908] A.C.406, where 
it was stated that the shipowners could not justify ceasing to 
attempt to enter the port of discharge, which was blocked by ice, 
after three days trial, whereas in fact the next day the ice 
cleared and access to the port became safe; see also Reardon 
Smith V. Ministry of Agriculture. [1962]1 Q.B.42 at pp. 109-110.
2- The Varinq. [1931] P.79 at p.87 (Scrutton, L.J.)
3- Goodwin. Ferreia & Co. Ltd V. Lamport & Hold. Ltd. (1939)34 Ll. L.
Rep.192; Falconbridqe Nickel Mines. V. Chimo Shipping. [1973J2 
Lloyd's Rep.469 at p.472, it was held that the discharge into 
barge alongside the ship was considered as part of the discharge 
operation, and the obligation to take the cargo ashore was part of
the contract; East & West S.S.Co. V. Hossain Bros. [1968]2 Lloyd's
Rep. 145 at p. 164 where it was stated that the carriage of goods 
under the Hague Rules did not cease when the goods were discharged 
from the ship into lighter; Captain V. Far Eastern. [1979]1 
Lloyd's Rep.595 at p.602.
4- The Astri, (1945) A.M.C.1064, where iron plates were damaged by a 
leaky drum of acetic acid stowed on top of them in the ship.
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will still be responsible for damage resulting from the 
goods discharged into a lighter, unless such damage occurs 
through the negligence of the lighter operators 
Furthermore, the duty of the shipowner is to get the goods 
out of the ship's hold,^ to put them on the ship's deck or 
alongside for the purpose of discharging the cargo from the 
ship.3
It is to be noted that the carrier's obligation to 
deliver must be carried out in accordance with the custom 
or usage of the port of destination. In some cases, the 
delivery to a terminal operator or to customs authorities 
may terminate the carrier's liability.4 However, the 
contracting parties are at liberty to stipulate any special 
terms and conditions for the manner of discharging the 
cargo.5
It is to be noted that the carrier must notify the 
consignee of the expected time and place of arrival of the 
ship; also the notice should specify the wharf or pier 
where the goods are to be a v a i l a b l e . 6
After discharge sound plates were mixed with the damaged ones. It 
was held that the carrier was responsible not only for the damage 
which took place on board, but also for the damage ashore; Tetley 
& eleven, p.825.
Domestic Insurance Co. V. Barber Line. [1970J1 Lloyd's Rep.49 at 
p.50.
2- Ballantvne & Co. V. Paton & Hendry. 1912 S.C.246.
3- Hang Fung Shipping Co. V. Mullion & Co: [1966]1 Lloyd's Rep.511 
at p.523.
4- "A delivery to certain other particular persons may, by virtue of 
the custom, be equivalent to a delivery to the consignee himself". 
Carver, p.1098; Tetley & eleven, p.825; Peninsular & Oriental 
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. V. Leatham Sons Ltd. (1915)32 T.L.R.153 
at p.155 (Lush, J); A/S Samelling V. Grain Importers fEJRE1. Ltd. 
[1952]1 Lloyd's Rep.313.
5- Regina V. Montreal Shipping Co.. (1956) Ex.C.R.280.
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.565.
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Lastly, the term "substituted delivery" purports to 
terminate the carrier's liability when the carrier 
discharges the goods on the wharf at the end of ship's 
tackle. Such a discharge is intended to complete the 
performance of the carrier's duty, and the consignee is 
required to receive the cargo as soon as discharged.1 Non­
responsibility clauses are then valid after discharge and 
as such are not contrary to U.K. l a w . 2 Thus, in Bank of 
India. Australia & China V. British India Steam Navigation 
Co. Ltd.3 it was stated that: "In all cases and under all
circumstances the liability of the company shall absolutely 
cease when the goods are free of the ship's tackle, and 
thereupon the goods shall be at the risk for all purposes 
and in every respect of the shipper or consignee". 
However, the United States Court of Appeals held that a 
bill of lading clause relieving the carrier of 
responsibility in the delivery from the ship's deck was 
null and void under the Harter Act, as was a clause that 
the ship's responsibility ceased if the consignee did not 
immediately receive the goods.^
Under the Harter Act, a clause of a similar nature was held void, 
see Caterpillar Overseas S.A V. S.S. Expeditor. (1963) A.M.C.1662 
at p.1666.
2- The Arawa. [1980]2 Lloyd's Rep.135; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.583.
3- [1909] A.C.369; Scrutton, 19th ed,Note 4, p.304, where he states: 
"In the absence of any such express provision, the question must 
be decided by the custom of the port of discharge; and, if no such 
custom can be proved, the general rule appears to be "that goods 
are delivered when they are so completely in the custody of the 
consignee that he may do as he pleases with them".
4- David Crystal V. Cunard S.S.Co. (1965) A.M.C.39; Monsieur Henri 
Wines Ltd. V. S.S.Covadonqa. (1965) A.M.C.740.
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2.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
The basic rules governing the responsibility of the 
carrier were discussed by the Working Group on Merchant 
Shipping Legislation of UNCITRAL at its third session in 
February 1972. Alternative schemes of liability to replace 
the existing Articles 3 and 4 of the Hague Rules were 
considered.
Both carrier nations and shipper nations supported the 
principle of the carrier's liability being based on fault, 
and it was believed to be desirable, at the outset, that 
the basic principle of fault be simply stated while the 
rules for the burden of proof were separately elaborated 
together with a separate consideration of the exceptions to 
liability.*
At the fourth session in Geneva, in September 1972, of 
the Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping 
of UNCITRAL, after lengthy discussions, the majority of the 
members reached an agreement on the principles which should 
be incorporated in a set of rules that would govern the 
responsibility of the carrier for loss of or damage to 
cargo and which would replace Articles 3(l)and(2) and 4 
(l)and(2) of the Hague Rules.2 Accordingly, they chose to 
state an affirmative rule of responsibility based on
Sweeney, part 1, p.102
2- This session adopted the following working basis; 1.Retention of 
the principle of Hague Rules that the responsibility of the 
carrier should be based on fault; 2.Simplification and 
strengthening of the above principle by removing or modifying the 
exceptions that relieve the carrier of responsibility for 
negligence or fault of his employees or agents (Article 4,2(a) and 
(b) Hague Rules); and 3. Simplification and unification of the 
rules on burden of proof; Cleton, p.5; Kimball, p.233; UNCITRAL 
Year Book, vol, IV (1973),pp.138-139.
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presumed fault and to abolish the catalogue of exceptions
contained in Article 4(2) of the Hague Rules. This
statement of basic liability was drafted and has been
adopted under Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, which
provides that:
"The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss
of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in
delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place while the goods were in 
his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the 
carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took 
all measures that could reasonably be required to 
avoid the occurrence and its consequences".
Thus, the new Rules do not endeavour to introduce a
"strict" or "absolute" system of the carrier's liability
under which the carrier is liable for all loss or damage
which may affect the cargo whilst in his custody. 1 This
basis then does not change the concept of the Hague Rules,
but the fundamental difference between the two systems lies
in the different ways in which the "fault" principle is
applied in each.2 Accordingly, the basic duties of the
carrier set forth in Article 3(1) and (2) of the
Hague/Visby Rules would remain in effect under the Hamburg
Rules Article 5(1) as part of the carrier's overall
responsibility to perform with due care all of his
obligations under the contract of carriage. However, the
B.K.Williams, The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance, 
published in the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.252, hereinafter cited as 
"Williams".
2- Ibid.
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Hamburg Rules provide a general rule which is based on the 
principle of presumed fault or neglect.*
As it has already been mentioned that the first of the 
carrier's major obligations under the Hague Rules is to 
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, the 
carrier is accordingly liable not only for any negligence 
committed by himself or by his servants or employees, but 
also he is responsible for the negligence of independent 
contractors such as surveyors and ship repairer s. 2 in this 
connection then Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules intended 
to achieve the same result by providing that the carrier 
would be liable for any negligence in making the ship 
seaworthy whether caused by his own employees or by the 
employees of an independent contractor, such as a ship 
repairer J  However, instead of referring to the 
seaworthiness of the ship and instead of providing that the 
shipowner has a positive and non-delegable duty to exercise 
due diligence, it provides that "The carrier is liable for 
loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, [....] 
unless he proves that he, his servants and agents took all 
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence and its consequences".
Furthermore, the Hamburg Rules are also intended to 
eliminate the discrepancies and ambiguities which are found 
under the Hague Rules. Under the Hague Rules, the
Annex II of the Hamburg Rules (Common understanding adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on carriage of goods by sea).
Muncaster Castle. [1961]1 Lloyd's Rep.57.
3- Diamond, UNCITRAL,p.47.
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obligation of the carrier to provide a seaworthy ship is
restricted to a duty to exercise due diligence before and
at the beginning of the voyage.1 However, the carrier's 
duty to provide a seaworthy ship under the Hamburg Rules is 
to be judged on the same basis as his duty towards the
cargo, and both obligations are to run throughout the 
v o y a g e .  ^ in other words, the provision of Article 3 ( 1 )  of 
the Hague Rules is not specifically set out in the Hamburg 
Rules but is effectively covered by Article 5 ( 1 ) .  This
means that Article 5 ( 1 )  of the Hamburg Rules covers the 
meaning of seaworthiness by the term of "reasonable 
measures" and that an implicit undertaking should be 
adhered to throughout the period of carriage.
Undoubtedly, it is clear that para.l of Article 5  of the 
Hamburg Rules contains a rule of liability for fault. 
However, one must recognize that such a rule, combined with 
a reversal of the burden of proof, can be close to a rule 
of strict liability.3 Accordingly, it can be noted that, 
par.l of Article 5  includes two stages concerning the 
carrier's liability. The first stage is to establish that 
the "occurrence" which caused the loss or damage incurred 
occurred while the goods were in the carrier's charge. If 
it did, then the second stage will follow. This second 
stage means that it is for the carrier to prove that he
Article 3(1) of the Hague Rules.
2- Wilson, p.204.
3- Robert Cleton, The Special Features arising from the Hamburg 
Diplomatic Conference,published in the Hamburg Rules, A One-Day 
Seminar, organised by Lloyd's of London Press Ltd,1978, London, 
p.5, hereinafter cited as "Cleton".
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took all measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
A question may then arise as to what is the significance 
of the term "occurrence"? It may mean something other than 
the fact that the goods have sustained damage or that they 
have become lost while in the carrier's charge. 1 In other 
words, the occurrence need not be of an extraordinary 
nature or arise from irresistible force. All that is 
required is that it happens while the carrier is in charge 
of the goods, 2 namely that the occurrence must have
occurred while the goods are in the shipowner's charge, and
that the only real effect of the Rule is to oblige the 
shipowner to prove that he took reasonable measures 
affecting the goods.3
Another important question is: What is it that the
carrier has to prove in order to escape liability? Does he 
have to show solely that a reasonable shipowner in his 
position would not have done more to safeguard the cargo 
than he did? Or is it necessary for him to go further and 
prove that it would have been totally impracticable to take 
further steps in this respect? It is believed that Article 
5(1) of the Hamburg Rules does not impose a more extensive 
duty on the shipowner than that of ordinary reasonable 
care. Annex II of these Rules makes it clear that all the 
shipowner needs to do is to show that he took reasonable
Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.10.
^- Mankabady, p.5 5.
3- Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.11.
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care of the goods. 1 Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules 
makes clear that the carrier is liable for loss or damage 
caused by his own fault or neglect or by the fault of his 
servants or agents. It is then necessary to establish the 
criterion by which the carrier, servants and the agents can 
be defined.
The Hamburg Rules have made two separate provisions for
the carrier and the actual carrier as follows:
"1.'Carrier' means any person by whom or in whose name 
a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been 
concluded with a shipper.
2. 'Actual carrier' means any person to whom the 
performance of carriage of the goods, or of part of 
the carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, 
and includes any other person to whom such 
performance has been entrusted.
It seems that the definition of the carrier under the
Hamburg Rules is somewhat wider than that provided under
the Hague/Visby Rules.3 However, there is no article in
the Hamburg Rules which attempts to define the concept of
"servants" and "agents". It is not difficult to define the
concept of "servants". It is well defined in the U.K. as
"A person usually employed on a regular basis, who as
distinguished from an independent contractor, is subject to
the command of his employer as to the manner in which he
Ibid
2- Article 1(1,2) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Article 1(a) of the Hague Rules defined the carrier as follows: 
''' carrier' includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a 
contract of carriage with a shipper".
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shall do his work."l It is to be noted that the concept of 
"agents” tends to have a different meaning because it is 
not always easy to determine the exact role of the 
intermediaries as to whether they are acting as servants, 
agents or independent contractors. Also most
intermediaries do not adhere strictly to their role and 
undertake associated activities.^ For instance, a freight 
forwarder may act as an independent contractor,3 or as an 
agent acting on behalf of the shipper,4 the consignee or 
the carrier. However, it is believed that the concept of 
"agents" "must include persons whom the carrier may employ 
ad hoc (for example, as independent contractors) for the 
purpose of performing the contract of carriage".5
As has already been mentioned, stevedores are the most 
important category in this respect. Then what is the 
criterion for deciding whether the stevedore is a servant, 
agent or independent contractor? In most countries the 
status of stevedores is not clear, and the courts have 
adopted different solutions in this matter.6 However, in
Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.13.
2- Mankabady, p.69.
3- J.Evans & Sons (Portsmouth) Ltd V. Andrea Merzario Ltd. [1976]2 
Lloyd's Rep.165 at p.168 (L.J. Roskill) when he said: "The
defendants are not carriers .... they are forwarding contractors 
who arranged for the transport of goods .... The work which they 
do is performed by them through many sub-contractors".
4- The freight forwarder may also: a)obtain the necessary documents 
for export and import; b) carry the customs formalities and check 
the packages; c) pay the dues and, d) arrange for an insurance 
cover.
Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.13.
6- Hevn V. Ocean S.S.Co.. (1927) 27 T.L.R.358, where it was held that 
"the stevedores are the ship's servants, and the shipowner or 
charterer, as the case may be, is vicariously liable for damage 
done by stevedores".
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English case law, there are two criteria used to clarify 
the position of stevedore as follows:
1.The degree of control and supervision of his work by 
the principal.1
2. The work to be done within the scope of his 
employment.2
If a stevedore satisfies these criteria he will be held 
to be a servant for whom the carrier will be vicariously 
liable. It is worthy of note that if the meaning of the 
terms "servants or agents" is left to be determined 
according to the concepts established under each legal 
system, different interpretations may prevail, because each 
contracting state may apply its own rules of vicarious 
liability when applying Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules 
and that widely differing results may be expected in 
different states.3 However, if the courts, guided by 
Article 3 of the Hamburg Rules, 4 give weight to the 
international character of the rules, one may expect some 
uniformity in this respect.
It is to be noted that the Hamburg Rules may be, on a 
carrier, rather stricter than the provisions of the Hague
Canadian Transport Co. V. Court Line Ltd. [1940] A.C.934 at
pp.937-938, (Lord Atkin).
United Africa Co. Ltd V. Saka Owoade, [1955] A.C.130, where it is 
stated: "There is no difference in the liability of a master's 
wrongs whether for fraud or any other wrong committed by a servant 
in the course of his employment"; The Eurvmedon. [1971]2 Lloyd's 
Rep.399 at p.408; Mankabady, p.70.
3- Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.13.
4- Article 3 of the Hamburg Rules provides that:
"In the interpretation and application of the provisions of this 
convention regard shall be had to its international character and 
to the need to promote uniformity".
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Rules, where Article 7(2) provides* that the carrier's 
servants or agents can avail themselves of the defence in 
the Rules if only they prove that they acted within the 
scope of their employment. 2 it is also noteworthy that 
where the contract of carriage wholly or partially is 
concluded by someone who is not the contracting carrier or 
the carriage is performed by such carrier, he is called 
"the actual carrier".3 The carrier is responsible for acts 
or omissions of the actual carrier and for the acts or 
omissions of his servants or agents acting within the scope 
of their employment according to Article 10(2) of the 
Hamburg Rules. On the other hand, the shipper has a right 
to bring his claim against the actual carrier if the loss, 
damage or delay of the goods occurred while they were in 
his charge.^ The actual carrier will under the Hamburg 
Rules be under an entirely statutory liability, neither 
contractual nor tortious, regarding the carriage of goods.5 
On the other hand, the statutory protection and defence of 
the servants and agents of the carrier are extended to the 
servants and agents of the actual carrier.
*- Article 7(2) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"[....] such servant or agent, if he proves that he acted within 
the scope of his employment, is entitled to avail himself of the 
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to 
invoke under this convention".
Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.14.
Article 10(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Articles 10(2) and 11(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
5- Gordon Pollock, A Legal Analysis of the Hamburg Rules (part II), 
published in the Hamburg Rules, A One-day Seminar organized by 
Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, London, 1978, p.9, hereinafter cited 
as "Pollock".
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It is to be mentioned that Article 11 of the Hamburg 
Rules together with Article 10 exonerates the carrier from 
liability in the following situations
1. Where the contract of carriage provides explicitly 
that a specified part of the carriage covered by the 
contract is to be performed by a named person other 
than the carrier;
2. When a contract provides that the carrier is not 
liable for loss, damage or delay caused by an 
occurrence which takes place when the goods are in 
the charge of such a named person;
3. If the carrier can prove that the damage occurred 
whilst the goods were in the charge of such a named 
person.2
Insofar as loss or damage caused by delay in delivery is 
concerned, it is important to note that the Hague/Visby 
Rules contain no specific provisions in respect of delay; 
but that does not mean that the Hague/Visby Rules leave 
cargo-owners unprotected. Such an obligation could be then 
implied in Article 3(2), which imposes a general duty of 
care in handling the cargo.3 However, para.l of Article 5
Article 11(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
2- Wilson, p.214; Thomas, p.7; J.P.Honour, The P fit I, Clubs and the 
New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
1978, published in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.247, hereinafter cited as 
"Honour".
2- Report of the Working Group of UNCITRAL, A/CN. 9/WG. III/WP. 12 
(Vol.l) of 30 November 1973, where it was believed that the 
language of Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules authorized recovery 
for physical damages caused by delay because of the carrier's 
obligation to, "... properly and carefully load ...., carry ...., 
and discharge the goods carried". Thereafter, the Report pointed 
out that the recovery of economic loss is also authorized under
99
of the Hamburg Rules makes it clear that the carrier is
liable for loss resulting from delay in delivery of the 
goods. Para. 2 of the same Article then defines what 
constitutes delay. Two possibilities are provided for: 
first, there is delay in delivery if the parties have 
expressly agreed upon a time for delivery and the goods are 
not delivered at the port of discharge within that time. 
Secondly, where there is no such express agreement, there 
is delay if the goods are not delivered within the time 
which it would be reasonable to require of a diligent
carrier, having regard to the circumstances of the case.l 
What is then the situation if the goods are not delivered 
within the estimated time? Para.3 of Article 5 of the 
Hamburg Rules resolves this situation by providing that the 
consignee is entitled to recover for loss of the goods if 
they have not been delivered within 60 consecutive days 
following the expiry time for delivery.2 in other words, 
failure to deliver the goods within 60 consecutive days 
following the expiry of the above defined delivery date 
entitles the consignee to treat the goods as lost. 
However, this provision gives rise to some considerable 
difficulties. One of these is that para.3 of Article 5 can 
operate even where the carrier has been guilty of no fault
whatsoever. For instance, if the carrier and the shipper
the Hague Rules. Report of Working Group A/CN. 9/88 of 29 March 
1974, para.13-17; Wilson, p.208.
1- Article 5(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
This provision is similar to Article 20 of the CMR Convention, 
Article 30 of the CIM Convention and Article 16(2) of the IMT 
Convention (but 90 days instead of 60 days).
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have agreed a time for delivery, and the ship is delayed 
through no fault of the carrier more than 60 days beyond 
the agreed period, then the owner of the goods is entitled 
to deem the goods to have been lost.l Furthermore, how 
does the claimant treat the goods as lost? Does he abandon 
them, in the sense of making no attempt to obtain 
possession? If so, who then owns the goods, is it the 
carrier or the cargo insurer if the latter has settled a 
claim for non-delivery? Moreover, at the end of 60 days 
period the place where the goods are may be known, although 
some further time may elapse before they can be delivered 
at the intended destination. The Hamburg Rules do not say 
which claimant shall have the goods.
In practice, it has been said that no carrier would ever 
guarantee anything beyond the date of arrival of his vessel 
at the contractual destination (port of discharge), because 
it may be that many factors could combine to delay 
berthing, discharging, customs and quarantine formalities. 
Also, these provisions for liability in case of delay are 
unworkable, unless there is a firm written agreement 
between the carrier and the shipper at the outset as to the 
time to be taken to perform the carriage. Accordingly, I
It is noteworthy that there were differing views as to whether the 
carrier should have the right to prove that the goods were not in 
fact lost. Some favoured retention of the language "unless the 
carrier proves the contrary" following the expression "may treat 
the goods as lost", in order to permit the carrier to prove that 
the goods were not lost, and thereby overcome the presumption of 
their loss. But, the majority considered it unnecessary to 
include provisions regulating in detail the rights of the claimant 
and the carrier if the goods should be recovered, trusting that 
the problems would be solved in commercial practice. Report of 
the Working Group of the Seventh Session (A/CN. 9/88) at par.25 
and 28; Sweeney, part III.p.494.
101
am inclined to agree with the view that the carrier should 
be advised not to agree to any specific delivery period in 
order to minimize the risk of liability due to delay. 1
Insofar as the consequences of delay are concerned, the 
question is what is to be the measure of damages in cases 
of delay? Obviously the words "loss or damage" cover 
physical d a m a g e ^  to the goods caused by delay, but it is 
not clear whether these words also cover loss of value 
through delay. The measure is the difference between the 
market value of the goods on the date they should have 
arrived and the market value at the date of actual 
a r r i v a l .   ^ What is the meaning of market value? Market 
value is an important criterion for estimating damages 
considered to be the commonest basis in this respect and 
the only one which ascertains the loss to the shipper or 
c o n s i g n e e .  ^ it is easy to estimate damages, if there is a 
market value or price with published listing at the place 
of discharge; but when there is no such market price, the 
value must be ascertained by substituted methods which
■*•- Pollock, p.5, Robert Schilling, The effect on International Trade 
of the Implementation of the Hamburg Rules from the point of view 
of the shipper, published by Comity Maritime International,
Colloquium on the Hamburg Rules, 1979, p.7, hereinafter cited as 
"Schilling".
2- Such as, the goods carried may suffer a minor loss or damage from
natural causes during the course of the voyage. See Sweeney, part
III.pp.488-490; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.332.
3- Koufos V. C. Czarnikow. Ltd, [1969] 1 A.C.350; Heskell V.
Continental Express. (1950)83 Ll.L.R.438;Scrutton, 19th ed, p.404. 
The Queen Dynamic. [1982]2 Lloyd's Rep.88 at p.89, where it 
stated thats "On the issue of damage, the sound arrived value 
shall be assessed on the basis that a higher rate of duties would 
be payable on them".
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apply criteria of the value, or the nearest date as a 
governing basis.^
Coming now to the consideration of the period of 
responsibility, we have to ask whether the question may 
arise as to when the period of the carrier's responsibility 
would begin and when it would end.
First of all, it has already been mentioned that under 
the Hague/Visby Rules the period of the carrier's 
responsibility is limited to a "tackle to tackle" period.
The Working Group on International Legislation on 
Shipping of UNCITRAL, considered two problems concerning 
the operation of the existing Article 1(e) of the Hague 
Rules:
1. Doubt as to whether the Rules apply to loss or damage 
occurring during loading or unloading operations
2. The fact that the existing Rules do not cover loss or 
damage occurring prior to loading or subsequent to 
discharge even while goods are in the charge or 
control of the carrier or its a g e n t s . ^
The constituted Working Group established two points s
The Juno.r19861 1 Lloyd's Rep.190 at p.191; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.325.
2- The Report of the Secretary General suggested the following draft: 
"Carriage of goods covers the period from the commencement of 
loading operations until the completion of discharge of the goods 
from the ship." Doc.No.A/CN.9/63/Add.1.par.26 (1972).
3- The Report of the Secretary General suggested a modification draft 
to the above suggested draft, as follows:
"Carriage of goods covers the period from the time the goods are 
(in charge of) (accepted for carriage) (received by) the carrier 
to the time of their discharge". Doc.No.A/CN.9/63/Add.1.par.37,
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1. The New Rules should be extended to govern the entire 
period during which the carrier was actually in charge 
of the goods.
2. The period of responsibility under the New Rules 
should not begin prior to the carrier's custody at 
port of loading and should not continue beyond the 
port of discharge. 1
After long discussions, the Drafting Party reached
agreement on the period of responsibilities as follows:
"The responsibility of the carrier for the goods 
under this convention covers the period during which 
the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of 
loading, during the carriage and at the port of 
discharge."2
It will be noted that this Article is wider than Article 
1(e) of the Hague Rules which adopted a narrow concept of 
period of responsibility, namely "covering the period from 
the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they 
are discharged from the ship". That Article then covers 
only the sea carriage, whereas the Hamburg Rules cover the 
period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods 
at the port of loading, during the carriage itself and at 
the port of discharge. Therefore, the period of the 
carrier's responsibility under the Hamburg Rules governs 
different operations whether on land or waterways which are 
deemed to be necessary for the carriage of goods by s e a . 3  
Thus, Article 4 of the Hamburg Rules, designed to replace
1- Sweeney, part 1. p.78.
2- Article 4(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Peyrefitte, pp.125-126.
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Article 1(e) of the Hague Rules, abandoned the so-called 
"tackle to tackle" rule^.
Article 4(2) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, the 
carrier is deemed to be in charge of the goods:
(a) from the time he has taken over the goods [...]"
The Hamburg Rules do not define the terms "in charge of 
the goods" or "has taken over the goods". It is therefore 
important to find out the precise moment of taking charge 
of the goods. The terms "taking over" the goods have 
different interpretations. In the literature it is said 
that the carrier's responsibility is linked with the 
supervision of the cargo. In other words, effective 
supervision is an important element in taking charge of the 
g o o d s .  ^ Another approach believes that taking over the 
goods commences from the moment when the carrier exercises 
or is able to exercise his right of checking the cargo.3
In my opinion these views are too rigid and I consider 
that the best approach is to say that taking over the goods 
is a matter of fact which can be proved by any means in any 
given case. Of course, in determining the time of taking 
over the goods, supervision of the cargo and checking of 
the cargo are both highly relevant factors. I submit, 
however, that neither are conclusive of the question of 
taking over the goods. It is also possible for the parties
1- Mankabady, p.5 0
2- Ibid.
2- Peyrefitte, p.130.
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to specifically agree to determine the moment of taking 
over the goods. This must, however, be subject to the 
provision of the convention. 1 This is made clear by 
Article 2 3^, that the Rules under this convention have a 
compulsory character. That means any clause which 
derogates, directly or indirectly, from the provisions of 
the Convention is null and void. Therefore, it prohibits 
any clauses by which the carrier limits the scope of his 
obligation in a way different from the provisions of the 
Convention^. An example would be a contractual clause which 
sought to use the "tackle to tackle" period. Such a clause 
although purporting to determine the timing of taking over 
the goods would not be consistent with the Hamburg Rules 
and would thus be invalid under those rules. It would be an 
attempt to re-introduce an aspect of the Hague/Visby Rules 
by contract.
It is to be mentioned that Article 14(1) of the Hamburg 
Rules states that "when the carrier or the actual carrier 
takes the goods in his charge, the carrier must, on demand 
of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading"; but 
the carrier may take over the goods before issuing the bill 
of lading. In such a case, it would be wise for the
Peyrefitte states that: "As the provisions of the new convention 
have a compulsory character (Article 23), clauses which stipulate 
different places for taking over the liquid will be null and 
void", p.131.
2- Article 23 (1) of the Hamburg Rules provides that:
"Any stipulation in a contract of carriage by sea, in a bill of 
lading, or in any other document evidencing the contract of 
carriage by sea is null and void to the extent that it derogates, 
directly or indirectly, from the provisions of this convention".
3- Peyrefitte, p.130.
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shipper or his representative to ask for a delivery receipt 
indicating the exact date of taking over the goods.1 
Furthermore, the carrier takes over the goods from the 
shipper, or any person acting on his behalf or an authority 
or other party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations 
applicable at the port of loading.2 As a result, all the 
operations after taking over the goods, such as loading 
operations, are part of the performance of the contract of 
carriage.
Insofar as the goods are carried by lighter, the 
question concerns the point when the exact moment of taking 
charge of the goods begins. The answer depends on the 
circumstances, that is, if the carrier owns or controls the 
lighters, then carriage by lighters is deemed part of the 
performance of the contract of carriage, whereas, if the 
carrier does not own or control the lighters, but they are 
owned or controlled by an independent contractor, the exact 
moment of taking charge of the goods begins at the place 
where the carrier has a right to check the contents of the 
shipment.3
In the case of carriage by containers, usually the 
carrier takes over the container at the place of business 
of the shipper e.g. his warehouse. Then the moment of 
taking over the goods by the carrier will be the time when 
the carrier exercises or is able to exercise his right of 
checking the container. Even a partial exercise of this
1- Mankabady, p.5 0.
Article 4(2)(a) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Peyrefitte, p.131.
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right of checking, either by the carrier himself or by his 
servants or agents, is sufficient to take the containers 
into his charge.1
It is noteworthy that Article 23 (2) of the Hamburg
Rules permits the carrier to extend the period during which 
he is in charge of the goods^. Accordingly, the carrier 
can be responsible for any loss or damage to the container 
while it is carried from the shipper's warehouse to the 
port of loading if he so agrees by contract with the 
shipper3.
We must now consider the question of whether the goods 
may be carried on deck. Unlike the Hague Rules**, the 
definition of goods in the Hamburg Rules is wide enough to 
include deck cargo. Article 9 of the Hamburg Rules deals 
specifically with deck cargo. The carrier is entitled to 
carry the goods on deck only if such carriage is in 
accordance with an agreement with the shipper, or with the 
usage of the particular trade, or is required by statutory 
rules or regulations^. This means that if the goods are 
carried on deck contrary to the agreement, usage of trade 
or statutory rules, the carrier will be in breach of the
Ibid, p.132.
2- Article 23(2) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a 
carrier may increase his responsibilities and obligations under 
this convention".
3- Mankabady, p.51.
Article 1(c) of the Hague Rules.
5- Article 9(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
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contract. * Thus, cargo carried on deck in appropriate 
circumstances is subject to the Rules.2
It is to be noted that, in the case of agreement with 
the shipper to carry the goods on deck, the carrier must 
insert, in the bill of lading or other document evidencing 
the contract of carriage, a statement to that e f f e c t . 3 The 
meaning of "statement" in Article 9(2) of the Hamburg Rules 
does not require a statement that the goods are actually to 
be carried on deck, but only that there is an agreement 
that they may be so carried, and thus only state that the 
goods shall or may be carried on deck.** However, in the 
absence of such a statement, the carrier has the burden of 
proving vis-a-vis the shipper that there was an agreement 
to carry the goods on deck; the carrier, however, is not 
entitled to invoke such an agreement against a third party 
who has acquired a bill of lading in good faith. 5 The 
carrier will be responsible for any loss or damage to the 
goods, as well as for delay in delivery resulting solely 
from the carriage on d e c k , 6 that is, when the goods have 
been carried on deck contrary to the provisions of para.l
■*- Mankabady, p.76.
william Tetley, Articles 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules, published 
in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, edited by 
Samir Mankabady, 1978, p.198, hereinafter cited as "Tetley, 
Articles 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules".
3- Article 9(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Article 15(1)(m) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"The bill of loading must include, inter alia, the following 
particulars:
(m) the Statement, if applicable, that the goods shall or may be 
carried on deck."; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.670.
5- Article 9(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
6- Article 9(3) of the Hamburg Rules.
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of Article 9 of the Hamburg Rules,! notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, even if he 
shows that he took all reasonable measures to avoid 
carrying the cargo on deck and the damage resulted from 
such c a r r i a g e .  ^Moreover, Article 9(4) of the Hamburg Rules 
provides that "carriage of goods on deck contrary to 
express agreement [between the carrier and the shipper], 
for carriage under deck is deemed to be an act or omission 
of the carrier within the meaning of Article 8 " . 3 This 
means, if the shipper agreed with the carrier that his 
goods were to be carried below deck, and the goods were 
subsequently carried on deck contrary to the agreement, 
then the shipper will recover any loss of or damage to the 
cargo and delay in delivery without regard to the 
limitations set in Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules.**
Tetley critically concludes that Article 9 of the 
Hamburg Rules has done nothing to clarify what deck 
carriage is, nor when it may take place; and that, moreover 
Article 9 has enlarged the right to carry on deck, and has 
diminished the sanction for improper deck carriage.5
Insofar as dangerous goods are concerned, it is to be 
noted that the Hamburg Rules basically follow the formula 
of the Hague Rules, but the position has been changed in
1 - Ibid.
2- Sassoon & Cunningham, p.184.
3- Article 9(4) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Waldron, p.313.
5- Tetley, 3rd ed,pp.669-670, The Hamburg Rules, p.11.
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some respects.! Thus, the shipper is obliged to mark or 
label the dangerous goods in a suitable manner^ and must 
inform the carrier of the dangerous character of the goods, 
and, if necessary, of the precautions to be taken.3 The 
term "if necessary" means that if the precautions are not 
well known to the carrier, then the shipper must state the 
precautions.** The Hamburg Rules do not affect the rights 
and liabilities of the contracting parties if dangerous 
goods are shipped.5 However, if the shipper fails to inform 
the carrier of the dangerous character of the goods, then 
the shipper will be liable to the carrier for any loss or 
damage to the cargo resulting from such goods, and the 
carrier shall be entitled, without payment of compensation, 
to discharge and destroy such goods if the circumstances 
may r e q u i r e . 6 On the other hand, if the carrier is told or 
otherwise knows of the dangerous character of the goods, 
the carrier will then not be able to recover loss or damage 
from the shipper unless any loss or damage is caused by the 
fault of neglect of the shipper.7
Lastly, coming now to consideration of the delivery of 
the goods at the port of discharge as agreed in the 
contract, we have to mention an important point: all
operations which take place before delivery are considered
!- Article 13 of the Hamburg Rules, Cf. Article IV (6) of the Hague 
Rules.
2- Article 13(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Article 13(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Tetley, Articles 9-13 of the Hamburg Rules, p.202.
5- Thomas, p.6.
6- Article 13(2)(a,b) and para.3 of the Hamburg Rules.
7- Thomas, p.6.
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to be part of the performance of the contract of carriage.! 
Therefore, the delivery of the goods happens when the goods 
are received by the consignee or his representative.2 it 
supposes also the readiness of the consignee or his 
representative to check the goods. Therefore, in order to 
claim for compensation, the consignee must prove that the 
loss or damage to the goods existed before delivery. Thus 
the consignee or his surveyor has the right to check the 
goods before d e l i v e r y .  3 it is to be mentioned then that 
the rules concerning the delivery are similar to those 
applied to taking over of the goods by the carrier.
The carrier has a right to discharge the goods at the 
nearest safe port,** when the carrier is unable to deliver 
the goods at the named port for a reason, such as a strike 
or force majeure, and the carrier cannot be expected to 
wait for an end of a strike or the force majeure. Article 
4(2)(b)(ii) of the Hamburg Rules makes clear by providing 
that where the consignee does not receive the goods, the 
carrier is deemed to deliver the goods when they are placed 
"at the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the 
contract or with the law or with the usage of the 
particular trade, applicable at the port of discharge." 
Thus, in such a case the period of transport comes to an 
end without any acceptance of the consignee which is
!- Peyrefitte, p.133.
Article 4(2)(b) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Peyrefitte, p.133.
4- Bartle, p.6.
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equivalent to delivering the goods to their final 
destination indicated in the bill of lading.!
It can be concluded that the above discussed Hamburg 
Rules are fair and equitable in safeguarding mutual 
interests between shipper and carrier. This view is 
reflected in the supporting opinions of authors. Future 
developments will hopefully confirm the usefulness and 
validity of the Hamburg Rules also in judicial practice.
2.2 The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof, although a question of the law of 
evidence, is in practice a basic element in balancing the 
rights and interests of the contracting parties with 
respect to any legal claim. In order to find out the 
differences and the most satisfactory rules, it is 
important then to discuss and analyse the burden of proof 
in respect of proving or disproving the carrier's liability 
for loss or damage to the goods under the following points:
2.2.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules.
2.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules.
!- Peyrefitte, p.134.
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2.2.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules.
There is no general theory of burden of proof set out in 
the Hague Rules!, certain references are to be found in
particular provisions where the burden of proof is 
prescribed.
When the goods arrive and the cargo-owner discovers that
his goods have been lost or damaged, he must make a prima
facie case against the carrier by showing that the loss or
damage occurred while the goods were in the carrier's
charge. Thus, in Gosse Millerd. Ltd V. Canadian Government
Merchant Marine. Ltd .^ Viscount Sumner said:
"As the cargo in question was shipped in good order 
and condition and was delivered damaged, in a manner 
which was preventable and ought not to have been 
allowed to occur, there was sufficient evidence of a 
breach by the carrier of his obligations under 
Article III, r.2, of the Act of 1924, to shift to him 
the onus of bringing the cause of the damage 
specifically within Article IV, r.2, so as to obtain 
the relief for which it provides".
Hence, the carrier's failure to deliver the goods in 
spite of the arrival of the ship, is considered prima facie 
evidence of a breach of the contract.3 This is probably 
only enough to establish negligence on the part of the
!- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.133.
[1929] A.C. 223 at p.234; Wright J. at trial also said:
"The words 'properly discharge' in Article III, r.2., mean, I 
think, 'deliver from ship's tackle in the same apparent order and 
condition as on shipments', unless the carrier can excuse himself 
under Article IV. Hence the carrier's failure to deliver must 
constitute a prima facie breach of his obligations, casting on him 
the onus to excuse that breach". [1927J2 K.B. 432 at p.434.
3- Scrutton, 19th ed,p.220.
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carrier,! not wilful m i s c o n d u c t ^ . Then, in order to
free himself from responsibility, the carrier must show 
that the goods were not shipped on his ship in case of non­
delivery or that the loss or damage to the goods occurred 
while the goods were not in his c h a r g e . 3 Furthermore, if 
the carrier wants to invoke the protection of the 
immunities conferred upon him by Hague/Visby Rules, he must 
prove that the loss of or damage to the goods which has 
occurred is neither the result of his actual fault or 
privity nor of the fault or neglect of his agents or 
servants. **
It is to be mentioned that the carrier cannot rely on 
the "excepted perils" if he has not carried out his duty 
under Article 3(1) of the Hague Rules to exercise due 
diligence to make the ship s e a w o r t h y . 5 However, if there 
are two contributing acts affecting the cargo, one 
constituting unseaworthiness caused by a failure of the 
carrier to exercise due diligence, and the other is an act 
for which the carrier is entitled to exempt himself from 
liability (by the exceptions of Article 4(2) of the Hague
!- The "Roberta". (1938) 60 Ll. L.R. 84.
2- Smith. Ltd V. Great Western Railway, Co. [1922]1 A.C.178.
3- Chung Hwa Steel Products & Trading V. Glen Lines. (1935) 51 Ll. 
L.R. 248, where cases containing wool gaberdine did not arrive. 
The consignees claimed damages and alleged that they had been 
pilfered from the ship. It was held that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove with any reasonable certainty that the goods were 
lost while in the custody of the ship (even though it was not 
impossible that the goods were pilfered while on rail or in the 
dock shed); Scrutton, 19th ed,p.220.
4- Article 4(2)(q) of the Hague Rules; Owners of Cargo of City of 
Baroda V. Hall Line. Ltd. (1926) 42. T.L.R. 717.
5- Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. V. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
Ltd, [1959] A.C.589; [1959] 2 All E.R.740.
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Rules), the burden of proof is then upon the carrier. He 
has to prove what damage was due to the cause for which he 
is exempted.1 For instance, if the carrier proves that he 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, but in 
spite of that some loss or damage was caused to the goods, 
he will be exonerated from liability by virtue of Article 
4(2) of the Hague Rules.2 Otherwise the carrier will be 
responsible for the entire d a m a g e , 3 unless he shows that 
part of the damage is proportionately attributable to the 
exempted p e r i l . 4 Moreover, if the carrier cannot protect 
himself by one of the exceptions under Article 4(2) of the 
Hague Rules, he will be responsible for unexplained damage 
to the goods despite the fact that the ship was seaworthy, 
the goods were stowed in the driest and safest place aboard 
and the hold was in good condition.5 On the other hand, 
when the carrier establishes a prima facie case that the 
loss or damage to the goods resulted from an excepted 
peril, the onus then shifts to the shipper or consignee to 
prove that the real cause of the loss was not within the
Government of Cevlon V. Chandris, [1965] 3 All E.R.48; Scrutton, 
19th ed,p.451.
2- J. Gerber & Co V. S. S. Sabine Howaldt & Co.. [1971] A.M.C. 539, 
where the carrier showed the cause was a peril rather than lack of 
due diligence; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.314; Kimball, p.226; Gilmor & 
Black, p.163.
3- Smith. Hogg & Co. Ltd V. Black Sea & Baltic General In. Co. Ltd. 
[1940] A.C.997.
Gosse Millerd V. Canadian Government Merchant Marine. (1928)32. 
Ll.L.Rep.91 at p.98;[1929] A.C.223 at p.241 (per Viscount Sumner); 
The "Torenia". [1983]2 Lloyd's Rep.210 at p.218, where Hobhouse, 
J. stated that: "where the facts disclose that the loss was
caused by the concurrent causative effect of an excepted and non­
excepted peril, the carrier remains liable. He only escapes 
liability to the extent that he can prove that the loss or damage 
was caused by the excepted peril alone".
5- George E . Pickett. (1948) A.M.C.453.
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exceptions e.g. unseaworthiness or unjustifiable 
deviation.^ However, if the shipper fails to discharge this 
onus the carrier will be protected by one of the excepted 
perils. ^  Thus it is not required that the carrier has 
positively to prove that he was not negligent. He does 
have the onus of showing that the loss or damage was caused 
by an excepted peril or excepted cause and he will be 
exonerated if he establishes this and if the shipper fails 
to establish that the cause was outside of the excepted 
perils. In the course of his evidence, however, he may 
seek to exclude causation by his own negligence but not as 
definitely required by force of law to do so, but rather to 
discharge his onus of showing that loss or damage was due 
to an excepted peril.3
Lastly, it is convenient to mention that the usual 
method of proof is established by the claimant having 
surveyors on board the ship to inspect the cargo there. 
However, if the carrier refuses permission to the consignee 
or his agent to attend on board, the refusal should be 
indicated on the survey. It is to be noted that the Hague 
Rules do not specifically provide that the consignee or his
!- London & NW.RY V. Ashton. [1920] A.C.84; Hunt & Winterbotham V. 
B.R.S. (Parcels) Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 617; The Citta di Messina. 169 
F. 472 (1909 S.D.N.Y), where it is stated that:
"Where damage to cargo was prima facie within the exceptions in 
the bill of lading, the burden is on the shipper to establish that 
the goods are removed from the operation of such exception because 
of the carrier’s negligence"; Scrutton, 19th ed, p.220.
2- Minister of Food V. Reardon Smith Line. (1951) 2 Lloyd's Rep.265; 
Joseph Constantine V. Imperial Smelting Co, (1942) A.C. 154 (Lord 
Simon L.C.)4
Albacora S.R.L. V. Westcott & Laurance Line. Ltd. [1966]2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 53 at p.64 (Lord Pearson).
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agent has the authority to attend on board the ship;! but
such permission seems to be presumed in Article 3(6) of the
Hague Rules, which provides:
"In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or 
damage the carrier and the receiver shall give all 
reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting 
and tallying the goods".
Then, once the damage is established, the burden of 
proof is shifted, and the carrier has to prove that the 
loss or damage falls under one of the exceptions 
constituted by law or by the contract of affreightment.2
2.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
As we have already seen, the general view under the 
Hague Rules seems to be that if the cargo-owner proves loss 
or damage to the goods, the carrier has the consequent onus 
of bringing himself within one of the exceptions set out in 
Article 4(2) of the Hague Rules.
The Hamburg Rules then seek to remove this confusion 
under the Hague Rules by adopting presumed fault or neglect 
in all cases of loss or damage to the goods and so imposing 
a burden of proof on the c a r r i e r . 3
As already mentioned, the carrier is liable for loss or 
damage to the goods if the occurrence which caused the loss 
or damage took place while the goods were in his charge.
!- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.544.
2- Chorley & Giles, 8th ed, p.202; Gilmore & Black, p.184; Kimball, 
p.226; "The Bulknes", [1979]2 Lloyd's Rep.39.
3- Wilson, p.205.
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On the other hand, the carrier can escape from liability if 
he proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures 
that would be reasonably required to avoid the occurrence 
and its consequences.!
The common understanding of the Hamburg Rules made this 
point clear by providing that "The liability of the carrier 
under this convention is based on the principle of presumed 
fault or neglect. This means that, as a rule, the burden 
of proof rests on the carrier but, with respect to certain 
cases, the provisions of the convention modify this rule".2
Obviously, the intent of the draftsmen of this 
convention is to direct the cargo-owner to make out a prima 
facie case against the carrier by showing that the goods 
were not received in as good condition as when they were 
delivered to the custody of the carrier. Once the cargo- 
owner makes a prima facie case, the carrier is required to 
show and prove that the cause of the loss or damage was not 
an act of fault or negligence for which he is responsible.3 
This differs considerably from the position under the Hague 
Rules where there is no positive duty to disprove 
negligence on the part of the carrier. While the carriage 
of live animals is subject to the general obligation of 
care outlined in Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, the 
carrier will not be liable for loss, damage or delay in 
delivery resulting from any special risks inherent in that 
kind of carriage or, if he can prove that he has complied
!- Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
2- Annex II of the Hamburg Rules.
Kimball, p.239
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with any special instructions given to him by the shipper.! 
Obviously, the carrier has many arguments at his disposal, 
such as technical details of weather conditions, 
navigational dangers from other ships when passing through 
congested seaways, and other aspects relating to sea perils 
which prevent the effectiveness of applied reasonable 
measures.2 However, he will remain liable if it is proved 
that loss, damage or delay in delivery arose from fault or 
negligence on his part or his servants or a g e n t s .3
It is noteworthy that the provision of Article 5(5) of 
the Hamburg Rules, which deals with live animals, increases 
the liability of the carrier since, under the Hague Rules, 
live animals are not included in the definition of "goods" 
and the carrier can therefore exempt himself from 
liability.4
It is to be mentioned that the term "reasonable 
measures" quite clearly includes many of the exceptions 
provided for in Article IV(2) of the Hague Rules. It can, 
therefore, be said that the carrier, in attempting to prove 
that "he, his servants or agents took all measures that 
could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and 
its consequences", would adduce evidence on the familiar 
exceptions under the Hague Rules, e.g. perils of the sea, 
latent defect, etc. "Then many of the very exceptions 
which have been deleted would be reintroduced by case-law
!- Article 5(5) of the Hamburg Rules.
2- Williams, p.256.
3- Article 5(5) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Honour, p.246.
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through the back-door, as it were, and a position close to 
one of the status quo vis-a-vis the Hague Rules would be 
reached",! except for the situation in the case of fire, 
where under the Hamburg Rules the burden of proving the 
fault or neglect rests on the claimant.2 in other words, 
the carrier is not liable for loss or damage to the goods 
unless the claimant proves that the fire arose from the 
fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants 
or agents, presumably for the reason that no carrier would 
deliberately set fire to his own ship, and in the majority 
of cases, in any event fire is an accident.3 Accordingly, 
Article 5(4)(a) of the Hamburg Rules states that the 
carrier is liable for loss or damage caused by fire if the 
cargo-owner proves either that the fire arose from fault or 
neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents, 
or from their fault or neglect in not taking all measures 
that could reasonably be required to put out the fire and 
avoid or mitigate its consequences. In order to ascertain 
the cause of such a fire, Article 5(4) (b) of the Hamburg 
Rules provides that either party (claimant or the carrier) 
may require a survey to be made in accordance with shipping 
practices, and a copy of the surveyor's report shall be 
made available on demand to both parties. Accordingly, I 
am inclined to agree with the view that the special 
provision on carrier's liability for fire (Art. 5(4))
!- Shah, p.19; Doc. TD/B/C.4/148 para.9 of the UNCTAD Working Group;
Mankabady, pp.55-56.
2- Article 5(4)(a.i) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Wilson, p.205.
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should be deleted in order to bring the carrier's liability 
for that kind of loss or damage to the goods under the main 
rule which is set out in Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, 
because it is unfair to put the entire burden of proof on 
the claimant, and make the carrier win the action simply 
because the cargo-owner might be unable to present the 
necessary evidence of negligence against the carrier, his 
servants or agents, in spite of the carrier's failure to 
give detailed evidence as to the causes of the fire.l
It is noteworthy that the Hamburg Rules attempt to 
clarify the position under the Hague Rules where two 
contributing acts affecting the cargo, such as fault of the 
carrier and an act which falls within one of the 
exceptions, have combined to cause loss, damage or delay in 
delivery, by providing that the carrier shall be liable 
only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in 
delivery is attributable to his fault or negligence.2 
Then, the carrier can escape from liability if he can 
establish the proportion of the loss attributable to other 
factors. Otherwise, if he fails to establish that 
proportion, he will be liable for the entire loss of or 
damage to the goods.3
Lastly, it can be concluded that the Hamburg Rules 
impose a heavier burden of proof than the Hague Rules do 
upon the carrier (except in the case of fire), as he will 
be in a position to control the carriage and ascertain the
Cleton, p.6; Diamond,The Hamburg Rules, p.12.
Article 5(7) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Ibid; Wilson, p.207.
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cause of any loss or damage to the cargo. The carrier then 
needs to show and prove that neither he nor his servants or 
agents caused the loss, damage or delay in delivery by 
their fault or neglect.
2.3 The Immunities of the Carrier
The carrier can claim many immunities throughout the 
agreed voyage. They are considered to be part of the 
contract and should be read together and reconciled with 
the agreed voyage in the bill of lading, taking into 
account the main object of the contract and must be 
subordinate to the performance of the voyage described. In 
such a context I will discuss the immunities under:
2.3.1 The Hague/Visby Rules; and
2.3.2 The Hamburg Rules.
2.3.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules
Article 4(2)1 Qf Hague/Visby Rules lists the
immunities which are available to the carrier so that he 
shall not be responsible for loss or damage to the goods.
1- Article 4(2) of the Hague Rules provides:
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It would be, however, outside the scope of this study to 
examine in detail all the exceptions set forth in Article 
4(2), and consequently it should be sufficient here to 
concentrate on three exceptions which are the most 
important in the Hague/Visby Rules:
A. Error in Navigation or in the Management of the ship.
B. Fire.
C. Peril of the Sea.
"Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss 
or damage arising or resulting from:
a. Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the 
servant of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of 
the ship.
b. Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the 
carrier.
c. Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable 
waters.
d. Act of God.
e. Act of war.
f. Act of public enemies.
g. Arrest or restraint or princes, rulers or people, or seizure
under legal process.
h. Quarantine restrictions.
i. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his 
agent or representative.
j. Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from 
whatever cause, whether partial or general, 
k. Riots and civil commotions.
1. Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea.
m. Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising
from inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods.
n. Insuffiency of packing.
o. Insuficiency or inadequacy of marks.
p. Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence.
q. Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of
the carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or
servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the
person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that
neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault
or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed
to the loss or damage."
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A. Error in Navigation or in Management of the Ship
Article 4(2)(a) of the Hague Rules provides:
"Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be 
responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting 
from:
a: Act, neglect, or default of master, mariner,
pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the 
navigation or in the management of the ship".l
This provision is one of the most exculpatory exceptions
since it allows the carrier to rely on it in order to avoid
liability for loss or damage caused to the cargo.
Thus, according to this provision, the carrier's duty to
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy assumes
considerable importance. If the goods are damaged through
the negligence of the master and crew or servants of the
carrier, the question will be then whether the negligent
act was an act of navigation or management of the ship,2 or
whether it rendered the ship unseaworthy. Moreover, would
this exemption apply if an error in navigation or in the
management of the ship occurred after the commencement of
the voyage?
The scope of the term "navigation" presents less 
difficulty than that of the term "management". The term 
"navigation" is defined as "something affecting the safe
Both the U.S. Harter Act 1893 and COGSA also exempt the carrier 
from liability for loss or damage to the cargo resulting from 
error in navigation or management of the ship.
2- Tetley, 3rd ed,p.398, where he stated: "An error in the navigation 
or in its management is an error primarily affecting the ship. 
Error in the navigation and management of the ship might be 
defined as "an erroneous act or omission, the original purpose of 
which was primarily directed towards the ship, her safety and 
well-being and towards the common venture generally".
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sailing of the ship" .1 A similar view was expressed in 
Lord V. Newsum & Co. Ltd, 2 when it was held that 
"navigation" referred to the time when the ship was in 
motion or was being cast off; the term consequently did not 
cover an error by the master while in port as to the route 
he should pursue to get to the port of discharge. In The 
Accomack the Court of Appeal held that the negligent 
removal of a bilge-pump by crew whilst the ship was 
discharging cargo in dock (water had entered the hold and 
had damaged the cargo) was not covered by the exception of 
negligence of the crew in the navigation of the ship ' in 
the ordinary course of the voyage', because although the 
negligent act was committed in the course of the 
contractual voyage, the ship, in ordinary language, was not 
then being navigated.
Concerning the interpretation of the term "management" 
of the ship, despite many court decisions, the authorities 
in question are not very satisfactory or convincing and 
hence it is still difficult to define the meaning of the 
term clearly and accurately. ^  in The Glenochil.5 sir F. 
Jeune said that "the word 'management' goes somewhat beyond 
- perhaps not much beyond - navigation, but far enough to 
take in this very class of acts which do not affect the
The Ferro. [1893] P.38 at p.45 (Sir F. Jeune).
2- [1920] 1 K.B. 846 at p.849 (Bailhache. J).
3- (1890) 63 L.T. 737.
4- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.244; Chorley & Giles, 8th ed,p.204, stated 
thatj"The difficulty of this clause lies in the fact that so many 
things are done on a ship in the course of its voyage that it is 
sometimes not easy to say whether any one act was done in the 
course of the management of the ship".
5- [1896]P.10.
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sailing or movement of the vessel, but do affect the vessel
herself."^ The difficulty then is to distinguish, on the
one hand, that fault in the management of the ship from
which the carrier may exonerate himself and, on the other,
fault in respect of the carrier's duty under Article 3(2)
of the Hague Rules to take proper care of the cargo.2 In
this connection we can refer to The Glenochil, where Sir F.
Jeune said: "the distinction I intended to draw... is one
between want of care of cargo and want of care of vessel
indirectly affecting the cargo".3 This suggestion was
later expanded in a leading case considered to be a most
useful guide to the meaning of the terms; Gosse Millerd V.
Canadian Government Marine. Ltd.4 a vessel had been loaded
with a cargo of tinplates on board while repairs were being
executed. Workmen had to be frequently in and out of the
hold where the tinplates were stored, and the hatches in
consequence were often left open. Owing to the negligence
of the shipowner's servants the hatches were not protected
when rain was falling. Greer L.J, stated that:
"If the cause of the damage is solely, or even 
primarily, a neglect to take reasonable care of the 
cargo, the ship is liable, but if the cause of the 
damage is a neglect to take reasonable care of the 
ship, or some part of it, as distinct from the cargo, 
the ship is relieved from liability; for if the 
negligence is not negligence towards the ship, but
1- Ibid, at p.16; see also Norman V. Binninqton, [1890]2 Q.B.D. 475; 
The Rodney (1900)P.112; The Touraine, [1927]P.58; Rowson V. 
Atlantic Transport Co. Ltd. (1903)2 K.B.666.
2- Tetley, 3rd,ed, p.397; Wilson, p.252.
3- The Glenochil. [1896JP.10 at p.16.
4- (1927)29 LI. L.R.190.
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only negligent failure to use the apparatus of the 
ship for the protection of the cargo, the ship is not 
so relieved."!
This view was reversed by the Court of Appeal, but the 
House of Lords upheld Greer L.J, declaring that (l)the 
shipowner had failed properly and carefully to carry, keep 
and care for the tinplates as required by the carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1924, Article 3(2) and (2)the failure to 
cover the hatches properly was not negligence in the 
management of the ship and consequently the defendants were 
not protected from liability.2
As already mentioned, the carrier is bound to make the 
ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage3. 
To deprive, then, the carrier of the exemption of Article 
4(2)(a), the unseaworthiness should occur before or at the 
beginning of the voyage and must contribute to the loss or 
damage to the cargo**.
If both unseaworthiness and error in management or 
negligent navigation together cause damage to the cargo,
!- Ibid, p.200
2- [1929JA.C.223; See also Foreman & El lams. Ltd V. Federal Steam 
Navigation Co. Ltd. [1928]2 K.B.424 (Wright.J) at pp.438-439; 
Leesh River Tea Co. Ltd V. British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. 
[1967] 2 Q.B.250; [1966]1 Lloyd's Rep. 450; [1966]2 Lloyd's Rep. 
193 (C.A); The Frances Salman. [1975]2 Lloyd's Rep. 355.
3- Article 3(2) of the Hague Rules.
4- In Herald & Weekly Times. Ltd V. New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. 
(1947)80 Ll. L.Rep. 596, it was held that the carrier had failed 
to show that the entry of sea water due to the act or default of 
one of his servants in failing to close valves; nor assuming that 
the valves had been left open by one of their servants, had the 
shipowners shown that such act or default was an act or default 
"in the navigation or in the management of the ship"; El Carol V. 
Greenwood, Problems of Negligence in Loading, Stowage, Custody, 
Care and Delivery of Cargo; Errors in Management and Navigation; 
Due diligence to make seaworthy, (1971)45 Tul.L.R.790 at p.803, 
hereinafter cited as "Greenwood".
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the carrier can escape from liability for damage to the 
cargo only if such error in management or negligent 
navigation occurs following the commencement of the 
voyage.! Thus, if the carrier cannot separate the 
resulting losses to the cargo, he will be responsible for 
the damaged cargo.2
Lastly, if the unseaworthiness is not involved in the 
cause of loss or damage to the cargo, it is consequently 
unnecessary to determine whether the voyage had commenced 
before the event, in which case an exemption would apply.3
B. Fire
Article 4(2)(b) of the Hague Rules provides:
"2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible 
for loss or damage arising or resulting from [... ]
b. Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity 
of the carrier"
Fire means a flame and not just heat. In other words, 
the loss or damage to the goods must be due to a flame and 
not merely heat. Thus in Tempus Shipping Co. Ltd V. Louis
!- The New Port. 7 F. 2d 452 (1925); The Willowpool. (1936) A.M.C. 
1852; Carmichael & Co. V. Liverpool S.S. Association, (1887) 19 
Q.B.D. 242, Canada Shipping Co. V. British Shipping Association. 
(1889) 23 Q.B.D. 342.
2- The Walter Raleigh. (1952) A.M.C, 618, where it is stated that 
"when two causes of damage concur and one is due to unexcused 
unseaworthiness, the vessel is liable for resulting cargo 
damaged".
3- Greenwood, p.804.
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Dreyfus & Co, Ltd.l it was held that an exception of 
'fire' by itself would not be apt to cover loss caused by 
heat short of actual ignition.
Where the loss or damage to the cargo is caused by the 
fire, the carrier must show that he exercised due diligence 
to make the ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of 
the voyage. The question of the relationship between the 
fire and unseaworthiness, and the carrier's liability, with 
regard thereto, was made clear in Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd 
V. Canadian Merchant Marine. Ltd^, which concerned certain 
frozen waste pipes and the application of heat to them. It 
was found that during the loading of the cargo a fire broke 
out as a result leading to the loss of the cargo. It was 
held that negligence of the shipowners' servants had caused 
the fire, as in fact a failure to exercise due diligence. 
It was also added that Article 3(1) which requires the 
carrier to exercise due diligence to make the ship 
seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage, 
assumed an overriding obligation, and consequently the 
exception in respect of fire could not be relied on.
If the carrier fails to prove how the fire began and the 
fire causes loss or damage to the goods, it will be assumed 
that there existed a lack of due diligence in making the 
ship seaworthy or in the duties provided in Article 3(2) of 
the Hague Rules.3
1- [1930]1 K.B. 699; Harris V. Polland [1941]1 K.B. 462; Tetley, 3rd
ed,p.412
2- [1959]2 Lloyd's Rep. 105
3- The "Santa Malta". [1967]2 Lloyd's Rep. 791.
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However, after proving the cause of loss or damage to 
the goods while due diligence had been exercised, the 
carrier has the burden of proving that the loss or damage 
occurred without his actual fault or privity.1
It is to be noted that the actual fault or privity of 
the carrier must be the fault of the carrier himself^ and 
not merely of a servant or agent. The question then may 
arise as to what is the meaning of actual fault or privity?
These terms are derived from English law; and their 
meaning has been authoritatively declared by the House of 
Lords in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. V. Asiatic Petroleum 
Co. Ltd^ which concerned a situation in which the ship and 
the cargo were destroyed by fire. The ship belonged to a 
limited company of which Mr Lennard was an executive 
director. Viscount Haldane L.C. explained:^
"The fault or privity is the fault or privity of 
somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for 
whom the company is liable upon the footing, 
respondeat superior, but somebody for whom the 
company is liable because his action is the very 
action of the company itself."
Carver, p.180, where he stated: "The statutory exception protects 
the shipowner from fire, however caused, if it be without his 
actual fault or privity"; Wilson,p.261; Astle p.141; The Ocean 
Liberty. [1953]1 Lloyd's Rep.38; Louis Dreyfus & Co V. Tempus 
Shipping Co. [1931] A.C.726.
2- A/CN. 9/74 Report of the Working Group on the work of its Fourth 
(special) session, 1972 Annex 1, par.2 at p.8; It is noteworthy 
that the carrier within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) Hague/Visby 
Rules "must be the person or persons with whom the chief 
management of the company resides" See Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd 
V. Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. [1914]1 K.B.419 at p.437, (per 
Hamilton L.J,); Tetley, 3rd ed, p.417.
3- [1915] A.C.705.
4- Ibid at pp. 713-714.
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The same point was made in Paterson Steamships, Ltd V.
Robin Hood Mills, Ltd.l where Lord Roche said:
"The words 'actual fault or privity' [•••] infer 
something personal to the owner, something 
blameworthy in him, as distinguished from 
constructive fault or privity such as the fault of 
his servants or agents ...Actual fault negatives that 
liability which arises solely under the rule of 
respondeat superior [...]. Another and very 
important principle is to be derived, namely, that 
the fault or privity [...Jmust be the fault or 
privity in respect of that which causes the loss or 
damage in question, a proposition which was acted 
upon and illustrated in Lennard's case"^
The result of these cases is that only very rarely will 
the fire be considered to be due to the actual fault or 
privity of the owner as that phrase has been restrictively 
construed. The onus of disproving actual fault or privity 
rests with the owner but discharging it has not been too 
difficult in most cases. It is noteworthy that the damage 
through fire includes damage to the cargo by water used to 
extinguish the fire.3
Lastly, if a fire results from spontaneous combustion, 
due to the dangerous condition of the goods, of which he 
could not reasonably know, the carrier will be protected by 
the exception of f i r e .4
1- (1937)58 LI. L. Rep.33.
2- ibid at p.39
3- Tempus Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Louis Dreyfus & Co, Ltd. [1930]1 
K.B.699.
4- Scrutton, 19th ed,p.239.
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C. Peril of the Sea
Article 4(2)(c) of the Hague Rules provides;
"2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible 
for loss or damage arising or resulting from...
c.perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other 
navigable waters"
The meaning of ’peril of the seas' has given rise to a
good deal of legal argument. It is defined by Lopes, L.J,1
as follows;
"Damage to goods caused by the action of the sea 
during transit, not attributable to the fault of 
anybody, is... a danger or accident of the sea, 
intended to come within the exception and exonerating 
the shipowner".
However, this definition cannot be accepted as being
exhaustive. Scrutton, criticising it, said:^
"Sea-damage, through the fault of somebody (e.g. 
another ship), will be a peril of the sea both under 
a policy of insurance and a contract of 
affreightment, though by reason of implied 
undertaking the shipowner, in the case of negligence 
of the crew, may not be protected under a charter".
It is also defined in the Xantho  ^ where Lord Herschell
said: "'Perils of the sea' does not cover every accident or
casualty which may happen to the subject-matter (of the
carriage) on the sea... not every loss or damage of which
the sea is the immediate cause that is covered by these
words. They do not protect... against the natural and
inevitable action of the winds and waves, which results in
Pandorf & Co. V. Hamilton, Fraser. & Co. (1887)16 Q.B.D. 629 at 
p.633.
2- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.229.
3- (1887)12 App.Cas, 503 at p.509.
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what may be described as wear and tear. There must be some 
casualty, something which could not be foreseen as one of 
the necessary incidents of the adventure".
This view is related to insurance cases: - 'peril of the 
sea' has the same meaning in policies of marine insurance 
and in bills of lading. 1 Accordingly, the most consistent 
definition among other authorities, is that given by 
Scrutton, now generally adopted. "Perils of the Sea" 
includes:
"Any damage to the goods carried caused by sea-water, 
storm, collision, stranding, or other perils peculiar 
to the sea or to a ship at sea, which could not be 
foreseen and guarded against by the shipowner or his
servants as necessary or probable incidents of the
adventure".2
In accordance with these authorities, the phrase "perils 
of the sea" refers only to fortuitous accidents or 
casualties of the seas. Perils of the sea do not include 
the natural action of the winds and waves which may result 
in what may be described as wear and t e a r .3 Nor do they 
cover secondary damage such as deterioration of goods by 
reason of delay caused by perils of the s e a .4 Storms and 
high seas are obviously relatively common incidents in sea
transit. The carrier is expected to avoid them whenever
possible by exercising all reasonable care. If he does so,
Chorley & Giles, 8th ed, p.206; Scrutton, 19th ed, p.227 
Scrutton, 19th ed,p.228; Tetley, 3rd ed,p.432, where he said: 
"peril of the sea may be defined as some catastrophic force or 
event that would not be expected in the area of the voyage, at the 
time of the year and that could not be reasonably guarded 
against".
3- The Xantho. (1887)12 App.Cas 503 at p.509.
4- Scrutton, 19th ed,p.228; Pink V. Fleming (1890) 25 Q.B.D.396.
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the exception of perils of the sea can apply to them. It 
is not necessary that these conditions are absolutely 
excessive or extreme for the exception to assist the 
carrier, it all depends on e.g. the time of year and route 
of the voyage.1
If the loss of goods is caused by negligence or 
misconduct of the master or crew of the ship, 2 or in 
consequence of the ship being unseaworthy,3 the loss will 
not be covered by the clause 'peril of the sea', and the 
carrier is not entitled to the protection of this clause. 
Further, the cause of loss or damage to the goods must be 
accidental, although it has been said that the exception 
clause 'perils of the sea' includes only losses which are 
of an 'irresistible force' or 'inevitable accident'. The 
general principle of English law is that the losses, in 
order to be within the exception, need not be 
extraordinary, it is enough that damage is done by the 
fortuitous action of the sea.4
It is noteworthy that 'inevitable accident' has been 
defined as "something....done or omitted to be done, which 
a person exercising ordinary care, caution and maritime 
skill, in the circumstances, either would not have done or 
would not have left undone, as the case may b e " .5 Thus, an 
inevitable accident in point of law is that in "which the
Carver, p.166; Wilson, p.243.
The Chasca. (1875) L.R 4 A & E,446; (1875) 32 L.T. 836.
3- Smith. Hogg V. Black Sea & Baltic. [1940] A.C.997.
4- Carver, p.166.
5- The Marpesia. (1872) L.R. 4.P.C. 212 at p.220.
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party charged with the offence could not possibly prevent 
it by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and maritime 
skill".1
To constitute losses within the exception of peril of 
the sea, the factual situation must be peculiar to the sea. 
This limitation would exclude from the ambit of exception, 
inter alia, damage due to rats,^ or vermin^ eating away the 
cargo, heating, sweating or explosion and other mishaps of 
machinery. However the damage would be within the
exception
a) if the loss is due to a sea peril and the sea peril 
itself in turn has resulted from an accidental cause not 
per se qualifying as sea peril, for example, rats causing a 
leak in pipes carrying sea-water;^ or b) if the sea peril 
was the operative cause of the damage, even though it was 
not the proximate cause, for instance, when the heating or 
sweating of the cargo is due to the unavoidable shutting of 
ventilators to prevent the entry of the sea-water.5
Lastly, it is to be mentioned that in the light of 
exception clauses as drafted (Article 4(2)(c)), there seems 
to be no difference between the phrase 'peril of the sea' 
and 'dangers of the sea', and either phrase can have the
Ibid.
Laveroni V. Drury. (1852)8 Ex.166.
3- Hamilton V. Pandorf (1887) 12 App. Cas. 518 at p.525 (per Lord 
Watson).
4- Hamilton V. Pandorf. (1887) 12 App. Cas.518.
5- it is noteworthy that heavy weather, when 'extraordinary in 
character' will be deemed to constitute a peril of the sea for the 
purposes of Article 4(2)(c) of the Hague/Visby Rules. W. Anqliss 
& Co V. P & 0 Steam Navigation Co. (1927) 28 LI. L. Rep.202 at 
p.204; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.438.
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same meaning attached to it,* whether occurring in a policy 
of marine insurance or a bill of lading. In the words 
'peril', 'danger' and 'accident' there is conveyed a 
meaning of something fortuitous and unexpected. Thus, 
whether there has been a peril of the sea is a question of 
fact left to the decision of the court on the evidence.2
2.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
In the course of UNCITRAL discussions in regard to the 
catalogue of exceptions in Article 4(2) of the Hague Rules, 
there were controversial views concerning the merits of 
maintaining the two policy-based exceptions related to 
fault liability in the Hague Rules:
1. Error of navigation and management of the ship, 
Article 4(2)(a).
2. Fire. Article 4(2)(b).
The U.K. delegates opposed any changes to the existing 
Hague Rules because any changes would have inevitably 
increased freight rates, and such a proposed change would 
destroy the ancient institutions of salvage and general
1- Wilson, p.243.
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.435.
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average.1 However, Norway supported the deletion of the 
navigation and management error and fire exceptions,2 
whereas the U.S. delegates proposed a drastic expansion by 
extending the fire defence to e x p l o s i o n s .3
In the conclusions to the discussions, the majority of 
the Working Group members were in favour of deleting the 
general catalogue of exceptions set forth in Article 
4(2)(C-P) of the Hague Rules.4 In fact, however, the whole 
list of the catalogue of exceptions in the Hague Rules can 
be said to be causes of loss or damage to the goods for 
which the carrier cannot be responsible, or to borrow the 
term used in The Marine Sulphur Queen .^ the "Uncontrollable 
Causes". In other words, this catalogue of exceptions 
constituted an attempt to set forth circumstances in which 
the carrier would not be considered to be at fault, and 
thus had no effect with an independent significance outside
1- The delegations who supported the U.K. position to maintain these 
exceptions were: Polish, Belgian and U.S.S.R; Sweeney, part I,pp. 
104-110.
2- Sweeney, p.104.
3- Ibid at p. 105; Egypt had also submitted a proposed text which was 
criticized by developing countries. It stated that the list of 
exceptions were only illustrative and not mandatory. Consequently, 
Egypt came to approve the French proposal which as a single simple 
statement of the entire problem of liability, defences, and burden 
of proof. Ibid, pp.105,110.
The countries supporting these decisions were: Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Nigeria, 
Norway, Singapor, Spain, Tanzania and United States. Whereas the 
countries opposing deletion of the negligent navigation exception 
were: Belgium, Japan, Poland, U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom; See 
UNCITRAL Working Group on the work of its Fourth (special) 
Session. A/CN. 9/74, 1972, par.23,28 at pp.9-10; Sweeney,
part.I.p.111.
5- [1970]2 Lloyd's Rep, 285; Mankabady, p.53.
138
the general rule that the carrier would only be responsible 
where he is at fault. 1
It was generally agreed that this attempt was not 
satisfactory, as it did not describe all or accurately the 
circumstances that might arise with the carrier alleged to 
be at fault, and therefore, had produced uncertainty and 
litigation.2 The majority of these exceptions do not in 
fact involve fault on the part of the carrier. 
Accordingly, it would be beneficial from a legal standpoint 
to remove the unnecessary and uncertain aspects surrounding 
the definition and extent of such exceptions, which are 
merely examples of circumstances in which fault cannot be 
attributed to the carrier.3
Hence, Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules is designed to 
expand the liability of the carrier to include causes of 
loss for which he is under the Hague/Visby Rules not 
responsible. The Hamburg Rules have eliminated the 
catalogue of exceptions contained in Article 4(2) of the 
Hague Rules. Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules states that 
the carrier escapes liability if he proves that he, his 
servants or agents took "all measures that could reasonably 
be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences". 
Thus, one of the major changes that would result from 
adoption of the Hamburg Rules would be that of the 
abolition of the exemption covering error in navigation or 
management of the ship. That would lead to a substantial
Doc A/CN. 9/74, (1972) par.23 at p.9.
2- ibid, par.24 at p.9; Kimball, pp.237-238.
3- Wilson, p.204
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increase in freight rates. 1 On the other hand, such a 
change would represent a clear shift by increasing the 
carrier's liability in favour of the cargo interests.2
The exception of fire under Article 4(2) (b) of the Hague 
Rules has been amended by Article 5(4) of the Hamburg Rules 
in the sense that the carrier is liable for loss or damage 
caused by fire if the claimant proves either that the fire 
arose from fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, 
or his servant or a g e n t s ,3 or from neglect in not taking 
all measures that could reasonably be required to put out 
the fire and avoid or mitigate the d a m a g e .  ^  However, in 
practice, this puts a strict burden on the claimant who 
does not usually have the facts available.5
It is to be mentioned that Article 4(4) of the Hague 
Rules states that the carrier will not be liable for loss 
or damage resulting from "any deviation in saving or 
attempting to save life or property at sea or any 
reasonable deviation". There is no specific provision in 
the Hamburg Rules devoted to deviation. Instead, liability 
for deviation has been brought into the general carrier's 
liability (the principle of presumed fault or n e g l e c t ) .6 
Accordingly, the carrier would be liable for loss or damage 
or delay in delivery resulting from deviation unless he 
could establish that he or his servants or agents had taken
Ibid, p.205.
2_ Hoyle, p.230.
3- Article 5 (4.a(i) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Article 5 (4.a(ii) of the Hamburg Rules.
5- Diamond, The Hamburg Rules,p.12.
6- Wilson p.207; Waldron, p.315.
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"all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid 
the occurrence and its consequences."
However, according to Article 5(6) of the Hamburg Rules, 
the carrier escapes liability if the loss or damage or 
delay in delivery results from measures to save life, or by 
reasonable measures applicable to property at sea.l It can 
hence be said that this Article would apply to deviation as 
much as loss or damage to cargo is concerned. It is not 
however expressly mentioned within Article 5(1) of the 
Hamburg Rules although it was protected by Article 4(4) of 
the Hague Rules.2
It is noteworthy that historically accepted exceptions 
to the carrier's liability, including Act of God, inherent 
vice of the goods, fault of the shipper or his agents, and 
all other causes outwith the control of the carrier and his 
servants and agents would still exempt him from liability 
under the Hamburg Rules if the carrier shows the cause of 
the loss.3
Lastly, one can conclude that the Hamburg Rules have 
changed the "catalogue of exceptions" contained in Article 
4(2) of the Hague Rules, but most of the exceptions are 
still valid in that they would be covered by the "all
This position is similar to Article 4(2) (L) of the Hague Rules.
2- it is noteworthy that in discussions leading to the adoption of 
the Hamburg Rules, there was no objection against continuing the 
carrier's exception from liability for loss or damage to cargo 
resulting from deviation to save life or property at sea. Such 
exemption was criticised on the grounds that it permitted the 
carrier to gain substantial profit, often to the detriment of the 
cargo carried on his own ship; A/CN.9/74 (1972) par.25 at p. 9; 
Wilson, p.206; Waldron, p.315.
3- Kimball, p.238.
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measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence and its consequences" as a defence to 
liability.*
Wilson, p.204; Chandler, p.244; Chorley & Giles, 8th ed, p.321; 
Waldron, p.319.
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Concluding remarks
We may conclude the foregoing discussion and analysis with
the following points:
1. The system of the carrier's liability under the Hamburg 
Rules has been clarified compared with that of the 
Hague/Visby Rules. The liability of the carrier under 
the Hamburg Rules is based on the principle of presumed 
fault or neglect. This is made clear under Annex II 
(Common Understanding) of the Hamburg Rules, liberating 
it from the confusion found in the Hague/Visby Rules, 
by imposing the burden of proof on the carrier, except 
in the case of damage caused by fire when the onus is 
on the claimant. Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to 
retain the "catalogue of exceptions" and certain 
provisions specifying the obligations of the carrier 
which exists under the Hague/Visby Rules.
2. The period of the carrier's responsibility under the 
Hamburg Rules is greater than under the Hague/Visby 
Rules. This is made clear by abandoning the so-called 
"tackle to tackle" period. The Hamburg Rules extend 
the period of carrier's responsibility; it covers the 
period during which the carrier is in charge of the 
goods at the port of loading, until the time he has 
delivered the goods to the consignee.
3. Under the Hamburg Rules live animals are now included 
in the definition of "goods" which are entirely 
excluded under the Hague/Visby Rules.
The Hamburg Rules have enlarged the right to carry on 
deck, whilst deck cargo did not come within the 
provisions of the Hague/Visby Rules.
The carrier retains his immunity for loss, damage or 
delay to cargo resulting from measures to save life or 
property at sea.
Lastly, it can be said that the carrier is placed in a 
weak position compared with that of the Hague/Visby 
Rules, by increasing the level of his liability. On 
the other hand, the Hamburg Rules have removed the 
peculiarities and uncertainties inherent in the 
existing Hague/Visby Rules. Therefore, it may have a 
positive economic effect.
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Chapter Three 
The Limitation of the Carrier's Liability
The limitation of the carrier's liability is a universal 
concept amongst shipping nations and recognizes the 
potentially perilous nature of maritime transport.
The carrier is entitled to limit his liability for loss 
or damage to the goods in accordance with a certain 
monetary figure set out by the Rules. The purpose of these 
Rules is to maintain the proper balance between the rights 
and responsibilities of the carrier, on the one hand, and 
the claimant on the other.* However, the limitation of 
amounts and the technique used in fixing the limits exhibit 
an abundance of variants. Therefore it will be necessary 
to discuss them under the following headings;
3.1 The Units of Limitation.
3.2 The Unit of Account.
3.3 Loss of the Right to Limit Liability.
In British Columbia Telephone Co. V. Marpole Towing Ltd. (1971)17
D.L.R.545 at p.558, Ritchie, J. said: "The limitation of
liability provisions....are expressly designed for the purpose of 
encouraging shipping and affording protection to shipowners 
against bearing the full impact of heavy and perhaps crippling 
pecuniary damage sustained by reason of the negligent navigation 
of their ships on the part of their servants or agents,” see also 
Chorley & Giles' (8th ed.) pp.394-395, which justifies the concept 
on the grounds that it enables an insurer to calculate with 
relative confidence the maximum amount to which an insured 
shipowner could be held liable; In The Bramlev Moore. [1964]P. 
200 at p.220 (C.A.), Denning, M.R. said .Limitation of
liability is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of public 
policy which has its origin in history and its justification in 
convenience."
145
3.1 The Units of Limitation.
The limitation of the carrier's liability is based on 
different methods. The Hague Rules based it on a single 
system, being per package or unit. The Visby Rules adopted 
a dual (alternative) system, being per package or unit, on 
the one hand, and per weight on the other. This dual
system has also been adopted by the Hamburg Rules with a 
slight difference in the wording of the term.
The various aspects of the single and dual systems can 
be discussed under:
3.1.1 The Hague Rules.
3.1.2 The Visby Rules.
3.1.3 The Hamburg Rules.
3.1.1 Under the Hague Rules
The units of limitation are mentioned in Article 4(5) of 
the Hague Rules which provides:
"Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or 
become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection
with goods in an amount exceeding £100 per package or unit,
or the equivalent of the sum in other currency unless the 
nature and value of such goods have been declared by the 
shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of 
lading."
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It is clear from the above provision that the limitation of 
liability is based on a single system, being per package or 
unit.1
In general, the expression 'per package or unit' has its 
equivalent in the limitation of liability provisions of the 
various Hague Rules Acts, such as British COGSA. However, 
there is no definition of the words 'package' and 'unit' in
the Hague Rules. It is therefore important to know the 
difference and the definitions of 'package' and 'unit' in 
order to delimit the carrier's limitation liability as
follows:
A. The concept of per package
The Hague Rules, in Article 4(5), use the word 
'package'. The question then is what constitutes a 
'package' under the Hague Rules? As already said, there is 
no definition or meaning of 'package' in the Hague Rules. 
This lack of definition or meaning has caused difficulties 
which may exist as to the exact determination of the extent
to which packing or covering is required in order to
justify the conclusion that the goods in question 
constitute a package.2 The courts of various countries 
diverge in trying to give a uniform standard definition of 
'package'. Therefore, in order to interpret the word
This system had been adopted by Comity Maritime International 
(CMI) conference in 1921 as a compromise solution, so as to avoid 
disagreement on the subject of limitation and even to prevent a 
breakdown of the conference itself. Erling Selvig, Unit 
Limitation of Carrier’s Liability,1961,pp.25-26, hereinafter cited 
as "Selvig, Unit Limitation"; Diamond, 1978,p.229.
2- Selvig, Unit Limitation, p.42.
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'package', we should refer to the relevant legislation and 
certain decisions of some major maritime industrial 
countries which are contracting parties to the Rules, such 
as U.K. and U.S.A.
Before the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, the word 
'package' was used in the Carriers Act 1830. In Whaite V. 
Lancashire & Yorkshire Rv. Co. ^ the case concerned a wagon 
prepared for shipment with wooden sides but without a top. 
The wagon contained articles, including oil paintings. The 
Court of Exchequer held that the wagon with its contents 
was a package within the meaning of the Carriers Act 1830.
Temperley2, indicates that the term 'package' "properly 
implies something packed up or made up for portability". 
It has also been defined by Tetley2: "a package is a
wrapper, case, bag, envelope or platform in which or on 
which cargo has been placed for carriage".
To consider, then, the term as a package, there must be 
a packing. This has been made clear by Goddard, J:^ 
"Package must indicate something packed".
He also said:
"I do not feel that I can hold that a motor-car put 
on a ship without a box, crate or any form o f 
covering is a package, without doing violence to the 
English language."5
1- (1874) L.R.9 Ex.67.
2- Temperley, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, (1927),p.79, 
hereinafter cited as "Temperley".
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.880.
Studebaker Distributors Ltd V. Charlton S.S.Co. Ltd. [ 1938]1 
K.B.459 at 467.
5- Ibid.
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This means that the lost or damaged goods shipped 
unpacked, unwrapped, unboxed, uncrated, can never be 
considered as 'packages'. Thus, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co 
V. Pacific Far East Line-*-, a large electrical transformer 
was attached by bolts to a wooden skid, but not otherwise 
boxed or crated. It was held by the U.S. Court of Appeals
that the transformer was not a 'package'".
It may be asked: does the size or the shape of the
cargo have an effect on the determination of whether the 
goods in question constitute a package or not? Scrutton2 
with reference to the case of Whaite V. Lancashire &
Yorkshire Rv.Co2. in which the court held a railway wagon 
with wooden sides to be a 'package', said: "the Carriers
Act 1830 contains provisions analogous to Article IV, Rule 
5", and concludes that : "Mere size will not prevent a
thing from being a package (a Hague Rules package)",4 and 
he framed this sentence having regard not only to the
domestic precedents,5 but also to decisions of, for 
instance, American courts regarding 'package' for 
international uniformity in courts' decisions. Thus in 
Aluminios Pozuelo. Ltd V. S.S. Navigator5 . Moore, J. 
concluded:
[1974]1 Lloyd's Rep. 359; International Factory Sales V. S . S . 
Alexander Serafinnovich. [1975]2 Lloyd's Rep, 346 at p.354;
Pennell V. U.S. Lines. (1959) A.M.C.935.
2- Scrutton, 18th ed, p.442.
3- (1874) L.R.9 Ex.67.
4- Scrutton, 18th ed, p.442; in the same case Cleasby, B, said: "It
would be absurd to say that the wagon was too large to be a
package plainly, size cannot be a criterion", (1874) L.R.9 Ex. at 
p. 70.
5- (1874) L.R.9 Ex. 67.
6- (1968) A.M.C. 2532.
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"The meaning of 'package' which has evolved from the 
cases can be said to define a class of cargo, 
irrespective of size, shape, or weight, to which some 
packing preparation for transportation has been made 
which facilitates handling, but which does not 
necessarily conceal or completely enclose the goods".
The same point was made in Mitsubishi International
Corp. V .' S. S. Palmetto Stated. The damaged cargo consisted
of a fully boxed and completely enclosed steel roll
weighing 32% tons in a wooden case. The Court of Appeals,
second circuit, held that the roll was a package, ruling
that "an article completely enclosed in a wooden box
prepared for shipment is a 'package' within section 4(5) of
COGSA, regardless of the size and weight of the p a c k a g e . "2
It may be said that, if large items are shipped as
single pieces, such items will qualify as packages if they
are fully crated or boxed, irrespective of their size or
shaped But such items will not qualify as packages if
they are freestanding, with no packaging or appurtenances
having been attached to prevent damage or facilitate
transportation.4 The question is, however, whether or not
such items will qualify as packages when they are partially
packaged. This is made clear in Tamini V. Salen Dry Cargo
A .B .5 Wooden crating had been placed around the more
vulnerable portions of the rig, but the rig was fully
exposed. The rig was also freestanding, unattached to a
1- (1963) A.M.C. 958.
ibid, per Moore.J., at p.961.
3- Herd & Co V. Krawill Machinery Corp. (1959) A.M.C.879.
4- Hartford Fire Inc Co. V. Pacific Far East Line Ltd. (1974)
A.M.C., 1478 at p.1481.
5- 866 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1989)
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skid, cradle or other device to facilitate handling. The 
Court of Appeals held that the rig was not a package, 
because no appurtenances had been added to facilitate 
handling and the rig was for the most part fully exposed. ^ 
One can conclude that the term "package" refers to any 
items of cargo which have been sufficiently packed for the 
purposes of being held and protected during transit to be 
thus described.2 Therefore, the purpose of Article 4(5) of 
the Rules or COGSA was to set a reasonable figure below 
which the carrier should not be permitted to limit his 
l i a b i l i t y 3  on the one hand, and on the other, to protect 
him from any excessive or unforeseen cargo claims resulting 
from goods of high value which were not inserted in the 
bill of lading.
B. The Concept of Per Unit
The term 'unit' set forth in Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules is not defined also and is somewhat ambiguous because 
it might be construed as 'shipping unit' i.e. the physical 
unit as received by the carrier from the shipper, for 
instance, an unboxed car, a barrel, a bale, a sack, etc; 
or it may mean the 'freight unit', i.e. the unit on which 
the freight for carriage of goods is calculated.4 The 
'freight unit' is usually a weight or volume of the goods,
1- Ibid at p.743; Gulf Italia V. American Export Lines. Inc (1959) 
A.M.C.930 at p.931.
2- Diamond, 1978, p.240; Mankabady, p.58.
3- The Mormaclvnx. (1971) A.M.C.2383 at p.2403, 451 F. 2d (1971)800 
at pp.815-816, (Friendly, J).
4- Scrutton, 18th ed, p.443; J.F. Wilson, Basic carrier liability 
and the right of limitation, published in the Hamburg Rules on 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, edited by Samir Mankabady, 1978, 
p. 146, hereinafter cited as "Wilson, Basic carrier liability".
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for instance, tons, cubic feet. The 'unit' may also refer 
to the 'commercial unit', that is the unit in which the 
particular commodity is customarily traded in commercial 
practice, for instance, the standard is the usual measure 
for timber.*
A question that arises is, what is the distinction 
between 'package' and 'unit'? If 'unit' is construed to 
mean a 'shipping unit' what may conceivably be called a 
package, equally constitutes a shipping unit,^ although 
some shipping units are not packages as defined and 
discussed above. In other words, all packages are shipping 
units, but not all shipping units are packages. If, 
however, 'unit' is interpreted to mean a 'freight unit', 
the whole position will be significantly different, because 
the calculation based on 'freight unit' will be higher than 
that based upon 'shipping unit'. In other words, the 
maximum liability will be greater than that based upon 
'shipping unit'.3
It is to be mentioned that the purpose of adding the 
term 'unit' to the term 'package' was to cover all types of 
goods not being shipped in packages.4 In other words, the 
words 1 per unit' were added to the term ' package' in order
Erling Selvig, Unit Limitation and alternative types of 
limitation of carrier's liability, 1967, p.Ill, hereinafter cited 
as "Selvig, 1967"; Mankabady, p.58.
2- Selvig, Unit Limitation, p.61; Mankabady, p.58.
3- Selvig, 1967, p.111.
4- F.Bonelli, Limitation of Liability of the carrier, present 
regulation and prospects of reform, published in studies on the 
revision of the Brussels Convention on Bills of lading, edited by 
Francesco Berlingieri, 1974, p.169, hereinafter cited as 
"Bonelli"; Report of Thirtieth Conference held at the Peace 
Palace, The Hague, Holland, 30th August - 3rd September, 1921, 
Vol II, London 1922, p.158.
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to establish the limitation of liability when goods are not 
shipped in packages. This applies even if the "shipping 
unit view" is followed. That position is taken in the 
United Kingdom. Under U.K. COGSA, the term 'unit' in 
Article 4(5) is defined as 'shipping unit'. This is made 
clear by the English writers. Carver 1 inclines to read 
'unit' as meaning a 'shipping unit'. The wagon containing 
goods which was held to be a 'package' in the Whaite Case2 
and the unboxed motor-vehicle which was held not to be a 
'package' in the Studebaker Case  ^ are both presumably a 
'unit' in Carver's view. Diamond suggests that "'unit' is 
to be construed as referring to an individual article or 
piece of goods which is not a 'package'".4 Furthermore, 
interpreting the term 'unit' as to mean 'shipping unit' is 
applied by the Canadian judiciary:
"The word 'unit', [•••], normally applies only to a 
shipping unit, that is a unit of goods, the word 'package' 
and the context generally seem so to limit it".^
The position in the U.S.A. stands in sharp contrast. 
Under U.S. COGSA, the concept of 'unit' has been made quite
Carver, p.301.
2- (1874) L.R.9 Ex.67
2- [1938]1 K.B.459; Falconbridqe Nickel Mines V. Chimo Shipping Ltd 
[1973]2 Lloyds Rep. 469 at p.475 (Ritchie.J)
4- Diamond, 1978 p.241; In that context Temperley, p.79, also said: 
"The natural interpretation of the word 'unit' appears to be that 
it has been added in order to cover parts of a cargo in general 
was similar to a package, but not strictly included in that term, 
which properly implies something packed up or made up for 
portability”.
5- Per Rand.J. (expressing the opinion of the Can. Sup. Ct) in 
Anticosti Shipping Co. V. Viateur St. Amand. [1959]1 Lloyd's Rep. 
352 at p.358; this case has been treated as an authority in 
favour of the shipping unit in Falconbridqe Nickel Mines V. Chimo 
Shipping, (per Ritchie.J.), [1973]2 Lloyd's Rep. 469 at p.475.
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clear by use of a new expression which is called 'customary
freight unit'l. In Brazil Oitica. Ltd V. M/S. Bill.2
Chestnut, J. said:
"The phrase 'customary freight unit' refers to the 
unit of quantity, weight or measurement of the cargo 
customarily used as the basis for the calculation of 
the freight rate to be charged. Generally in marine 
contracts the word 'freight' is used to denote 
remuneration or reward for carriage of goods by ship 
rather than the goods themselves".
It can then be concluded that, under U.K. COGSA the term
'unit' should thus be interpreted as to mean 'shipping
unit', whereas, the U.S. COGSA provides 'customary freight
unit' which differs from the prevailing viewpoint in the
Hague Rules, where the reference is to the 'shipping
unit' . ^
Coming now to the consideration of the important point 
concerning the effect of the palletization and 
containerization on the 'per package or unit' concept, the 
following can be said:
During recent years, palletization has been employed, so 
that several cartons can be stacked on a flat wooden tray 
and then moved by means of a forklift t r u c k b u t  one of
Article 4(5) of United States COGSA.
2- (1944) A.M.C. 883 at 887; Freedman and Slater V. M.V. Tofevo. 
(1963) A.M.C. 1525 at p.1538; Waterman S.S. Corp V. U.S.Smelting 
Refining & Mining. (1949) 86 F. Supp.487.
3- Chandler, p.268.
4- Seymour Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, (1974)5 J.M.L.C. 
p.511, hereinafter cited as "Simon"; Tallman Bissell, The 
Operational Realities of Containerization and their Effect on the 
"package" limitation and the "on-Deck" prohibition: Review and 
Suggestions, (1971)45 Tul. L.R. p.907, hereinafter cited as 
"Bissell", where he said: "'Palletization' is a method of stowing 
general cargo of a fairly homogeneous nature on rectangular 
wooden cargo trays designed to be transported by means of a 
forklift truck"; Standard Electrica S.A. V. H ambur q
154
the most important technological developments in the 
transportation of goods by sea is the recent advent of the 
container revolution.1 The introduction of the container 
into the maritime industry has stimulated the courts to 
take a new look at the package limitation in intermodal 
transport. Then, in considering containerized 
transportation, a distinction should be made between three 
basic types of intermodal shipments:
1. "Door-to-Door" shipment, where a container is loaded and 
sealed at the supplier's factory and delivered intact to 
the consignee's warehouse or other place of business.
2. "Point-to-Point" shipment, in which a container is 
loaded by a freight consolidator at an inland point and 
transported to an inland point overseas.
3. "Port-to-Port" or "Air terminal-to-Air Terminal" 
shipment: here the transport of a container i s 
consolidated at a port or air terminal and shipped to an 
overseas port or air terminal where the contents then 
are sorted for distribution.2
Undoubtedly, the container system has brought many 
advantages to the different modes of transport of goods.
Sudamerikanische. [1967]2 Lloyd's Rep. 193 (U.S. Ct. of Appeals), 
herein after cited as "Standard Electrica Case".
1- "'Container' is an article of transport equipment other than a
vehicle or conventional packaging [which is] ...strong enough to 
be suitable for repeated use; .... specially designed to 
facilitate the carriage of goods by one or more modes of 
transport, without intermediate reloading .... [Fitted] with 
devices permitting its ready handling, particularly its transfer 
from one mode of transport to another; and .... so designed as to 
be easy to fill and empty". See, proposed Regulation, 49 C.F.R. 
par. 420.3(3), published at 34 Fed. Reg. 14054 (Sept.4.1969) .
Quoted in, Edward Schmeltzer & Robert A. Peavy, prospects and 
problems of the Container Revolution, (1970)1 J.M.L.C. p.203, 
Footnote, 1, hereinafter cited as "Schmeltzer & Peavy".
2- Schmeltzer & Peavy, pp.205-206,
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One of the major advantages of the container revolution is 
the reduction of the total costs of transport, and 
increased security and protection. 1 It also prevents cargo 
damage resulting from the deliberate or otherwise throwing 
or dropping of packages to the deck of a pier or ship. In 
addition, the risk of damage to cargoes resulting from 
stevedores carelessly stowing heavy cargoes on top of 
delicate ones is eliminated under containerization.2 
Another advantage of the container revolution is that 
certain administrative costs can be reduced or even 
eliminated, such as the cost of purchasing cargo insurance 
and the cost of freight-forwarders and custom brokers for 
handling port and airport clearances.3 The use of the 
container, then, has largely facilitated the carriage of 
goods, particularly in combined transport.^
However, despite the above mentioned advantages 
resulting from the container revolution, the use of 
containers has presented a major problem of interpretation 
of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules. The question is 
whether the container constitutes the package, or whether 
the packages within the container are to be considered 
separately for limitation purposes. The gap in the 
provisions of the Hague Rules in dealing with the concept 
of 'package' is reflected in the container, pallet-package 
problem which was unknown when the Hague Rules were
Carl E. McDowell, Containerization: Comment on Insurance and
Liability, (1972)3 JMLC, p.503, hereinafter cited as "McDowell".
2- Simon, p.511.
3- Schmeltzer & Peavy, p.210.
4- For more details as to these advantages, see Ibid, pp.206-210;
Simon, pp.511-513.
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adopted. Accordingly, the container-package question has 
encouraged a variety of opinions to come into existence. 
The following are however the criteria which have emerged 
from the decisions of the courts of different countries.
1. "The Intention of the parties" test, and
2. "Functional Economic" test.
1. "The Intention of the parties" Test
According to this test, the question to be determined is 
whether the contracting parties (the shipper and the 
carrier) intended to treat the container or pallet as a 
'package' or intended that the contents of the container or 
the pallet to be so treated.
The intention of the parties could be ascertained from 
consideration of a number of facts, such as previous course 
of dealings, the descriptions of the goods in the bill of 
lading as stated; the type of container or pallet; who 
shipped it; who sealed it; if it was sealed on delivery to 
the carrier.^
It is to be noted that Article 3(3) (b) of the Hague 
Rules helps in defining a package by imposing obligations 
on the carrier and shipper to describe the goods on the 
bill of lading in terms of "the number of packages or 
pieces". In this connection, Tetley concludes that "In 
deciding what the package or unit is, one must look to the
1- J.A.Johnston Co. Ltd V. The 'Tindefjell', [1973]2 Lloyd's Rep.253 
at p.258 (per Collier, J), (Canada Federal Court).
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intention of the parties and must note what has been stated 
on the face of the bill of lading."!
To determine whether a pallet or a container constitutes 
a package or not, the court extracts the characterization 
of the parties from the facts and shipping documents, such 
as the description of the goods in connection with their 
actual numeration by the carrier. Thus in Leather's Best 
Inc V. The ' Mormaclvnx'2 it was held that the individual 
bales were the packages and not the container. The court 
also can deduce from the facts that the dock receipt, and 
the bill of lading indicated that the parties regarded each 
pallet as a ' p a c k a g e'.3
However, if the bill of lading states the number of 
packages as (1 container) and gives no indication of the 
fact that '190 cartons' were inside the container, these 
cartons are deemed as one 'package'.4 This means that the 
parties regarded the container as a 'package' in their 
dealing and not each carton individually.5
The ' intention of parties' test received some attention 
in J.A. Johnston Co. Ltd V. The ' Tindef jell' 6. where 
Collier, J. said:
!- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.641
2- [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep.476 at p.486, (U.S. Court of Appeals, Second 
Cir) .
3- Standard Electrica V. Hamburg Sudamerikanishe. [1967]2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 193 at p.195, (U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Cir).
4- 'The Bischofstein'. [1974]1 Lloyd's Rep. 122 at p.126, (U.S. Dist 
Ct. of Southern Dist of New York).
5- ibid.
6- [1973]2 Lloyd's Rep.253 at p.254. In this case the bill of 
lading described the shipment as two containers, in one container 
there were 173 cartons of shoes and 148 in the other. The court 
held that the individual cartons were the packages and not the 
container.
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"Where the shipper knows his goods are to be shipped 
by container and specifies in the contract [usually
by means of the bill of lading] the type of goods and 
the number of cartons carried in the container, and 
where the carrier accepts the description and that 
count, then....the parties intended that the number 
of packages for purposes of limitation of liability 
should be the number of cartons specified."!
One can then conclude that the main factors in
determining whether a pallet or container is a package,
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and, in
particular, on the intention of the parties as indicated by
what is stated in the shipping documents and the course of
dealing between them.2
This test, 'intent of the parties', has been criticised
as futile when there is inequality in bargaining power
between the contracting p a r t i e s . 3 Another undesirable side
effect of a rule based upon the intention of the parties is
that, in fact, it might impair the value and negotiability
of the bill of lading, due to uncertainty in the allocation
of risks with respect to the cargo. The holder of the bill
of lading may never be sure what the parties intended to
treat as a package, except to the extent that said intent
can be deduced from the full content of the bill of lading
itself.4
!- Ibid, at p.258.
2- International Factory Seals V. The "Aleksandr Serafimovich" 
[1975]2 Lloyd's Rep.346 at p.354. (Canada Federal Court).
3- Standard Electrica V. Hamburg Sudamerikanische. [1967]2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 193 at p. 194.
4- The 'Aegis Spirit'. [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep.93 at p.100.
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2. "Functional Economic" test.
Under this test, where the shipper's own cartons or
crates have been packed in a container, a presumption is 
created that each of the cartons or crates is deemed a 
package for the purpose of limitation of liability if the 
shipper's cartons or crates are functional packages in the 
sense that they are sturdy enough to withstand the rigours 
of break-bulk carriage.! burden of proof is placed on
the carrier to show that both parties intended the 
container to be the package.2 However, where the shipper's 
own individual cartons or crates are not functionable or 
usable for overseas shipment, the container is
presumptively a package for the purpose of limitation of 
liability and the burden shifts to the shipper to show why 
the container should not be treated as the p a c k a g e .3
Oakes, Ct. J,4 explained the necessity for such a test
by saying:
"The 'functional package unit' test we propound today 
is designed to provide in a case where the shipper 
has chosen the container a 'common-sense test' under 
which all parties concerned can a l l o c a t e  
responsibility for loss at the time of contract, 
purchase additional insurance if necessary, and thus 
'avoid the pains of litigation'".
1_ "Break-bulk", is the term used to refer to traditional non­
containerized cargo carriage, see The Aegis Spirit. [1977]1 
Lloyd's Rep.93 at p.98,100
2- Roval Typewriter V. M.V. Kulmerland, [1973]2 Lloyd's Rep.428 at 
p.431, hereinafter cited as The 'Kulmerland'; The 'American 
Legion'. [1975]1 Lloyd's Rep.295 at p.296.
3- The 'Kulmerland'. [1973]2 Lloyd's Rep. at p.432.
4- Ibid, at p.432.
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This test has been criticized for many reasons; It does 
not afford the predictability needed for the parties to 
allocate responsibility for loss at the time of contract
and to purchase the necessary insurance, because neither 
does the carrier know how the goods inside a sealed
container are packed, nor is the shipper able to obtain the 
benefit of a limitation based on each carton in the
container.! Also, the parties' intent, as evidenced by the 
bill of lading, should have no effect on a COGSA
determination.2 Further, the test fosters economic waste 
by requiring the shipper to package container shipped goods 
expensively to avoid the statutory limitation.3
3.1.2 Under the Visby Rules
The Hague Rules have rendered considerable services to 
the maritime transport industry, but since their beginning 
more than 60 years ago many new problems have arisen and 
these Rules do not provide solutions to them. Both the
!- M.E. De Orchis, The Container and the package limitation - The
Search for Predictability, (1974)5 JMLC, p.279, hereinafter cited
as "De Orchis".
2- George Denegre, Admiralty-carrier-owned shipping container found
not to be COGSA "package",(1982)56 Tul.L.R.p.1416, hereinafter
cited as "Denegre".
3- The Aegis Spirit. [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep. 93; Simon, p.523; Insurance 
Company of North America V. S/S. Brooklyn Maru. [1975]2 Lloyd's 
Rep.512 at p.513, where Tyler, Jr.D.J, states; "Since the 
individual cases were not suitable for overseas shipment without 
further packaging or special shipping arrangements the 636 boxes 
placed in the container failed the 'functional economics test' and 
could not qualify as S.4(5) packages"; The American Legion.
[1975]1 Lloyd's Rep.295 at p.304 (Wilfred Feinberg Ct. J.); It is 
to be mentioned, there is another criterion for the container- 
package issue which is called 'single shipper package test' that 
where a container contains goods of a single shipper and has been 
sealed and packed by the shipper, the container will be deemed as 
a 'package', see Rosenbruch V. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines 
Inc, [1974]1 Lloyd's Rep. 119 at p.121, (U.S. District Court,
Southern District of New York).
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traditional maritime States (the shipowning countries) and 
the developing States have realized that the Hague Rules 
have become unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction of the 
traditional maritime States arose from the realization that 
"the rules for unit limitation of liability which depended 
on shipments in boxes, bales or bags appropriate for 
sailing ships as well as liberty-ships and victory-ships 
which had been built for maritime usage in 1917-1918 and 
1944-1945, could not easily be accommodated to 
containerized shipping. The worldwide depression had 
already unsettled the monetary value of the unit limitation 
rule so that wide disparities existed even under the laws 
of those states which were parties to the Hague Rules."!
The main problems, then, arising from Article 4(5) of 
the Hague Rules were: the terms 'per package' or 'unit'
lacked any real precision and, the limitation figure itself 
is not precise.^
These reasons and many others prompted the Comity 
Maritime International [CMI] to contemplate making radical 
amendments to a number of some important aspects of the 
Hague Rules in order to eliminate their unsatisfactory 
features. Therefore, many conferences have been held to 
deal with the revision of the Rules.
1- Sweeney, part I, pp.72-73. Whereas the dissatisfaction of the 
developing States consisted essentially that "the operation of 
traditional maritime law (along with other aspects of 
International trade law) impairs the balance of payments 
position of developing States so as to insure continued poverty 
and perpetual under-development in an industrial age". Ibid, 
p.73.
2- Diamond, 1978, p.229.
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The sub-committee of the CMI in the Stockholm 
conference, held in June 9, 1963, after deep discussions of 
different solutions, finally agreed to retain the 'per 
package' or 'unit', changing only the amount of the maximum 
to be equivalent to 10,000 Poincar4 francs per package or 
unit.1
In 1967, at the Diplomatic conference on Maritime Law 
convened in Brussels to discuss this subject, it was 
proposed by the Norwegian delegation to replace the per 
package or unit system embodied in Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules with a system based on weight unit which had 
already been adopted in the International Conventions for 
the carriage of goods by rail (CIM), by road (CMR) and by 
air (Warsaw Convention)2. Much controversy concentrated on 
the use of weight as a unique unit of l i m i t a t i o n . 3 As a 
result, the British delegation suggested postponing the 
discussion of the units of limitation to the second phase 
of the conference^ which took place in Brussels in Feb, 
1968, again as a Diplomatic conference of maritime law, 
where a 'mixed or alternative system' was adopted. This 
alternative system has a dual limit basis, one being per 
package or unit, and the other being per kilo gross weight
!- Selvig, 1967, pp.109-110; see also Manca, P. International 
Maritime Law, Vol.2, Belgium, 1970, p.267, hereinafter cited as 
"Manca".
2- Diamond, 1978, p.232. This proposal was also supported from the 
U.S. delegation.
3- John L DeGurse, The "Container clause" in Article 4(5) of the 1968 
Protocol to the Hague Rules, (1970)2, J.M.L.C. p.138, hereinafter 
cited as "DeGurse"; Schmeltzer & Peavy, p,223,
4- DeGurse, p.138.
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of the goods damaged or lost, whichever is the higher.! It
is submitted that the per package or unit limit is intended
to apply to relatively light cargoes, while the per kilo
limit is intended to apply to heavier o n e s . 2
Therefore, the proposal of alternative units of
limitation, after acceptance at the Diplomatic conference
became sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the
1968 protocol which reads:
"a. Unless the nature and value of such goods have 
been declared by the shipper before shipment and 
inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier 
nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable 
for any loss or damage to or in connection with the 
goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of Frcs. 
10,000 per package or unit or Frcs. 30 per Kilo of 
gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever 
is the higher".
There had been a new proposal submitted at the 
conference providing that there should be a ceiling 
according to which the total liability of the carrier shall 
not be e x c e e d e d . 3 The conference, however, rejected the
!- Conference Diplomatique de Droit Maritime, Douzieme Session (2e 
phase) Bruxelles 1968, Doc. No.l, p.187, hereinafter cited as 
"Brussels Conference 1968".
2- Report of the Secretary-General, second report on responsibility 
of ocean carriers for cargo: Bills of lading, (A/CN.9/76/Add.1), 
1973, p.163, para.11; The British delegation also favoured the 
alternative units of limitation for the following reasons: 1. The 
present limitation by package or unit is inappropriate to our 
container traffic and causes considerable doubts and difficulties. 
Therefore, the per kilo base is the best way to deal with this 
particular problem; 2. Relying on per kilo basis only is 
insufficient, because it has two disadvantages; "firstly it is not 
really appropriate for small packages of a reasonably high value. 
Secondly, it gives rise to particular administrative 
difficulties". See Brussels Conference, 1968, p.44.
2- Several amounts were suggested, see for more details: Brussels 
Conference 1968, proposal of the Danish delegation, p.200, 
proposal of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
p.191, proposal of the Netherlands, pp.196-97, 215.
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proposed ceiling, as it would run counter to the container 
clause.! In addition the parties to the contract of 
carriage according to paragraph 1(g) of Article 2 of the 
Protocol 1968, can fix maximum amounts differently than as 
provided for in Article 2(a).2
It is noteworthy that sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 
of Article 2 of the Visby Rules may produce some
difficulties in certain circumstances. For instance, the 
loss or damage to a shipment under one bill of lading of 
several 'packages' or 'units' of differing weights. In 
such a case, it is not clear whether the criteria are 
available only as an alternative to the collective cargo or 
whether, in order to derive the maximum liability, the
cargo-owner can select which of the two alternatives -
package/unit or weight - is more attractive to each 
individual item of cargo and thereby classify some items by 
package or unit and others by weight. It has been
!- The British delegation indicated that the proposed ceiling would 
run counter to "the whole philosophy of this clause (the 
container clause) into which it would be inserted. The 
philosophy of this clause is to deal with the cargo of 
exceptional value. It used to be only exceptional value per 
package or unit, it is now exceptional value per package or unit 
or in the case of the larger ones per weight of these goods lost 
or damaged. The effect of putting on a global ceiling introduces 
an entirely different concept. It introduces a maximum based 
upon the quantity of goods you ship, whatever their value. Even 
though you are shipping goods of ordinary value, if you ship them 
in a large container under rates in which the large container is 
the unit, then your recovery will be less because you have 
shipped them in a large container rather than in a small 
container. So to start with it runs counter to the whole system 
of this clause, which is to deal with goods of exceptional value, 
not of exceptional quantity". Brussels Protocol, 1968, p.121.
2- Paragraph 1(g) of Article 2 provides: "By agreement between the
carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the shipper other 
maximum amounts than those mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this 
paragraph may be fixed, provided that no maximum amount so fixed 
shall be less than the appropriate maximum mentioned in that sub- 
paragraph ."
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suggested that, in such a case, reference should be made to
the bill of lading. If the bill gives the number of
packages or units, the package/unit limit is used and if
not, the weight limit is used.! This suggestion, however,
has been contested by the editors of Chorley & Giles who
state correctly, "that the plain wording of the Rules
dictates an answer which is in terms independent of the
bill of lading and simply on the giving the greater award
of damages to the cargo-owner. "2 They submit that the
choice of limitation - package/unit or weight - depends on
the mathematical result (whichever is the higher) and not
on the type of cargo.
Another difficulty arises in cases where part of the
cargo is lost. It is not clear whether the limitation test
is applied to the part lost or to the whole of the cargo as
being damaged. Diamond suggests:
"If a package or unit weighs more than 333.3 Kilos 
and only some of the goods within it are lost or
damaged, the limit will be 10,000 francs unless those 
goods weigh more than 333.3 Kilos".3
Coming now to the consideration of the container clause. 
It is to be noted that before the 1968 Brussels Protocol, 
knowing the number of packages in relation to container 
cases was a problem because, as stated, there were 
different interpretations as to whether the container or
!- Diamond, 1978, p.241.
2- Chorley & Giles, 8th ed, p.211.
2- Diamond, 1978, p.240. He also suggests that "If a package or 
unit weighs 333.3 kilos or less, then the limit is 10,000 francs 
irrespective of whether all the goods were lost or damaged or 
only some of them. If a package or unit weighs more than 333.3 
kilos and all the goods within it are lost or damaged, then the 
weight alternative will provide a higher limit". Ibid.
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its contents constituted COGSA packages. Then, with a view
to finding a solution to the container-package question,
the Visby Rules attempt to deal with the problem of
containerized goods. Article 2(c) of the Protocol 1968
(Visby Rules) provides:
"Where a container, pallet or similar article of 
transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of 
packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as 
packed in such article of transport shall be deemed 
the number of packages or units for the purpose of 
this paragraph as far as these packages or units are 
concerned. Except as aforesaid such article of 
transport shall be considered the package or unit."!
The above provision makes it clear that a container or 
pallet will cease to count as a single package if the 
packages or units within the container are enumerated in 
the bill of lading. In other words, the number of packages 
or units within the container must appear on the face of 
the bill of lading in order to constitute the basis for 
calculation of the limitation. Accordingly, three 
possibilities can arise under Article 2(c) of the Visby 
Rules:
1. If the bill of lading enumerates the contents of the 
container individually (e.g. 1 container containing 500
cases of machinery), the container is not a package but 
each of the 500 cases will qualify as a package or unit.
!- This provision has been mentioned literally in Article 4(5) (c) of 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, of the British COGSA, 
while the American courts still apply the American COGSA 1936 in 
regard to the container-package question, because the U.S. has not 
ratified the Brussels Protocol 1968.
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2. If the bill of lading does not enumerate the contents of 
the container (e.g. 1 container containing machinery), 
then the container is deemed to be the package or unit.
3. If the bill of lading enumerates the contents of the 
certain packages or units plus general cargo included in 
the container (e.g. 1 container containing 10 cases of 
machinery and general merchandise), each of the 10 cases 
is a package or unit and the container with the 
remaining general goods is to be treated as another 
package or unit.
It is to be noted that the legislative background of the 
Hague/Visby Rules relating to Article 2(c) of the Visby 
Rules, clearly reveals that the intention of the parties 
has received much attention in the formulation of this 
provision. The British delegation, within their explanation 
describe the nature and purpose of the container clause as 
follows:
"It is for the shipper and the carrier to decide 
whether they want the particular container to be 
treated as the package for the purpose of limitation 
of weight, or whether they want the smaller packages 
or units in it to be so treated; and no doubt when 
the latter alternative is taken, that is to say the 
individual packages are to be treated as separate 
units, a higher rate of freight will be payable than 
when the container is to be the unit - a higher rate 
of freight because the maximum liability, may itself 
be higher [ . . . ] What is essential is that into 
whoever' s hands the bill of lading may come, the 
hands of the consignee, of the banker who finances 
the transaction, or of the insurer, it will appear on 
the face of the bill of lading whether the package
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for purposes of maximum liability is, the container, 
or the individual packages inside the container [...] 
what we want to do is to leave open to the shipping 
industry, the shippers and the ship owners, to decide 
as a matter of business whether they want to get 'per 
container rates' in which case the container will be 
treated as the package, or the ordinary freight rates 
in which (case) the traditional packages within it 
will be treated as individual packages [ . . . ] Under 
this paragraph all you will have to do is to look at 
the bill of lading and see, does it contain any 
figures of the numbers of packages other than the 
containers themselves."!
It is submitted that nothing in the language of Article 
4(5)(c) of the Hague/Visby Rules indicates that for the 
privilege of the enumeration in the bill of lading of the 
number of packages or units loaded into the container, the 
shipper must pay an increased freight rate. The practice 
of charging higher rates has tended to discourage shippers 
from declaring the nature and value of their goods in the 
bill of lading. Instead, they have tended to rely on 
supplementary cargo insurance as a means of protection 
against loss, which is, for the most part, less expensive 
than paying a higher freight rate.2
It is noteworthy that Article 4(5) (c) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules has largely solved the problem of whether the 
container is a package for limitation purposes. Despite 
this a number of problems remain to be solved, for instance
!- Brussels Conference, 1968, pp.118-119. However some delegations 
opposed the container clause, for instance, the Irish delegation, 
Ibid, pp.42-43.
2- DeGurse, p.133.
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'similar article of transport' and 'used to consolidate 
goods'. Concerning the expression 'similar article of 
transport', Scrutton suggested that, 'roll on-roll off' 
lorries and trailers do not fall within this description."! 
This suggestion has been contested by Carver who finds that 
'roll on-roll off, push on-push off, drive on-drive off, 
fly on-fly off, are not only similar to but are containers 
if they consolidate goods. "2 The question also may arise 
as to what is meant by 'used to consolidate', Scrutton 
suggested that perhaps the most obvious interpretation is 
'used to carry' or 'used to contain'. The word
'consolidate' is often used in shipping practice as meaning 
'treat as one consignment for the purpose of calculating 
freight.Diamond reaches the same conclusion as Scrutton 
when he finds the expression 'used to consolidate goods' 
refers to the physical placing of goods together inside a 
container, not to the consolidation of the goods of 
different shippers or of the goods shipped under different 
contracts of carriage.4
Lastly, a question to be solved is: in what
circumstances is the number of packages "enumerated in the 
bill of lading as packed", in the container? It is 
submitted that where the bill of lading is "said to 
contain" a certain number of packages, then this is 
sufficient for the purpose of Article 4(5)(c) even though 
it would probably not create an estoppel under Article
!- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.455, note.33.
2- Carver, p.397.
2- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.455, note.34.
4- Diamond, 1978, p.243.
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3(3). It would appear that both parties are bound, for 
limitation purposes, by an incorrect enumeration which is 
an unsatisfactory result.!
One can then conclude that the Visby Rules produce 
important amendments to Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules. 
The amendments in question are:
1. The 'per package or unit' limitation fixed earlier 
in gold, is changed into gold poincar£ francs and is 
raised to Frcs. 10,000.
2. A new alternative standard limitation, the per kilo 
of gross weight is added, clearly improving the 
position of the cargo-owner since he was now allowed 
to claim the higher of the two figures produced by 
the application of the two alternative tests.2
3. The addition of the new sub-paragraph (C) to Article 
4(5) solved some, although not all, of the 
limitation problems which containerized transport 
raised under the Hague Rules. In other words, we 
can say that the container clause was produced to 
clarify the question of the number of packages in 
container cases and consequently to make it easily 
possible to calculate which amount would be the 
higher in accordance with Article 4(5)(a) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules. The amended rules also provide 
the shipper with a choice between a weight-based 
limit of liability and a limit per package or unit.
!- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.455, note 35; Carver, p.397.
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.885; Wilson, Basic carrier liability, p.l47%
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3.1.3.Under the Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules adopted a dual system of liability
limitation. The units of limitation were a matter of
controversy at the relevant UNCITRAL Conference.
Some countries favoured a system based on the principle
of the weight of cargo alone^ as found in the CIM, CMR and
Warsaw Conventions, with no reference to the package
limitation system as found in the Hague rules (Art.5(4) or
the Hague/Visby Rules (Brussels Protocol 1968). Some other
countries were in favour or retaining the dual system which
was adopted under the Hague/Visby Rules^, i.e. "per package
or unit", and "weight", because of a) the difficulty of
establishing weight in cases of partial loss, or broken
package cases, and b) the dual system is a flexible
approach to the problem of the carrier's limitation of
liability.^ Finally, the Hamburg Rules Conference accepted
a dual system of liability limitation. Thus, Article
6(1)(a) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"The liability of the carrier for loss resulting from 
loss or damage to goods according to the provisions 
of Article 5 is limited to an amount equivalent to 
835 units of account per package or other shipping
1- Such as Nigeria and Norway whose argument was based on the 
"simplicity of administration, the ambiguities and resulting 
friction in any 'package' system of limitation and necessity to 
accommodate intermodal carriage systems in the future". However, 
the Australian delegate indicated that he could accept the dual 
system. Joseph C.Sweeney, Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules, 
published in the Hamburg Rules on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
edited by S. Mankabady, 1978, p.155, hereinafter cited as 
"Sweeney, Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules".
2- These countries were: The United States, the United Kingdom, the 
USSR and France. This view was endorsed by Belgium, Japan, 
Poland, Singapore, India, Argentina and Brazil. However, Japan 
accepted this system only on condition that the container should 
be governed by weight alone. Ibid, pp. 155,156.
2- Mankabady, p.62; Sweeney, part.II, p.329.
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unit or 2.5 units of account per kilogramme of gross 
weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is 
the higher".
As we have seen the limitation units under the Hamburg 
Rules are "per package or other shipping unit" and 
"weight". This test is clearly applicable when the goods 
are carried in packages or as shipping units and their 
weight is known. Where, however, the weight of lost or 
damaged goods is unknown, the per package or shipping unit 
will be the only applicable test, and, where the nature of 
the cargo is in a manner which is not usually carried in 
packages or as other shipping units, such as bulk cargo,! 
the weight test will clearly be applicable. This is more 
beneficial to the s h i p p e r . 2
It is noteworthy that the Hamburg Rules used the terms 
"shipping unit" to remove any uncertainty caused by the 
term "unit" used in the Hague/Visby Rules. So the 
draftsmen of the Hamburg Rules use the term "other shipping 
unit" after the term "package". The former term thus means 
a shipping unit which is not regarded as "a package" like 
an unboxed car or tractor. Under the Hague/Visby Rules it 
was not completely clear whether the unit meant "shipping 
unit" or "freight unit", i.e. the unit upon which the 
freight is calculated such as tonne. This is, as already 
discussed, why some believe that the Hague/Visby Rules
!- Bulk Cargo, includes such cargo as "coal, grain, sugar, various 
chemicals and so on, which are loaded in bulk, which are of 
character inclined to run under some circumstances like sand, and 
which are not either cases or bags or individual pieces like 
machinery or timber. Hird V. Rea Ltd [1939]63 Ll.L.Rep. 261 at 
p.263 (per Scott J.)
2- Mankabady, p.62; Chorley & Giles', 8th ed, p.211.
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"unit" means "shipping unit" while some others believe that 
it means "freight unit". This uncertainty is resolved by 
the Hamburg Rules.!
It is to be noted that, Article 6(l)(b) of the Hamburg 
Rules brought a new unit of limitation for loss caused by 
delay in delivery. This limitation is based on an amount 
equivalent to two and a half times the freight payable for 
the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight 
payable under the contract of carriage. It must be 
mentioned, however, that a delay may cause physical damage 
to the goods, so the question here is, whether this damage 
would be governed by Article 6(1) (b), or by the general 
unit limitation of liability figure found in Article 
6 (1) (a ) ?
On this point Professor Selvig ( N o r w e g i a n  
representative) indicated that the physical damage to cargo 
caused by delay was clearly covered by Article 6(1)(a) and 
not by Article 6(1)(b) (the special delay damage f i g u r e ) . 2  
Accordingly, the United States delegate (Professor Sweeney) 
also indicated that he would make an oral representation as 
part of the official documents to that effect at the 
Plenary Session of the Conference. The Statement was as 
follows:
"At the discussion on delay damages [ ... ] a question 
was raised about the problem of carrier liability for 
physical deterioration or wasting of the cargo caused 
by delay. The opinion was given [...] that the 
expression in Art. 5(1), 'The carrier shall be liable
!- Wilson, p.209? Bonelli, p.195
2- Sweeney, Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules, p.161.
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for loss resulting from loss or damage to the goods 
as well as from delay in delivery...', covers 
physical deterioration of the cargo caused by delay. 
No-one disagreed. We also hold that view. We said 
then that we wish to place on record our 
understanding that the provisions of Article 5(1), 
and more importantly, the provisions of Article 
6(1) (a) applying the unit limit of 2.5 SDR per kilo 
and 835 SDR per package apply to physical 
deterioration of the cargo caused by delay".!
It can be said then that the Article 6(1) (a) figure of 
the Hamburg Rules applies to physical damage to cargo 
caused by delay, whereas the Article 6(1)(b) figure covers 
only the consequential economic losses caused by delay in 
delivery.
As already mentioned, the Hague/Visby Rules attempted to 
solve the container-package problem by producing a 
container clause.2 The Hamburg Rules too attempt to solve 
the container-package problem by, as we have said, adopting 
a dual system liability limitation, i.e. 'per package or 
other shipping unit' and 'weight'. The adoption of this 
system will be inevitably followed by the container-package 
problem, because, in order to calculate the carrier's 
liability limitation in such a system, it has to be decided 
whether a container is a package or not. The drafting 
committee after a long debate reached a general agreement 
that the container clause of the Hague/Visby Rules should
1- Ibid, pp.161-162, as noted above, no contrary view as expressed.
2- Article 4(5)(c) of the Hague/Visby Rules.
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be used as the basis of the new clause.! Therefore, the 
Hamburg Rules are based on the Hague/Visby Rules, Article 
5(4)(c), but the Hamburg Rules have a more comprehensive 
context than the Hague/Visby Rules. Take the case where no 
bill of lading is issued and the number of packages or 
other shipping units is set out in another document 
evidencing the contract of carriage by sea. This situation 
seems not to fall within Article 4(5) (c) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules. In order to deal with such a situation, the Hamburg 
Rules conference decided to add the phrase "if issued, or 
otherwise in any other document evidencing the contract of 
carriage by s e a " 2 after the phrase "enumerated in the bill 
of lading'. So Article 6(2) of the Hamburg Rules reads as 
follows s
"For the purpose of calculating which amount is the 
higher in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of this 
Article, the following rules apply:
a.Where a container, pallet or similar article of 
transport is issued to consolidate goods, the 
package or other shipping units enumerated in the 
bill of lading, if issued, or otherwise in any 
document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea, 
as packed in such article of transport are deemed 
packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid the 
goods in such article of transport were deemed one 
shipping unit.
b.In cases where the article of transport itself has 
been lost or damaged, that article of transport, if
!- Sweeney, Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules, p.158; DeGurse, p.131.
2- These phrases were the proposal made by the Scandinavian nations, 
Ibid. Sweeney, p.160.
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not owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier, is 
considered one separate shipping unit."
Another point which the Hague/Visby Rules have not dealt 
with concerns the above paragraph (b) of Article 6(2). The 
lost or damaged article of transport (such as a container, 
pallet) is recoverable under the Hamburg Rules as one 
separate shipping unit from the view point of the carrier' s 
limitation of liability.! other words, if the container
itself is damaged or lost the carrier may be responsible 
for the damage. In such a case the container itself will 
be considered as one separate shipping unit.
One can then conclude that the Hamburg Rules have 
removed the uncertainty which was caused by the term 'unit' 
under the Hague/Visby Rules by using the term ' shipping 
unit', as well as resolving the problems arising from
containerization more comprehensively than the Hague/Visby 
Rules.
3.2 The Unit of Account
Units of account are employed in international transport 
conventions concerning the carriage of goods. In general 
terms, a unit of account measures the amount of any
particular currency that holders can obtain for it. The 
Hague Rules adopted a Gold Clause, the Visby Rules adopted 
the Franc Gold basis and the Hamburg Rules approved the
Special Drawing Right (S.D.R.) basis. They are discussed
below.
!- Chandler, p.271.
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3.2.1 The Gold Clause Basis
The monetary limits under Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules are £100 for the lost or damaged cargo. The monetary 
units in question, in terms of Article 9 of the Hague 
Rules, were to be taken to be gold value, as Article 9 
provides:
"The monetary units mentioned in this convention are
to be taken to be gold value".
Thus, the unit of account under the Hague Rules is the 
gold standard.
The gold clause was intended to ensure international 
uniformity and stability in imposing an integrated charge 
on the carrier, for loss or damage to the goods, in 
different countries, as well as protecting the holder of 
the bill of lading against the devaluation of local 
currencies if the limit was expressed in terms of one of 
these currencies, but difficulties have arisen in 
application of this Article, firstly with the remarkable 
changes in the real value of gold over time and, secondly, 
with respect to the date of conversion for contracting 
states where the pound was but no longer is a given 
monetary unit.
The pound sterling is not convertible into gold and 
devaluation of the pound in relation to the sovereign has 
taken place. Consequently it has no longer the same value 
as the pound sterling in 1924. In other words, the pound 
nowadays does not represent one pound sterling in gold. 
Therefore, many countries adopted at that time in their
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domestic legislation an amount in local currency as the 
equivalent of £100 sterling.! The result was that the 
limitation level was decreased and the carriers accordingly 
gained an extra profit from the £100 limit or its 
equivalent in other currencies. This figure became 
unsatisfactory to ascertain the balance between the 
interests of the carriers and cargo-owners, a balance which 
represents the merit and the ultimate object of the Hague 
Rules.2
In consequence, under the auspices of the British 
Maritime Association a number of carrier and cargo owner 
interests in the U.K. concluded an agreement on 1st August, 
1950, known as the "Gold Clause Agreement", whereby the 
limitation of liability was raised to £200 sterling lawful 
money of the U.K.3 This agreement was amended on 1st July 
1977 by increasing the amount of limitation to £40 0 
sterling lawful money of the U.K.4
!- Diamond, 1978, p.240; William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 2nd 
ed,1978, p.445, hereinafter cited as "Tetley, 2nd ed".
2- N.W. Palmier Egger, The unworkable per-package limitation of the 
carrier's liability under the Hague (or Hamburg) Rules, (1978) 24 
McGill L.J. p.459, hereinafter cited as "Egger, The unworkable 
per-package limitation".
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.1240, Astle, p.179; Ridley, p.190; This 
agreement appears to have been referred to once in court in 
Pvrene Co. V. Scindia Navigation Co. [1954J2 Q.B.402 at p.413, 
where Devlin J. said: "The defendants (the carriers) admit
liability but claim that the amount is limited under Article 4, 
rule 5, of the Hague Rules. The limit stated in that rule is 
£100, but this is subject to article 9 which prescribes that the 
figure is to be taken to be gold value. There are doubts about 
the interpretation and effect of this latter article, and they 
have been very sensibly resolved for the parties to this case by 
the acceptance of the British Maritime Law Association's 
Agreement of August 1, 1950, which fixes the limit at £200." 
R.E.Beare, Forum Shopping: The Effect of Conflict of Law on the 
Exercise of Cargo Underwriters' Subrogation Rights, published in 
the speakers' papers for the Bill of Lading Conventions 
Conference, Organized by Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1978, p.3, 
hereinafter cited as "Beare"; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.1241.
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As already stated above, the real value of gold over
time also changed with the date of conversion for
contracting states where the pound was and no longer is a
monetary unit. The courts of different contracting states
have not reached any uniform conclusions in determining the
rate of conversion. The choice has been between: 1. the
date of the breach of the contract; 2. the date of the
payment; 3. the date of the commencement of the
proceedings; 4. the date of the judgement; 5. the date of
the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge.
The English case law formerly adopted the date of breach
of the contract or, in the case of tort, the date of the
tortious act. Thus, in Pi Ferdinando V. Simon. Smits &
Co.* Bankes L.J. said:2
"The plaintiff is entitled to have his damages 
assessed as at the date of breach, and the court has 
only jurisdiction to award damages in English money. 
The judge must therefore express those damages in 
English money, and in order to do so he must take the 
rate of exchange prevailing at the date of breach".
This position was given judicial approval by the House
of Lords in the United Railways of Havana & Regia
Warehouses. Ltd case,3 where Viscount Simonds said:
"...A claim for damages for breach of contract or for 
tort in terms of a foreign currency must be converted 
into sterling at the rate prevailing at the date of 
breach or tortious act."4
1- [1920]3 K.B. 409.
2- ibid at p.412.
3- [1961] A.C.1007.
4- Ibid, at p.1043.
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However, a revolutionary change was made by the House of 
Lords in Miliangos V. Frank (Textiles) Ltd.l when it was 
held that the date of conversion should be at the date of 
payment in terms of sterling, and the above authorities 
were overruled. This change was made to secure a just 
result in a radically different economic climate, e.g. 
floating rather than fixed exchange rates.
In Scotland, there have been conflicting views as to 
what constitutes the relevant moment of conversion of a 
foreign currency into sterling. In Hvslops V. Gordon,2 the 
Court of Session gave decree for a sum in U.S. dollars, 
which was the money of account of the contract, but the 
House of Lords held that decree should have been given in 
the sterling equivalent of the U.S. dollar converted on the 
date of raising the a c t i o n , 3  whereas in Macfie's Judicial 
Factor V. Macfie^ it was held that the amount was to be 
calculated in sterling, in accordance with the rate of 
exchange prevailing at the date when the debt became 
payable and not at that prevailing at the date of decree.3
However, the Court of Session in C o mme r z b a n k 
Aktiengesellschaft V. Large .^ held that: "For the purposes
[19763 1 Lloyd's Rep.201 at pp.206-207 (Lord Wilberforce); Lord 
Denning, in George Veflinqs Rederi A/S V. President of India (The 
Bellami) . [1978]1 Lloyd's Rep. 467, affirmed by the Court of
Appeal [1979]1 Lloyd's Rep.123 at p.125, where Lord Denning said: 
"It seems to me clear that the rate of exchange should be the rate 
prevailing at the date of payment".
(1824)2 Sh. App.451.
3- Ibid, at pp.457-460 (per Lord Gifford).
4- 1932 S.L.T. 460 at p.461; see also Fiskasola V. Mauritzen. 1977 
S.L.T. 76.(Sh. Ct).
3- Ibid, see for more details A.E. Anton, Private International Law, 
A treatise from the standpoint of Scots Law, (1990) 2nd ed, p.279, 
hereinafter cited as "Anton, Private International Law".
6- 1977 S.L.T. 219.
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of this case the pursuers have deliberately chosen to fix 
the conversion date as the date of payment or at the date 
when the decree is extracted whichever is the earlier". 1 
In that case the Inner House follow the approach of the 
House of Lords in Miliangos. The case of Hvslops V. Gordon 
was seen as no longer being binding in Scotland. Thus the 
law of Scotland is essentially the same as that of England 
on this point.
It is to be noted that in Miliangos the House of Lords 
departed from the rule, which stated that the foreign 
currency should be converted into sterling when the action 
was raised. It became possible for the plaintiff to 
recover the loss of or damage to the goods in a foreign 
currency. The English Courts can give judgement in foreign 
currency, and can enforce it by converting that currency 
into sterling at the rate current at the date of payment.2 
As noted above, this also applies in Scotland following the 
Commerzbank decision. It appears that the new rule on 
foreign currency applies very widely to appropriate cases 
of breach of contract and tort or delict as well as to 
claims for payment of debt.
Ibid, at p.224.
Miliangos V. Frank (Textiles). Ltd. op. cit.p.201; Lord Denning, 
in The Bellami. [1979]1 Lloyd's Rep.123 at p.125, where he states: 
"Since so far as demurrage was concerned, the money of account was 
U.S. dollars and the money of payment was also U.S. dollars; and 
since there was no provision for it to be paid in sterling, then 
it is a reasonable inference that the money is payable in U.S. 
dollars"; The "Despina R". [1977]2 Lloyd's Rep 319; "The Folias". 
[ 1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 39; Scrutton, 19th ed, p.395. See also North 
Scottish Helicopters Ltd. V. United Technologies Corp. Inc.
(No.2). 1988 S.L.T. 778 at p.780.
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In the United States, there have also been different
rules as to the proper date of conversion. The Supreme
Court has adopted the date of the commencement of the
proceeding as the proper date of conversion.1 However, in
another much more recent case, the District Courts of the
United States upheld the date of the breach as the proper
date of conversion. 2 i.e. the same approach as that now
current in the United Kingdom.
There is, however, no general principle among the
contracting parties for the relevant date of conversion.
Therefore, one can conclude that the relevant date for
conversion is the date agreed upon by the parties^ or the
date which is governed by national laws of the contracting
parties and by its jurisprudence in explaining this issue.
These principles have been confirmed by Article 9(3) of the
Hague Rules which provides:
"The national laws may reserve to the debtor the 
right of discharging his debt in national currency 
according to the rate of exchange prevailing on the 
day of the arrival of the ship at the port o f 
discharge of the goods concerned".
3.2.2 The Gold Franc Basis
As we have already seen the Hague Rules limit of £10 0 
sterling, coupled with the provision that it was to be 
"gold value", did not succeed in practice in satisfying the 
objectives which are intended to be achieved by a limit of
Die Deutsche Bank V. Humphrey, 272 U.S.517 (1926).
2- Philip Holzman A.G. V. S.S. Hellenic Sunbean. (1977) A.M.C.
1731
3- Diamond, The Hamburg Rules, p.18.
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liability, namely, (a) certainty; (b) uniformity; (c)
stability and (d) the maximum degree of protection against
fluctuations and devaluations in currencies.1
The Visby Rules attempted to achieve these objectives by
replacing the gold clause by gold poincare franc as a unit
of account.2 Article 2 par (d) of the Visby Rules defines
the franc as follows;
"A Franc means a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrammes 
of gold of millesimal fineness 900"
The gold franc provided uniformity and stability as long 
as the dollar was linked with gold, especially before the 
Second World War (1939-45).3 However, certain events had 
occurred in the practice of the international monetary 
system which in turn affected the stability of the gold 
franc. The fluctuations of currencies in varied 
proportions created serious doubts as to the stability of 
the gold franc, which reflected changes in the market rates 
of national currencies and it was difficult to convert an 
amount expressed in gold into other c u r r e n c i e s . ^
The fluctuations and the devaluations of the poincar£ 
franc's value have made the official value different from 
the free market value. This situation caused uncertainty 
in applying the gold franc as a unit of account for the 
limitation of carrier's liability. The Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands in Hornlinie A.G. V. Societe Nationale
Diamond, 1978, p.236.
Article 2(a) of the Visby Rules fixed the limitation of liability 
at 10,000 francs per package or unit or 30 francs per kilo of 
gross weight of goods lost or damaged.
3- L.Bristow, Gold Franc - Replacement of Unit of Account, (1978)1 
LMCLQ, p.31, hereinafter cited as "Bristow".
4- Mankabady, p.113.
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Petrole Aquitaine .^ has solved this problem by stating 
that:
"The conversion rate of the gold franc, under the 
Brussels Convention on shipowners' limitation of 
liability, shall be calculated on the basis of the 
official value of the currency in relation to the 
Poincar6 gold unit, and not on that of the free 
market".
Regarding the date of conversion, Article 2(d) of the
Visby Rules provides:
"The date of conversion of the sum awarded into 
national currencies shall be governed by the law of 
the court seized of the c a s e " . 2
Although the Visby Rules did not fix the date of 
conversion, it can be said that they are more flexible than 
the Hague Rules because the date of conversion is left to 
be decided by the national law of the court seized of the 
case.
Thus one can conclude that both the Hague Rules and the 
Visby Rules have not succeeded in satisfying the four 
objectives for a limit of liability set out earlier. As a 
result of this situation, therefore, the S.D.R. of the
I.M.F.3 has been introduced as the basic unit of account as 
seen in the discussion which follows below.
(1972)7 E.T.L. 933.
2- However, the COGSA of the U.K. 1971 adopted the poincar€ gold 
franc as a unit of account of limitation by converting the gold 
franc into S.D.R and then into sterling at a rate of exchange 
prevailing on the date in question. (Art.4(5)). Diamond, 1978, 
p.239.
3- International Monetary Fund; It is to be noted that the 
Hague/Visby Rules have adopted the S.D.R. as a unit of account by 
replacing the Frcs: 10,000 per package or unit and Frcs. 30 per 
kilo to 666.67 S.D.R. per package or unit and 2 S.D.R. per kilo 
according to Article II (1) and (2) of the Brussels Protocol of 
1979. This protocol entered into force, February 14, 1984.
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3.2.3 The S.D.R. Basis
The uncertainty of the value of the gold franc had been 
a matter of concern since currencies began to float in
1971.1 The market price of gold became much higher than 
the official price. Determining the exact limitation 
amount thus became difficult with reference to the value of 
gold 'poincar^' franc as a basis for the conversion of the 
gold poincar£ franc into national currencies.2
The IMF was also faced with similar problems in relation 
to the value of the S.D.R.3 used as a form of reserve 
currency as well as a unit of account with a value fixed in 
terms of gold. In 1974, then, the IMF decided to define 
the value of the S.D.R. in terms of a "basket" of fixed 
amounts of 16 currencies.4 However, on January 1, 1981,
the basket was reduced to the strong currencies of the five 
IMF members.^
The International transport liability conventions aimed 
to employ the S.D.R. as a unit of account in order to avoid 
the fluctuations and devaluations of the poincare franc 
gold by converting a gold franc first into S.D.R.s and then 
into national currencies at rates which reflect current
Bristow, p.33.
2- Chandler, p.270.
3- The SDRs are an international value used to provide a regular 
comparative evaluation by the IMF of the currency of member 
states. Tetley, 3rd ed, p.879.
4- Bristow, p.32.
5- The value of the S.D.R. was equal to the market value of fixed 
amounts of five IMF members' currencies as follows: The U.S. 
dollar 42%, the Deutsche mark 19%, French franc 13%, British pound 
13% and Japanese Yen 13%; Tetley, 3rd ed, p.879; Les Ward, The SDR 
in Transport Liability Conventions: Some clarification, (1981)13 
JMLC, p.3, hereinafter cited as "Ward",
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market conditions.1 Consequently UNCITRAL has adopted the 
S.D.R. as a unit of account defined by the IMF in order to 
provide more stability in value than gold in international 
trade and exchange.2
Article 6(3) of the Hamburg Rules provides: "Unit of
account means the unit of account mentioned in Article 2 6". 
According to Article 26(1) of the Hamburg Rules the unit of 
account is the S.D.R. as defined by the IMF. An analysis 
of Article 2 6 shows that the Hamburg Rules have adopted, in 
fact, two kinds of units of account: The S.D.R. and the
poincar^ franc.
The S.D.R. is used as the Hamburg Rules' unit of account 
for the states which are members of the IMF, or for states 
which are not members of the IMF but whose laws do not 
prohibit the application of the provisions of para 1 of 
Article 2 6 including the S.D.R. For a member-state of the 
IMF the value of its national currency in terms of the 
S.D.R. will be calculated according to the method of
valuation applied by the IMF at the date in question for 
its operations and transactions,3 whereas, for non-member 
States of the IMF, where their laws permit them to use the 
S.D.R., the value of their national currencies in terms of 
the S.D.R. will be calculated in a manner determined by
those states.
1- Bristow, p.32.
2- Aleksander Tobolewski, The Special Drawing Right in Liability 
Conventions; An Acceptable Solution? (1979)2 LMCLQ, p.173, 
hereinafter cited as "Tobolewski"; Ward, p.3.
2- Article 26(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
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Another important point that needs to be mentioned is an
exceptional option, granted by Article 26, for those states
who are not members of the IMF and whose laws do not permit
a calculation to be made on this basis (S.D.R.)/ in which
case such states may use the poincar6 franc as an
alternative unit of account.1
Lastly, as far as the date of conversion is concerned,
Article 26(1) of the Hamburg Rules provides that:
"The amounts mentioned in art. 6 are to be converted 
into the national currency of a state according to 
the value of such currency at the date of judgement 
or the date agreed upon by the parties".
It should be noted that the date of judgement may raise 
the question of how the exchange risks between that date 
and the date of payment are allocated. This situation
would give the strong party a right to choose the date of 
conversion most favourable to him. Accordingly, it will be 
more sensible to adopt the date of payment rule as a date
of conversion in order to respond to the aims of conversion
by avoiding the fluctuations of exchange rates.2
One can conclude that, by adopting the SDR as a unit of 
account, the Hamburg Rules achieve the maximum possible 
uniformity, because determining the exact limitation amount 
through the conversion of gold francs into national
currency is very difficult without a fixed relationship 
between national currencies and gold.
Wilson, p.209.
Stephen A. Silard, Carriage of the SDR by Sea: The unit of
account of the Hamburg Rules, (1978)10 JMLC, p.29, hereinafter 
cited as "Silard".
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3.3 Loss of the Right to Limit Liability
Two main means for eliminating the statutory limit can 
be deduced from the three sets of Rules read together: 
Hague Rules, Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. Firstly, a 
declaration of the nature and value of the goods in the 
bill of lading; and secondly, serious faults committed by 
the carrier or by his servants or agents. The first means 
is provided for in both the Hague Rules and Visby Rules, 
whereas it is removed by the Hamburg Rules from the 
circumstances in which the limit is broken. As far as the 
second means is concerned, both the Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules make it clear that serious faults of the 
carrier result in his being prevented from relying on the 
limitation of liability clause. In addition, serious 
faults of the servants or agents of the carrier will 
preclude them from invoking the statutory limit. The Hague 
Rules contain no provisions on this point. Therefore, in 
what follows below 1) The declaration of the nature and 
value of the goods; and 2) serious faults will be 
discussed.
3.3.1 Declaration of the nature and value of the goods.
Under both the Hague and Visby Rules the limitation of 
liability provided for therein cannot be invoked by the 
carrier if the nature and value of the goods have been 
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the
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bill of lading. 1 The original draft of the Hague Rules
Article 4(5) contemplated that shippers should always
declare the value of the goods. However, practice showed
that shippers seldom disclosed the value of the goods in
the bills of lading. The reason for that was explained by
Mr. Dor in the Hague Conference 1921:
"What happens is this, that the shippers very often 
do not declare the value, because they are afraid of 
paying the taxes - the ten per cent tax, or luxury 
tax or one of the other taxes; for a good many 
reasons they do not declare the value; and what you 
want to declare, that the shipowner is able to limit 
his liability to 10 francs per package"2
By and large the prevailing point of view among 
representatives of the cargo interest was that having paid 
ordinary freight rates, they were entitled to rely on a 
certain minimum liability of the c a r r i e r . 3 On the other 
hand, shipowners wanted to avoid excessive and 
unanticipated cargo claims; the declaration of the nature 
of the cargo and its value was considered absolutely 
necessary in order to enable the carrier to exercise due 
care for the protection of the cargo and to ensure that the 
carrier did not incur a liability wholly disproportionate 
to the freight charged for the carriage.4 Finally, the 
conference arrived at a compromise as expressed in Article 
4(5) of the Hague Rules.
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules and Article 2(a) of the Visby 
Rules.
2- The Hague Rules Conference 1921, Report 1921, p.159.
3- per Rudolf in Report 190-1.
4- per Harris in Report.p.188.
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The question then, is what are the formal requirements 
of declaration? According to Articles 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules and Article 2(a) of the Visby Rules, there are 
certain formal requirements for the declaration to be 
effective in avoiding the statutory limitation of 
liability. It must be express, referring specifically to 
the particular goods which are the subject of the carriage; 
the shipper must declare the nature and the value of the 
goods before shipment, and the nature and value must be 
inserted in the bill of lading.
A. The Declaration must be express.
The reason why the declaration must be express is clear
enough. The declaration must be specific so as to enable
the carrier to exercise due care for the protection of the
cargo in question. Clauses in bills of lading which do not
comply with this condition are generally held ineffective.
In Fov & Gibson Ptv, Ltd V. Holvman & Sons Ptv. Ltd.l a
clause in bill of lading fixing the value of each package
at £5 was held not to have the character of an effective
declaration of value. It was stated
"Clause 14 of the bill of lading does not declare 'the 
nature and value of such goods' within the meaning of 
the first paragraph of Art. IV, Rule 5. Such a 
declaration must be specific. It must state the 
nature as well as the value of the goods. A statement 
that none of the goods exceeds £5 in value does not 
declare either the nature or the value of any goods".2
1- (1946)79 LI. L.Rep.339 (C.A.Aust.),
2- Ibid, at pp.341-2 (per Latham, Ch.J.),
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This followed the same line as in Williams V. African 
S .S.Co, 1 where the bill of lading described the goods as 
"one box containing about 248 ounces of gold-dust". It was 
held that that was not sufficient statement of the value so 
as to deprive the shipowner from invoking the limitation of 
liability under the British Merchant Shipping Act. The 
same approach was taken under the Hague Rules as mentioned 
above.
The question may, however, be raised whether the shipper 
is actually required specifically to declare the nature and 
value of the goods, or whether information on these points 
otherwise conveyed to the carrier will make a special 
declaration superfluous. In Anticosti Shipping Co. V. 
Viateur St. A m a n d . ^  a truck worth more than $500,000 
suffered damage exceeding $4000. No value was declared to 
the carrier. The District Judge held that the carrier was 
not entitled to limit his liability to $500 of the Canadian 
Water Carriage of Goods Act, S.4(5), because the truck was 
obviously of a value well in excess of $500,000 and 
therefore the shipper was not required to declare the value 
of the truck. This decision was rejected by the Court of 
Appeal which held that the carrier was entitled to 
limitation of liability. The Court said: "The
responsibility for seeing that the value of the thing 
shipped is declared and inserted in the bill is on the
1- (1856)1 H & N.300.
[1959]1 Lloyd's Rep. 352 (Canadian S.C.),
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shipper and any consequential hardship must be charged 
against his own failure to respect that requirement".1
B. The declaration must be before shipment.
It is not enough for the purposes of avoiding the 
limitation of liability to declare the nature and value of 
the goods expressly in the bill of lading; the declaration 
must be "before shipment". The words "before shipment" are 
very important, as in practice it has been found that 
although the value may have been declared and entered in 
the bill of lading the declaration of value was made after 
shipment on board the vessel.2 The reason why the 
declaration must be "before shipment" is the same as that 
why the declaration must be express. If no value has been 
declared before the goods were shipped, the carrier will be 
deprived of the opportunity of giving the goods the special 
care in handling and stowage which the value warranted. It 
is common practice for valuable packages to be carried in a 
special lock-up, but if the value is declared after the 
goods have been loaded on board it is too late for special 
handling and stowage to be made a v a i l a b l e . 3
C. The declaration must be inserted in the bill of lading.
Article 4(5)(a) of the Hague/Visby Rules, expressly 
provides that the declaration of nature and value of the 
goods should be embodied in the bill of lading, implying
Ibid, at p.358.
2- Astle, p.173.
3- Ibid.
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thereby that a declaration not inserted in the bill of
lading is of no effect. The effect of the requirement of
inserting the declaration in the bill of lading was
explained by Mackinnon, J., in Pandle & Rivett Ltd V.
Ellerman Lines. Ltd.l:
"When the plaintiffs sent their shipping instructions 
to the defendants they did so by document addressed 
to the Western Laurence Line, limited (the carrier) 
and they said as regards case 6,855 that it weight 3 
Cwt. lqr. 131b., that it contained wool and silk as 
well as woollen goods, wool and silk containing under 
4 per cent of silk, and stated the value of the case 
as being £256. 8s. Id. When , however, the bill of
lading was issued..., it did not include any thing
about the value of the goods. Therefore, though
plaintiffs did declare the value of the goods for
shipment, the value was not inserted in the bill of 
lading; and in those circumstances only one of the 
conditions on which the defendants could be liable
for more than £100 was fulfilled".
Thus the validity of the declaration depends on its 
incorporation in the bill of lading.
Difficult questions arise when the goods have suffered 
damage before the bill of lading is issued. This 
interesting situation arose in Deere & Co V. Mississippi 
Shipping Co.2 where a boxed tractor dropped forty feet into 
a hold whilst being loaded. The shipper had made no 
attempt to declare its value before shipment as required by 
U.S. COGSA, and no bill of lading was ever issued. The 
shipper asserted that since the limitation could only be
(1927)29 Ll. L. Rep.133 at p.136, (1927)33 Com. Cas 70 at pp.78- 
79.
2- (1959) A.M.C. 480.
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avoided by a declaration of value inserted in the bill of 
lading, and since the bill of lading was not to be issued 
until after the shipment was loaded, he had no opportunity 
to exercise that option until that time and was therefore 
not bound by the limitation. The Court considered that the 
words of COGSA, Section 4(5) had to be read in the light of 
Section 3(3), which gave the shipper the right to demand a 
bill of lading from the carrier at any time after delivery 
of the goods for shipment. There was nothing to show that 
the shipper had required the carrier to issue a "Received 
for shipment" bill of lading declaring the full value of 
the goods at the time of delivery to the wharf, and 
accordingly his claim was limited to the amount provided by 
the Act, i.e. $500.
3.3.2 Serious Faults.
Both the Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules provide that 
the carrier will be deprived of the right to enjoy the 
limitation of liability provided by Article 4.5(a) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules and Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules if the 
loss or damage to the goods resulted from "an act or 
omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, 
or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or 
delay would probably result".! A similar provision 
deprives a servant or agent of the carrier of the right of
Article 2(e) of the Visby Rules and Article 8(1) of the Hamburg
Rules.
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availing himself of the limitation clause where he has 
displayed a similar intent or recklessness.!
The nature and degree of the seriousness of the 
carrier's fault for which he can limit his liability have 
aroused controversy as to whether the statutory limit is 
available to the carrier in the event of damage caused by 
his act or omission, be it intentional or unintentional 
such as, wilful misconduct or gross negligence which 
constitutes a fundamental breach of the contract o f 
carriage.
It appears that the limit will be available unless the 
carrier's conduct can be fitted into the above formulation. 
The UNCITRAL discussion about the degree of seriousness of 
faults the carrier or his servants and agents revealed a 
diversity of view on the subject. The U.S.S.R. delegate 
supported the idea of making the carrier, his servants or 
agents liable for intentional damage, but he opposed the 
concept of damage caused recklessly having the same 
effect.2 The Norwegian delegate offered two alternative 
drafts, and both alternative proposals concluded as 
follows:
"Nor shall any of the servants or agents of the 
carrier be entitled to the benefit of such limitation 
of liability with respect to damage caused by such an 
act or. omission on his p a r t " . 3
The French delegate pointed out that there should be a
clearer distinction between the carrier's intent to cause
!- Article 3(4) of the Visby Rules and Article 8(2) of the Hamburg 
Rules.
2- Sweeney, part II, p.337.
3 -  I b i d .
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damage and the degree of misconduct by servants imposing 
carrier liability, and also agreed with Nigeria about 
recklessness and distinguished wilful misconduct from the 
lower standard of "inexcusable negligence" which should in 
his view be the test to break unit limitation of carriers.! 
Fundamental disagreement with the entire proposal to make 
special provision for serious fault by the carrier came 
from the delegate of the United States. He felt that "the 
Hague Rules dealt with the consequences of carrier 
negligence (or culpa) or simple breach of the contract of 
carriage and that there did not appear to be a need to make 
special provision in international law for the consequences 
of intentional acts (or dolus). The number of acts of 
deliberate damage to cargo must be few and the proof 
thereof extremely difficult. Further, the principal area 
in which intentional torts would be relevant would be with 
respect to theft, the proof of which was often so difficult 
that shippers were forced to rely on the presumption of 
carrier negligence to seek compensation. He noted that 
with respect to deliberate damage of cargo, shippers would 
use the traditional common law remedies which would permit 
punitive damages2 and relaxed rules of consequential 
damages rather than to place any reliance on the Hague
!- Ibid, p.338.
2- Punitive damages are apparently not allowed in cargo cases and 
cannot be given for breach of contract which constitutes on the 
basis of Article 4(5) of the United States COGSA which provides: 
"In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the amount 
of damage actually sustained"; see George L. Waddell, Damages in 
Cargo Cases, published in Damages Recoverable in Maritime Matters, 
edited by Robert B. Acomb, Jr, Chicago, 1984, p.44, hereinafter 
cited as "Waddell"; Cosmos U.S.A. V. U.S.Lines. (1983) A.M.C.1172 
(N.D.Cal.1980).
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Rules".! The eventual text is thus obviously a compromise 
but one somewhat tilted in favour of the carrier's 
interest.
Turning now to the language of the relevant provisions, 
once it is proved that the loss or damage to the goods 
resulted either from the carrier's act or omission done 
"with the intent to cause such loss or damage", or from his 
act or omission done recklessly and with knowledge that 
such loss or damage would probably result, the carrier is 
deprived of the right to limit liability. In other words, 
in these two types of misconduct the carrier loses the 
right to limit his liability. It seems that the criterion 
in intentional misconduct is subjective. Therefore 
misconduct by itself is not sufficient to determine the 
liability of the carrier or his servants or agents, but it 
must be proved that he has knowingly done something wrong.2 
Just as in criminal law, intention can rarely be proved 
directly. Thus the existence of intent can be inferred 
from facts and circumstances of the case as a whole. Even 
this will be very difficult in practice to achieve. 
Likewise, on one view, the word "recklessly" implies a 
subjective realization involving a deliberate disregard on 
the part of the carrier of the consequence on his c o n d u c t . 3 
However, the alternative to intention presents more 
difficulties than the provisions on intention. There is a 
need to clarify whether recklessness is subjective or
1- Sweeney, part.II, p.338
2- Horabin V. BOAC. [1952] 2 All E.R.1016 at p.1020, (Barry, J.).
2- Diamond, 1978, p.245.
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objective in character in determining what is meant by
recklessness. Also what kind of knowledge is necessary to
satisfy the Rules? It should also be noted that knowledge
of probable damage is an additional criterion t o
recklessness.
Professor Walker1 defines recklessness ass 
"A frame of mind in which persons may behave, an 
attitude of indifference to the realised possible 
risks and consequences of one's actions, in which 
consequences are foreseen as possible but are not 
desired, not a form of negligence but a cause of 
negligence."
English writers and Judges have differed between 
themselves as what constitutes recklessness. It is agreed 
that it is more than negligence.2
Professor P o w l e s ^  has adopted Megaw J.'s v i e w ^  which 
construed recklessness as being objectively tested and has
David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd ed, 1981, 
p.43, hereinafter cited as "Walker, Delict"; Diamond, 1978, p.246, 
where he states: "I therefore suggest that: 'recklessly' involve
either; (i) a higher degree of subjective realisation that damage 
will probably occur or (ii) a deliberate shutting of the eyes to a 
means of knowledge which, if used, would have produced the same 
realisation".
2- E.g, Humphreys, J, in John T. Ellis Ltd V. Walter T. Hinds.
[ 1947] 1 K.B. 475 at p.486, where he stated: "The word 'reckless',
means a great deal more than negligence"; Lord Herschell, in 
Derrv V. Peek. ( 1889) 14 App.cas. 337 at p.374, stated:
"recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". Nonetheless, 
that dictum was in the context of whether fraud has been 
established at a period when fraud was needed to make a 
misrepresentation actionable. At that time negligent 
misrepresentation was not a cause of action in England. Thus his 
Lordship was not equating recklessness and negligence.
2- David G. Powles, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, [1978] 
J.B.L. p.145, hereinafter cited as "Powles", where he stated: 
"In view of the fact that an objective assessment of knowledge 
can involve an element of recklessness, it could be argued that 
these additional words attract a subjective interpretation".
4- Shawiniqan Ltd V. Vokins & Co. Ltd. [1961]2 Lloyd's Rep. 153 at 
p.162; [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1206 at p.1214; [1961]3 All E.R. 396 at
p.403, where he states: "Recklessness is gross carelessness - the 
doing of something which in fact involves a risk, whether the
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applied it to the provisions under discussion here, 
whereas both Mustill^ and Diamond^ have adopted the 
opposite view by construing the term recklessness as having 
a subjective realisation. At least in the current context, 
these views may not differ too significantly in practice, 
as Professor Powles concedes that the additional 
requirement of knowledge adds a subjective element. It is 
hard to envisage a case where the result would differ 
between a test where subjective actual knowledge of damage 
resulting is demanded as well as objective recklessness and 
one based on subjective recklessness.
In Scots criminal law, recent authorities have stressed 
that recklessness is tested o b j e c t i v e l y . 3  it differs from 
negligence in requiring conduct to fall far below normal 
care and competence and to involve complete disregard of 
dangers. It is submitted that a similar description of
recklessness may well be appropriate in this branch of the 
law too.
It should be noted that under other conventions relating 
to c a r r i a g e ^  limitation of liability is lost on proof of 
wilful misconduct by the carrier. That phrase does not 
appear in the Hague/Visby Rules or Hamburg Rules. However
doer realises it or not; and the risk being such having regard to 
all the circumstances, that the taking of that risk would be 
described as 'reckless'. The likelihood or otherwise that damage 
will follow is one element to be considered, not whether the doer 
of the act actually in ordinary parlance realised the
likelihood".
Mustill, p.700.
2- Diamond, 1978,p.246.
3- E.g. Allan V. Patterson. 1980 S.L.T. 77.
4- The term "wilful misconduct" used under unamended provision of 
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention and Article 29 of the
Carriage of Goods by Road convention.
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the definitions of "wilful misconduct" appear to include 
the types of misconduct spelled out in these Rules and 
discussed above. 1 This supports the view that it is 
difficult to establish conduct which removes the limitation 
of liability. However it is submitted that the tests under 
the above Rules are those laid down specifically in them 
rather than the concept of wilful misconduct as such.
Lastly, another question is: What kind of knowledge is 
necessary to suffice and satisfy the Rules? The additional 
words "with knowledge that damage would probably result" 
following the word "recklessly" set out in the COGSA 1971, 
the Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules have to be construed. 
Certainly they cover a subjective realisation of the 
probability of damage occurring.2 in a related context, it 
has been held that knowledge includes not only positive 
knowledge but turning a blind e y e . 3 it is submitted that 
it would be appropriate to apply these dicta in this 
situation as well. This would be supported by the 
statement that such conduct is "far more blameworthy than
Horabin V. BOAC. [ 1952]2 All E.R.1016 at pp.1020, 1022,
(Barry.J.); Ruatenberq V. Pan American World Airways. Inc. 
[1977]1 Lloyd's Rep.564 at p.569 (Ackner.J.), affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal (1979)1 Lloyd's Rep.19; Froman V. Pan American 
Airways Inc. (1954) 284 App.Div. 935; see also, Tuller V. KLM,
(1961) 292 F.2d.p.775.
2- Warren A. Seavey, Negligence - Subjective or objective? (1928) 41
H.L.R. 1 at p.2 hereinafter cited as "Seavey", where he describes 
"knowledge" as "being the consciousness of the existence of a 
fact, it implies advertence, or focusing of the mind upon a 
fact".
3- Lord Denning, M.R, in Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A. V. The 
Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association. Ltd. (The "Eurvsthenes". 
(1976)2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 at p.179, where he said: "And, when I 
speak of knowledge, I mean not only positive knowledge but also 
the sort of knowledge expressed in the phrase ' turning a blind 
eye'".
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mere negligence".1 Thus extending knowledge in this way is 
consistent with the policy of these provisions which 
require more than ordinary breach of duty. Thus it is 
probable that 'knowledge' extends to failure to make 
inquiry in certain cases.
1- Ibid.
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Concluding Remarks
From the foregoing analysis and discussions, we may 
conclude the following points:
The Visby Rules produced important changes in relation 
to the limitation of the carrier's liability.
The new alternative standard limitation, the per kilo of 
gross weight, has clearly improved the position of the 
cargo-owner since he was now allowed to claim the higher of 
the two figures produced by the application of the two 
alternative tests. However, despite the change made by the 
Visby Rules to the Hague Rules, the terms 'package or unit' 
had remained unclarified. As an improvement, the Hamburg 
Rules have removed the uncertainty caused by the term 
'unit' under the Hague/Visby Rules by using the term 
'shipping unit'.
Furthermore, the addition of the new sub-paragraph (c) 
in the Visby Rules (container clause) has solved some, 
although not all, of the problems generated by 
containerized transport, already existing under the Hague 
Rules. The Hamburg Rules in turn resolve the problems 
arising from containerization more comprehensively than the 
Hague/Visby Rules.
By adopting the SDR (like the Visby Protocol 1979) as a 
unit of account, the Hamburg Rules achieve the maximum 
possible uniformity with respect to the value of the limits 
of liability, because determining the exact limitation 
amount through the conversion of gold francs into national
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currency is very difficult when there is no longer a fixed 
relationship between national currencies and gold. The 
Hamburg Rules moreover establish a uniform rule as to the 
time when the conversion into national currencies is to be 
made. That time is either the date of judgement or the date 
agreed by the parties. The establishment of this rule 
clarifies a question which has frequently arisen under the 
Hague/Visby Rules and to which differing solutions have 
been applied. However, I am inclined to the view that the 
date of payment rule as a date of conversion is more 
sensible when responding to the aims of conversion by 
avoiding the fluctuations of exchange rates.
It is to be noted that the Visby Rules and the Hamburg 
Rules, by extending the limitation to cover the carrier's 
servants or agents, where it can be established that the 
loss was due to an intentional act or omission of the 
person concerned (they will be liable to the full extent of 
the loss), have brought a solution to a problem existing 
under the Hague Rules. It should also be noted that no 
limitation of liability is allowed with respect to the 
loss, damage or delay caused by an act or omission, if the 
person seeking to rely on a limitation can be found to be 
responsible for intent to cause loss, damage or delay, or
1
act recklessly and with knowledge that such a result would 
occur.
Lastly, as already mentioned, the limitation of 
liability can be avoided under the Hague/Visby Rules, if 
the nature and value of the goods have been declared by the
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shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. 
This rule is removed by the Hamburg Rules. In my opinion, 
there is no rational reason for this removal.
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Chapter Four 
Procedures of Action for Lost or Damaged Cargo
The procedures of claims and actions are very 
significant for the court in doing justice to the parties. 
Once the cargo claimant has made his claim to the court, 
in order to satisfy the conditions precedent of action, he 
must: 1) prove that the notice of loss or damage has been
given to the carrier or his agent, before or at the time 
of the removal of the goods, or not later than the day 
when the goods were handed over to the consignee, or 
within specified days in case the loss or damage is not 
apparent^; 2) prove that the suit has been brought and 
instituted within a specific period after delivery of the 
goods, or the date when the goods should have been 
d e l i v e r e d ^ ;  and, 3) satisfy himself that the court which 
hears a particular case is the right court and the action 
can be brought within its jurisdiction^. These formal 
conditions are explained below as follows:
4.1 Notice of loss, damage and delay in delivery.
4.2 Time limitation for suit.
4.3 Jurisdiction clauses.
1- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules and Article 19 (1,2,4,5) of the 
Hamburg Rules.
2- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules and Article 20 (1,2) of the
Hamburg Rules.
3- Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules.
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4.1 Notice of loss, damage and delay in delivery.
4.1.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules
Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules states that if the loss 
or damage to the goods at the port of discharge is 
apparent, notice of claim should be given to the carrier 
or his agent before or at the time of the removal of the
goods. If the loss or damage is not apparent, notice of
claim should be given within three days of their removal 
into the custody of the person entitled to delivery, and 
if this is not done, the removal of the goods "shall be 
prima facie evidence of delivery by the carrier of the 
goods as described in the bill of lading". In other
words, uncomplaining removal is prima facie evidence that 
the goods were received in good order.
These points may seem clear. Article 3(6) of the Hague 
Rules has however explained them in order to emphasise the 
basic duty of the carrier to deliver the goods which were 
in his charge in the same apparent good order and
condition as he received them at the port of loading.! 
Consequently, the purpose of the notice requirements under 
the Hague Rules and COGSA is that:
1. Notice given to the carrier by the consignee, or any 
person authorised by him means that the goods have 
suffered loss or damage.
!- Astle, pp.109-110.
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2.The carrier is allowed to investigate the claim while he 
has access to the facts concerning the goods and all the 
evidence is still available to him in order to defend 
himself against groundless or exaggerated claims.!
It is to be mentioned that the notice of loss or damage 
to the goods must be given to the carrier in writing and 
must disclose the general nature of such loss or damage 
before or at the time of the removal of the goods into the 
custody of the person entitled to d e l i v e r y .2
The United States COGSA added an additional useful 
paragraph to the Rules, intending to clarify them as 
follows:
"Said notice of loss or damage may be endorsed upon 
the receipt for the goods given by the person taking 
delivery thereof".
This allows us to conclude that there are some forms other
than written notice considered as an equivalent to written
notice, namely:
1. The issue of a qualified receipt at the time of 
discharge, i.e. bad order receipt, or out-turn report 
and short-landing certificate for the goods.3
2. Joint survey or inspection by the contracting parties 
or their agents.4
However, turning now to the effect or sanction of the 
failure to give notice, we may ask whether the failure to
!- George F. Wood, Damages in cargo cases, (1971)45 Tul L.R.p.952, 
hereinafter cited as "Wood"; Miami Structural Iron Corp V. Cie 
Beige de T.M. 224 F.2d 566 (1955).
2- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
3- Astle, p.111.
4- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
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give notice can operate as a forfeiture of the claim or is 
merely a prima facie obstacle. We can infer from Article 
3(6) of the Hague Rules that the failure to give notice 
does not affect the right of the parties to bring a suit 
within one year.! Various authors have expressed their 
viewpoints in referring to such a sanction or effect. 
Scrutton^ believes that the notice of loss or damage seems 
to have no effect:
"The first paragraph of Rule 6 appears to have no 
effect. Whether notice is given or not, the onus of 
proving loss or damage will lie upon the person 
asserting it".
Carver^ supports Scrutton's viewpoint by saying:
"The first paragraph of this rule appears to have 
little, if any, meaning, as the burden of proving 
loss or damage is on the consignee in any event".
However, Tetley4 says that the notice of loss or damage 
is set out in the Hague Rules as prima facie evidence of 
the condition of the goods at discharge can be valuable to 
the consignee.
On the other hand, Article 3(6) of the United States
COGSA, intended to clarify the Hague Rules, has added the
following paragraph:
"Provided, that if a notice of loss or damage, either 
apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for
!- Wood, p.953.
2- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.440
2- Carver, par.524 at p.370.
4- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.872.
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in this section, that fact shall not affect or 
prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit 
within one year after the delivery of the goods or 
the date when the goods should have been delivered".!
Then, what is the legal effect of a notice of claim
clause which purports to bar the suit in case a notice was
not given in a specific time? These clauses are not valid
under the Hague Rules because the failure to give notice
does not affect the right of the consignee, or his agent,
to bring suit within one year, and such a clause would be
in violation of Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules, where it
is provided that any clause intending to relieve the
carrier or the ship from liability arising from
negligence, fault or failure in the duties and obligations
provided in the Rules or lessen such liability other than
as provided in this convention, shall be null and void and
of no effect.2
4.1.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules, in respect of notice of loss, damage 
or delay in delivery, have added some new elements to the 
Hague Rules. The Eighth Session of the Working Group and
!- Article 3(6) of United States COGSA.
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.873; Coventry Sheppard & Co. V. Larrinaca 
Steamship Co. Ltd. (1942) 73 LI. L.R. 256; Elser, Inc V.
International Harvester. (1955) A.M.C. 1929; Nashiwa et al V. 
Matson Navigation. (1954) A.M.C. 610, where it is stated:
"The failure to give notice of loss within three days after 
delivery, as set out in the bill of lading, does not bar the 
suit, despite the provisions of the bill of lading. Such 
provisions are null and void of s.1303 (8) of COGSA".
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the UNCITRAL plenary session was devoted to discussion in 
respect of "notice of loss". There were contradictory 
versions of what is the sanction for a failure to give the 
required written notice.!
The United States' viewpoint was very clear that the 
failure to give such notice is not considered as a time 
bar. Germany favoured retention of the "notice of loss" 
provision of the Hague Rules as a precondition to stating 
a claim, while the United Kingdom favoured the retention 
of the "notice of loss" provision of the Hague Rules, but 
as a "disciplinary measure".2 At this session there was 
also emphasis that a distinction should be made between 
loss or damage which was apparent and loss which was non- 
apparent, as well as the notice of loss provision in 
respect of delay.3 Eventually, Article 19 of the Hamburg 
Rules was adopted. In what follows below the provisions 
of this Article are discussed in comparison with the Hague 
Rules concerning notice of loss or damage to goods. The 
notice of loss or damage must be given to the carrier in 
writing, but the period for giving notice has been 
enlarged by the Hamburg Rules.
Concerning apparent loss or damage, the required time 
for the written notice, relating to the general nature of 
such loss or damage, is to be given not later than the
!- Sweeney, part V. p.173.
2- Ibid.
2- ibid at p.174.
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working day after the day when the goods were handed over 
to the consignee.!
Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice in 
writing must be given within fifteen consecutive days, 
regardless of holidays, after the day when the goods were 
handed over to the consignee.2 This period, is preferable 
to that under the Hague Rules, because, in practice, it is 
considered more sufficient to discover non-apparent 
damage.
However, in the case of loss or damage to the goods 
caused by delay, the notice must be given in writing to 
the carrier within sixty consecutive days after the day 
when the goods were handed over to the consignee.3
These notices of loss, damage or delay in delivery must 
be given by the consignee to the carrier, actual carrier, 
shipper or any person who is acting on the carrier's or 
the actual carrier's behalf, including the master or the 
officer in charge of the ship, or to a person acting on 
the shipper's behalf. If given in such a way it is deemed 
to have been given to the carrier, to the actual carrier 
or to the shipper, respectively.4
On the other hand, in the event that the goods caused
damage to the ship, then such notice must be given in
writing by the carrier or actual carrier to the shipper
!- Article 19(1) of the Hamburg Rules; cf. the Hague Rules (before 
or at the time of the removal of the goods).
2- Article 19(2) of the Hamburg Rules; The Hague Rules allow three 
days for the notice to be given; Sweeney, part V, p. 174; 
Mankabady, p.9 4.
2- Article 19(5) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Article 19(8) of the Hamburg Rules.
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not later than ninety consecutive days after the 
occurrence of such loss or damage or after the delivery of
the goods, whichever is later.!
However, failure to give notice concerning loss or 
damage to the goods, does not affect the right of the 
consignee to bring suit against the carrier and it 
concerns only the question of quality of the evidence.2 
Such failure is deemed prima facie evidence that the 
carrier has delivered the goods as described in the bill 
of lading or, has delivered them in good condition, if no
such bill of lading has been issued.3
With respect to the failure of the carrier to give 
notice of loss or damage to the ship caused by the goods, 
such failure is considered prima facie evidence that the 
carrier, or the actual carrier, has sustained no loss or 
damage due to the fault or neglect of the shipper, his 
servants or agents.4 However, failure of the consignee to 
give notice of loss or damage to the carrier resulting 
from delay in delivery is considered as a precondition to 
recovery, because no compensation shall be payable for 
delay in delivery and it will bar the claim.5
It is to be mentioned that Article 19(3) of the Hamburg 
Rules contains the same rule as Article 3(6) third
!- Article 19(7) of the Hamburg Rules.
2- Sweeney, part V. p.173.
2- Article 19(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
4- Article 19(7) of the Hamburg Rules.
5- Article 19(5) of the Hamburg Rules; D.E.Murray, The Hamburg
Rules: A comparative analysis, (1980)12 Lawyer of the Americas
(U.S.A.), p.80, hereinafter cited as "Murray"; Sweeney, part V, 
p.174; Mankabady, p.94.
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paragraph of the Hague Rules, that notice in writing need 
not be given where the state of the goods has been the 
subject of joint survey or inspection by the parties, 
because such a survey or inspection is deemed an 
equivalent to such notice. Moreover, Article 19(4) of the 
Hamburg Rules binds the carrier and the consignee to give 
all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and 
tallying the goods.
Lastly, despite the changes that have been brought 
about by the Hamburg Rules to the Hague Rules, it is
noticeable that the Hamburg Rules are more restrictive 
than the Hague Rules in that they oblige the consignee to 
give notice, whereas the Hague Rules do not specify who 
must give such notice. Does it mean that the consignee's
agent has no right to give notice or such notice would be
no longer valid? Why is it not sufficient that notice be 
given as under the Hague Rules? The Hamburg Rules, in
fact, give no answer to this question. In my opinion, 
therefore, the draftsmen of the Hamburg Rules should 
clarify this situation, by adding the phrase underlined 
below to the provision of Article 19(1) of the Hamburg 
Rules: (unless notice of loss or damage,[...], is given
[ . . . ] by the consignee or any person authorised by him) in 
order to overcome the uncertainty and the ambiguity.
4.2 Time Limitation for Suit
The general principles of the time limitation within 
which an action may be brought have been characterized as
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related to a period of time, that is as a procedural 
matter not covered by substantive rules. When a claimant
institutes an action after the expiry of a period of
limitation, only the contractual remedy will be barred
without extinguishing the right. That means that a claim 
could be revived by an acknowledgement or payment made 
after the expiry of the limitation period of a particular 
action.! The contracting parties, then, may agree to 
extend the time limitation provided by the Rules. I will, 
therefore, discuss the time limitation for suit as 
follows:
4.2.1 Under the Hague Rules and Visby Rules.
4.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules.
4.2.1 Under the Hague Rules and Visby Rules.
The Hague Rules provide that the time limitation for 
suit for loss or damage to the goods is one year.2 
Article 3(6) of the Hague/Visby Rules provides that the 
period of limitation commences within one year from
delivery of the goods (if damaged) or from the date when 
the goods should have been delivered (if lost). Then, the
!- P.A. Stone, Time limitation in the English conflict of laws, 
(1985)4 LMCLQ, pp.497, 500, hereinafter cited as "Stone"; Guest, 
A.G., Anson's Law of Contract, (1979), p.588, Oxford, 
hereinafter cited as "Anson's Law of Contract".
2- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules (Unchanged by the Visby Rules).
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claimant must bring his suit within one year subject to 
the Rules.!
It should be noted that the time limitation for suit
begins to run from delivery, or the date when the goods
should have been delivered and not from discharge.2 It
becomes important, therefore to know what constitutes
delivery for operating the time limitation for suit; and
what is the difference between delivery and discharge?
Since the Rules use the word "delivery", there is no
doubt that delivery is what in fact the Rules refer to, to
let the time period begin running.3 However, disputes may
arise in determining the meaning of the word "delivery".4
Tetley,5 has defined "delivery" as follows:
"'Delivery' would seem to mean the moment when the 
consignee named in the bill of lading receives the 
goods. This would normally mean upon delivery by the 
stevedore or terminal agent to the consignee or to 
the consignee's agent"6
The aim of the one year provision was to speed up the settlement 
of claims, and to prevent the carrier from reducing the time 
limit into short period by means of a clause in the bill of 
lading. Tetley, 3rd ed, p.671; Nea Acrex SA V. Baltic shipping 
Co. Ltd. [1976]2 All E.R, 842.
2 - Mankabady, p.9 4.
3- American Hoesch Inc. V. "Aubade", [1971]2 Lloyd’s Rep. 423 [U.S. 
Dis. Ct, Dis of south Carolina (Charleston Division)].
4- David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, 1980, pp.349, 362, 
hereinafter cited as "Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law", 
where he defines the word "delivery" and "discharge".
5- Tetley, 2nd ed, p.331.
6- Centerchem Products V. A/S Rederiet Adiell et Al. (1972) A.M.C. 
373 at pp.374-375, where proper delivery is defined as follows: 
"It has been established that proper delivery occurs when a 
carrier (1) separates goods from the general bulk of the cargo; 
(2) designate them; and (3) gives due notice to the consignee 
of the time and place of their deposit, and a reasonable time 
for their removal".
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In American Hoesch. Inc V. Aubade. 1 the U.S. Dis, Ct,
(Dis of South Carolina) it was held that the word
'delivery' was not synonymous with 'discharge', for
'delivery' denoted a two-party transaction in which the
consignee would have an opportunity to observe defects,
whereas 'discharge' need only involve the carrier, and
there might or might not be an opportunity for the
consignee to discover the damage at that point; only at
delivery must there be such an opportunity. Hemphill,
D.J., said in the above cited case:2
"'Delivery' is a concept which has been subject of 
considerable litigation in several areas of the law 
[...] delivery implies mutual acts of the carrier and 
the consignee. It is a more inclusive term than 
'unloading', implying acceptance or agreement to 
accept by or, at least communication to, the
consignee; if not actual passing of possession to the 
consignee, coupled with relinquishment of possession 
or control by the carrier. The mere discharge is not 
delivery".
Another case of interest was that of the "Beltana"3. 
where it was held that delivery was made for purposes of 
Article 3(6) either when the goods were landed on the 
wharf and freed from the ship's tackles, or at least, when
!- [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep. 423; The "Straat Cumberland". [1973]2
Lloyd's Rep. 492.
2- ibid, at p.425; compare, Lord Wright, in, Gosse Millard V. 
Canadian Government Merchant Marine. (1927)28 Ll. L. Rep. 88 at 
p.103, where he said: "The word 'discharge' is used, I think in 
place of the word 'deliver' because the period of responsibility 
to which the Act and Rules apply (Art 1(e)), ends when they are 
discharged from the ship. The word 'properly discharge' I think 
means, deliver from the ship's tackle in the same apparent order 
and condition".
3- [1967]1 Lloyd's Rep. 531 (Supreme Court of Western Australia); C. 
Tennant. Sons & Co. V. Norddeutscher Lloyd's. (1964) A.M.C. 754.
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they were placed in premises of the plaintiff's agent and 
immediately became available to the consignee.!
The word 'delivery' then must be considered as having a 
different meaning from 'discharge',2 which is used in 
Articles 1(e) and 3(2) of the Hague Rules in explaining 
the period of the carrier's responsibility and the basis 
of his liability.3 On the other hand, the word 'delivery' 
is used in Article 3(6) concerning 'notice of loss and 
time for suit' without referring to the word 'discharge'.
One can conclude then that the failure to mention 
'discharge' in Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules was
deliberate and must be considered as an essential factor 
in interpreting the word 'delivery'4
It is noteworthy that, in case of a series of 
deliveries, the time limit begins to run from the date of 
the delivery of the last item of the cargo. In Loeb V. 
S.S. Washington M a i l . the ship had discharged her cargo 
on October 8, 1951. The consignee received some of his
cargo on October 11th, 1951. Some of its cargo was
however missing, and sorting of all the cargo discharged
from the vessel continued until October 31st, 1951 when
!- Ibid, at pp.540-1 (Nevile, J.).
2- Tetley, 3rd ed. p.671.
3- See chapter two of this thesis, (2.1.1 at p.63).
4- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.569; It seems that the word 'delivery' has
been deliberately selected instead of 'discharge' on the part of 
the draftsmen of the Rules and presumably at least some form of 
constructive delivery to the consignee or his authorised agent 
will be required before time will commence to run; Wilson, 
p.196.
5- (1957) A.M.C. 267; Unqar V. S.S.Urola. (1946) A.M.C. 1663, the
one year delay to sue for a loss of cargo was held to begin when 
the last item of a large cargo was delivered; The "Beltana". 
[1967] 1 LLoyd's Rep. 531.
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the last cargo was delivered to the consignee. It was 
held that the suit would be valid until October 31st, 
1952 .
In respect of non-delivery, the time limitation for 
suit, as expressly set out under the Hague Rules, begins 
to run from the date when the goods should have been 
delivered.! In Western Gear Corp V. States Marine Lines 
Inc.2 a machine shipped from Seattle to New Orleans was 
damaged when washed overboard. It was subsequently 
repaired and shipped on a different ship under a new bill 
of lading and ultimately delivered. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals held that suit instituted within a year from 
actual delivery but 16 months after it should have been
delivered was barred by the one-year limitation under 
COGSA.
Furthermore, the question may arise whether the one- 
year time limit for suit provided in Article 3(6) of the 
Hague Rules would apply when the carrier has delivered the 
goods to a wrong person not entitled to them; i.e. is a 
misdelivery made? In Anglo-Saxon Petroleum & Co.Ltd V. 
Adamastos S.S.Co.Ltd.3 the court stated that wrong 
delivery will be considered as non-delivery and
consequently the one-year limit applies.
Another case of interest was that of Commodity Service 
Corp. V. Furness Withv & Co.4 The action was against the
!- Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
2- (1966) A.M.C. 1969 (9 Cir. Ct), 362 F.2d 328; American Export
Isbrandtsen V. Joe Lopez, (1976) 11 E.T.L. 665.
3- [1957]1 Lloyd's Rep. 79.
4- (1964) A.M.C. 760.
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shipowner for wrong delivery of cargo, the goods being 
delivered to a 'notify party' without production of the 
bill of lading. The shipper, who still held the bill of 
lading, filed a claim against the shipowner. The 
shipowner contended that the claim was time-barred because 
the action was commenced nine days after the expiry of the 
limitation period. It was held that wrong delivery is to 
be treated in the same manner as non-delivery and that the 
claim was time-barred.
One can conclude that misdelivery (or wrong delivery) 
of the goods is to be treated in the same way as non­
delivery. Then the one year time bar applies also where 
the carrier misdelivered the goods, therefore the 
proceedings in the action must be brought within one year 
from the date when the goods should have been delivered. 
Otherwise, the claim will be time barred.! However, if 
the misdelivery was intentional, then there was a fraud, 
and it is submitted a fundamental breach of contract.2 In 
consequence, the carrier is deprived of the benefit of the 
one year period for suit, under the Hague Rules. Under 
Hague/Visby Rules, as discussed below, the limitation
!- Ibid; The Captain Gregos, (1989) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 63 at 69,
(1990)1 Lloyd's Rep.310; Astle, pp.113-114; Wood, 956.
2- Commodity Service Corp. V. Furness Withv & Co, (1964) A.M.C. 
760; The New York Star, [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep, 445; Spurlinq 
Ltd. V. Bradshow. [1956]1 W.L.R. 461; In this respect, Tetley, 
2nd ed, p.335, said: "It is submitted that a fundamental breach
of contract depends on the intention of the person who violates 
the contract. If breach is intentional, the person violating 
the contract may lose his rights both under the contract and the 
Rules".
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period of one year will apply, for the benefit of the 
carrier, even in this case.
It is convenient here to mention that suit must be 
brought properly in the relevant jurisdiction; otherwise 
it will be barred. Thus the phrase "unless suit is 
brought" in Article 3(6) means "unless the suit before the 
court is brought within one year". It does not mean 
"unless suit is brought anywhere within one year".1 That 
means that the action must be brought in the jurisdiction 
in which the dispute is ultimately decided.2 Thus, such 
action will be time-barred, if the proceedings are not 
instituted before the proper jurisdiction and are brought 
in another jurisdiction within the period of limitation. 
In Compania Colombiana De Sequros V. Pacific Steam 
Navigation Co..3 a cargo of electric cables loaded on the 
defendant's vessel was insured by the plaintiffs for a 
voyage from Liverpool to Buenaventura, Colombia, and was 
delivered in a damaged condition on 12th December, 1954. 
The plaintiffs indemnified the cargo owners, who assigned 
to them their rights to sue the defendants. The plaintiffs 
brought an action in the Supreme Court of New York on 2nd 
November, 1955, but it was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs thereafter brought the 
action in an English court on 7th January, 1960, but it 
was too late. It was held that the action was time-barred
1- Compania Colombiana De Sequros V. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. 
[1965]1 Q.B. 101 at p.130; Payne & Ivamy, p.162.
2- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.441; Halsbury's Shipping & Navigation, 
p.535, para.773, footnote 1; The Merak. [1965J1 All E.R. 230.
3- [1963]2 Lloyd's Rep.479.
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under Article 3(6). The fact that the New York
proceedings were brought within the period of one year was
immaterial. Roskill, J,1 makes that quite clear:
"I think the true proposition in English law is that 
where in an action in the English Courts the 
plaintiff seeks relief and the defendant pleads 
limitation, the issue which an English court has to 
determine is whether the action before the court, and 
not some other action, has been instituted within the 
relevant limitation period".
It is important to note that an arbitration clause2 
contained in the bill of lading does not affect the time 
limit, and in such a case the principles of the period of 
limitation should be applied, because the situation does 
not amount to a waiver of the time limit.3 Therefore, if 
an arbitration clause intends to limit the period of 
limitation to less than one year, such a clause would be 
invalid, because it would be in conflict with Article 3(6) 
of the Hague Rules by lessening the time limitation for 
suit. This was made clear in The Ion.4 where the bill of 
lading stated: "Any claim must be made in writing and
claimant's arbitrator appointed within three months of
Ibid at p.496.
2- The Hague Rules and the Visby Rules are silent as to arbitration 
clauses, because arbitration is a procedural matter subject to 
national law. Nevertheless the Rules do stipulate in Article 
3(8) of the Hague Rules that no clause may lessen the 
responsibilities of the carrier, and Article 3(6) that the 
carrier "...shall be discharged from all liability...unless suit 
is brought within one year...". These two Articles are relevant 
in any consideration of the application of arbitration clauses. 
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.589.
3- Scrutton, 19th ed, p.441; Mankabady, p.95; Penny Mott & 
Dickson, Ltd. V. Lvnn Shipping Co. Ltd. [1963J1 Lloyd’s Rep.339; 
The Merak [1964]2 Lloyd's Rep. 527.
4- [1971]1 Lloyd's Rep. 541.
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final discharge and where this provision is not complied 
with the claim shall be deemed to be waived and absolutely 
barred". It was held that the part of the arbitration 
clause concerning the time limit was void, because it was 
in conflict with Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules.
The term 'suit' in Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules thus 
includes the commencement of arbitration proceedings. 
That means, the arbitration proceedings must be brought 
within one year of delivery or the date when the goods 
should have been delivered.1
It is noteworthy that the words "all liability 
whatsoever" in Article 3(6) of the Hague/Visby Rules 
replace the words "all liability in respect of loss or 
damage" in Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules. Namely, the 
words "in respect of loss or damage" are discarded, and 
the word "whatsoever" is added.2 This alteration makes it 
clear that the time limit (one year) applies even to cases 
where the carrier commits a deviation or to the type of
The Merak. [1964]2 Lloyd's Rep. 527, in referring to the words
in Article 3(6) "unless suit is brought within one year after 
delivery..." Sellers, L.J. said at p.532 "In their context I 
think the words mean "unless proceedings are brought within one 
year, and that the commencement of arbitration proceedings would 
meet the requirement"; The Agios Lazaros. [1976] 2 Lloyd's
Rep.47 at p.51; compare, Son Shipping Co. V. De Foss & Tanghe. 
(1952) A.M.C. 1931, where it is stated: "Where an arbitration
clause was incorporated in a bill of lading, there was no time 
bar because arbitration is not within the term 'suit' as used in 
Article 3(6) of the American Act".
2- Article 3(6) sub-par.4 of the Hague/Visby Rules provides:
"...the carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged 
from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods;" In 
their comment on the word "whatsoever", Sassoon and Cunningham, 
p. 175, said: "The addition of the word "whatsoever" was
presumably designed to prevent the limitation from being 
abrogated through carrier misconduct such as unjustifiable 
deviation, and would have been redundant if the limitation 
applied 'in any event' and regardless of the carrier's fault”.
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misconduct referred to in Article 4(5)(e) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules.1 In other words, this word covers not 
only the normal claim for loss or damage to cargo, but 
also extends even to claims arising from a fundamental 
breach of contract by the carrier, or where he has 
committed a deviation,2 or from the type of misconduct 
provided in Article 4(5)(e) of the Hague/Visby Rules,3 
(probably including fraud). This view is justified on the 
grounds that the word is expressly given "the force of 
law".4 This word "whatsoever" would seem to give the 
carrier the considerable benefit of one year time bar in 
all cases covered by the Hague/Visby Rules.
As to the extension of the time limit, it is to be 
noted that the one year delay for suit can be waived or 
extended by written consent between the parties.3 This is
1- It is believed that one of the main purposes for introducing the 
word "whatsoever" in the Visby Rules was to make the time limit 
apply where the goods had been delivered without production of 
bills of lading, so as to enable banks and other parties issuing 
letters of indemnity to regard themselves as discharged from 
liability after one year? Diamond, 1978, p.256; Scrutton, 19th 
ed, p.441, Footnote.32; Carver, p.370, par.523, footnote, 47? 
The Chanda. [1989]2 Lloyd's Rep 494 at p.504; The Captain 
Grecos. [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep.63 at p.69? [1990]1 Lloyd's Rep.
310 at p.311.
2- The Antares (Nos.1&2)[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep.424 at p.430 (C.A.), 
upholding The Antares (No.2)[1986J2 Lloyd's Rep.633 at p.637? 
The Chanda. [1989]2 Lloyd's Rep.494 at p.504; The Captain Grecos 
[1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 63 at 69.
3- See chapter three of this thesis, (3.3.2 at p.196).
4- The Antares. (Nos.1&2)[1987]1 Lloyd's Rep. 424.
5- The British Maritime Law Association Agreement (The Gold Clause 
Agreement), 1977, extends the time limitation to two years. 
Clause 4 (of the Gold Clause Agreement) provides: "The 
shipowners will, upon the request of any party representing the 
cargo (whether made before or after the expiry of the period of 
twelve months after the delivery of the goods or the date when 
the goods should have been delivered as laid down by the Hague 
Rules, or the Hague/Visby Rules, extend the time for bringing 
suit for a further twelve months unless (a) notice of the claim 
with the best particulars available has not been given within
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a common practice in most jurisdictions because it 
benefits both the carrier and the claimant. Namely, it 
may avoid the suit and allows time for possible settlement 
of the claim. In Clifford Maersk.l the cargo-owners 
alleged that when the cargo was delivered to them in 
Amsterdam it was damaged. In July, 1980, investigation 
into the cause of the damage was still proceeding and 
since the time limit under the Hague Rules would soon have 
expired, the cargo-owners applied for an extension of the 
limitation period. It was held that where there was an 
extension "up to and including April 21st, 1981", which
was a Sunday, then the suit on the following Monday was 
timely.2
If the extension is given for a certain time, then the 
suit must be brought by the end of the extension or 
another extension must be obtained by the contracting 
parties.3 Therefore a mere request for extension of the 
time limitation without express agreement by another party 
does not constitute a waiver. Thus, in Schwabach Coffee 
Co V. S.S.Suriname ,^ it was held "knowledge of the pending
the period of twelve months, or (b) there has been undue delay 
on the part of consignee, receivers or underwriters in obtaining 
the relevant information and formulating the claim".
[1982]2 Lloyd's Rep. 251? United Fruit. Co. V. Folger, (1959) 
A.M.C. 2224, where it was held that after timely limit, may be 
waived by the carrier; however, where an extension of only 60 
days has been agreed to, a suit must be brought within the 
additional 60 days period; Aron & Co. V. Sterling Navigation. 
Co. (1976) A.M.C. 311; Buxton V. Rederi. (1939) A.M.C. 815.
2- The same principles of extension applies as to the waiver of the 
one year delay for suit when a charterer is involved; The 
Italian. [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.11 at p.16 (Brandon.J).
Wood, p.957.
4- (1967) A.M.C.604 at p.605.
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claim and failure to answer a written request for an 
extension of time to file suit [... ] did not constitute a 
waiver by the carrier of the one-year limitation provision 
of COGSA".
Article 1(2) of the Visby Rules permits the parties to 
extend the time limitation for suit "if the parties so 
agree after the cause of action has arisen".
We can conclude that the contracting parties might 
effectively extend the period of limitation, whether prior 
to or after the cause of action has arisen, by inserting 
an express provision in the bill of lading, or depending 
upon the provision of the Visby Rules in the case of the 
extension being made after the cause of action has 
arisen.1
The one year time limit for suit does not apply however
to an indemnity claim against a third party. Then, what is
the time-bar for an indemnity claim against a third party?
Article 3(6)bis of the Visby Rules, which is entirely
new, provides:
"An action for indemnity against a third person may 
be brought even after expiration of the year provided 
for in the preceding paragraph, if brought within the 
time allowed by the law of the court seized of the 
case. However, the time allowed shall be not less • 
than three months, commencing from the day when the 
person bringing such action for indemnity has settled 
the claim or has been served with process in the 
action against himself".
1- Compania Colombiana De Secmros V. Pacific Steam Navigation. Co.
[1965] 1 Q.B. 101; F.J.J. Cadwallader, 'COGSA 1971', (1972) 35
M.L.R.p.70, hereinafter cited as "Cadwallader, COGSA 1971"; 
Mustill, p.707.
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We can find out from the above provision that such an 
indemnity action may be commenced even after expiration of 
the time limitation (one year), if it is brought before 
the proper court within the time allowed by the law of the 
court seized of such an action. 1 Then the time allowed
under the Visby Rules must not be less than three months.
That means the three months period in Article 3(6) bis of 
the Visby Rules is therefore the minimum and not the
maximum time to be allowed for taking the indemnity 
action.2 This extension of the time limit concerning the 
recourse action has generated some controversies about the 
phrase "has settled the claim". Does it refer to the 
agreement which is to settle the dispute or to the time 
when the claimant has actually paid the money? It has 
been submitted that "the carrier 'has settled the claim' 
when he has made a binding agreement for compromise, even 
if he has not yet made p a y m e n t " . 3
Furthermore, the words "time allowed by the law of the
court seized of the case" presumably means the general
) '
t
period of limitation prescribed by the local law for 
bringing an action in relation to the carriage of goods by 
sea.4 Thus in English law a six years delay applies to a
Cadwallader, COGSA 1971, p.70; Astle, p.195; The Vechscroon. 
[1982]1 Lloyd's Rep.301.
The Xinqchenq. [1987]2 Lloyd’s Rep.210; The Andros. [1987]1
W.L.R.1213 at p.1219.
3- Scrutton, 19th ed, 422; Mustill, p.707; Carver, p.370; compare,
J. Maskell, "The Influence of the New Rules on contracts of
carriage", published in the Hague/Visby Rules and The Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, London, 1977,p.5, hereinafter cited 
as"Maskell", where he said: "I myself feel that actual payment 
will have to be made before the time limit commences".
4- Mustill, p.707.
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suit concerning a recourse action. When the party is
claiming indemnity against a third person, then the
claimant must bring the action within six years, or even
more if the law of the forum so provides. 1
Lastly, it is worthwhile to mention that the Visby
Rules have extended the one year time limit to be applied
to servants or agents of the carrier. In other words, the
Visby Rules have extended the defences given to the
carrier to cover his servants or agents by providing that
(Article 4 bis (2):
"If such an action is brought against a servant or 
agent of the carrier (such servant or agent not being 
an independent contractor), such servant or agent 
shall be entitled to avail himself of the defences 
and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled 
to invoke under this convention".
Accordingly, the servants or agents of the carrier will 
protect themselves by the Visby Rules defences when such 
rules are incorporated specifically within a contract. 
Otherwise, where the Rules are not incorporated in a 
contract, the voyage will not be subject to the Visby 
Rules and the servants or agents therefore will not 
receive the protection.2 The same result is reached if it 
is proved that the carrier's servants or agents acted with 
intent to cause damage or acted recklessly. Then they will 
lose the benefits of this Article (4 bis) by virtue of 
Article 4 bis (4) which refers to the defences under this
The Xinqchenq. [1987]2 Lloyd's Rep.210 at p.214; Bosnia V. 
Larsen. [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep.22.
2- Maskell, p.5.
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convention. Thus, the servants or agents lose not only 
the benefit of the time limitation for suit, but all 
defences under the convention including the limitation of 
liability and the exceptions set out in the Rules. 1 The 
carrier, however, only loses the limitation per package or 
kilo provided under Article 4(5)(e) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules and not the benefit of the one year delay for suit.2
4.2.2 Under the Hamburg Rules.
The Hamburg Rules, compared with the Hague/Visby Rules,
brought fundamental changes in the provisions concerning
the time-limitation for suit.
The one year limitation period for suit under the
Hague/Visby Rules is extended to two years^ by virtue of
Article 20(1) of the Hamburg Rules as follows:
"Any action relating to carriage of goods under this 
convention is time-barred if judicial or arbitral
Halsbury's Shipping & Navigation, p.549, par.787; Tetley, 3rd 
ed, p.675; Maskell, p.5.
2- Tetley, 3rd ed, p.675.
3- There was extensive debate at the "UNCITRAL" conference in 
drafting of the New Rules, about whether the time limit should 
be one year or two years. At the conclusion of the Plenary 
Discussion, nine States favoured the one year time bar (U.S., 
U.S.S.R., Japan, France, Poland, Belgium, Brazil, Argentina and 
U.K.) while six States favoured the two years provision 
(Australia, Nigeria, Singapore, Norway, India and Hungary). 
Accordingly the entire topic was referred to the Drafting party. 
See, Sweeney, part.II. pp.348-349; UNICTRAL, Report "Fifth 
session, 1973, p.24, par.68, Doc. (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.10 
(Vol.Ill); UN. Doc. A/CN.9/76/Add.1, part two, International 
Legislation on shipping, 1973, p.193,par. 68, hereinafter cited 
as "Doc.A/CN.9/76/Add.1, part two".
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proceedings have not been instituted within a period 
of two years".
We can find out from the above provision that the
Hamburg Rules have clarified the ambiguities which arose
under the Hague/Visby Rules concerning arbitration
clauses, by providing that the limitation period covers
both judicial and arbitral proceedings. It is to be noted
that Article 20(1) of the Hamburg Rules has also removed
the doubt created by the Hague/Visby Rules concerning the
time-bar when it refers to "Any action relating to
carriage of goods". This phrase covers actions instituted
by the carrier and by the cargo interests, because it
clearly refers to actions by the carrier against the
shipper in respect of dangerous goods or freight.1 On the
other hand, this phrase covers all actions against the
carrier concerning the carriage of goods whether they are
based on contract, tort or otherwise.2
Furthermore, Article 20(2) of the Hamburg Rules has
pointed out the commencement of the time limitation for
suit and has removed the disputes which arose under the
Hague/Visby Rules by explaining the day or the date of the
goods delivery or when they should have been delivered, by
providing that:
"The limitation period commences on the day on which 
the carrier has delivered the goods or part thereof
Thomas, p.8.
2- Article 7(1) of the Hamburg Rules provides: "The defences and
limits of liability provided for in this convention apply in any 
action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to the 
goods covered by the contract of carriage by sea, as well as of 
delay in delivery whether the action is founded in contract, in 
tort or otherwise".
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or, in cases where no goods have been delivered, on 
the last day on which the goods should have been 
delivered"
The Hamburg Rules have also clarified in more detail as 
to which day is included in the limitation period and 
which one is not, when it is stated that the first day of 
the commencement of the time-bar is not included, but the 
last day of the period is counted. 1
In respect of the extension of the limitation period, 
the Hamburg Rules make it clear that the limitation period 
may be extended during the commencement of the time-bar by 
a declaration in writing to the claimant.2
The Hamburg Rules have followed the Hague/Visby Rules 
by providing a special provision for recourse actions by 
allowing the claimant to institute his action even after 
the expiration of the time limit (two years), if 
instituted within the time allowed by the law of the state 
where proceedings are instituted. However, it specifies a 
minimum extension of 90_ days commencing from the day on 
which the party instituting such action for indemnity "has 
settled the claim or has been served with process in the 
action against himself".3
It can be concluded, then, that the extension of time 
limit from one year to two years as well as the provisions
1- Article 20(3) of the Hamburg Rules provides: "The day on which
the limitation period commences is not included in the period".
2- Article 20(4) of the Hamburg Rules provides:
"The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during 
the running of the limitation period extend that period by a 
declaration in writing to the claimant. This period may be 
further extended by another declaration or declarations".
3- Article 20(5) of the Hamburg Rules.
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relating to recourse actions are a great advantage to the 
claimants, because they will have the effect of increasing 
the shipowner's liability as, in some substantial cases, 
claims are apt to end after one year, whereas if the limit 
is two years, the claimants have additional time to decide 
whether or not to sue the carrier.
Lastly, it is to be noted that the servants or agents 
of the carrier are entitled to avail themselves of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is 
entitled to invoke under this convention. Thus, the time 
limitation for suit applies to servants or agents of the
carrier if they prove that they acted within the scope of 
their employment,1 even though they acted intentionally or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or 
delay in delivery would probably result.2
4.3 Jurisdiction Clauses
A Jurisdiction clause is a clause relating to the place 
or the country and the court where proceedings may be
started by the claimant. This clause, however, does not
determine which laws shall apply to a particular dispute. 
It may be a factor in deciding that question in case of 
doubt. Therefore, with this point in mind, the 
jurisdiction clause should be examined under:
Article 7(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
2- Article 8 of the Hamburg Rules.
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4.3.1 The Hague/Visby Rules and,
4.3.2 The Hamburg Rules
4.3.1 Under the Hague/Visby Rules
It is to be noted that neither the Hague Rules nor the 
Visby Rules contain express provisions regulating 
jurisdiction clauses for the handling of claims. Most 
bills of lading contain a jurisdiction clause intended to 
seek an advantage from local laws, or to facilitate the 
handling and defence of claims by the carrier.1
Many courts, when dealing with a jurisdiction clause, 
prefer to refer to it as staying an action rather than 
dismissing it. This is because the time limit for suit 
may expire under the court to which jurisdiction is 
transferred as otherwise the court may refuse to hear such 
a case.2
The question, then, is what is the criterion for the 
court to determine the validity of a jurisdiction clause? 
There are a number of criteria applied by the courts in 
considering the validity of a jurisdiction clause. Most 
courts endeavour to base the exercise of their discretion
1- Beare, p.5; Mankabady, p.98.
2- The Fehmarn, [1957]2 Lloyd's Rep.551; [1957]1 W.L.R.815; Tetley, 
2nd ed, p.322; Astle, p.315.
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on the criterion of "reasonableness" in order to accept or
refuse a jurisdiction clause.1
What however, constitutes reasonableness? There are
many factors constituting a reasonable jurisdiction
clause. These factors may be deduced from the agreement
of the contracting parties, if there is no allegation that
the court, to which jurisdiction is transferred, would not
provide a fair trial,2 or the defendants were in that
country and discussion had taken place there.3 Mere
inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of
unreasonableness.4 The court will thus enforce the
jurisdiction clause unless the plaintiff can clearly show
that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust or that
the clause is invalid. 3 in many countries, the
effectiveness of jurisdiction clauses is at the court's
discretion. Many factors can thereby be considered.
Brandon, J, in, The Eleftheria,^  has made this quite clear
where he said:
"The principles established by the authorities can, I 
think be summarised as follows:
1. Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an 
agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and 
the defendant apply for a stay, the English court, 
assuming the claim to be otherwise within the
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.792.
2- Nieto V. Tinnum, (1959) A.M.C.2555.
3- The Vestris. (1932) 43 Ll. L. Rep. 86.
4- Muller V. Swedish American Lines Ltd. (1955) A.M.C. 1687.
3- Zapata Off-shore V. The "Bremen" & Unterweser Reederei G.M.B.H.. 
[1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 315 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
[1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237 at p.242.
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jurisdiction; is not bound to grant a stay but has a 
discretion whether to do so or not.l
2 . The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay 
unless strong cause for not doing so is shown.2
3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the 
plaintiffs.3
4. In exercising its discretion the court should take 
into account all the circumstances of the particular
case.^
5. In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the 
following matters, where they arise may be properly 
regarded:
a. In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is 
situated, or more readily available, and the effect 
of that on the relative convenience and expense of 
trial as between the English and foreign courts;5
b. Whether, the law of the foreign court applies and, if 
so, whether it differs from English law in any 
material respects;^
c. With what country either party is connected, and how 
closely;7
d. Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the 
foreign country, or are only seeking procedural 
advantages;8
e. Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having 
to sue in the foreign court because they would (i) be 
deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable
The Sennar. (No. 2)[1984]2 Lloyd's Rep. 143 at p.154.
2- The Biskra. [1983]2 Lloyd's Rep. 59; The Frank Pais. [1986]1 
Lloyd's Rep.529.
3- The Fehmarn. [1957J1 Lloyd's Rep. 511 at p.514; [1957]2 Lloyd's
Rep.551.
4- The Frank Pais. [1986]1 Lloyd's Rep.529.
5- The El Amria. [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.119 at p.125.
6- The Vishva Prabha. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 287 at p. 288; The El
Amria. [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.119 at p.127.
7- The Kislovodsk. [1980]1 Lloyd's Rep. 183 at p.185; The El 
Amria. [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep. 119 at p.125.
The Trauqutt. [1985]1 Lloyd's Rep.76 at p.79; The Pia Vesta.
[1984]1 Lloyd's Rep, 169 at p.172.
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to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced 
with a time-bar1 not applicable in England; or (iv) 
for political, racial, religious or other reasons be 
unlikely to get a fair trial" .2
It can, however be said that the criterion of the 
reasonableness test gives prima facie validity to a 
foreign jurisdiction clause and thus places the burden of 
proof on the person disputing its applicability to a 
case.3 This indicates that the question of reasonableness 
is a question of fact for the court to decide in the light 
of all the circumstances of the case.4
It should be noted that the jurisdiction clause must be 
clear and precise to be applicable. This allows the case 
law of some countries to hold that a jurisdiction clause 
is null and void if its ambiguity does not permit the 
parties to ascertain which court is the proper one.5
A change in the jurisdiction clause should not, 
however, cause the parties to lose rights which they have 
already acquired in the original court, e.g. there was no 
real prejudice to suit in England, while the delay for
The Blue Wave. [1982]1 Lloyd's Rep.151? The Sennar. [1984]2
Lloyd's Rep. 119 at p.128.
2- The El Amria. [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep. 119 at p. 128; It is to be 
mentioned that these principles were restated and elaborated on 
by Brandon, J, in The El Amria. [1981]2 Lloyd's Rep. 119 at 
pp.123-124.
Muller V. Swedish American Lines Ltd. (1955) A.M.C. 1687; 
Mankabady, p.102.
The Eleftheria. [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237.
5- Dunbee Ltd V. Gilman & Co. (Australia) Ptv. Ltd. [1968]2 Lloyd's 
Rep.394 (Australia Supreme Court of New south Wales, Court of 
Appeal), where it is stated: "The law of a particular country 
was the proper law of the contract did not mean that there had 
been a submission to the jurisdiction of the courts of that 
country"? The Media. (1931)41 Ll. L.Rep. 80 at p.82; Tetley, 
3rd ed, p.816.
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suit in Poland had expired.! Such an inconvenience may 
emerge from contravening Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules 
by relieving the carrier from obligations or duties or 
lessening such liability provided for in these Rules. 
That is to say, if the effect of the jurisdiction clause 
is to enable the transfer of the case or dispute to a 
country which has neither adopted nor incorporated the 
Hague Rules, then such a clause will be null and void, 
because it is contrary to Article 3(8) of the Hague 
Rules.  ^if the clause does not have that effect, then it 
cannot be successfully attacked as being contrary to 
Article 3(8). In Maharani Woollen Mills Co V. Anchor 
Line.3 goods were shipped from Liverpool to Bombay. The 
consignee had complained of the condition of the goods on 
arrival and had been paid by the underwriter. The bill of 
lading provided that in the first instance any dispute 
must be tried at the port of destination of the goods 
according to British law; but instead of bringing the 
action in Bombay, the underwriters brought the action in 
England. It was held that the jurisdiction clause which 
provided that the action must be brought at Bombay's
!- The Adolf Warski, [ 19 7 6 ] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 107 at p.114, where 
Brandon, J, states: "It would often be reasonable, unless real 
prejudice to the defendant is clearly proved to make such 
enforcement subject to a condition that the defendant should 
waive reliance on the time bar if he can lawfully do so? or 
alternatively, if such waiver is not permissible, to refuse a 
stay".
2- The Morviken, [1983]1 Lloyd's Rep.l; It is convenient here to 
mention that the principal argument against their validity is 
that the jurisdiction clause has the effect of lessening the 
carrier's liability, and is therefore null and void. Sweeney, 
part 1, p.94; Cf. The Benartv. [1984]2 Lloyd's Rep. 244 (C.A.)
3- (1927)29 Ll. L.Rep.169; The Eleftheria. [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237.
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courts did not conflict with Article 3(8) of the Hague
Rules, since it in no way diminished the liability of the
carrier. Scrutton, L.J., in this case, made this point
quite clear when he said:
"Now the liability of the carrier appears to me to 
remain exactly the same under the clause. The only 
difference is a question of procedure - where shall 
the law be enforced? - and I do not read any clause 
as to procedure as lessening liability".
The decisions in the U.K. and the U.S. concerning the 
validity of jurisdiction clauses have reached the same 
conclusions, but on different grounds.!
In the U.K., when the jurisdiction clause provides that 
disputes should be settled in the U.K., then such a clause 
is considered v a l i d .  2 On the other hand, when the 
jurisdiction transfers the disputes to a foreign court, 
then such clauses would be applied according to 
considerations of the "convenience" and t h e i r  
"reasonableness" under the circumstances of the particular 
case. 3 in the U.S., the American courts, in the past 
rejected any type of jurisdiction clause in a bill of 
lading which displaced the jurisdiction of the United
!- Beare, p.5, where he states: "Similar attitudes and tests are
adopted in the English and Canadian courts, although the 
impression seems to be that the courts in the United States are 
less likely to stay an action".
Mankabady, p.99.
3- The Adolf Warski. [1976]2 Lloyd’s Rep. 241 at p.242, where it is 
stated: "Although the court might be more willing to grant a
stay where a clause was reasonable than where it was not".? The 
Eleftheria. [1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237? The Makefiell. [1976]2 
Lloyd's Rep.29.
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States' courts.! This attitude has been changed by the
American courts, by granting exclusive jurisdiction to 
foreign courts on the basis of "reasonableness"2 and
"convenience".3
Lastly, it is to be noted that convenience"!, sometimes 
described as reasonableness^, is the criterion in respect 
of deciding a plea forum non conveniens. In The Spiliada.6 
the House of Lords found that it was wiser to avoid the 
use of the word "convenience" and refer rather to the
appropriate forum. The burden of proof is then on the
plaintiff to show that the forum is the most appropriate, 
whereas in the forum non conveniens? cases that burden
!- Wood & Salick Inc V. Companie Generale Transatique. 43F. ed, 
pp.941-942 (2nd Cir. 1930); Carbon Black Export Inc V. The S.S. 
Monrosa. 254 F.2d, 297 (5th Cir. 1958); Mankabady, p.101.
2- Muller V. Swedish American Lines Ltd. (1955) A.M.C. 1687; 
Kranqer V. Pennsylvania Rail Co, 174 F.2d.2556 (2d Cir. 1949); 
Zapata off-shore company V. The "Bremen" & Unterweser Reederei 
G.M.B.H. (The Chapparral). [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep.348 at p.351. 
(U.S. Sup. Ct).
3- indussa Corp V. Ramborq. [1967]2 Lloyd's Rep. 101 (U.S. Ct. of 
App); Northern Assurance Co. Ltd V. M.V. Caspian Career. (1977) 
A.M.C., 421, where it was held that a clause, requiring disputes 
to be settled in The Tokyo District Court was invalid under 
Section 3(8) of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 
1936, since the clause "lessens the carrier's liability"; 
Sergio Carbone & Fausto Pocar, Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 
Carriage by Sea and Uniform Law, published in the Studies on the 
Revision of the Brussels Convention on Bills of Lading, 
Universita Di Genova, Facolta Di Economia E Commercio, 1974, 
p.331, hereinafter cited as "Carbone & Pocar"? Beare, p.5.
4- The Spiliada, [1987]1 Lloyd's Rep.l.
5- Muller V. Swedish American Lines Ltd. (1955) A.M.C. 1687 at 
p.1689.
[1987]1 Lloyd's Rep.l at p.9.
?- Lord Goff, in The Spiliada. [ 1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 at p. 10, 
formulated an authoritative approach to forum non conveniens. 
He stated: "The basic principle is that a stay will only be
granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is 
satisfied that there is some other available forum, having 
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the 
trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more 
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of
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rests on the defendant by showing that the forum is not 
appropriate.1
4.3.2 Under the Hamburg Rules
As already mentioned above, the Hague/Visby Rules 
contain no provisions for a jurisdiction clause.
The Working Group of UNCITRAL considered various 
viewpoints concerning the subject of jurisdiction in cargo 
damage disputes. The first view was that no provision at 
all on jurisdiction should be added to the Rules. The 
second view supported an opposite approach which held that 
all foreign jurisdiction clauses should be considered null 
and void. The third approach was in favour of the 
insertion of a provision in the Rules, to govern the 
jurisdiction clause in the light of general criteria 
emerging from the extensive practice over the question of 
jurisdiction clauses under the Hague/Visby Rules, (in the 
absence of a specific provision regulating such a clause 
and equally in the absence of any guidance giving validity 
to the clause). The fourth approach supported the trend 
calling for a provision, by which a claim may be brought, 
specifying several alternative places.2
justice"? Therefore, it only required the adoption of the 
principles which are set down by Lord Brandon in The Eleftheria. 
[1969]1 Lloyd's Rep.237 at p.242, and restated in The El Amria. 
[1981]2 Lloyd's Rep.119 at pp.123-124 (C.A.).
1- The Spiliada [1987]1 Lloyd's Rep.l at p.13
2- Sweeney, part I, p.94; Mankabady, p.104.
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These various views were discussed and debated by the 
Working Group, and the text in Article 21 of the Draft 
convention was adopted by the Hamburg Rules which provides 
that the plaintiff! or the claimant, at his option, may 
bring an action in any court of the following places: 
a: The principal place of the business or, in the 
absence thereof, the habitual residence of the 
defendant; or
b. The place where the contract was made, provided that 
the defendant has there a place of business, branch 
or agency through which the contract was made; or
c. The port of loading or the port of discharge; or
d. The agreed or designated place in the contract of 
carriage by sea.2
e. The place where the vessel has been arrested.3
The plaintiff or the claimant has broadly the same 
choice of forum in case of arbitral proceedings."!
!- Sweeney, part I.pp.100-101, where he states; "The United States
also opposed the use of the word 'plaintiff' as inappropriate in 
the context of the purpose for which these rules were being 
drafted. "Plaintiff" would mean either the cargo interest or 
the carrier interest, whereas the true purpose of the provision 
was to replace choice of law and choice of forum clauses in 
bills of lading limiting the effective remedies for the cargo 
interest".
2- Article 21(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Article 21(2) of the Hamburg Rules; Some delegates opposed the
provision of the in rem jurisdiction. For instance, France,
believed the in rem problem to be solved by the 1952 C.M.l 
Convention on the Arrest of Vessels "International Convention 
for the unification of certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of 
Seagoing Ships, May 10, 1952". Also, Norway objected to any in 
rem attachment at places other than the states listed in Sub- 
paragraph 1(a), (c) and (d) of the proposal A. Sweeney, part.I, 
pp.97-98; UNCITRAL Report on its third session, A/CN. 
9/63/Add.1 of 17th March 1972, p.18? Mankabady, p.105; It is to 
be noted that the Hague/Visby Rules do not contain rules on 
Arrest of the Vessel.
4- Article 22(3) of the Hamburg Rules.
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Respecting judicial or arbitral proceedings, the 
contracting parties may agree upon the bringing of an 
action in a place other than one of those mentioned above 
when they so agree after the dispute has arisen.!
As already mentioned, the action may be brought at a 
place where the vessel has been arrested.2 However, to 
protect the defendant, the claimant must remove the action 
to one of the jurisdictions mentioned in Article 21(1) of 
the Hamburg Rules if the defendant so requests; but prior 
to the removal of the action the defendant must furnish
security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgment 
awarded to the claimant.3 The sufficiency of the security 
will be determined by the court at the place of arrest."! 
If, however, the defendant does not ask for removal of the 
action, the court in the place of arrest will remain 
competent.
It is to be noted that Article 21(3)and(4) provides 
additional procedural provisions supplementing the 
jurisdictional rules in Article 21(l)and(2). Article
21(3) makes it clear that the jurisdictions mentioned in 
Article 21(1)and(2)are exclusive: the claimant may not
bring a claim in any other jurisdiction. However, courts 
of a non-contracting State cannot be bound by this rule
!- Article 21(5) of the Hamburg Rules; Waldron, p.317? Tetley, The
Hamburg Rules, p.8; Murray, p.81.
2- Article 21(2)(a) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- ibid.
4- Article 21(2)(b) of the Hamburg Rules.
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except by virtue of the statement contained in the bill of 
lading pursuant to Article 23(3) of the Hamburg Rules.!
Article 21(4) (a) prohibits a new action on the same 
grounds between the same parties where a suit has been 
instituted in a competent court under Article 21 (1,2) of 
the Hamburg Rules, or where a judgment has been delivered 
by such a court, unless the judgment is not enforceable in 
the country where the new claim has been brought. 
Moreover, there are two procedures that are not to be
considered as starting of a new action; first, institution 
of measures with a view to obtaining enforcement of the 
earlier judgment; second, the removal of a case to a 
different court in the same country or to a court in
another country in accordance with Article 21(2)(a).2
It should be mentioned that Article 21(1) of the 
Hamburg Rules has been criticized. For instance, "the 
place where the contract was made" and "the port of 
loading" in fact are usually indicated as the same place
because the bill of lading is normally issued at the port
of loading, therefore paragraph (b) of Article 21 is not
needed.3
!- Article 23(3) of the Hamburg Rules provides: "Where a bill of 
lading or any other document evidencing a contract of carriage 
by sea is issued, it must contain a statement that carriage is 
subject to the provisions of this convention which nullify any 
stipulation derogating therefrom to the detriment of the shipper 
or the consignee".
2- Article 21(4)(b,c) of the Hamburg Rules.
3- Mankabady, p.105; Sergio M. Carbone & Riccardo Luzzatto, 
Arbitration clauses, Carriage by Sea and Uniform Law, published 
in The Studies on the Revision of the Brussels Convention on 
Bills of Lading, 1974, p.385, hereinafter cited as "Carbone & 
Luzzatto", where they criticize paragraph (b) of Article 21 of 
the Hamburg Rules which gives the plaintiff the option to 
institute the action in the place where the contract was made,
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Lastly, it must be noted that the Rules require that a 
court which exercises jurisdiction under Article 21 of the 
Hamburg Rules must be competent according to its national 
law. Thus, although there is nothing in the Hamburg Rules 
explicitly referring to the rule of forum non conveniens, 
a court competent within the meaning of Article 21 can 
exercise its discretion to refuse to hear a case on that 
ground.! The contracting parties themselves also have a 
right to choose one or more forums, as an additional 
option to the choice of forum indicated in the Rules. But 
a competent or proper forum must be selected according to 
the principle of reasonableness and subordinated to a 
condition of equality of the parties.2
but on another ground by saying that: "As a matter of fact it is 
well known that the principles adopted in various national legal 
systems with a view to determining the moment and place of 
making contracts vary considerably under many aspects in 
accordance with more general concepts of the theory of 
juridicial negotiation. And it is equally well known how 
divergent may be the solutions accepted by various national 
legal systems as to determination of fundamental norms whereby 
the place of concluding a contract is to be ascertained".
!- Jackson, p.230.
2- Carbone & Pocare, p.339.
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Concluding Remarks
It is to be noted that the Hamburg Rules have generated 
a substantial impact on the procedure of the action for 
lost or damaged cargo in many respects.
1. The period for giving notice has been extended from 3 
days, as provided in the Hague/Visby Rules, to 15 days 
in case of latent damage. This period is considered 
sufficient to discover non-apparent damage.
2. The sanction for not giving notice is still the same, 
which does not affect the right of the contracting 
parties to bring suit against the carrier within the 
time limit for suit in the Rules. The effect of not 
giving such written notice is considered prima facie 
evidence of discharging the goods carried in sound 
condition as stated in the bill of lading.
3. The time limit for suit has been extended from one year 
to two years. This time limit covers both judicial and 
arbitral proceedings during the two years under the 
Hamburg Rules. The expansion to two years, clearly, 
will have the effect of increasing the shipowner's 
liability. On the other hand, it gives a great 
advantage to shippers and cargo interest because it 
gives the claimants additional time in which to decide 
whether or not to sue the carrier. It also will 
increase the frequency of claims and, consequently, the 
costs of shipowners.
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4. It should be mentioned that, owing to the absence of a 
provision on jurisdiction in the Hague/Visby Rules, the 
courts of most countries, in exercising their 
discretion, may accept or refuse jurisdiction according 
to Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules. However, the 
situation of jurisdiction has become much better under 
the Hamburg Rules than under the Hague Rules as the 
Hamburg Rules provide for several alternative places 
where action may be brought, including arbitration 
proceedings. These provisions aim to achieve a balance 
between the carrier and the cargo interests by allowing 
the shipper or the cargo-owner to bring his action in 
any court provided by the Hamburg Rules as the proper 
forum for such action.
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Chapter Five
The Liability of the Multimodal Transport Operator for 
Loss of or Damage to the Goods under the 1980 United 
Nations Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention
The crux of the Multimodal Transport Convention (MTC) 
and indeed the most sensitive and contentious element of 
any international convention on the carriage of goods is 
the liability regime. The MTC consists of eight parts. 
One of the most important parts of the Convention is part 
3, i.e. "liability of the multimodal transport operator 
(MTO)". In this part some points are of a high degree of 
importance. This chapter will, therefore, conduct the 
discussion under the following headings:
5.1 The background of the Convention
The carriage of goods by a combination of two or more 
modes of transport in succession is a common phenomenon in 
international trade. Each mode of transport has its own 
physical characteristics and commercial requirements and 
these to a large extent are reflected in the nature of the 
legal regime! on a national, or international level
!- The legal rules governing the different modes of transport are 
as follows:
1. The Warsaw Convention 1929 (Air), which was amended by the 
1955 Hague Protocol and the 1961 Guadalajara Convention and the 
Montral Protocol No.4 (1975).
2. The CIM Convention 1933 (Rail) which was revised in 1952, 
1961 and 1970.
3. The CMR Convention 1956 (Road).
4. The Hague Rules 1924 (Sea) which was amended by the 1968 
Brussels Protocol. The Hamburg Rules 197 8 are intended to 
replace the Hague Rules.
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governing the contractual relationship between the 
consignor and the consignee of cargo and the carrier; the 
documentation to be issued and used; and more 
importantly, the liability of the carrier for the loss of, 
or damage to goods entrusted in his care for 
transportation. Consequently, when cargo is transferred 
from one mode of transport to another mode, most often it 
is also transferred to a different legal regime.! 
However, some of the conventions contain provisions which 
extend the application of the Convention to combined 
transport. ^  in such a case combined transport is 
considered as a subsidiary to the carriage in question. 
When more than one transport document is issued, it is 
necessary to find out where and when the loss, damage or 
delay has occurred in order to apply the rules contained 
in the transport document. But often difficulties arise 
in establishing the time and the cause of loss or damage 
to the goods. Hence there is a need for a more equitable 
solution to the problem. Moreover, among the important 
features of the past three decades or more, is the fact 
that the development of technology and the creation of
!- Eugene A. Massey, prospects for a New International legal Regime: 
A Critical Look at the TCM, (1972) 3.JMLC p.726, hereinafter 
cited as "Massey".
E.g. The Hamburg Rules, Article 1, pars 1 and 6; The Warsaw 
Convention Article 1, pars. 1 and 2 and Article 31, par.l; The 
Guadalajara amendment Article 1, pars, (b) and (c) and Article 
11; The CMR Convention Article 1(1), Article 2 and Article 3; 
The CIM Article 1(1) and Article 2; See the proposals submitted 
to the first committee of the diplomatic conference on a 
Multimodal Convention by the United Kingdom delegation in 
document TD/MT/CONF/C.1/CRP.1 and TD/MT/C0NF/C.1/CRP.2 and Add.l 
contained in UNCTAD document TD/MT/C0NF/17/Add.1 Report of the 
United Nations Conference on a Convention on International 
Multimodal Transport Vol.II, part One. (1979) pp.16-23.
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container transport after World War II changed 
transportation methods and caused an increasing use of 
intermodal containers by the later 1950s.! In other 
words, the history of the increase of multimodal transport 
of goods, particularly its international form, dates back 
to the birth of the methods of integration and 
consolidation of goods for carriage such as 
containerization and palletization.2 The use of containers 
and pallets has led to an integration between the methods 
of transport.3 This is because multimodal transport of 
goods is to a very large extent based on container 
transport.
Thus, during the last three decades international 
multimodal transport of goods has, because of the 
suitability of container method of carrying cargo in 
multimodal transport, grown so much that it can be said 
that the history of multimodal transport of goods has 
during this period been tied to the history of container 
transport."! Also computers are now widely used to monitor 
the movement of goods in air and sea transport and 
transport documents are increasingly being simplified to
!- W. Driscoll & Paul B. Larsen, The Convention on International 
Multimodal Transport of Goods,(1982)57 Tul.L.R.p.195, hereinafter 
cited as "Driscoll & Larsen".
2- P.G. Fitzpatrick, combined transport and the CMR convention, 
[1968] J.B.L. p.314, hereinafter cited as "Fitzpatrick".
3- S. Mankabady, The Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention: A 
challenge to Unimodal Transport Conventions, (1983)32 ICLQ p.137, 
hereinafter cited as "Mankabady, The Multimodal Transport of 
Goods Convention".
4- Driscoll & Larsen, p.195.
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facilitate fast movement of goods. Furthermore, the 
existing international infrastructure is not fully adapted 
to the requirements of international multimodal transport 
of goods. As a result, there arose a serious need for the 
creation of a Convention on multimodal transport contracts 
to bring certainty in this area of transportation, and 
therefore, to facilitate trade by removing any impediments 
slowing down the growth of multimodal transport.1 
Consequent on these developments the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) adopted, on 
24 May 1980, the United Nations Convention on 
International Multimodal Transport of Goods.2 Obviously, 
the objective of this Convention was to create a uniform 
multimodal transport document and to dispel the wide 
disparity in the contractual terms adopted by different 
operators. It sets out in great detail the multimodal 
transport operator's liability including his liability 
limitation for loss or damage to goods.
The work on a Convention for multimodal transport of 
goods, theoretical more than practical, has a long history 
going back to the 1930s. 3 The subject received full 
attention following the increased use of containers in 
trade between developing and developed countries. The 
original project was based upon the need for a multimodal
Kurosh Nasseri, The Multimodal Convention, (1988)19 JMLC, p.234, 
hereinafter cited as "Nasseri".
2- it is not yet in force; hereinafter cited as IMTC, or the MTC.
3- Report of United Nations Conference on Convention on 
International Multimodal Transport, TD/MT/CONF/12/Add.1, 1980, 
part Two, p.l, hereinafter cited as "TD/MT/CONF/12/Add.1, part 
Two" .
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instrument which would address the question of liability 
for the loss of or damage to goods occurring during 
multimodal transport and to standardize other aspects of 
multimodal transport.1 Two non-governmental organizations 
each prepared texts for a Convention,2 subsequently 
merged, at the initiative of the Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE), into one text known as a draft Convention on 
International Combined Transport of Goods or TCM draft 
Convention.^ The TCM Convention is directly linked to the 
existing unimodal conventions because it attempted to 
place an umbrella of uniformity over the existing 
conventions governing liability. ^  The TCM draft 
Convention attempted to set out some voluntarily 
applicable common rules dealing with liability and 
documentation aspects of contracts for multimodal 
transportation in order to fill the gaps in existing
William J. Driscoll, The Convention on International Multimodal 
Transport: A Status Report, (1978) 9 JMLC p.441, hereinafter
cited as "Driscoll".
2- These are the draft conventions prepared in the 1960s by the 
International institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) which produced a draft convention where the emphasis 
was on the system of liability in multimodal transport, and the 
Comity Maritime International (CMI) which had focussed on the 
Hague Rules, when it decided to prepare rules on multimodal 
transport emphasising on documentation aspects and loss or damage 
problem when the place of loss or damage can not be known. The 
CMI draft, known as the "Tokyo Rules". See, Driscoll, p.442; 
Massey, p.727; Mankabady, The Multimodal Transport of Goods 
Convention, p.121.
3- The TCM draft convention was presented and adopted at the fourth 
meeting of the ECE and Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO), held in London in November 1971; the 
initials "TCM" represents the French title of the Convention 
"Transport Combing de Marchandises".
4- For more details regarding the preparation of the TCM draft 
convention, see Massey, p.727; S. Mankabady, Some Legal Aspects 
of the carriage of goods by container, (1974) 23 ICLQ p.329, 
hereinafter cited as "Mankabady, Some legal aspects of the 
carriage of goods by container"; Driscoll, p.727.
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conventions on carriage of goods and to establish single 
responsibility and a through transportation document under 
which the created Combined Transport Operator (CTO) is 
responsible for the whole multimodal journey.1 The TCM 
Convention, however, failed. Several factors contributed 
to its failure; these are: 1) the lack of support by the
United States and some other countries demanding that 
several aspects of international combined transportation 
including the economic and social implications must, with 
special respect to the needs and requirements of 
developing countries, be fully studied before the 
Convention be c o n c l u d e d 2) tfye work on the multimodal 
transport convention already started by UNCTAD3 and the 
prevailing view within UNCTAD was that it was premature to 
adopt a multimodal Convention on the basis of the t TCM 
draft.4
During the initial UNCTAD deliberation, it became clear 
that the TCM draft Convention would not be used as the
Massey, p.730; Driscoll, p.447.
The developed countries sought (1) to limit the coverage of the 
convention to ensure the continued validity of existing 
'"unimodal" national laws and international conventions, and (2) 
to minimize obligations to be imposed on carriers. In contrast, 
the developing countries sought (1) to maximize the protection of 
the shipper, and (2) to make increased developing country 
participation in the business (and insurance) of intermodal 
transportation mandatory. Thus, it can be said that 
international convention has a political background. This can be 
seen in its preamble. See, Driscoll & Larsen, p.193; Driscoll, 
pp.449-452; Erling Selvig, The Background to the Convention, 
published in One-day Seminar, Southampton University, 12 Sep. 
1.980, pp.A3,A9, hereinafter cited as "Selvig, The Background to 
the Convention"; Erik Chrispeels, The United Nations Convention 
on International Multimodal Transport of Goods: A Background
NIote, (1980) 15 E.T.L., p.361, hereinafter cited as "Chrispeels".
3- TD/MT/CONF/12/Add.1 .p.2 .
4- Selvig, The background to the convention, p.A9.
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basis for discussion, 1 and the drafting of a multimodal 
convention was therefore commenced. Thus, in a worldwide 
container conference, sponsored by the U.N. and the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMCO) held in Geneva in November 1972, it was recommended 
that UNCTAD should carry out further studies on several 
aspects of multimodal transport and provide a draft 
convention on it. When the UN/IMCO recommendations were 
endorsed by the Economic and Social Council of the UN 
(ECOSOC) the whole matter of a multimodal transport 
convention was entrusted to UNCTAD. In order to prepare 
the draft Convention the Trade and Development Board (TDB) 
of UNCTAD, which already had done some work on sea 
transport regulations, decided to extend its activities 
into other modes of transport too. To this end, the TDB 
of UNCTAD established the Intergovernmental Preparatory 
Group (IPG) in 1973. After six years, in March 1979, the 
IPG completed a draft convention on international 
multimodal transport of goods.2 On May 24, 1980, a
diplomatic conference held in Geneva adopted the
The major substantive issues in the renewed drafting effort were 
those pertaining to the weaknesses of the TCM draft convention, 
namely, 1) the scope of the convention, 2) the liability regime,
3) documentary simplification, and 4) preservation of the 
existing unimodal conventions. See Driscoll, p.447.
For more details, see Preparation and Adoption, 
U.N.Doc.TD/MT/CONF/6 (1979) at p.15; UN Conference on a 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport. Report of 
Intergovernmental Preparatory Group, part One - Draft Convention 
on International Multimodal Transport, U . N . Doc . TD .MT/CONF/1, 
TD/B/AC.15/56 (1979), hereinafter cited as "IPG Draft Convention, 
Part One", and Part Two - Report of the International Preparatory 
Group on its Sixth Session, U.N.Doc. TD/MT/CONF/1/ Add.1,TD/B/AC. 
15/56/Add.1(1979), hereinafter cited as "IPG Sixth Session";
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Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods by consensus 
of 81 States.1 This Convention will become applicable to 
international multimodal transport of contracts when 30 
states become contracting parties to it.2
It is important to note that during the period in which 
the draft of the multimodal convention was under 
discussion and negotiation, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (I.C.C.) published its Uniform Rules for a 
Combined Transport Document in 1973 because it was very 
concerned with the commercial problems of combined 
transport and felt that such publication was essential. 
The revised form of the Rules was then published by the 
I.C.C. in 1975. These Rules were based on the principles 
contained in the TCM Convention.3 In other words, the 
I.C.C. Rules operate under a network liability system for 
determining the CTO's liability, i.e. if the mode of
Before the final adoption of the convention there was a 
diplomatic conference which was convened by the UN in Geneva in 
November 1979 and was resumed in May 1980. See, the UN 
Conference on an International Multimodal Transport, Report of 
the UN Conference, Part one - Draft Convention on International 
Multimodal Transport, U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/12 (1980), hereinafter 
cited as "UN draft Convention Part One", and Part two - Report of 
the First Session of the UN Conference, 
UN.Doc.TD/MT/CONF/12/Add.1 (1980), hereinafter cited as "UN
Session, part two"; UNCTAD, Report of the UN Conference on 
International Multimodal Transport on its Resumed Session, U.N. 
Doc. TD/MT/C0NF/16/Add.1 (1980), hereinafter cited as "Resumed 
Session".
Article 36 of the IMTC.
3- The I.C.C. Rules which are a voluntary code for a combined 
transport contract and have no statutory force are operated by 
incorporating into a contract made by the consignor and the 
combined transport operator (CTO) and evidenced by the combined 
transport document. For more details concerning the I.C.C. Rules 
see, Mankabady, The multimodal transport of goods convention, 
p.122; Driscoll & Larsen, p.199; Chorley & Giles, 8th ed, p.271.
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transport where the loss or damage occurred is known, the 
appropriate international convention or national law 
particular for that mode which is of mandatory character 
applies to determine the CTO's liability.1 However, the 
UNCTAD and the I.C.C. subsequently created a working group 
which drafted a new set of rules for multimodal documents 
intended to replace the existing I.C.C. Rules. The new 
rules, called the UNCTAD/I.C.C . Rules on Multimodal 
Transport Documents were finalized in April 1991 for entry 
into force by the end of 1991. From then on commercial 
parties would be free to use the new rules if they so 
wish. Although the new rules, (UNCTAD/I.C.C. Rules) are 
based on the existing unimodal liability regimes, they 
facilitate multimodal transport. However, when the MT 
Convention enters into force,the UNCTAD/I.C .C. Rules on 
Multimodal Transport Document can be removed.2
Lastly, it can, therefore, be concluded that the 
background of the multimodal transport convention on which 
the convention is based is threefold: 1) the unimodal
transport of goods conventions, such as the Hague Rules, 
CMR and the Hamburg Rules; 2) the previous efforts done 
in order to prepare the Convention, such as TCM draft
Rule 13 of the I.C.C. Rules; see also, F.J.J. Cadwallader, 
Uniformity in the Regulation of Combined Transport, (1974) 
J.B.L.p.198, hereinafter cited as "Cadwallader"; B.S.Wheble, The 
International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Rules for a Combined 
Transport Document, (1976) L.M.C.L.Q. p.146, hereinafter cited 
as "Wheble".
UNCTAD, The Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry 
into Force of the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport 
Convention, Doc.TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1.p.28 (1991), hereinafter cited 
as "UNCTAD TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1"; ICC, Doc. No. 321-34/1 Rev.2. 
(1991), p.10, hereinafter cited as "ICC Doc. No.321-34/1 Rev.2".
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Convention, I.C.C. Rules; and 3) political efforts 
(developed and developing countries). It is noteworthy 
that while the provisions of the multimodal convention are 
broadly in line with the regime established by the Hamburg 
Rules,! also draws heavily on the TCM draft and the
I.C.C. Rules. Therefore, it is fair to state that without 
the earlier negotiation on the Hamburg Rules and the
I.C.C. Rules, agreement on the MT Convention would have 
been much more difficult to achieve. 2 in this connection 
it has been said that the Convention "is interesting and 
important not only for the principles it establishes, but 
also for its symbolic significance to the developing 
countries, irrespective of how soon it may come into 
force".3
The MT Convention is, to a large extent, based on and strongly 
influenced by the Hamburg Rules. Firstly, because many of the 
participants involved in the work on the multimodal transport 
convention were the same participants in the work on the Hamburg 
Rules who had their main background in shipping law and policy so 
that they considered the problems of multimodal transport mainly 
from the point of view of shipping, although the multimodal 
transport convention covers all types of multimodal carriage; 
Secondly, the Hamburg Rules were used by all groups involved in 
the work on the multimodal convention as a model for the MT 
convention whether from the view of subject matters or of 
substance and drafting of the various provisions of the Hamburg 
Rules; thirdly, the Hamburg Rules brought the international law 
on carriage by sea closer to the international conventions 
governing carriage by the other modes of transport and, 
therefore, became a relevant law to be considered as a base for 
the MT Convention by the IPG. See Selvig, The background to the 
convention, pp.A9, A12, A13.
2- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.24.
3- W.J. Driscoll, "The world's first international multimodal 
transport convention", Transcript of seminars on international 
intermodal cargo liability, Course VI, Shippers National Freight 
Claim Council, Fordham University, School of Law and Golden Gate 
University, San Francisco, September 1980, p.174, hereinafter 
cited as "Driscoll, The world's first International MT 
Convention".
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5.2 The aim and importance of the multimodal transport
of goods
Since the concept of the multimodal transport of goods 
is based on the integration of different modes of 
transport by the use of a container system, the most 
important aim of multimodal transport of goods is to 
facilitate the movement of goods by reducing the total 
costs of transport and the time which is necessary for the 
performance of carriage and reducing losses, damage and 
the danger of theft or pilferage, and therefore to obtain 
maximum economic benefits.! This will, undoubtedly, have 
an important effect on international trade in goods. 
Thus, under multimodal transport the goods are carried 
from origin to destination under a single contract, 
instead of making a separate contract (as in segmented 
transport of goods) for each mode of transport which 
involves high contracting and documentation costs.2 And 
so multimodal transport has the effect that contracting 
and documentation costs are reduced. Furthermore, under 
multimodal transport of goods the shipper deals with one 
carrier (the MTO with whom he has a multimodal transport 
contract) rather than several different carriers. If
!- UNCTAD, Multimodal Transport and Containerization, TD/B/C.4/238, 
1982, p.7, par.10, hereinafter cited as UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/238" . 
Le T. Thuong & Frederick M Collison, In search of a coherent 
policy on International Intermodal Transportation, (1985) 16
J.M.L.C., p.397, hereinafter cited as "Thuong & Collison"; 
Mankabady, Some legal aspects of the carriage of goods by 
container, p.317.
2- Driscoll & Larsen, p.204; Gerald H. Ullman, Combined Transport 
to and from the United States, (1976) L.M.C.L.Q, p.157, 
hereinafter cited as "Ullman".
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there is any loss of or damage to goods, the shipper would 
have direct recourse against the MTO, and it would not be 
necessary for him to show at which state of transport the 
loss or damage occurred and which carrier was 
responsible.! Thus, the other costs which are necessary 
to unimodal transport will be reduced or eliminated.2 
Moreover, the multimodal transport of goods, through the 
coordinated operations of the multimodal operator, either 
accelerates the speed of the loading and unloading 
operation of the containers or reduces the time when the 
containers are awaiting a transport vehicle at the loading 
points. Owing to multimodal transport, the time of 
loading and unloading and waiting of the container will be 
considerably reduced (e.g. to some hours rather than days 
or weeks).3 It is, therefore, important that we have 
container operators encouraged to invest in the business 
of multimodal transport.4
In conclusion, the traditional transport system 
involves breaks or discontinuations which cause high 
transportation costs, while a multimodal transport 
operator can offer, through the use of containers, a 
coordinated transport service which is less discontinuous 
and is more direct than the traditional international
!- In unimodal transport each unimodal carrier is only responsible 
for the performance of the service relative to his own specific 
leg of the journey; UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/238, p.7; Driscoll & 
Larsen, p.204.
2- Thuong, p.397.
3- J.E. Bannister, Containerization and marine insurance, (1974)5 
J.M.L.C.p.470, hereinafter cited as "Bannister".
4- Dale E. Taylor, Problems underwriters encounter when insuring 
cargo, (1971)45 Tul.L.R.p.1008, hereinafter cited as "Taylor".
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transport system; i.e. an international multimodal 
transport operator would be able to offer shippers cheaper 
multimodal services than would modal carriers. These 
savings in transportation costs between the origin and 
destination are a main factor which has invited carriers 
to invest in the business of multimodal transport.
Accordingly, the importance of multimodal transport 
arises because of its aim, its benefits and its effects on 
international trade. It will, therefore, affect the 
economic situation of countries as foreign trade is of 
economic importance for almost all countries. Some 
countries may rely partly on foreign trade while for other 
countries, foreign trade may be of vital importance. They 
should, therefore, try to keep and continue their foreign 
trade. One of the important factors for keeping and 
continuing foreign trade is the existence of a 
transportation! system supporting it. Otherwise, in the 
case of lack of such a transportation system, foreign 
trade may be faced with difficulties which will cause 
economic difficulties. It can, therefore, be said that 
international multimodal transport system stimulates 
foreign trade and has a very good effect on the economic
!- David C. Oliver, A Framework for an International Multimodal 
Transportation based upon the concept of the world ocean, I.C.C. 
Prac's, J. vol.50 (1983) pp.198, 201, hereinafter cited as
"Oliver", when he said:"The importance of transportation has long 
been recognised as a vital element in a healthy economy". He 
then referred to the importance of container transport system and 
stated that "containerized transportation can be most effective 
when integrated into the 'land-bridge’ or 'mini-bridge' system".
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situation of countries in so far as the export and import 
of goods is concerned.
5.3. Scope of Application of the Convention and its 
Mandatory Effect
Article 2 of the multimodal transport convention makes
the scope of application of the Convention clear. The
international element which is required for the Convention
to apply appears from the requirement that the multimodal
transport must proceed between two different States. It
is enough that either the place for taking in charge of
goods by the MTO according to multimodal transport
contract or, alternatively, the place for delivery is
located in a contracting state. Article 2 provides:
"The provisions of this Convention shall apply to all 
contracts of multimodal transport between places in 
two States, if:
a) The place for the taking in charge of the goods by 
the multimodal transport operator as provided for in 
the multimodal transport contract is located in a 
Contracting State, or
b) The place for delivery of the goods by the 
multimodal transport operator as provided for in the 
multimodal transport contract is located in a 
Contracting State".
It should be noted that only one of these two States 
needs to be a Contracting State. The purpose, therefore,
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of requiring only one state and not both to be a 
Contracting State is to widen and secure the scope of 
application of the Convention.!
As seen, multimodal transport requires to be treated as 
international when it proceeds between two different 
States. The question now is: what does international
multimodal transport mean for the purpose of the 
Convention? This, along with other expressions, has been 
defined in Article 1 of the Convention. So, to be more 
accurate, it can be said that the Convention applies to 
every contract for international multimodal transport 
which can be included in the definitions mentioned in 
Article 1. Subject to Article 1(3) of the Convention 
"multimodal transport contract" means a contract whereby a 
MTO undertakes, against payment of freight, to perform or 
to procure the performance of international multimodal 
transport. The MTO is defined as any person who on his 
own behalf, or through another person acting on his 
behalf, concludes a multimodal transport contract not as 
an agent but as a principal, and assumes responsibility 
for the performance of the contract.2 "International 
multimodal transport", therefore, means "the carriage of 
goods by at least two different modes of transport on the 
basis of a multimodal transport contract from a place in 
one country at which the goods are taken in charge by the
!- Wei Jia Ju, UN Multimodal Transport Convention, (1981) 
J.W.T.L.p.288, hereinafter cited as "Wei Jia Ju".
2- Article 1(2) of the IMTC.
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multimodal transport operator to a place designated for 
delivery situated in a different country".!
Therefore, for the purposes of the Convention, 
international multimodal transport must contain the 
following important elements, (otherwise it is not 
considered as international multimodal transport to which 
the Convention applies).
1.There must be at least two different modes of 
transport;
2.The transport must proceed between two different 
countries;
3. The transport must be performed on the basis of 
multimodal transport contract, i.e. there must be a 
multimodal transport contract covering at least two 
of the modes to be used.
Thus, if the international transport is on the basis of 
a unimodal contract so that the operations of pick-up and 
delivery of the goods are carried out by a mode different 
from that of international transport in the performance of 
that unimodal transport contract, that kind of transport, 
although apparently in form of international multimodal 
transport, is not international multimodal transport as 
defined by Article 1(1)2 and the Convention does not apply
!- Article 1(1) of the IMTC.
2- The second sentence of Article 1(1) of the IMTC provides: "The
operations of pick-up and delivery of goods carried out in the 
performance of a unimodal transport contract, as defined in such 
contract, shall not be considered as international multimodal 
transport".
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to such a contract.! The Convention, also, does not apply 
to the following situations which fall outside its scope 
of application:
1. A contract for international multimodal transport 
carried out within one country.2
2. A contract for international multimodal transport 
carried out between two different States of which 
neither is a contracting party to the Convention.3
3. A gratuitous contract for international multimodal 
transport since there must be a payment of freight.4
4. A contract for international multimodal transport if 
the carrier does not assume responsibility for the 
performance of the contract since such a carrier is not 
a multimodal transport operator as defined in Article 
1(2) and therefore such international multimodal 
transport is not such as defined in Article 1(1). For 
instance, a shipping line issuing a through bill of 
lading or combined transport document disclaiming 
liability for the on-carriage is not a multimodal 
transport operator as defined in Article 1(2 ).3
Some points need to be clarified. First, there is a 
distinction between the words "mode" and "means" of 
transport. Sea, air and inland (rail-road) are
!- There is a general rule, that where services provided can 
naturally be considered to be part of a unimodal service, the 
convention shall not be applicable. See, Selvig, The background 
to the convention, p.A4.
2- Article 1(1) of the IMTC.
3- Article 2 of the IMTC.
4- Article 1(3) of the IMTC.
5- Article 1(2) and 1(1) of the IMTC.
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traditionally considered as "modes" of transport, whereas 
the methods or arrangements which are used for transport 
such as container or pallet are considered as "means" of 
transport.! A second point is whether a pipeline is a 
mode or a means of transport. For example, suppose at oil 
is conveyed from an inland point of country A to a seaport 
through a pipeline and then is carried by a ship to 
country B, the question is whether this transport is 
unimodal or multimodal transport. In the writer's view, a 
pipeline is a mode of transport and, therefore, such 
transport is a case of multimodal transport.2 A third 
point is whether a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) system3 
could be considered as unimodal or multimodal transport. 
The answer depends on whether the barges, which are lifted 
out of the ship and continue the voyage through rivers and 
lakes to the inland points, are regarded as part of the 
ship and the inland voyage is regarded as incidental to 
the sea voyage or not. If the barges are regarded as part 
of the ship and their voyage is, therefore, incidental to 
the sea voyage, the transport will be unimodal transport; 
otherwise it will be regarded as multimodal transport.4
It should be noted that the multimodal transport 
convention applies only to the relationship between the
!- Mankabady, The multimodal transport of goods convention, p.125.
2- Ibid.
3- in LASH system the ship does not enter into rivers and lakes, but 
the barges which had been lifted into the ship are lifted out of 
the ship and continue the voyage through rivers and lakes. 
Mankabady, The multimodal transport of goods convention, p.125.
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MTO and the consignor,! i.e. the parties to a multimodal 
transport contract.2 It does not, therefore, apply to the 
relationship between the MTO and the sub-carrier employed 
by him under a separate contract in order to perform a 
particular stage of the multimodal transport. Nor does it 
apply to the relationship between the consignor and the 
sub-carriers employed by the MTO.3 These relationships 
are governed either by international Convention or by 
national law whichever may be applicable to the particular 
contract between the MTO and the s u b - c a r r i e r . 4
As has already been mentioned, there must be a 
multimodal transport contract for the Convention to apply. 
Also the application of the Convention to a multimodal 
transport contract is mandatory.3 This means that no 
clause or stipulation of the multimodal transport contract 
can contract out of or derogate from the convention' s 
provisions particularly to the detriment of the shipper. 
This principle is provided for in Article 3(1) of the
!- Article 1(5) of the IMTC provides: " 'consignor' means any person 
by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf a multimodal 
transport contract has been concluded with the multimodal 
transport operator, or any person by whom or in whose name or on 
whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the multimodal 
transport operator in relation to the multimodal transport 
contract."
2- Anthony Diamond, Legal Aspects of the Convention, One day 
Seminar, Southampton University, 12 September, 1980, p.C8, 
hereinafter cited as "Diamond, Legal Aspects of the Convention"; 
Driscoll & Larsen, p.210; Selvig, the background to the 
convention, p.A4.
3- Selvig, The background to the convention, pp.A4-5.
4- Ibid, p.A4; Driscoll & Larsen, p.210.
3- It is to be mentioned that international conventions governing 
each specific mode of transport generally apply mandatorily, 
depriving the parties of freedom of contract. This makes any 
stipulation derogation from such mandatory provisions null and 
void.
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multimodal Convention.! Therefore, any stipulation which 
contracts out of or derogates, directly or indirectly, 
from the provisions of the Convention is null and void. 
This invalidity applies only to such a stipulation and not 
to the contract as a whole.2 However, there is an
exception to the principle of the mandatory application of 
the Convention. E.g., if a clause in a contract increases 
the liability of the MTO under the Convention, such a
clause, although it derogates from Article 28(1), is valid 
provided that it is inserted with the agreement of the
consignor.3 But if a clause of a contract decreases the 
liability of the MTO under the Convention, i.e. if the
clause is to the detriment of the consignor, it is null 
and void even if it is with the agreement of the consignor 
because it derogates downwardly from the MTO's liability 
provisions of the convention. This is because the 
multimodal convention, in order to prevent such clauses, 
goes further than Article 28(1) and (2) and provides other 
mandatory provisions in Article 28(3) and (4), that "the 
multimodal transport document shall contain a statement
!- Article 3(1) of the IMTC provides: "When a multimodal transport
contract has been concluded which according to article 2 shall be 
governed by this convention, the provisions of this convention 
shall be mandatorily applicable to such contract."
2- Article 28(1) of the IMTC provides: "Any stipulation in a 
multimodal transport contract or multimodal transport document 
shall be null and void to the extent that it derogates, directly 
or indirectly, from the provisions of this convention. The 
nullity of such a stipulation shall not affect the validity of 
other provisions of the contract or document of which it forms a 
part..."
3- Article 28(2) of the IMTC provides: "Notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, the multimodal 
transport operator may, with agreement of the consignor, increase 
his responsibilities and obligations under this convention".
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that the international multimodal transport is subject to 
the provisions of this Convention which nullify any 
stipulation derogating therefrom to the detriment of the 
consignor or consignee";! and if the claimant has incurred 
a loss as a result of the lack of such a statement in the 
multimodal transport document, the MTO must pay 
compensation to him.2
It is to be noted that during the discussions on the
Convention some countries were of the view that the
multimodal transport convention should have had optional
application3 and not mandatory application, in order to 
ensure the continued application of the ICC Rules and
other standard conditions for the multimodal transport 
currently used, and in the meantime there would be an 
opportunity for the multimodal convention, which was a new 
and untried regime, to be experimented with.4 This view
!- Article 28(3) of the IMTC.
2- Article 28(4) of the IMTC provides: "Where the claimant in 
respect of the goods has incurred loss as a result of a 
stipulation which is null and void by virtue of the present 
article, or as a result of the omission of the statement referred 
to in paragraph 3 of this article, the multimodal transport 
operator must pay compensation to the extent required in order to 
give the claimant compensation in accordance with the provisions 
of this convention for any loss of or damage to the goods as well 
as for delay in delivery. The multimodal transport operator 
must, in addition, pay compensation for costs incurred by the 
claimant for the purpose of exercising his right, provided that 
costs incurred in the action where the foregoing provision is 
invoked are to be determined in accordance with the law of the 
State where proceedings are instituted".
3- Such as the U.K.; UNCTAD, Report of the UN Conference on 
International Multimodal Transport on its resumed session, UN. 
Doc. TD/MT/CONF/16/Add.1,p.6, (1980), hereinafter cited as 
"UNCTAD, TD/MT/CONF/16/Add.1".
4- UNCTAD, TD/MT/CONF/16/Add.l; Driscoll & Larsen, p.240; Selvig, 
The background to the Convention, p.Al9.
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was not accepted and the Convention will be (once in 
force) of mandatory application first because the major 
negotiation Groups! on the multimodal transport convention 
in UNCTAD favoured mandatory application of the 
convention;2 secondly, Article 3 of the multimodal 
convention makes it clear that the application of the 
convention to multimodal transport contract is mandatory; 
thirdly, Article 3(2) which provides "nothing in this 
Convention shall affect the right of the consignor to 
choose between multimodal transport and segmented 
transport" does not imply the optional application of the 
Convention. Rather it states that the consignor has the 
option3 to determine the type of transport, i.e. unimodal 
transport or multimodal transport. That is to say, 
Article 3(2) clearly reminds the parties of the fact that 
they can choose between unimodal and multimodal transport. 
So, if they do not want to be involved in the mandatory 
character of the multimodal transport convention, they can
!- The Groups were: 1) The Group of 77 (Developing Countries),
2) Group D (Socialist Bloc and the People's Republic of China 
'PRC'), and 3) Group B (Developed Countries). All Group of 77 
and D and even some States in Group B favoured the mandatory 
character of the convention. See Driscoll & Larsen, p.240.
2- UNCTAD, TD/MT/CONF/16/Add.1
3- Although Article 3(2) does not expressly state that the carrier's 
right of choosing between the multimodal transport and segmented 
transport, undoubtedly, it is also the right of the carrier to 
decide between multimodal transport and segmented transport 
unless the national law regulation provides otherwise. Thus, if 
the carrier acts as a common carrier who includes multimodal 
transport services as well as unimodal services he does not have 
the right of choosing between multimodal and unimodal transport 
but he has the duty to accept whatever the consignor might 
prefer. But if he does not offer multimodal transport services 
(only unimodal transport services), he need not accept the 
consignor's demand for a multimodal transport contract. See, 
Selvig, the background to the convention, p.A19; 
UNCTAD,TD/B/C.4./315/Rev.1, p.158.
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instead choose segmented transport and enter into several 
unimodal transport contracts (one contract for each mode 
of transport) to which the Convention does not apply. 
Instead the relevant unimodal convention applies to each 
mode of transport. Thus, once the parties choose the type 
of transport and enter into a contract, whether unimodal 
or multimodal transport, their option has, in fact, been 
exercised. If they enter into a multimodal transport 
contract, then the multimodal convention will apply to it 
as mandatory.!
One can, therefore, conclude that the multimodal 
transport Convention is mandatory in respect of its 
application to an international multimodal transport 
contract, but it is optional in the sense that the choice 
of the mode of transport is preserved. It only applies 
when the choice is made in favour of multimodal transport 
(as defined), but when that choice is made it applies on a 
mandatory basis.
5.4. The Liability of the MTO for Loss of or Damage to 
Goods under the MT Convention
As has already been mentioned, Part 3 of the MT 
Convention is the most important part as it is concerned 
with the MTO's liability. It is submitted that this part, 
(the MTO's liability) is the core of this Convention. 
Therefore, the following important points of this Part 3 
need to be carefully discussed.
!- Selvig, The background to the convention, p.Al9.
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5.4.1. The system of liability under the MT Convention
The important point in multimodal transport is whether 
the loss of or damage to goods which occurs during the 
multimodal transport is localized (often called "known") 
or non-localized (often called "unknown" or "concealed"). 
It is localized when the place of loss or damage is known 
and can be attributed to a particular mode of the 
multimodal transport, otherwise it is non-localized loss 
or damage.! Any system of liability for multimodal 
transport should, therefore, be apt to cover both 
localized and non-localized loss or damage.
The liability system which was established by the 
Multimodal Transport Convention is neither the uniform 
liability system, nor the network liability system.2 It 
is called a "modified network liability system"3. This was 
a compromise solution to reconcile those favouring the 
network system and those favouring the uniform system of 
liability for the MT Convention.4
Under the uniform system of liability, the liability 
regime (the basis of liability and limits of liability) of
!- Jan Ramberg, The Implications of new transport technologies, 
(1980) 15 E.T.L. p.130, hereinafter cited as "Ramberg".
2- There were two alternative solutions to the MT Convention’s 
liability system problem in front of those who negotiated it.
3- Driscoll & Larsen, p.210; Selvig, The background to the 
Convention, p.Al4.
4- Jerome Racine, International Multimodal Transport. A Legal 
Labyrinth, published in the Essays in Air Law, Edited by Arnold 
Kean, 1982, p.225, hereinafter cited as "Racine".
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the MTO is the same, whether or not the loss or damage is 
localized to a particular mode of transport. In other 
words, the uniform system regulates the liability of the 
MTO uniformly throughout the entire multimodal transport 
irrespective of the particular liability regimes governing 
different modes of transportation. This system has the 
apparent advantage of simplifying the legal situation, and 
is more in keeping with the concept of multimodal 
transport as being separate from the unimodal systems of 
transport already available. However, the disadvantage of 
this system is that it does not allow for recourse action 
between the MTO and the sub-contractors for which the 
different systems of the multimodal chain must be used.!
Under the network system of liability, if the place of 
loss or damage is unknown the basis and limits of 
liability of the MTO cannot be determined as under that 
system it is essential to determine the place of loss or 
damage. On that depends which unimodal liability regime 
applies. Thus any liability for non-localized damage or 
loss must be specifically created and imposed on the MTO 
by Convention provisions which go beyond the network 
system. This is a problem with the network system. In 
other words, it does not apply to non-localized or 
concealed loss or damage without specific extensions.
Another criticism of this system is that its adoption 
would only have required the multimodal Convention to 
incorporate within itself numerous and different unimodal
!- Ibid, p.226.
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liability regimes.! Under the network system, if the loss 
or damage is localized to a particular stage of multimodal 
transport, the basis and limits of liability of the MTO 
will be the same as those of the liability regime 
applicable to unimodal carriers in that particular mode of 
transport. For example, if the damage is localized to the 
air leg, then the MTO's liability will be determined 
according to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 
Essentially the network liability system preserves and 
safeguards the various liability regimes established by 
the different unimodal transport conventions. The network 
system was used in the ICC Uniform Rules for a Combined 
Transport Document and is also utilised in current 
commercial practice.2
According to the liability system adopted in the MT 
Convention - the modified network liability system3 - the 
basis of liability of the MTO is determined uniformly for 
the entire course of the multimodal transport whether the 
loss or damage is localized or n o n - l o c a l i z e d . 4 Thus, in 
the case of localized loss or damage, the basis of 
liability of the MTO, unlike the network liability system
!- Selvig, The background to the Convention, p.A14.
2- R. Vogel, Multimodal Transport: Impact on Developing Countries, 
6, Ocean Yearbook, 1986, p.146, hereinafter cited as "Vogel".
3- The UNCTAD Secretariate in its report TD/B/AC.15/29 of 14 
September 1977 was in favour of the two systems. The report 
states at p.25 par. 70 that "It would, on the other hand, be 
possible to stipulate in the proposed MT Convention that the 
network liability rule will apply only if the loss, damage or 
delay can be attributed to one unimodal carrier and that the MTO 
sui generis liability rules will apply if the loss or damage can 
be attributed to more than one unimodal carrier".
4- Article 16 of the IMTC.
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is established by the Convention itself and has nothing to
do with the liability regimes established by the different
unimodal transport conventions. However, regarding the 
limits of liability of the MTO the network principle is 
applicable,! that is, the Convention is confined to 
determining the MTO's liability limits in cases of non- 
localized loss or damage, and in cases of localized loss 
or damage the MTO's liability limits will be the same as 
the liability limits mentioned in the relevant unimodal 
transport Convention or mandatory national law. However, 
if in such a case of localized loss or damage the MTO's
liability limit under the relevant unimodal transport 
Convention or mandatory law is lower than his liability
limit under Article 18 of the MT Convention, then it will 
be the latter which applies to determine the MTO's 
liability limit.2
It can, therefore, be concluded that under the 
"modified network" liability system which was adopted for 
the MT Convention, the basis of liability of the MTO will 
be determined uniformly according to the rules contained 
in Article 16 of the MT Convention, while the network 
liability system will apply, in respect of limits of 
liability, in case of localized loss or damage.3 In all 
other instances the uniform limits of liability provided 
for in Article 18 will apply.
!- Ibid, Article 19 of the IMTC.
2- Ibid.
3- Article 19 of the IMTC.
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Lastly, it is to be noted that the developing countries 
rejected the network liability system because it would 
preserve the Hague/Visby system.! They favoured the 
modified network liability system. The pro-network 
liability system countries accepted the modified network 
liability system because the MT Convention guaranteed that 
the unimodal transport conventions would apply whenever by 
their own terms they would apply.2 An example of this is 
Article 30(4) of the MT Convention under which it is 
accepted that carriage of goods under the CMR and CIM 
conventions shall not be considered multimodal carriage 
under the MT Convention to the extent that States Parties 
are bound by those Conventions.
5.4.2. The Basis of the MTO and the Period of Responsibility
under the MT Convention
As has already been mentioned the MT Convention provides 
a uniform basis of liability. If loss or damage results, 
or delay in delivery occurs to the goods, whether 
localized or non-localized, the basis of liability is that 
the MTO is presumed to be at fault or in neglect, and he 
is liable for the loss resulting therefrom. In other 
words, the MT Convention system is based on the principle 
of presumed fault or negligence of the MTO. However, this 
presumption may be rebutted by the MTO, i.e. the burden of
!- Selvig, The background to the Convention, p.Al6.
2- Driscoll & Larsen, p.233.
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proof is placed on him to prove that he has not been at 
fault once the consignor has established loss, damage or 
delay. Therefore, if the occurrence causing the loss or 
damage to the goods happens while the MTO is in charge of 
the goods, he is liable for it - whether it is localized 
or non-localized loss or damage - unless he proves that 1) 
he, his servants or agents or any other person referred to 
in Article 15 have not been at fault in causing the loss 
or damage, i.e. he proves that they all took all measures 
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
and its consequences; or 2) the consignor or consignee 
caused the loss or damage. 1
This principle of presumed fault or negligence follows 
the pattern established by the Hamburg Rules. As already 
stated, the Hamburg Rules, including their principle of 
the presumed fault or negligence of the carrier, was used 
as a model for the MT Convention.2 Article 16 of the MT 
Convention which contains the main rule on liability, 
creates the uniform basis of liability. This is of 
considerable importance when the loss or damage occurs 
during a sea leg to which the Hague/Visby Rules would 
otherwise apply because the basis of liability in the 
Hague/Visby Rules^, unlike the Hamburg Rules, the Warsaw 
Convention and the Rail and Road Conventions^-, differs
Articles 16 and 17 of the IMT Convention.
2- Selvig, The background to the Convention, p.Al3.
3- Under the Hague/Visby Rules there are many exceptions of
liability. Also the liability limit is very low.
4- Selvig, The background to the Convention, p.A16.
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from that under the MT Convention. Article 16(1) of the
MT Convention provides:
"The multimodal transport operator shall be liable 
for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the 
goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the 
occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay in 
delivery took place while the goods were in his
charge as defined in Article 14, unless the
multimodal transport operator proves that he, his
servants or agents or any other person referred to in
Article 15 took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences".*
The question here is: what measures could be required 
"to avoid the occurrence and its consequences"? The test 
is, the standard of care which could be expected of a 
diligent MTO.2 In other words, regard must be given to 
the course which would be pursued by a prudent operator in 
the circumstances of the c a s e . 3 Furthermore, as science 
advances and new knowledge and methods are available, the 
standard required will become higher so that more will be 
expected from operators. The reasonable measures can be 
delegated to the operator's servants or agents.
It has been said that Article 16(1) introduces a two­
fold test to the liability regime.4 First, one has to 
ask: Did the occurrence which caused the loss or damage
occur while the goods were in the operator's charge? If
This Article is similar to Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules and 
Article 18 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.
2- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.172.
2- Mankabady, p.56.
4- Diamond, Legal Aspects of the Convention, p.C19.
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it did, then the second limb of the test comes into play. 
That is, the operator is liable unless he can prove that 
he and those for whom he is responsible took all measures 
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
and its consequences.
Further, the preamble of the MT Convention also makes 
it clear that the MTO's liability "should be based on the 
principle of presumed fault or neglect".1
It is to be noted that, as in the Hamburg Rules, the MT 
Convention defines delay in delivery in the following 
words:
"Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not 
been delivered within the time expressly agreed upon
or, in the absence of such agreement, within the time
which it would be reasonable to require of a diligent 
multimodal transport operator, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case".2
Thus, delay in delivery could occur in two situations:
a) The parties might have agreed that the goods will be 
delivered within a time expressly agreed upon (so-called 
"time guaranteed transport"); or
b) The delivery time might exceed the time which it would 
be reasonable to require of a diligent MTO.
However, when applying this test of reasonableness, 
regard should be had to the "circumstances of the case".
This means that the MTO would avoid liability if he took
all reasonable measures to ensure timely arrival of the 
goods. In other words, the same test which is set out in
1- Paragraph (d) of the second part of the IMT Convention.
2- Article 16(2) of the IMTC; Article 5(2) of the Hamburg Rules.
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Article 16(1) would have to be met. On the other hand, 
paragraph (3) of Article 16 enables the claimant to treat 
the goods as lost, if the goods have not been delivered 
within 90 consecutive days following the date of delivery 
determined according to paragraph (2) of this Article. 
Here the question may arise whether the claimant has the 
option to treat the goods as lost, if a delay exceeding 
the time permitted under Article 16(3) takes place, 
although they obviously exist, but in the wrong place. 
For example, a case may be considered of a stranding of a 
ship for which the operator is responsible under both 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 16. As a result of the 
stranding, the ship must be taken to a port of refuge for 
provisional repairs. The question, it is submitted, 
should be answered in the affirmative, if the MTO had not 
been diligent in avoiding the stranding. If so, he must 
answer for any subsequent delay, including the risk that 
the claimant could choose to treat the goods as lost 
according to paragraph 3 of Article 16.1
Regarding the period of the MTO's responsibility, the 
principle adopted by the MT Convention is that the MTO is 
responsible during the whole period while the goods are in 
his charge. This period of responsibility begins from the 
time the MTO takes the goods in his charge until the time 
of their delivery, i.e. throughout the multimodal 
transport of the goods whether the MTO himself performs 
all modes of the transport or just performs part of the
1- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.174.
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transport and sub-contracts the rest to unimodal carriers, 
or sub-contracts to unimodal carriers the whole transport. 
This period was agreed by all the negotiating groups on 
the MT Convention* and was reflected in Article 14 of the 
Convention. Article 14(1) provides: "The responsibility
of the multimodal transport operator for the goods under 
this convention covers the period from the time he takes 
the goods in his charge to the time of their delivery."2
Although the main principle expressed in para.(l) of 
Article 14 seems to be clear enough, there might be some 
practical difficulties in determining the period of 
responsibility, since the goods are often taken in charge 
by the MTO from a person other than the consignor himself, 
e.g. the consignor's servant or agent, and also the goods 
are often delivered by the MTO to a person other than the 
consignee. Therefore, the important questions are: from
whom should the MTO take the goods into his charge? To 
whom should the goods be delivered? In order to determine 
the period during which the MTO is in charge of, and 
responsible for, the goods, the above questions need to be 
answered. The determination of this period is very
!- Driscoll & Larsen, p.230.
2- This Article is similar to Article 4 of the Hamburg Rules. The 
only difference is the words "multimodal transport operator" have 
been substituted for the word "carrier", and the words "at the 
port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of 
discharge" have also been omitted in the MT Convention because 
the aim is to extend the place of taking charge of the goods by 
the MTO beyond the port area to an inland point which accords 
with the objective of the door-to-door service of the new 
transport technologies. Another reason is that by omitting the 
words "port of loading or discharge" the draftsmen of the MT 
Convention wanted to avoid any conflict with the Hamburg Rules. 
They also wanted to let it be known that the MT Convention is 
distinct and separate from the Hamburg Rules; Mankabady, p.51.
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important because the liability of the MTO for loss of,
damage to or delay in delivery of the goods depends, as
will be seen, on the period of responsibility of the MTO,
i.e. if the occurrence causing the loss, damage or delay
happens between the time the goods are taken in the MTO' s
charge and the time they are delivered (during the period
of responsibility), the MTO is liable, no matter in which
mode of the transport the loss or damage occurs. On the
other hand, loss or damage to the goods which occurs
before or after the fixed period will not be the MTO's
responsibility. In other words, if the loss, damage or
delay occurs while the goods are in the custody of a
person acting on behalf of the consignor or consignee, or
in the custody of an authority to whom the goods must
legally be handed over by the consignor for transport at
the place of taking the goods in charge or by the MTO for
delivery at the place of delivery, the MTO is not liable
because it happened outside the period of his
responsibility. The above points are covered by Article
14(2) of the MT Convention which provides:
"For the purpose of this Article, the multimodal 
transport operator is deemed to be in charge of the 
goods:
a) from the time he has taken over the goods from:
(i) the consignor or a person acting on his behalf; or
(ii) an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant 
to law or regulations applicable at the place of 
taking in charge, the goods must be handed over for 
transport;
b) until the time he has delivered the goods:
(i) by handing over the goods to the consignee; or
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(ii) in cases where the consignee does not receive the 
goods from the multimodal transport operator, by 
placing them at the disposal of the consignee in 
accordance with the multimodal transport contract or 
with the law or with the usage of the particular 
trade applicable at the place of delivery; or
(iii) by handing over the goods to an authority or other 
third party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations 
applicable at the place of delivery, the goods must 
be handed over".
It is important to mention that there is no need for the 
MTO himself to take over or deliver the goods personally. 
It is sufficient that the MTO takes over or delivers the 
goods through his servants or agents or any other person 
whose services he makes use of for the performance of the 
multimodal transport contract, because the MTO's acts in 
Article 14(1) and (2) include acts of those persons; on 
the other hand, it is possible that the MTO takes over the 
goods from the consignor's servant or agent.! Thus, for 
instance, when the MTO takes over the goods from the 
consignor's servant or agent, he will be in charge of the 
goods from that time and his period of responsibility 
starts. Similarly if the MTO delivers the goods to a 
person appointed by the consignee in the multimodal 
transport contract by placing them in a certain location,
!- Article 14 (3) of the MT Convention provides: "In paragraphs 1
and 2 of this article, reference to the multimodal transport 
operator shall include his servants or agents or any other person 
of whose services he makes use for the performance of the 
multimodal transport contract, and reference to the consignor or 
consignee shall include their servants or agents"; See also 
UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.169; Driscoll & Larsen, p.230.
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then his period of responsibility would have come to an 
end.!
It is noteworthy that during that period only the MTO 
is responsible for the goods against the consignor because 
it is only the consignor and the MTO who are the parties 
to the multimodal transport contract, and, as stated, the 
MT Convention determines only the relationship between the 
MTO and the consignor. The MT Convention, in fact, 
simplifies the situation, particularly for the shipper, 
because he, instead of dealing with many sub-carriers,
with their different periods of responsibility, deals only 
with the MTO with one period of responsibility. 
Furthermore, it is important here to address the question, 
for whose acts or omissions the MTO is liable? Just for 
his own acts or omissions, or for somebody else's acts or 
omissions as well? As stated, reference to the MTO in
paras. (1) and (2) of Article 14 of the MT Convention 
includes his servants or agents or any other person whose 
services he makes use of for the performance of the
multimodal transport contract.2 This means that the acts
or omissions of the MTO's servants or agents or of any 
such person referred to in Article 14(3) are included in, 
and imputed to the MTO. This is made clear by Article 15 
of the MT Convention which expresses the fundamental 
principle that the MTO is liable for acts or omissions of 
his own servants or agents or of "any other person of
1- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.170; Driscoll & Larsen, p.230.
2- Article 14(3) of the IMTC.
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whose services he makes use for the performance of the
multimodal transport contract".! However, his liability
is subject to the condition that the servants or agents
must be acting within the scope of their employment,2 or
any such person referred to in Article 14(3) has acted in
the performance of the multimodal transport contract.
Thus, Article 15 of the MT Convention provides;
"..., the multimodal transport operator shall be 
liable for the acts and omissions of his servants or 
agents, when any such servant or agent is acting 
within the scope of his employment, or of any other 
person of whose services he makes use for the 
performance of the multimodal transport contract, 
when such person is acting in the performance of the 
contract, as if such acts and omissions were his 
own " .
It is suggested that this Article is an improvement on 
the Hamburg Rules text.3 it attempts to give an answer to 
the question "for whose fault or negligence is the
!- Article 15 of the IMTC.
2- It is argued that the words "acting within the scope of their 
employment or of the contract" have considerably cut down the 
impact of Articles 14 and 16 as it reduces the circumstances in 
which shippers may look to the MTO in the case of loss or damage. 
See M. Booker, The effect of the multimodal convention on 
international shippers, published in one-day seminar, Southampton 
University, 12 September 1980, p.E.3, hereinafter cited as
"Booker"? There is a wealth of authority in the U.K. on the 
application of this phrase in other areas of law especially 
vicarious liability of an employer for his employee's actions. A 
full discussion of these cases is outwith the scope of this 
thesis. The effect on the MTO's liability will depend on how 
widely the phrase is construed. There has been a general 
tendency to apply the phrase fairly widely, e.g. Rose v. Plenty 
[1976]1 W.L.R. 141; the general principle has recently been 
stated thus: "An employee is acting in the course of his
employment when he is doing what he is employed to do..., or 
anything which is reasonably incidental to his employment". Per 
Lord Goff of Chieveley in Smith V. Stages [1989]1 All ER.833 at 
p.836.
3- Diamond, Legal aspects of the Convention, p.C20; UNCTAD, 
TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1, p.89
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operator liable?" This question was left unanswered in 
the Hamburg Rules.!
It can thus be concluded that under the MT Convention 
the MTO is not only liable for his own acts and omissions 
in the performance of the multimodal transport contract, 
but also he may be liable for acts or omissions of a 
person other than himself, i.e. his servants, agents or 
any such person as is referred to in Article 15. His 
liability for these persons' acts or omissions is, 
however, subject to Article 21 relating to loss of the 
right to limit liability which will be discussed below.
Lastly, as to the burden of proof, it is important to 
note that the MT Convention does not adopt the 
extraordinary provision of the Hamburg Rules (Article 
5(4)) that where loss or damage is caused by fire, the 
burden of proving negligence falls on the cargo claimant. 
The MT Convention seeks to remove this confusion by 
presuming fault in all cases of loss or damage to the 
goods and so imposing a uniform burden of proof falling on 
the MTO. Contrary to the Hamburg Rules, the MT Convention 
thus does not incorporate the Hamburg Rules' revised 
burden of proof on fire, contained in Article 5(4) of the 
Hamburg Rules. So, there is no fire exemption in the MT 
Convention. This means, there is only one type of burden
!- According to Article 15 of the IMTC, the operator is liable for 
three classes of persons, namely, (1) servants, (2) agents, and
(3) any other person of whose services he makes use for the 
performance of the multimodal transport contract. The Hamburg 
Rules merely refer to "servants or agents" and appears to leave 
the precise content of these expressions to be determined at a 
national level.
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of proof within the MT Convention, which must be 
considered to be an advantage.
5.4.3 The Limitation of the MTO's Liability under the IMTC
All modern international transport conventions contain 
provisions for the limitation of the carrier's liability. 
This is first, because the carrier is enabled to know the 
extent of his liability for cargo loss or damage and can 
obtain an insurance policy based on that liability. 
Secondly, the underlying theory is that the carrier, who 
has no exact knowledge of the value of the goods he 
receives, should not be held liable in excess of their 
normal value. If the cargo owner wants a higher limit he 
must make a declaration of value and, in most cases pay an 
extra amount in addition to the freight.!
5.4.3.1 The MTO's Liability Limit in Case of Non-localized 
or of Localized Loss or Damage to Goods.
When the point in time at which the loss of or damage 
to the goods occurred is not known, and the MTO is liable 
under Article 16 of the MT Convention, i.e. it is proved 
that the loss or damage occurred during his period of 
responsibility, and he fails to prove that loss or damage 
was not the result of his failure to take all measures 
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
causing the loss or damage, and he is not deprived of the 
right to limit liability, his liability is limited to a
!- Jan Ramberg, The law of carriage of goods: Attempts at
Harmonization,(1974)9 E.T.L.p.16, hereinafter cited as "Ramberg, 
the law of carriage of goods".
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certain amount. It is determined subject to Article 18 of 
the MT Convention regardless of the stage at which the 
loss occurred. Accordingly, the calculation of the MTO's 
liability limitation amount depends on whether or not the 
multimodal transport includes a sea, or an inland 
waterways leg. Article 18, in fact, contains a two-tier 
method of calculation for determining the amount of the 
MTO's liability limitation which works either when the 
multimodal transport includes a sea or inland waterways 
leg of transport, or when it does not include such a leg 
of transport.
1. The MTO's Liability Limit in Case of Non-localized Loss 
or Damage if a Sea Leg of Transport is included in the
Multimodal Transport.
In this situation the MT Convention did not choose an 
average between the limitation amounts used in the various 
international unimodal transport conventions, but chose to 
limit it to the amount applicable under the Hamburg Rules. 
The reason for this choice was that when a sea leg is 
included in multimodal transport it is almost always the 
major leg.! Therefore, the MTO's liability limit is, as 
under the Hamburg Rules2, based on either "per package or 
other shipping unit" or "the gross weight" of the goods 
lost or damaged, whichever is the higher. However, the
!- Driscoll & Larsen, p. 237.
2- Article 6(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
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limitation amount under the MT Convention is approximately 
ten per cent higher than that under the Hamburg Rules.! 
This dual formulation is provided in Article 18(1)2 of the 
MT Convention under which the MTO's liability does not 
exceed 92 0 units of account^ per package or other shipping 
unit, or 2.75 units of account^- per Kg of gross weight of 
the goods lost or damaged. Of these the higher one will 
constitute the liability of the MTO and the claimant may 
choose whichever is more favourable for him. The reasons 
for choosing the "per package or other shipping unit" as a 
base for the calculation of the MTO's liability limit were 
that it was much more favourable than "per kilo" base for 
the consignor whenever there is light weight cargo, and 
that it applied traditionally to carriage of goods by 
sea.^ So, for packages weighing less than 54 kilos, it is 
higher than both the Warsaw and CIM Conventions limit, and 
for packages under 110 kilos it is higher than the CMR 
Convention's limit.6
!- It is also estimated as forty percent higher than under the
Hague/Visby Rules; see Matthew Marshall, Insurance and the 
multimodal Convention, One day seminar, Southampton University, 
12 September, 1980, p.D6, hereinafter cited as "Marshall".
2- Article 18(1) of the MT Convention provides:
"When the multimodal transport operator is liable for loss
resulting from loss of or damage to the goods according to 
article 16, his liability shall be limited to an amount not 
exceeding 920 units of account per package or other shipping unit 
or 2.25 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the 
goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher".
3- Under the Hamburg Rules it is 835 units of account per package or 
other shipping unit, and under the Hague/Visby Rules it is 666.67 
per package or unit.
4- Under the Hamburg Rules it is 2.50 units of account, under the
Hague/Visby Rules it is 2 SDR's per kilo, under the Warsaw
Convention it is 17 SDR's per kilo, under the CMR it is 8.33 
SDR's per kilo, and under the CIM it is 16% SDR's per kilo.
5- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315.Rev.1, p.176.
6- Diamond, Legal aspects of the Convention, p.C23.
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When the MTO's liability is calculated upon the per 
kilo limitation, a question which may arise is whether 
when only part of a package is lost or damaged, the MTO's 
liability limit should be calculated on the basis of the 
weight of such lost or damaged part or of the weight of 
the whole package of which the part is lost or damaged. 
It seems that the per kilo limitation should not be 
computed on the whole package but only on the weight of 
the part lost or damaged because Article 18 (1) implies
that the base of such calculation is the gross weight of 
the goods lost or damaged. However, if the lost or
damaged part is regarded as having a functional 
relationship to the remaining undamaged units, as for 
instance in the case of loss of or damage to the engine of
a car, it might be reasonable to take the weight of the
whole package into account in calculating the per kilo 
limitation.1
The dual formulation of "per package" and "per kilo" 
would cause the same problems in relation to container-
package as in the Hague Rules. In order to resolve this 
problem the MT Convention has followed the Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules. It provides that if the packages or other 
shipping units inside the container or similar article of 
transport are enumerated in the multimodal transport 
document, then those numbers are deemed to be the number 
of packages or other shipping units; otherwise, if they 
are not enumerated, the goods inside the article of
!- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315.Rev.1, p.177.
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transport are deemed to be one shipping unit for the 
purpose of the calculation of the higher limitation
amount.! Therefore, in order to determine the higher 
amount in the case of goods carried in a container, it is 
necessary to find out whether or not the package or other 
shipping units inside the container have been enumerated 
in the multimodal transport document.
The MT Convention also provides that the article of 
transport itself is to be considered as one shipping unit 
in case of loss or damage to it if it is not owned or 
supplied by the MTO.2 In other words, if the container is 
not owned or supplied by the MTO, it would be considered 
as one shipping unit in case of loss or damage to it. 
Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 18 applies a unified rule for 
the calculation of the amount of liability without taking 
into account the fundamental differences between the case 
of the full container load (FCL) and the less than full 
container load (LCL). In the case of FCL, usually an 
empty container is delivered to the shipper's premises
where he loads the cargo and from there the container is 
collected by, or delivered to, the operator, while, in the 
case of LCL, the cargo which belongs to several shippers 
is delivered to the operator or the forwarding agent at 
the container base. The operator or the forwarding agent 
will then pack the goods into the container. The 
difference is that, in the FCL the shipper undertakes the
!- Article 18(2)(a) of the IMTC.
2- Article 18(2)(b) of the IMTC.
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"stuffing" of the container which will not be opened 
before arrival at its destination, while in the LCL the 
damage to the cargo could be caused by various reasons.1
2. The MTO's Liability Limit in Case of Non-localized Loss
or Damage if no Sea Leg of Transport is included in the 
Multimodal Transport.
Unlike the situation when a sea leg is involved, the MT 
Convention chooses the amount applicable under the CMR 
convention. Therefore, the MTO's limit is based only on 
the gross weight of the goods lost or damaged. So, 
whenever no sea leg is involved in the multimodal 
transport, as evidenced by the multimodal transport 
contract, the liability limit provided for in Article 
18(1) and (2) will not apply but Article 18(3) will. This 
is based on a single formulation for the calculation of 
the MTO's liability limit, i.e. per kg limitation with a 
higher amount, that is, up to 8.332 units of account per 
kg of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 18 was in fact inserted in the MT 
Convention to reduce or remove the possibility of a 
conflict between the MT Convention and the existing 
unimodal conventions, because if this paragraph had been 
omitted, as suggested and favoured by the negotiating 
groups of 77, D and the PRC, there would have been a
!- Mankabady, The Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention, p.130.
2- This limitation amount being identical to that in the CMR
Convention.
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conflict between the MT Convention's liability limit and
the air, land and road transport conventions.! Article
18(3) of the MT Convention provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Article, if the international multimodal 
transport does not, according to the contract, 
include carriage of goods by sea or by inland 
waterways, the liability of the multimodal transport 
operator shall be limited to an amount not exceeding 
8.33 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight 
of the goods lost or damaged."
This paragraph may produce a higher limit than para.l 
of the same article for very heavy packages (packages 
weighing more than 110.5 kg), but normally (for packages 
weighing less than 110.5 kg) it produces a lower limit 
than Article 18(1). Thus when multimodal transport 
involves a sea leg, the limitation amount may be higher 
than when it does not. So, the MT Convention seems to put 
an end to the tradition that lower recoveries are made for 
transport by sea than for other modes of carriage.2
It can, therefore, be concluded that if there is non- 
localized loss or damage in multimodal transport involving 
a sea leg, Article 18(1) applies, but if such loss or 
damage does not involve a sea leg Article 18(3) applies to 
calculate the amount of the MTO's liability.
It should be noted that this kind of calculation of the 
amount of the MTO's liability limit also applies whenever 
the loss or damage can be localized to a particular mode
!- Mankabady, The multimodal Transport of Goods Convention, p.131;
Driscoll & Larsen, p.237.
2- Diamond, Legal aspects of the convention, p.C23.
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of transport, but the MTO's liability limit under the 
modal convention or mandatory national law relevant to 
that mode is lower than that under the MT Convention.! 
For instance, if the multimodal transport involves a sea 
leg and the loss or damage occurs during the sea 
transport, the MTO's liability is determined according to 
Hague/Visby Rules limits, but since his liability under 
the Hague/Visby Rules is lower than that under the MT 
Convention, it is the MT Convention's liability limit of 
Article 18 which determines his liability limit for the 
localized loss or damage. The reason for it is that since 
Article 19 of the MT Convention only refers to a higher 
limit, it is not likely to be relevant for determining the 
MTO's liability in case of loss or damage localized to the 
sea leg.2
Article 19 deals with the localized loss or damage to 
goods. If the loss or damage can be localized and 
attributed to one stage of multimodal transport and the 
MTO is, in accordance with Article 16, liable, the 
provisions of Article 19 are applied by the provisions of 
the relevant unimodal transport convention, or by 
mandatory national law^ applicable to that mode of 
transport, if the limits of liability under it are higher
!- Article 19 of the IMTC.
2- Selvig, The background to the Convention, p.A15.
3- The mandatory national law was included in Article 19 of the 
IMTC, because of the persistence of the U.S., and the reluctance 
of other countries who wanted to make the Convention more 
attractive to the U.S; see Driscoll & Larsen, p.236.
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than those provided in Article 18.1 This is because of
the modified network liability system upon which Article
19 has been based. Article 19 provides:
"When the loss of or damage to the goods occurred 
during one particular stage of the multimodal 
transport, in respect of which an applicable 
international convention or mandatory national law 
provides a higher limit of liability than the limit 
that would follow from application of paragraphs 1 to 
3 of Article 18, then the limit of the multimodal 
transport operator's liability for such loss or 
damage shall be determined by reference to the 
provisions of such convention or mandatory national 
law. "
The reason for these provisions is that if the MT 
Convention accepted a lower limit of liability than that 
under the unimodal transport conventions, the consignor or 
consignee would, in such a case, have the possibility of 
recovering an amount up to the higher limit of liability 
applicable to the sub-contractor by a direct action 
against him.2 Article 19 places the claimant in the same 
position as he would have been if he had concluded the 
contract directly with a unimodal c a r r i e r . 3 This could be 
the case with respect to air or rail carriage to which 
they apply, because they are the only two unimodal 
conventions which provide a higher liability limit than 
that under the MT Convention.
1- Diamond, Legal aspects of the Convention, p.C24; Selvig, The 
background to the Convention, p.Al5.
2- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315. Rev.l, p.179.
3- Ibid, p.180.
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However, Article 19 may give rise to some difficulties 
of interpretation. One may say that Article 19 should be 
interpreted in a manner which gives effect to its obvious 
purpose from its literal wording, i.e. applicable 
international conventions or mandatory national laws, if 
they provide for a higher liability limit than the MT 
Convention and are taken into account in order to remove 
the possibility of conflict between them and the MT 
Convention. Article 19 may also be interpreted to the 
effect that it is illogical to admit that international 
conventions and mandatory laws for unimodal transport of 
goods can be applicable to the multimodal transport 
contract because the MT Convention is based on the notion 
of a multimodal transport contract in principle
independent from unimodal transport contracts and cannot, 
therefore, be applied by unimodal convention or mandatory 
national law. It seems that the former interpretation is 
correct because with the acceptance of the latter one 
Article 19, which has in some circumstances followed the 
unimodal conventions liability limits (network limits of 
liability), becomes redundant, and as a result the MT 
Convention, which is based on the modified network
liability system, is put in question. If the second 
interpretation is accepted, it would be illogical for the
MT Convention to accept the "network liability system"
(even if modified) in any form.l
Ibid.
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In conclusion, in case of localized loss or damage, the 
MTO's liability limit is determined either by a unimodal 
transport convention or mandatory law, or by the MT 
Convention, depending on which one has the higher limit.
5.4.3.2 Loss of the Right to Limit Liability
It has already been mentioned that if the MTO is liable 
for loss or damage to the goods, he will be entitled to 
limit his liability subject to Article 18 of the MT 
Convention. However, his right to limit liability may be 
lost if he caused the loss, damage or delay in delivery by 
an "intentional or reckless"1 act or omission and with 
knowledge that such act or omission would probably result 
in the loss, damage or delay in delivery. Similarly, if 
the action is brought against a servant or agent of the 
MTO who was acting within the scope of his employment, or 
against a person of whose services the MTO made use for 
the performance of the multimodal transport contract, 
acting in the performance of the contract (like a sub­
contractor)2, each of them then has the right to limit his 
liability.3 However, they will lose the right under the
These expressions were already explained in chapter three of this 
thesis, (3.3.2 at p.196).
2- Driscoll & Larsen, p.231.
3- Article 20(2) of the IMTC provides:
"If an action in respect of loss resulting from loss of or damage 
to the goods or from delay in delivery is brought against the 
servant or agents of the multimodal transport operator, if such 
servant or agent proves that he acted within the scope of his 
employment, or against any other person of whose services he
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same rules which apply to the MTO himself. These 
principles, respecting the loss of the right to limit 
liability, are enacted in Article 21 of the MT Convention 
which provides:
"l.The multimodal transport operator is not entitled to 
the benefit of the limitation of liability provided 
for in this convention if it is proved that the 
loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an 
act or omission of the multimodal transport operator 
done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or 
delay or recklessly and with knowledge that such 
loss, damage or delay would probably result.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of Article 20, a servant 
or agent of the multimodal transport operator or 
other person of whose services he makes use for the 
performance of the multimodal transport contract is 
not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of 
liability provided for in this convention if it is 
proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery 
resulted from an act of omission of such servant, 
agent or other person, done with the intent to cause 
such loss, damage or delay or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would 
probably result."
A difficult problem may arise when the loss or damage 
is caused by the intentional or reckless acts or omissions 
of the MTO's servant or agent or of a person of whose 
services the MTO uses for the performance of the contract, 
but the action is brought against the MTO. If the MTO,
makes use for the performance of the multimodal transport 
contract, if such other person proves that he acted within the 
performance of the contract, the servant or agent or such other 
person shall be entitled to avail himself of the defences and 
limits of liability which the multimodal transport operator is 
entitled to invoke under this Convention."
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under Articles 15 and 16 of the MT Convention, is liable 
for such loss or damage, does he lose the right to limit 
his liability or is he entitled to that limitation?
Article 15 of the MT Convention makes the MTO liable for 
acts or omissions of his servants or agents or of such
person referred to in Article 14(3) but subject to Article 
21. Article 15 provides: "Subject to Article 21, the
multimodal transport operator shall be liable for the acts 
and omissions of his servants or agents, when any such 
servant or agent is acting within the scope of his 
employment, or of any other person of whose services he 
makes use for the performance of the multimodal transport 
contract, when such person is acting in the performance of 
the contract, as if such acts and omissions were his own".
It has been noted that the relationship between Article 
15 and 21 is not clearly expressed in their language, and 
there is therefore an argument that if deliberate or 
reckless loss or damage was caused by the MTO's servant, 
agent or a person whose services the MTO uses in the 
performance of the multimodal transport contract, and an 
action is brought against him, he will lose the right to
limit his liability, whereas if the action is brought
against the MTO, the MTO will probably, under Articles 15 
and 21, not lose the right to limit his liability because 
it probably cannot be proved that loss, damage or delay 
results from an act or omission of the MTO himself done 
with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or
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delay would probably result and, therefore, the deliberate 
or reckless loss, damage or delay cannot be imputed to the 
MTO.1
It seems that this reasoning is not correct, however, 
and that in a case like this also the MTO will lose the 
right to limit liability. This is, first, because, 
according to the express provisions of Article 15, the
MTO's liability for the acts or omissions of his servants, 
agents or of other person referred to in Article 14(3) is 
subject to Article 21. This liability of the MTO (i.e. 
the liability under Article 15) is not limited if such act 
or omission is intentional, or reckless with knowledge 
that such loss, damage or delay would probably result. 
Secondly, the sentence "as if such acts or omissions were 
his own" of Article 15 implies that the actions of such 
other persons can be imputed to the MTO. Thirdly, it is
not easy to observe the distinction between acts or
omissions attributable to his servant, agent or to such 
other person because the MTO's liability, according to
Article 15, includes the vicarious liability for his 
servants, agents or for such other persons.2 Fourthly, 
during the MTO's period of responsibility the MTO's acts 
or omissions include the acts or omissions of his 
servants, agents or of any such other persons;3 there is 
no reason why deliberate or reckless acts or omissions of 
such persons which cause the loss or damage are not
Driscoll & Larsen, p.231.
2- UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/315.Rev.1, p.183.
3- Article 14(3) of the IMTC.
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included in the MTO's acts or omissions. Therefore, if a 
deliberate or reckless act or omission of such persons 
causes loss or damage, not only is the MTO liable, under 
Article 15, for such act or omission, but he also loses 
the right to limit his liability under Articles 15 and 21.
It is to be noted that the MTO is only liable for his 
servants' or agents' acts or omissions if they act within 
the scope of their employment, and is only liable for the 
acts or omissions of the other person referred to in
Article 14(3) if he acts in the performance of the 
multimodal transport contract.
However, this uncertainty in Articles 15 and 21 could 
be resolved either by the courts or by the clarification 
in later protocols to the MT Convention.
5.5 Procedures of Action for Lost or Damaged Cargo under
the IMT Convention
As already mentioned, the procedures relating to claims 
and actions are very significant in doing justice to the 
parties. The following points, therefore, need to be
discussed.
5.5.1 Notice of loss, damage or delay in delivery
In considering the question of notice for loss, damage 
or delay, it is necessary to discuss such items as the 
nature of the notice; the length of time for the period
of notice and whether there should be different lengths of
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time for apparent and non-apparent loss or damage and 
delay; when to commence the running of the period of 
notice; and who is entitled to give notice of loss or 
damage. As will be seen, all of these elements came up 
for consideration during the discussion of Article 24 of 
the MT Convention.
This Article follows Article 19 of the Hamburg Rules as 
a guide. The notice of loss or damage must be given in 
writing and should indicate the nature of the loss or 
damage in general terms.
A distinction must, therefore, be made between two 
cases, that is, where the loss or damage is apparent and 
where it is not. In the former case, if the loss or 
damage occurs during the MTO's period of responsibility, 
the consignee must notify the MTO within one day. In 
other words, where the loss or damage is apparent, the 
consignee must give the notice in writing to the MTO 
forthwith, not later than the working day after the day of 
delivery of the goods, whereas in the latter case, if the 
loss or damage is non-apparent, notice should be given in 
writing to the MTO within six consecutive days of delivery 
of the goods. This short period is deemed necessary. It 
enables the MTO (but not in case of apparent loss or 
damage) to give notice to the underlying carrier under all 
unimodal transport conventions except the Hague/Visby 
Rules which contain a three days notice period.1 In other
The time limits for non-apparent loss or damage under the Hamburg 
Rules is 15 days (Art.l9(2)), 14 days under the Warsaw Convention 
as amended by the Hague Protocol, 1955 (Art 26(2)), 7 days under
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words, the time limit in the case of non-apparent* loss or
damage is less generous than that under the unimodal
conventions with the exception of the Hague/Visby Rules
and has clearly been selected to protect and allow
recourse by the MTO against the sub-contractors. This
explanation helps us to understand a provision which
strongly favours the interests of the MTO over those of
the shipper in a convention which generally favours the
shipper's interests.2
However, if the consignee fails to notify the MTO
within these periods, this failure is prima facie evidence
of delivery by the MTO of the goods as described in the MT
document. These principles are enacted in Article 24(1)
and (2) of the MT Convention which provides:
"1.Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the 
general nature of such loss or damage, is given in 
writing by the consignee to the multimodal transport 
operator not later than the working day after the day 
when the goods were handed over to the consignee, 
such handing over is prima facie evidence of the 
delivery by the multimodal transport operator of the 
goods as described in the multimodal transport 
document.
the CMR Convention (Art 30(1)), and 7 days under the CIM 
Convention (Art 46(2)(d.i)). See also, Driscoll & Larsen, p.229; 
Gerald F FitzGerald, The United Nations Convention on the 
International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 5 Annals of Air & 
Space L. (1980), p.46, hereinafter cited as "FitzGerald, 5 Annals 
of Air & space L".
*- It has been noted that non-apparent loss or damage "is one of the 
crucial issues. For goods consolidated in containers, it is not 
until the containers are opened that the damage or loss can be 
ascertained, and it usually takes considerable time to ascertain 
the damage sustained. This is especially true when there is a 
great bulk shipment to unload". See, Wei Jia Ju, p.292.
2_ Booker, p.E5.
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2. Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article apply 
correspondingly if notice in writing is not given 
within six consecutive days after the day when the 
goods were handed over to the consignee."
Regarding loss or damage resulting from delay in delivery,
the MT Convention has adopted the Hamburg Rules time
limits for giving notice of claims for delay in delivery,
that is, a notice in writing to the MTO is required within
sixty consecutive days* after the day of delivery of the
goods; but, if this stipulation has not been observed by
the consignee, no compensation shall be payable for such
loss or damage.2 This period, however, is counted either
from the time when the goods were delivered to the
consignee or, if no such transfer has taken place, from
the time when the consignee has been notified that the
goods have been placed at his disposal^ or have been
delivered to a particular authority or other third party.4
In fact, this is the most important provision in Article
*- 60 days under the Hamburg Rules, 21 days under the CMR 
Convention, 60 days under the CIM Convention, and 21 days under 
the Warsaw Convention; it has been pointed out that 
"unfortunately, the 60-day period (under the MT Convention) 
effectively precludes the MTO from giving notice in time to 
permit a recourse action by the MTO against an underlying carrier 
where the underlying carriage is subject to one of the model 
conventions". See, Driscoll & Larsen, p.229; FitzGerald, 5 
annals of Air & Space L, p.71.
2- Article 24(5) of the IMTC provides:
"No compensation shall be payable for loss resulting from delay 
in delivery unless notice has been given in writing to the 
multimodal transport operator within 60 consecutive days after 
the day when the goods were delivered by handing over to the 
consignee or when the consignee has been notified that the goods 
have been delivered in accordance with paragraph 2(b)(ii) or 
(iii) of Article 14."
3- ibid; Article 14(b)(ii) of the IMTC.
4- Ibid; Article 14(b)(iii) of the IMTC.
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24, since a consignee's failure to observe the other 
notice requirements only results in prima facie evidence 
that no loss or damage has occurred engaging the liability 
of the MTO.*
Furthermore, other questions of notice periods may also 
arise. If the loss or damage occurs while the goods are 
in the possession of the MTO, and such loss or damage is 
caused due to the fault or neglect of the consignor, his 
servants or agents (e.g. dangerous cargo inflicting damage 
on the MTO's property), is the MTO entitled to notify the 
consignor of that loss or damage? If so, what is the 
length of time for the notice period, and when does it 
start to run? To answer these questions, it is
necessary to note that Article 2 2 of the MT Convention 
makes it clear that the consignor shall be liable for loss 
sustained by the MTO if such loss or damage is caused by 
the fault or neglect of the consignor, his servants or 
agents.2
Where the MTO wishes to claim for such loss or damage 
against the consignor, he is required to notify him in 
writing. Such notice shall be given not later than 90 
consecutive days after the occurrence of such loss or 
damage or after delivery of the goods. However failure to
*- UNCTAD,TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1,p.189.
2- Article 22 of the IMTC provides:
"The consignor shall be liable for loss sustained by the 
multimodal transport operator if such loss is caused by the fault 
or neglect of the consignor, his servants or agents when such 
servants or agents are acting within the scope of their 
employment. Any servant or agent of the consignor shall be 
liable for such loss if the loss is caused by fault or neglect on 
his part."
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give such timely notice by the MTO is prima facie evidence 
that he has sustained no loss or damage due to the fault 
or neglect of the consignor, his servants or agents.*
It is important to mention that Article 2 2 of the MT 
Convention does not provide for presumed liability of the 
consignor; it merely states that the consignor shall be 
liable for loss sustained by the MTO if such loss is 
caused by the fault or neglect of the consignor, his 
servants or agents. This means that the onus would, in 
any event, be on the MTO to prove that he had sustained 
the loss or damage due to the fault or neglect of the 
consignor, his servants or agents.
It is to be noted that the notice periods mentioned in 
paras. 2, 5 and 6 of Article 24 are consecutive and not
interrupted by holidays. However, if the period expires 
on a day which is not a working day at the place of 
delivery of the goods, then it is extended to the next 
working day according to para.7 of Article 24 which 
provides:
"If any of the notice periods provided for in 
paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of this Article terminates on a 
day which is not a working day at the place of 
delivery, such period shall be extended until the 
next working day."
*- Article 24(6) of the IMTC provides:
"Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature 
of the loss or damage, is given in writing by the multimodal 
transport operator to the consignor no later than 90 consecutive 
days after the occurrence of such loss or damage or after the 
delivery of the goods in accordance with paragraph 2(b) of 
Article 14, whichever is later, the failure to give such notice 
is prima facie evidence that the multimodal transport operator 
has sustained no loss or damage due to the fault or neglect of 
the consignor, his servants or agents."
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Thus, paragraph 7 of this Article is useful because the 
word "days" in the mentioned paragraphs of the same 
Article is preceded by the adjective "consecutive", and, 
without it, a non-working day would otherwise have to be 
taken into account in computing a notice period that ended 
on that day.*
The notice mentioned in this Article can, however, be 
given not only to the MTO or the consignor himself, but it 
may also be given to other persons authorized to receive 
notice on their behalf, including persons whose services 
are utilized at the point of delivery of the goods.2
Lastly, it is worthy of note that no notice is needed 
where there has been a joint survey or inspection by the 
parties. 3 Therefore, the MTO and the consignee shall give 
each other all reasonable facilities for inspecting and 
tallying the goods.4
5.5.2 Limitation of Actions
As under the Hamburg Rules, the MT Convention sets the 
limitation period for action (both for judicial and 
arbitral proceedings) at two years.5
*- Gerald F FitzGerald, The Provisions governing notice of loss, 
damage or delay and limitation of actions in the United Nations 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 8 
Annals of Air & Space Law, (1983) p.48, hereinafter cited as 
"FitzGerald, 8 Annals of Air & Space Law."
2- Article 24(8) of the IMTC.
3- Article 24(3) of the IMTC.
4- Article 24(4) of the IMTC.
5- Article 25(1) of the IMTC; Article 19(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
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It should be noted that the "action" must relate to 
international multimodal transport as defined by the 
Convention*; otherwise the action falls outside the two- 
year time-bar provision. This means that, if the MT 
Convention does not apply, the action may come under 
another legal regime providing for a different period.
The period during which an action may, therefore, be 
brought against the MTO depends on whether or not a notice 
of claim, in writing, has been given to him within a 
certain time. In other words, it should be observed that 
in order to preserve the claim, notification in writing is 
required describing the nature and main particulars of the 
claim. Such notification has to be given within six 
months.2 Thus, if the shipper or consignee gives the MTO 
a written notice of claim describing the nature and main 
particulars of his claim within six months after the day 
on which the goods have been or should have been 
delivered, he is allowed to bring action within two years 
commencing on the day on which the goods have been or 
should have been delivered.3 if, however, the claimant 
fails to bring his action within a two-year period, his 
claim relating to the international multimodal transport 
will be time-barred. In other words, the time limit for 
bringing actions against the MTO is two years provided 
that the claimant gives notice within six months. The 
reason for giving a notice of claim to the MTO within six
*- Article 25(1) of the IMTC.
2- Ibid.
3- Article 25(2) of the IMTC.
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months is so that the MTO, who quite frequently has 
subcontracts with unimodal carriers, has enough time to 
bring a recourse action against the unimodal carrier 
during whose leg of carriage the loss or damage occurred. 
Otherwise, if the time for giving the notice were greater, 
the MTO's recourse action, which is likely to be governed 
by a unimodal convention, might be time-barred and, 
therefore, the MTO might lose the opportunity to claim 
indemnification from his sub-contractor since the time-bar 
under some unimodal transport conventions is very short.* 
Article 25(1) of the MT Convention provides:
"Any action relating to international multimodal 
transport under this convention shall be time-barred 
if judicial or arbitral proceedings have not been 
instituted within a period of two years. However, if 
notification in writing, stating the nature and main 
particulars of the claim, has not been given within 
six months after the day when the goods were 
delivered or, where the goods have not been 
delivered, after the day on which they should have 
been delivered, the action shall be time-barred at 
the expiry of this period."
If, therefore, the shipper or consignee fails to give 
the MTO a written notice of claim within six months, he is 
not allowed to bring his action afterwards, i.e. his 
action will be time-barred after the six months has 
expired.2 Thus, depending on the situation, the time-bar
*- The time limits for bringing actions against modal carriers under 
the Hague/Visby Rules, CMR and CIM Conventions are one year. It 
is two years under the Warsaw Convention.
2- Article 25(1) of the IMTC.
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under the MT Convention is either six months or two years 
commencing from the day after the day on which the goods 
have been or should have been delivered. However, the 
parties may agree to extend the limitation period but this 
must be done by an agreement in writing. In other words, 
the MTO or his representative may extend the time 
limitation period by a written statement during the 
running of the limitation period.*
Furthermore, the MT Convention attempts to provide for 
recourse actions by the MTO. Accordingly, the MTO may 
bring a recourse action for indemnity even after the 
expiration of the limitation period established under the 
MT Convention, provided that the other international 
convention does not bar such an action and provided that 
the indemnity action is instituted within the time limits 
found under local law. It should also be observed that 
the additional period for recourse action is not less than 
ninety days. This period commences either when the MTO 
exercising his right of recourse has settled the claim or 
has been sued. Article 25(4) of the MT Convention 
provides:
"provided that the provisions of another applicable 
international convention are not to the contrary, a 
recourse action for indemnity by a person held liable 
under this convention may be instituted even after 
the expiration of the limitation period provided for
*- Article 25(3) of the IMT Convention provides:
"The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during 
the running of the limitation period extend that period by a 
declaration in writing to the claimant. This period may be 
further extended by another declaration or declarations."
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in the preceding paragraphs if instituted within the 
time allowed by the law of the State where 
proceedings are instituted; however, the time allowed 
shall not be less than 90 days commencing from the 
day when the person instituting such action for 
indemnity has settled the claim or has been served 
with process in the action against himself."
It is to be noted that the words "under this
Convention" are aimed to ensure that this paragraph would
not deal with a recourse action by a consignor against the
MTO, i.e., in the case where the consignor had been sued
by the consignee, for late delivery or short delivery, and
then took a recourse action against the MTO.* It should
also be observed that the MT Convention does not extend
limitation periods which may apply according to other
applicable unimodal conventions.2 There are, however,
certain limitations found in para. 4 of this Article;
these are;
1. the recourse action may be brought but only provided 
that the provisions of another applicable 
international convention are not to the contrary.
2. the recourse action of the MTO against the underlying 
carrier may be instituted even after the expiration 
of the limitation period provided for in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Article, only if 
instituted with the time allowed by the law of the 
State where the proceedings are instituted, it being 
thereby understood that the minimum time is ninety
*- FitzGerald, 8 Annals of Air & Space Law, p.56.
2- UNCTAD,TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.1,p.192.
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days as specified in this paragraph. If there is no 
international convention to the contrary, the 
national law may or may not prove to be flexible 
depending upon the law of the court seized of the 
case.
3. the question of when the expiration of the limitation 
period, which is one of prescription (i.e. the period 
can be interrupted or suspended), takes place would 
have to be considered. It is very difficult to 
predict what fate will await an MTO in any particular 
country because of the varying approaches of courts 
to the problem of limitation periods in an 
international convention.
These remarks which are meant to be indicative, have 
been made in order to point out that para.4 of Article 25 
would have to be examined in each particular case with 
respect to the specific underlying convention and the law 
of the State where the proceedings are instituted.*
Therefore, the best safeguard for the MTO is the 
provision in the second sentence of Article 25(1) whereby 
an action is time-barred unless notification of claim has 
been given before the expiration of the specified six 
months' period. So, if the MTO receives a timely 
notification from the claimant, he would, given the 
existence of limitation periods to which he is subject in
*- FitzGerald, 8 Annals of Air & Space Law, p. 56; UNCTAD, 
preparation of a preliminary draft of a convention on 
International Multimodal Transport, TD/B/AC.15/29, (14 September
1977), pp.38-46, hereinafter cited as "UNCTAD, TD/B/AC.15/29."
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instituting recourse actions, have an incentive to take an 
early decision on whether or not to reject the claim. 
This would also shorten the period of uncertainty for the 
claimant. Moreover, the early settlement of the claim 
would give the MTO time to institute an action for 
indemnity against the underlying carrier. Similarly, 
early rejection of the claim might move the claimant to 
institute an action quickly against the MTO.*
5.5.3 Jurisdiction Clauses
The jurisdiction provisions of the MT Convention 
correspond to those of the Hamburg Rules. In other words, 
the provisions on jurisdiction under the MT Convention2 
are derived from Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules.
The MT Convention allows the claimant, at his option, 
to bring his action in a court that is competent according 
to the law of the forum state and whose territorial 
jurisdiction encompasses either^:
a) the defendant's principal place of business or habitual 
residence; or
b) the place where the multimodal transport contract was 
made; or
c) the place where the MTO took charge of or delivered the 
goods; or
*- FitzGerald, 8 annals of Air & Space Law, p.57.
2- Article 26 of the IMTC.
3- Article 26(1) of the IMTC.
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d) any other place agreed by the parties and designated in 
the multimodal transport contract and in the multimodal 
transport document.*
Although the claimant is restricted to the options 
mentioned above, he can take legal steps in relation to 
protective or interim measures in other places so long as 
they are taken in a Contracting State2, for example, 
seizure of property belonging to the defendant.
Furthermore, the parties are free, after the claim has 
arisen, to agree on another place for the institution of 
an action than those provided for in paragraph 1 of 
Article 2 6.3 Such agreements may be useful to the parties 
and each would presumably only agree if it was in his best 
interest.
Lastly, in order to prevent multiple actions in
different places, Article 26(4)(a) provides that no new
action can be instituted between the same parties on the 
same grounds, where an action has already been instituted 
or where judgement in such an action has been delivered. 
However, as has been said, if a judgement in the first 
action is unenforceable in a particular country, new 
proceedings might be started elsewhere. Article 26(4)(b) 
clarifies that it is not considered a new action when
*- Article 27 of the IMTC made similar provisions regarding the
place of arbitration.
2- Article 26(2) of the IMTC provides:
"No judicial proceedings relating to international multimodal 
transport under this Convention may be instituted in a place not 
specified in paragraph 1 of this article. The provisions of this 
article do not constitute an obstacle to the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting State for provisional or protective measures."
3- Article 26(3) of the IMTC.
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measures are taken to obtain enforcement of a judgement or 
when an action in the same country is removed from one 
court to another.*
5.6 The problem of conflict between the multimodal 
transport convention and the existing unimodal 
Conventions; the solution to avoid the conflict
With the coming into force of the multimodal transport 
convention, a problem which may arise is that of conflict 
between the multimodal transport Convention and the 
unimodal conventions. This problem arises if the MTO's 
liability for localized loss or damage is also governed by 
the relevant unimodal convention.2 The conflict problem 
results, in fact, from the differing liability regimes of 
the multimodal transport convention and the unimodal 
conventions.
This conflict problem is particularly evident if we 
accept that the multimodal transport contract can be split 
up into several unimodal transport contracts since each 
unimodal transport contract will be for one segment of the
*- Article 26(4) of the IMT Convention provides:
"(a) Where an action has been instituted in accordance with the 
provisions of this article or where judgement in such an action 
has been delivered, no new action shall be instituted between the 
same parties on the same grounds unless the judgement in the 
first action is not enforceable in the country in which the new 
proceedings are instituted;
(b) for the purpose of this article neither the institution of 
measures to obtain enforcement of a judgement nor the removal of 
an action to a different court within the same country shall be 
considered as the starting of a new action."
2- It was argued, in particular by the United Kingdom delegation, 
that the conventions governing sea, air, road and rail all
applied to multimodal transactions and that there was therefore
conflict. See D.C. Jackson, Conflict of Conventions, One-day
seminar, Southampton University, 12 September 1980, p.G3,
hereinafter cited as "Jackson, Conflict of Conventions".
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unimodal transport to which both the multimodal transport 
convention and a unimodal convention relevant to that 
segment apply. However, as already submitted, the 
multimodal transport contract is a single contract 
concluded between the consignor and the MTO as a principal 
taking responsibility for the performance of the 
multimodal transport contract. It has a nature completely 
different from that of unimodal transport contracts since 
the parties have reached an agreement on that contract 
(multimodal transport contract) as a whole and not on any 
particular unimodal contract. If it is, by construction, 
split up into several unimodal transport contracts, it is 
impossible and unjustifiable to say that the agreement of 
the original parties is still available on the split 
contracts because, as stated, the parties had already 
reached their agreement on a single contract of multimodal 
transport. Thus, it is illogical that a multimodal 
transport contract, which should be regarded as a whole 
and is, in fact, a new type of contract, can be split up 
into several unimodal contracts.
It seems that, even if it is accepted that the 
multimodal transport contract is a new and distinct type 
of contract which can not be split up into several 
unimodal contracts, (which is the prevailing view*), the
*- Professor Selvig points out that the prevailing view during 
discussions at UNCTAD was that the multimodal contract is a new 
and distinct type of contract which must be distinguished from 
the various contracts for unimodal carriage. He argues that: 
"it is not justified by construction to split up the multimodal 
contract into several unimodal contracts, one for each of the 
segments of the multimodal carriage. Hence, as long as the
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conflict problem is still present. The problem arises 
with the sea and air unimodal conventions rather than with 
the road and rail conventions (CMR and CIM) . This is 
because the CMR and CIM Conventions apply, as argued, 
neither to the multimodal transport contract nor to, 
respectively, the road or rail legs of the multimodal 
transport performed under a multimodal transport contract. 
Article 30(4) of the MT Convention expressly provides that 
the carriage of goods under Article 2 of the CMR or CIM is 
not considered multimodal transport governed by the MT 
Convention. However, some may conclude from Article 30(4) 
that there would have been conflict between the MT 
Convention and the CMR and CIM but for Article 30(4). 
Paragraph 4 of this Article appears to be intended to 
prevent the conflict; but, more accurately, Article 30(4) 
is not intended to prevent a conflict, since there is not, 
as argued, any; but rather to prevent any interpretation 
which poses a conflict.
As to the sea conventions - the Hague Rules and Visby 
Rules - the conflict problem becomes more complicated 
since, apart from the limitation amount, the basis of 
liability under the Hague/Visby Rules and MT Convention is
unimodal conventions apply only to contracts for carriage by a 
particular mode of transport, the multimodal contract falls 
outside their scope, and a new multimodal convention does not 
conflict with the existing unimodal conventions." See UNCTAD 
Doc.TB/MT/CONF/12 Add.l Annex IV, p.15; This view has also been 
mentioned in a number of background papers to the convention such 
as ICAO document 9096-LC/171, documents pp.96-106 which is a 
memorandum dealing with the Warsaw Convention submitted in 1974 
to the legal committee of ICAO by the Norwegian Delegation; 
others include Professor Jackson's paper submitted to the IPG in 
UNCTAD document TD/B/AC.15/53 (1979).
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not the same. A MTO who is liable under the MT Convention 
for sea loss or damage, may not be liable under the 
Hague/Visby Rules. In addition the MTO's liability limit 
under the Hague/Visby Rules is always lower than that 
under the MT Convention, and Article 19 of the MT 
Convention has, therefore, no effect to remove or reduce 
this conflict between the limitation amounts.
Conflict may also arise between the MT Convention and 
the Hamburg Rules because Article 1(6) of the Hamburg 
Rules, which provides "a contract which involves carriage 
by sea and also carriage by some other means is deemed to 
be a contract of carriage by sea...in so far as it relates 
to the carriage by sea," is so broad that it may be 
interpreted to include multimodal transport contracts. 
Accordingly, if the relevant States are parties to both 
conventions, then both conventions will apply as between 
the goods owner and the MTO to regulate the sea portion of 
the carriage.* However, since the basis of liability 
under the MT Convention and the Hamburg Rules are the 
same, the result of applying the two conventions will be, 
except as to the limitation amount, the same.
In order to avoid the problem of conflict, which may 
cause a great deal of litigation, the MT Convention 
attempts to resolve this issue in a number of ways by 
adopting the following provisions:
*- Similar conflict is likely to arise between the amended Warsaw 
Convention (Articles 1 and 31 of the Warsaw Convention, 1929 and 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Guadalajara Convention, 1961) and the MT 
Convention; Diamond, Legal Aspects of the Convention, p.C8.
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1. The provisions of para.l of Article 1 have the effect 
that the operations of pick-up and delivery of goods 
carried out in the performance of a unimodal transport 
contract would not be considered as an international 
multimodal transport as defined in the convention. 
This provision was intended particularly to exclude air 
carriers' operations, usually coupled with pick-up and 
delivery operations done by a mode other than air, from 
being multimodal transport. In other words, this 
provision avoids the possibility of converting what are 
essentially unimodal transports into multimodal 
transports, thereby preventing conflict particularly in 
connection with air carriage.
2. As already mentioned, in respect of the MTO's liability 
for non-localized loss or damage, Article 18(3) has 
made a distinction between when the multimodal 
transport does not involve a sea or inland waterways 
leg and when it does. It has determined a higher limit 
when no sea or inland waterways leg is included in the 
multimodal transport. This was intended to remove or 
reduce the possibility of the conflict between the MT 
Convention's limit and that of the existing unimodal 
conventions.
3. Article 19 of the MT Convention has employed the 
applicable unimodal conventions and mandatory national 
laws to determine the MTO's liability for localized 
loss or damage. Although this would prevent the 
problem of conflict in some cases, i.e. when the limit
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under the unimodal convention is higher than that under 
the MT Convention, the problem may appear in some other 
cases, i.e. when the limit under the unimodal 
convention is lower than that under the MT Convention.
4. Article 30(4) attempts to show that under the 
respective Article 2 of both the CMR ( 195 6) and CIM 
( 1970) the carriage of goods is not the same as 
multimodal transport within the meaning of Article 1(1) 
of the MT Convention. They should not be interpreted 
as meaning the same so as to create a conflict between 
the CMR or CIM on the one hand, and the MT Convention 
on the other. Article 30(4), in fact, prevents any 
interpretation which causes the problem. It provides: 
"Carriage of goods such as carriage of goods in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention of 19 May 1956 or 
the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road in Article 2, or the Berne Convention of 7 
February 1970 concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail, 
Article 2, shall not for States Parties to Conventions 
governing such carriage be considered as international 
multimodal transport within the meaning of Article 1, 
paragraph 1, of this Convention, in so far as such 
States are bound to apply the provisions of such 
Conventions to such carriage of goods."
5. It has been said that Article 38 of the MT Convention 
is intended to avoid any remaining conflict of 
conventions, and is an escape route for those who
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believe there may be a conflict of conventions.* This 
Article provides:
"If, according to Articles 26 or 27, judicial or 
arbitral proceedings are brought in a Contracting 
State in a case relating to international multimodal 
transport subject to this Convention which takes 
place between two States of which only one is a 
Contracting State, and if both these States are at 
the time of entry into force of this Convention 
equally bound by another international convention, 
the court or arbitral tribunal may, in accordance 
with the obligations under such convention, give 
effect to the provisions thereof."
Consequently, this Article does not apply if the
multimodal transport takes place between two States which
are both parties to the MT Convention.
However, this Article, it is suggested, is fraught with
great uncertainty. The conflict is apparently to be
resolved "in accordance with the obligations under such
convention." Are such obligations to be determined
according to principles of public international law?
Article 38 appears to exist at the level of state
obligations rather than of a level for resolving problems
of private law. The decision as to which convention would
ultimately apply will rest on the particular jurisdiction
where the action is brought and this would encourage forum
shopping.
Another difficulty is generated by Article 38 requiring 
that "other convention" binds the two states "at the time
*- Jackson, Conflict of Conventions, p.G8.
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of entry into force of this convention." It would not 
apparently apply if the other Convention binds the two 
States at a later time. It is in any case rather 
anomalous that one convention should depend for its 
application in a State on whether another convention is in 
force in another State. Finally, a point of construction 
matters. The use of the word "may" in Article 38 (" the
court...may... give effect to the provisions thereof") 
seems to indicate that the court enjoys a discretion 
whether or not to give effect to such provisions. Surely 
a conflict of conventions situation cannot be resolved by 
granting such a discretion. The word "may" it is 
suggested, should be read as "must."*
Such uncertainty may mean that courts will have to 
grapple with it to unfold its true meaning. This may 
result in a variety of interpretations which would defeat 
the principle of uniformity that the convention sets out 
to achieve. Perhaps the scope of its application could be 
properly defined by the national legislatures after it has 
been ratified; but if the domestic law of a State (that 
is a party to two conflicting conventions) provides that 
the operator's obligation shall be determined by the IMT 
Convention, then there may well be a derogation from the 
earlier convention, and the State will be in breach of its 
public international law obligations.2
*- It is possible that the MT Convention uses "may" because of the 
difficulties arising from the conflicts rules of the forum; 
Diamond, Legal aspects of the Convention, p.C14.
2- Ibid.
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However, in spite of the MT Convention solutions, the 
problem of conflict may still, as we have seen, remain in 
some cases. It has been suggested that one way to avoid 
conflict would have been for the MT Convention to require 
that the modes of transport should not be stated in the 
multimodal transport document. The unimodal conventions 
should be applicable to contracts of carriage by a 
specific mode of transport while the MT Convention would 
be applicable to contracts of carriage not specifying the 
modes of transport.* The idea is that the emphasis on the 
multimodal transport should be to carry the goods, without 
involving a number of contracting carriers whether linked 
together by forwarding agents or not, from the shipper's 
to the receiver's premises.2
There is another possible approach to the conflict 
issue. In my opinion, the limitation of liability for 
loss, damage or delay (per package or other shipping units 
or per kg) should be slightly increased, to the highest 
provided by the unimodal conventions e.g. Warsaw and CIM 
Conventions. In addition, as far as the goods are carried 
multimodally under a single contract (MT contract), then 
the MT Convention should be applicable to contracts of 
carriage whether or not the modes of transport are 
specified. Thus, we need not look at which limit is the 
higher under the applicable unimodal conventions or 
mandatory national laws, and also, whether or not the
*- Mankabady, The Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention, p.140;
Ramberg, The Law of Carriage of Goods, p.34.
2- Ramberg, The Law of Carriage of Goods, p.34.
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international multimodal transport has included the 
carriage of goods by sea or inland waterways. Such a 
proposal, I think, will ease the applicability of the MT 
Convention whether the loss or damage is localized (no 
matter if such loss or damage has occurred during the sea, 
air, rail or road transport) or non-localized. In 
addition, it will be much fairer and more just for the 
MTOs, shippers, consignors, consignees and the other 
parties who are involved in international multimodal 
transport. It will produce a much clearer and simpler 
regime of rights and duties. It will more accurately 
reflect a truly multimodal situation. It is unduly 
complicated to involve the unimodal conventions so much. 
This, it is submitted, partially defeats the whole 
rationale of a multimodal convention by producing the 
conflict problems just discussed.
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Concluding Remarks
We may, therefore, conclude that the MT Convention has 
the advantage of being limited and specific in scope. The 
Convention applies only to international multimodal
transport as defined. Its application is also restricted 
to the effect that it applies only to a single multimodal 
transport contract in which it governs only the
relationship between the MTO and the consignor.
As in the Hamburg Rules, the liability of the MTO 
according to this convention is based on the principle of 
fault or neglect. It has also made possible a
simplification of the liability regime because it became 
unnecessary to retain the catalogue of exceptions and 
certain other provisions specifying the duties of the MTO 
like those contained in the Hague/Visby Rules. This
principle is, while different from the Hague/Visby Rules, 
close to the basis of liability provided for in the 
conventions for carriage by air, road and rail. 
Consequently, the MT Convention has imposed on the MTO a 
uniform burden of proof in all cases (no exceptions) of 
loss or damage to cargo. This must be considered an 
advantage in removing the confusion concerning the burden 
of proof under the unimodal conventions (e.g. Hague/Visby 
Rules and Hamburg Rules). Furthermore, under the MT 
Convention, the MTO's period of responsibility becomes 
more apparent when one realises the complex role of the 
MTO in the multimodal transport operations when employing
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the services of different modes of transport to perform 
the multimodal transport contract. Thus, the period of 
responsibility has been extended to cover the entire 
period (throughout the multimodal transport) while the 
goods are in his charge. Clearly, there are advantages in 
imposing a liability which is uniform throughout the 
carriage, rather than one which varies with each leg. 
This certainly is an attraction to shippers in dealing 
with only one person (MTO) contractually, instead of 
dealing with many sub-carriers with their different 
periods of responsibility. It can, therefore, be said 
that the Convention brings the legal regime into line with 
current commercial practice.
The MT Convention clarifies the situation in relation 
to limits of liability of the MTO, by providing certain 
provisions which should be applied in case of localized 
and non-localized loss or damage to the goods, as well as 
when the multimodal transport involves a sea leg and when 
it does not. Further, although the Convention does not 
remove the diversity created by the international unimodal 
Conventions or national law, it provides a "floor" which 
uniformly applies in the absence of any higher limit. It 
is very important to note, however, that even though the 
limit of the unimodal convention or national law will 
apply to the MTO, the MT Convention's presumed liability 
regime will continue to apply to the MTO. It should also 
be noted that under this convention, both the MTO and his 
servants or agents lose the benefit of the limitation of
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liability if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay 
was caused by the deliberate act of such a person, with 
the intent to cause damage or recklessly causing any 
possible damage that might result.
In relation to claims and actions, the MT Convention 
establishes a six consecutive days period of notice for 
non-apparent damage, and sixty consecutive days in case of 
delay. On limitation of actions, the Convention operates 
with a two-tier system, six months for written notice and 
two years for the action itself. It has been said that 
"This is of great benefit to cargo assureds because it 
gives them a better opportunity to fulfil one of the basic 
conditions of their insurance policy in safeguarding their 
rights. But relationships between different time bars can 
only be satisfactorily resolved for the MTO through 
individual arrangements with subcontractors." 1 As to 
jurisdiction, the MT Convention gives the claimant more 
than four options of places in which to institute 
proceedings. In brief, the Convention simplifies claim 
proceedings, i.e. the claimant claims in all cases against 
the MTO. This considerably reduces the administrative 
cost of handling claimants' claims.
Marshall, p.D7.
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Final Conclusions
The Hague Rules keep the liability of the carrier on a low 
level. Its amendments have made some adjustments directed 
particularly to the limit of liability with due regard to 
the considerably increased value of cargoes and the wide
usage of containers. Accordingly, the amendments have
been few and not very significant in so far as the 
carrier's liability was concerned.
It is submitted that the Hague Rules did not meet the
most elementary standards of legal technique, readability 
and good statutory language, whereas, the Hamburg Rules 
reach much higher standards than their predecessors and 
are built on realities in modern shipping. Thus they are 
in harmony with the needs of modern trade. The Hamburg 
Rules are intended to introduce radical changes in 
international maritime law. Their form and structure are 
markedly different from those of the Hague Rules. As a 
consequence, the Hamburg Rules would, when compared with 
the Hague/Visby Rules as to the carrier's liability, seem 
to achieve (though they have not solved all the problems) 
better solutions by clarifying and amplifying in various 
respects the regulation of carriage by sea, in that they:
1. Govern all documents used in maritime transport. It is 
possible to use transport documents other than bills of 
lading.
2. Extend their scope to cover a large number of voyages.
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3. Expand the scope of the carrier's liability to cover 
the entire period during which the carrier is in charge 
of the goods, or to cover the carriage of live animals 
and the stowage of the goods on deck whether such 
liability emerges from physical or non-physical damage 
such as in the case of delay in delivery of the goods 
carried. The period of responsibility under the 
Hague/Visby Rules is shorter and is limited from 
tackle-to-tackle period only and the carrier's 
liability is excluded from applying to the carriage of 
live animals or the stowing of the goods on deck. It 
can therefore be said that the period of responsibility 
under the Hamburg Rules is wider and clearer than that 
under the Hague/Visby Rules and thus gives greater 
protection to the shipper.
4. Create a new system for the carrier's immunities rather 
than the catalogue of the seventeen exceptions provided 
by the Hague Rules.
5. Clarify the meaning of the word "unit" by using the 
terms "shipping unit."
6. Adopt a dual per kilo/per package limit as the Visby 
Rules do. Also, they do clarify when a container 
becomes a "package", with much the same result already 
achieved under the Visby Rules. Nevertheless, the 
Hamburg Rules have gone a little further than the Visby 
Rules by providing a useful stipulation that the 
container itself is to be considered as a package if 
supplied by the shipper.
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7. Extend the period of notice in respect of non-apparent
damage from three days to fifteen days.
8. Extend the time limit for action of loss or damage to
two years, since the one-year period in the Hague Rules
very often turned out to be short in practice. Thus, 
the two-years period is considered as a safeguard for 
the shipper's interests.
9. Give the claimant the right to institute his action 
before the competent courts of six different places, 
whereas, under the Hague Rules there is no provision 
concerning a jurisdiction clause for handling the 
claims. Thus, the Hamburg Rules, in terms of 
jurisdiction, have brought a flexibility and certainty 
to the claimant in his choice of court, as well as 
fairness and clarity to an unsettled, unpredictable 
area of international commercial relations. 
Furthermore, the Hamburg Rules also make it clear that 
arbitration proceedings are equivalent to suit in 
respect of time bar.
It is worthy of note that the obligation of the carrier in 
exercising due diligence which is restricted under the 
Hague Rules to providing a seaworthy ship, has been 
replaced by term of "reasonable measures" and that an 
implicit undertaking should be exercised throughout the 
period of carriage. This is, in our opinion, more 
practical and realistic in modern sea transport.
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In respect of other questions concerning the carrier's 
liability, the solutions adopted by the Hamburg Rules are 
almost the same as under the Hague/Visby Rules; for 
instance, the liability of the carrier under the Hamburg 
Rules is still based on the principle of presumed fault or 
neglect and not of strict liability. However, as a 
result, the Hamburg Rules have the advantage of fitting 
much better into the overall framework of transport law 
conventions. This will facilitate the resolution of 
problems arising in connection with multimodal transport.
As we have already seen, even the Hague Rules included 
a compromise between the interests of the carriers and the 
shippers, involving both the developed and developing 
countries; but the balance is substantially changed in 
favour of shippers rather than carriers under the Hamburg 
Rules.
Hence, the liability regime under the Hamburg Rules 
provides, from a practical point of view, more than under 
the Hague Rules, a more solid basis for the settlement of 
cargo claims and enforcement of the cargo liabilities 
imposed on the carrier. As already discussed, it gives 
clear solutions to the main questions relating to the 
liability of the carrier for cargo losses. There is good 
reason, therefore, to be inclined toward the attitude 
which intends to increase the level of the carrier's 
liability, leading to a higher standard of care and 
decreasing the incidence of cargo damage, that is more 
predictably than the Hague/Visby Rules do in reducing
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litigation and the expense of claims settlement, reducing 
also overall insurance costs.
Lastly, it is to be noted that the Hamburg Rules
nowadays are perhaps the most important reforms in 
shipping law. While not entirely agreeing with certain 
provisions, it can be said that the Hamburg Rules
represent a valuable contribution to the law of maritime
transport when compared with the Hague/Visby Rules. They 
should as such be considered as a definite improvement 
both in substance and form. However, a vital body of 
Hague case-law will remain useful, as decisions on whether 
or not the carrier exercised due care of the cargo, as 
contrasted with fault or neglect.
In respect of the liability regime under the MT 
Convention, it is to be first of all mentioned that the 
principles governing the unimodal conventions are to a 
great extent different from each other, e.g. these
conventions establish different rules of liability and 
different limits of liability for each segment of the 
multimodal transport. These differences make it very 
difficult to obtain an efficient and reasonable 
"synchronization" of these rules in multimodal transport 
contracts. Thus, under the present regime it is impossible 
to predict before the commencement of carriage which limit 
will be applicable in the event of loss or damage. These 
uncertainties are certainly impediments to the growth of 
multimodal transport and, in turn, international trade. 
The unimodal conventions are, therefore, inconvenient for
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the multimodal transport of goods. It is difficult and 
complex to bring multimodal transport contracts under the 
network liability system which preserves the unimodal 
transportation systems. This results in unpredictability. 
This was why a set of rules suitable for multimodal 
transport of goods was required.
Under the MT Convention these problems will, at least 
to some extent, be solved because the Convention's 
modified network liability system has, to a large extent, 
taken account of the uniform liability system to solve the 
problems. In other words, the MT Convention helps to 
resolve several fundamental legal uncertainties in the 
area of liability in so far as the multimodal transport is 
concerned. This Convention has been made in a much 
broader field. It establishes, as already seen, several 
principles which are quite clearly expressed, such as the 
new basis of liability, the period of responsibility, the 
relative stability of the limitation of liability, and the 
stipulation regarding claims and actions.
The main purpose of the MT Convention is to establish 
for the international multimodal transport of goods, a 
liability regime applicable to the relations between the 
MTO and the consignors/consignees. Hence, the MTO' s 
relations with consignors and consignees of multimodal 
shipments are governed by the liability regime of the MT 
Convention and not by the respective liability regimes 
applicable to underlying carriers used by the MTO.
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The major achievement of this Convention is that it 
divides intermodal carriage into two levels of legal 
relationships: one between the shipper and the MTO, the
other between the MTO and the underlying carrier. As a 
result, the unimodal liability regime remains unaffected, 
as it still governs the relationship between the MTO and 
the underlying carrier, while the relationship between the 
MTO and the shipper is significantly simplified and 
modernized. So, under this Convention, multimodal 
transport is governed by a single contract (m.t. 
contract), and the consignor or shipper deals only with 
the MTO who organizes the entire transport operation from 
"door-to-door". The multimodal transport 
contract/document, the freight rate, and insurance cover 
the entire multimodal transport journey. The MTO makes 
all arrangements with other carriers and all persons 
necessary to the multimodal transport of goods. He 
assumes liability for the performance of the multimodal 
transport and for the delivery of the goods according to 
the terms of his contract with the consignor. 
Accordingly, the MTO is liable for loss or damage to goods 
occurring at any time between taking charge of the goods 
and delivery, regardless of which mode of transportation 
is involved at the time of loss - no matter whether it is 
localized or non-localized. The MTO's liability 
provisions for non-localized loss or damage have, like 
other provisions of the Convention, mandatory character 
and cannot be contracted out of. This will remove a
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defect of the present regime and effect uniformity
regarding the MTO's liability for non-localized loss or 
damage in different multimodal transport documents. In 
this respect the MT Convention has even made a distinction 
between cases when the multimodal transport involves a sea 
leg and when it does not, so as to remove or reduce any 
probable conflict between its limit and the existing 
unimodal Conventions' limits. It establishes several 
limits on the liability of the MTO according to two
criteria, by applying Article 18(1) in case of non- 
localized loss or damage when the multimodal transport
involves a sea leg and Article 18(3) when it does not;
and Article 19 in case of localized loss or damage 
depending on which has the higher limit. The general 
effect of the MT Convention, therefore, is to increase the 
level of carriers' liabilities.
The coming into force of the MT Convention, seemingly, 
will create a semblance of order out of the present chaos 
of liability systems now in force and thus achieve a 
measure of uniformity in the field of multimodal transport 
liability. The MT Convention represents a major step 
forward for all shippers, it gives them guarantees for 1) 
transit times and frequency of transport facilities; 2) 
through responsibility for the goods by one operator; 3) 
transport costs for shipments during longer periods of 
time. They will be better protected under this Convention 
than according to current practices based on the existing 
liability regime(s), because the carrier will no longer
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have many exemptions allowed such as under the Hague/Visby 
Rules system; in addition, limits of liability will be 
equal to or higher than those now available. Furthermore, 
the MT Convention would expedite settlements because the 
law governing such settlements would be known. In 
concealed loss or damage situations, interested parties 
would no longer be able to escape responsibility by 
claiming that the applicable law was unknown. It would 
also expedite settlements because only one person, the 
MTO, would be responsible for the whole movement of the 
goods. In addition, the MT Convention would enable the 
exporters and importers to plan sales and purchases more 
efficiently, because they would be able to pass the 
responsibility of transportation to the MTO, who could be 
more easily reached than various carriers scattered 
throughout the world. Insurance underwriters could also 
benefit from the new coverage that would be required by 
the MTO's.
Lastly, one may ask: if the MT Convention has
important economic effects in international carriage of 
goods, why has it not yet come into force? As has already 
been mentioned, the MT Convention was drafted under the 
auspices of UNCTAD and its provisions are broadly in line 
with the regime established by the Hamburg Rules. Both 
Conventions, it is to be noted, are related to carriage of 
goods by sea, the Hamburg Rules directly, and the MT 
Convention indirectly, whenever a sea leg is included in 
multimodal transport. The general scheme of liability is
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similar. There is a direct relationship between the 
limits of liability. Also, there is a connection relating 
to claims and actions. Further, both of them reflect an 
attempt to establish a fair balance of interests between 
developed and developing countries. Accordingly, it is 
believed by some that the ratification process of the MT 
Convention will be accelerated once the Hamburg Rules have 
entered into force. In other words, the MT Convention 
cannot become a reality unless and until the Hamburg Rules 
come into force, since this would create a big gap between 
the liability of the MTO and that of the subcontracting 
sea carrier who would be liable only under the Hague/Visby 
Rules. Others believe that the reason for not considering 
the IMTC in the near future is that its economic benefits 
may not be significant.
However, despite the criticism (like those concerning 
other unimodal Conventions) faced by the MT Convention and 
the existence of different views, the usefulness of the 
Convention is much the same (or more) as that of any other 
international transport Convention. However, its 
significant effects to some extent cannot be as yet 
precisely determined until it is applied. Our view, then, 
is that, now, with the Hamburg Rules having come into 
force internationally on November 1, 1992, and, with the
worldwide "container revolution" and the international 
commerce and technology developments in international 
carriage of goods, it can be expected, with the need felt 
for an international Convention governing multimodal
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transportation, that the MT Convention will come into 
force some time in the future. This will have important 
effects on the commerce of all nations, including those 
not enthusiastic about its provisions, as well as those 
that favour it. Furthermore, it will provide a useful 
basis for interchange of experiences and opinions across 
borders. In the words of Tetley, "The Multimodal 
Convention of 1980 is an intelligent answer to most of the 
problems of combined carriage."1
Tetley, 3rd ed, p.937.
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